Smt. Siddagangamma Vs Sri. Rangaswamy

1(A) SMT. NALINI.S D/O LATE SIDDAGANGAMMA, W/O SHAHSIKUMAR.M, AGE ABOUT 51 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSE WIFE RESIDING AT NO.31, 14^TH MAIN ROAD, 8^TH D CROSS, NEAR TUNGA TAILORS, VIJAYANAGARA, BENGLAURU – 560 040.

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Digitally signed by RAMYA D Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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SRI SRINIVASA SON OF LATE T.SANJEEVAPPA, OCCUPATION:PRIVATE SERVICE, RESIDING AT NO.31/6, 14^TH MAIN, 8^TH B CROSS, RPC LAYOUT, BENGALURU – 560 040.

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(BY SRI. N.K. KANTHARAJU AND SRI. SREEDHAT.M.C, ADVOCATE FOR PROPOSED LR’S OF DECEASED A1(A))

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…APPELLANTS

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AND:

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SRI. RANGASWAMY SON OF LATE RANGAIAH, OCCUPATION:RETIRED FROM SERVICE, RESIDING AT:NO.22/3, 6^TH CROSS, 1^ST MAIN, DEEPANJALINAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 026.

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SRI. MANJUNATH

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SON OF LATE T.SANJEEVAPPA, RESIDING AT:NO.31/6, 14^TH MAIN, 8^TH B CROSS, RPC LAYOUT, BENGALURU – 560 040.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. SRIRAJ GOWDA N.S, ADVOCATE FOR R1; R2 IS SERVED)

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THIS RFA FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF THE CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 28.08.2018 PASSED IN O.S.NO.974/2008 ON THE FILE OF THE XXXIV ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE BENGALURU, DECREEING THE SUIT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

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THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FURTHER ARGUEMENTS, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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The appeal is filed by the defendant challenging the judgment and decree dated 28.08.2018 passed by the Court of XXXIV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, in O.S.No.974/2008, thereby, the suit for specific performance is decreed in full directing the defendants to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.

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Rank of the parties is referred to as per their

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rankings before the trial court.

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It is the case of plaintiff in brief that the husband of defendant No.1 and father of defendant Nos.2 and 3 is the owner of the suit schedule property and he has offered the suit schedule property for sale by entering into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff on 26.09.2006 and total sale consideration was fixed at Rs.6,00,000/- out of which the plaintiff has paid an advance amount of Rs.2,50,000/-. But thereafter late Sanjeevappa, who is the husband of defendant No.1 and father of defendant Nos.2 and 3 did not execute the sale deed, therefore upon issuance of legal notice calling upon Sanjeevappa and after his death to the defendants, when the defendants have not come forward to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff has filed suit for specific performance. Hence, the plaintiff prays to decree the suit for specific performance. Alternatively, the plaintiff prays to pass an order for refund

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of advance amount of Rs.2,50,000/- together with

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liquidated damages of Rs.2,50,000/- in total a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-.

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The defendants have appeared through their learned Advocate and filed the written statement and has taken pleading that there is no agreement of sale executed between the plaintiff and late Sanjeevappa and late Sanjeeevappa had taken hand loan from the plaintiff of Rs.2,50,000/- as plaintiff is doing money lending business and therefore, whatever agreement of sale is concocted one. Further submitted that during the lifetime of Sanjeevappa the plaintiff did not issue any legal notice and thereafter the plaintiff has issued legal notice and that is certainly replied. Therefore by taking contention that there was no agreement of sale executed, prays to dismiss the suit.

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Upon pleadings the trial court has framed the

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following issues:

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(1) Whether the plaintiff proves that late Sanjeevappa the husband of 1^st defendant and father of defendant No.2 and 3 had entered into an agreement to sell the suit schedule plaint property for consideration of Rs.6,00,000/- and received a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- as advance and executed an agreement of sale dated 26/9/2006?

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(2) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is always been ready and willing to perform his part of contract?

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(3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance of the sale agreement dated 26/9/2006?

