Assistant Executive Engineer (a E E) Vs Smt Yallamma

THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SEC. 96 R/W ORDER 41 RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 14.06.2023 PASSED IN OS NO.28/2020 ON THE FILE OF SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, SIRA., DECREEING THE SUIT FOR THE RELIEFS OF DAMAGES.

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THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S RACHAIAH

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V KAMESWAR RAO)

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This appeal has been filed by the appellants

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challenging the judgment and decree dated 14.06.2023 in

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OS No.28/2020 filed by the respondents herein, which has been decreed by the Court of Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Sira (‘Trial Court’ for short), by stating in paragraph No.12 as under:

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“12. Point No.3:- For the above-discussed

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reasons, I proceed to pass the following:

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ORDER

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Suit of the plaintiffs is hereby decreed with costs.

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The plaintiffs are entitled for the amount of Rs.20,00,000/- towards damages and mental agony due to the death of deceased Ravikiran as sought in the plaintiff with 6% p.a. from the date of decree till realization.

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The defendant No.1 and 2 are jointly and severally pay the compensation amount within 6 months from the date of this order.

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CMO is directed to calculate the court fee and to collect the same after depositing of compensation amount.

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Draw decree accordingly.”

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Respondent No.1 is the legally wedded wife of the deceased Ravikiran, respondent No.2 is his minor son and respondents No.3 and 4 are his parents. On 09.10.2018 at about 04:30 a.m., Late Ravikiran had told the family members that, he was going to farm. While going to his farm, he passed besides an electric pole, which was erected on his land. He came in contact with the pole and died on the spot because of electric shock. A criminal case was registered against the appellants herein.

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It was the case of the respondents that, Ravikiran died due to complete carelessness and negligence on the part of the appellants. They had not taken any safety measures for live wires. The respondents were completely dependent upon Ravikiran for their livelihood. He was doing drip irrigation contract and earning an amount of Rs.20,000/- to Rs.25,000/- per month during his lifetime. After his death, respondents have no source of livelihood.

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On the receipt of the summons, the appellants had appeared before the Court, but had not filed their written

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statement. In fact, appellant No.2 was proceeded ex-

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parte .

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The following points were framed by the Trial

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Court for its decision:

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“1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the death of deceased Ravikiran was caused due to negligent act of the defendant No.2?

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2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief as sought in the plaint?

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3. What Order or Decree?”

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On points No.1 and 2, the conclusion of the Trial

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Court was the following:

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“10. POINT NO.1 & 2: These points are being interconnected, in order to avoid repetition of facts taken up for joint discussion.

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In order to prove their case, the plaintiff No.4 examined herself as P.w.1 by way of filing affidavit in lieu of her chief examination and in her chief examination affidavit she has reiterated the plaint averments and got marked totally 9 documents as Ex.P.1 to P.9. She further examined 2 more witnesses as P.w.2 and 3 who

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were said to be the witnessed the tragic death of deceased Ravikiran who was electrocuted and died at the spot and if we go through the documents Ex.P.1 the same is the certified copy of UDR report it reflects that at about 4.30 p.m. her son left the home to attend the agricultural work and at about 6.00 p.m. they came to know about the death of her son through one Hemanth and Thoufik due to electrocution his son was died and she rushed to the spot and found her son dead in their land due to electrocution. Ex.P.2 is the certified copy of the complaint, Ex.P.3 is the inquest report, Ex.P.4 and 5 are the statement of the relatives of the deceased, Ex.P.6 is the P.M.Report of the deceased Ravikiran in which it has been clearly opined by the doctor who conducted P.M. of the deceased that the reason for the death is "Electrocution". Ex.P.7 is the charge sheet, Ex.P.8 and 9 are the postal receipt and acknowledgement.

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11. Further the P.w.1 stated that due to the negligent Act of the defendants her son died due to electrocution as they have not taken safety measurement with respect to the electric pole erected in their land and her evidence is supported by Ex.P.1 to P.9 and even the

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P.M.report also shows that the death is due to the electrocution as per Ex.P.6. P.w.2 and 3 were also examined by the plaintiff who were witnessed the death of the deceased Ravikiran due to electrocution as held in the plaint and they supported the case of the plaintiff and the evidence of the plaintiff remained unchallenged. Hence, this court is of the opinion that the death of the deceased Ravikiran is due to the electrocution and the defendants have not contested the suit as such in the absence of contrary evidence the plaintiff made out their case and plaintiff also enlighten that the deceased was doing drip irrigation contract and herein the plaintiffs have not paid any court fee as per the court order dated: 01.03.2021 and it is ordered that, the question on the payment of court fee in view of legal assistance by the plaintiff through TLSC Sira is kept open. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs are directed to pay the court fee after depositing of the award amount and CMO is directed to calculate the court fee and to deduct the same in the compensation amount. Accordingly, I answer the above points in the Affirmative.”

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We are of the view that, the challenge made to the

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impugned judgment and decree is without any merit. The issue which falls for consideration for grant of compensation by the Trial Court is well settled by catena of judgments. In fact, in a recent judgment, this Court in the case of Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited (KPTCL) -Vs.- Mrs. Rekha and others [WA No.861/2022 and connected matters, decided on 23.01.2025] , while upholding the judgment of the learned Single Judge, has held that the liability of Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Limited (BESCOM) is absolute and as such, the Electricity Company is liable to pay compensation for the death caused because of electrocution. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced as under:

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“71. The issue which now arises is, whether the appellant was negligent for it to be liable for compensation to respondents No.1 in the appeals? The issue has been answered by the learned Single Judge by drawing a distinction between strict liability and absolute liability by holding, the exceptions to strict liability as propounded in Rylands -Vs.- Fletcher

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(supra) like Act of God; petitioners’ own default; and interference of third-party shall not be applicable when accidents are attributable to supply and distribution of electricity.

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72. The submission of Sri. Sriranga was, the principle of absolute liability has no applicability to the facts in as much as the owner of the building was negligent against whom the proceedings have been initiated; even the BBMP was clearly negligent in its action. The aforesaid submission of Sri. Sriranga is unmerited because, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge more particularly paragraph No.31 which is reproduced as under, is very clear that the principles of absolute liability shall be applicable in as much as any enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and the accident is caused, then such enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions:

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“31. We must also deal with one other question which was seriously debated before us and that question is as to what is the measure of liability of an enterprise which is engaged in an hazardous or inherently dangerous industry, if by reason of an accident occurring in such industry, persons die or are injured. Does the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] apply or is there any

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other principle on which the liability can be determined. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] was evolved in the year 1866 and it provides that a person who for his own purposes brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril and, if he fails to do so, is prima facie liable for the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. The liability under this rule is strict and it is no defence that the thing escaped without that person's wilful act, default or neglect or even that he had no knowledge of its existence. This rule laid down a principle of liability that if a person who brings on to his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and does damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage caused. Of course, this rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and it does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the thing which escapes is present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is statutory authority. Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 45, para 1305. Considerable case law has developed in England as to what is natural and what is non-natural use of land and what are precisely the circumstances in which this rule may be displaced. But it is not necessary for us to consider these decisions laying down the parameters of this rule because in a modern industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and

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technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to carry as part of the developmental programme, this rule evolved in the 19th century at a time when all these developments of science and technology had not taken place cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs of the present day economy and social structure. We need not feel inhibited by this rule which was evolved in the context of a totally different kind of economy. Law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. As new situations arise the law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static. We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an argument that merely because the law in England does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability in cases of hazardous or inherently dangerous activities or the rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] as developed in England recognises certain

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limitations and exceptions, we in India must hold back our hands and not venture to evolve a new principle of liability since English courts have not done so. We have to develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concommitant to an industrial economy, there is no reason why we should hesitate to evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done in England. We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part. Since the persons harmed on account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity carried on by the enterprise would not be in a position to isolate the process of operation

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from the hazardous preparation of substance or any other related element that caused the harm the enterprise must be held strictly liable for causing such harm as a part of the social cost of carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. If the enterprise is permitted to carry on an hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its overheads. Such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for private profit can be tolerated only on condition that the enterprise engaged in such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity indemnifies all those who suffer on account of the carrying on of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity regardless of whether it is carried on carefully or not. This principle is also sustainable on the ground that the enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards. We would therefore hold that where in enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the

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rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] .”

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(emphasis supplied)

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73. We are also of the view that the learned Single Judge is justified in relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shail Kumari (supra) wherein in paragraph No.7, 8 and 13, the Court held as under:

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“7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through

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the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the lookout of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road

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the electric current	there	on should
automatically have	been	disrupted.
Authorities manning	such	dangerous

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commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps.

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8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis

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of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.

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13. In the present case, the Board made an endeavour to rely on the exception to the rule of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] ) being “an act of stranger”. The said exception is not available to the Board as the act attributed to the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated or at any rate its consequences should have been

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prevented by the appellant-Board. In Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd. [1936 AC 108 : 105 LJPC 18 : 154 LT 89] the Privy Council repelled the contention of the defendant based on the aforecited exception. In that case a hotel belonging to the plaintiffs was destroyed in a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas. The gas had percolated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in an intermediate pressure main situated below the street level and belonging to the defendants which was a public utility company. The fracture was caused during the construction involving underground work by a third party. The Privy Council held that the risk involved in the operation undertaken by the defendant was so great that a high-degree care was expected of him since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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74. Similarly, the learned Single Judge has relied upon the judgment in the case of H.S.E.B. (supra), wherein in paragraph No.6, it is held as under:

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“6. The appellants are carrying on a

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business which is inherently dangerous. If a person were to come into contact with a hightension wire, he is bound to receive serious injury and/or die. As they are carrying on a business which is inherently dangerous, the appellants would have to ensure that no injury results from their activities. If they find that unauthorised constructions have been put up close to their wires it is their duty to

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ensure that that construction is got demolished by moving the appropriate authorities and if necessary, by moving a court of law. Otherwise, they would take the consequences of their inaction. If there are complaints that these wires are drooping and almost touching houses, they have to ensure that the required distance is kept between the houses and the wires, even though the houses be unauthorised. In this case we do not find any disputed question of fact.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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75. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (supra) has, in paragraphs No.39, 40, 47 and 49, held as under:

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“39. The decision in M.C. Mehta case

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[(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] related to a concern working for private profit. However, in our opinion the same principle will also apply to statutory authorities (like the Railways), public corporations or local bodies which may be social utility undertakings not working for private profit.

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40. It is true that attempts to apply the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher against public bodies have not on the whole succeeded vide Administrative Law by P.P. Craig, 2nd Edn., p. 446, mainly because of the idea that a body which acts not for its own profit but for the benefit of the community should not be liable.

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However, in our opinion, this idea is based on a misconception. Strict liability has no element of moral censure. It is because such public bodies benefit the community that it is unfair to leave the result of a non-negligent accident to lie fortuitously on a particular individual rather than to spread it among the community generally.

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47. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in Section 124-A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability dehors statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta case [(1987) 1 SCC 395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] . In our opinion, we have to develop new principles for fixing liability in cases like the present one.

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49. There are dicta both ancient and modern that the known categories of tort are not closed, and that novelty of a claim is not an absolute defence. Thus, in Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [(1994) 4 SCC 1 : JT (1994) 3 SC 492] the Supreme Court observed: (SCC p. 10, para 8)

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“8. … law of torts being a developing law its frontiers are incapable of being strictly barricaded.” ”

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(emphasis supplied)

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76. In the case of Nagappa Manneppa Naik (supra) in paragraphs No.32 to 34 referred by the learned Single Judge, it is held as under:

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"C) Nature of liability of Power Supply Company

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32. The Power Supply Companies have sought to repudiate liability on the ground that the claimant by his/her acts of negligence was responsible for the accident and hence the company was not liable, that there were intervening acts by strangers/third parties which were responsible for the accident. All such contentions raised are no longer available for being canvassed in light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (supra). The facts of the case was that the deceased who was riding a bicycle rode over a live wire, lying on the road which was inundated with water and the victim died of electrocution. The defence taken was that one Hari Gaikwad had taken a wire from the main supply line to pilfer power and the line got unfastened from the hook and it fell over the road which caused the accident. While the court reiterated the applicability of strict liability but explicitly ruled the inapplicability of the defences available to 'strict liability' including that of an "an act of stranger".

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33. The Court while approving the law laid down in the case of M.C.Mehta v. Union of

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India reported in 1987 1 SCR 819 has in effect declared that there would be absolute liability i.e., strict liability as per the rule of Rylands and Fetcher without any of the exceptions.

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34. This position of law has been reiterated by the Division Bench of this court in the case of Bhagyabai V. Principal Secretary, Department of Energy and Others in W.A.No.3249/2010 and W.A.No.354043/2010 dated 25.10.2010. Accordingly, the contention of the Power Supply Companies regarding absence of liability while raising defences is liable to be rejected."

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(emphasis supplied)” ”

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In the present case, an amount of Rs.20,00,000/-

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has been granted. Though the same is not under different heads, but noting the fact that the deceased was of very young age (appears to be in his 20s) and is survived his wife, minor son and his parents, which will surely depict loss of earnings to the family they are entitled to the compensation as awarded by the Trial Court including for pain, etc.

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The appeal has no merit and is dismissed .

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No costs.

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