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(4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the alternative relief of the refund of advance amount of Rs.2,50,000/- and liquidated damages of Rs.2,50,000/-?

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(5) What decree or order?

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The plaintiff is examined as PW1 and one

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additional witness is examined as PW2 and produced the documents, which were marked as Exs.P-1 to P-6. The defendant No.1 is examined as DW1 and two witnesses

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have been examined as DW2 and DW3 and they produced the documents, which were marked as Exs.D-1 to D-14.

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The trial court has decreed the suit in full for specific performance directing the defendants to execute the sale deed. The trial court has assigned the reason that Ex.P-1 - agreement of sale was proved and as per Ex.P-3 reply notice Sanjeevappa during his lifetime had agreed to execute the sale deed and the signature found on the Ex.P-3 - reply notice is proved to be as that of Sanjeevappa, therefore execution of agreement of sale is proved. Hence, decreed the suit for specific performance of contract. The trial court also assigned the reason that the plaintiff is able to prove that plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract, therefore decreed the suit in full.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree

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passed by the trial court, the defendants preferred an appeal by raising various grounds and the learned counsel

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for the appellants/defendants argued in consonance with

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the grounds raised in the appeal memorandum and submitted that Sanjeevappa has never executed Ex.P-1 - agreement of sale and it is concocted one. Further submitted that the plaintiff is doing money lending business and Sanjeevappa had received hand loan of Rs.2,50,000/- and the plaintiff for security towards loan advanced, such agreement of sale might have been created. Further submitted that during the lifetime of Sanjeevappa the plaintiff has not issued any legal notice and Ex.P-3-reply notice stated to have been executed by Sanjeevappa, is not that of Sanjeevappa. But when plaintiff has issued legal notice on 05.01.2008 - Ex.P-5, the defendant has replied suitably by contending that Sanjeevappa had executed agreement of sale. Therefore, without appreciating the evidence on record properly, the trial Court has decreed the suit simply on the reason that agreement of sale is proved, is not correct approach and

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therefore, the appellants pray for interference with the judgment and decree passed by the trial court.

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On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that Sanjeevappa had executed the agreement of sale after receiving an advance sale consideration of Rs.2,50,000/- and it is proved in the evidence and moreover as per Ex.P-3 Sanjeevappa had issued reply notice agreeing to execute the sale deed. Therefore, the trial court is justified and correct in holding that agreement of sale is proved and accordingly, decreed the suit. Hence, prays to dismiss the suit.

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Further submitted that when the defendants had disputed the signatures of Sanjeevappa on Ex.P-3, the same was referred to a handwriting expert and report was received by the trial court that the signature of which the defendants are disputing, it is proved to be admitted signature of Sanjeevappa and disputed the signature by the defendants is proved to be authored by one and the

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same person. Therefore, it is proved that Sanjeevappa during his lifetime had agreed to execute the sale deed, but unfortunately died. Therefore, the plaintiff has issued the legal notice to the defendants as per Ex.P-5 and thus, the trial court is correct in decreeing the suit. Further submitted that the plaintiff has also proved that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and it is proved by the Ex.P-5. Therefore, the trial court is right in decreeing the suit. Hence, prays to dismiss the appeal.

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Upon hearing the arguments and perusal of the trial court records, following points would arise the consideration:

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(1) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, the plaintiff proves the fact that there was execution of agreement of sale dated 26.09.2006 by Sanjeevappa, who is the husband of defendant No.1 and father of defendant Nos.2 and 3?

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(2) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case,

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defendants prove that Sanjeevappa had received a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- from plaintiff as hand loan, thus there is no execution of agreement of sale?

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(3) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, the plaintiff proves that he was ever ready and willing to perform his part of contract?

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(4) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, even if, the execution of agreement of sale is proved, whether the discretion still lies with the Court to grant a decree for specific performance?

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(5) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court requires any interference?

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The suit is for a specific performance of contract

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simpliciter. It is admitted fact that the husband of defendant No.1 and father of defendant Nos.2 and 3 namely, Sanjeevappa is the owner of the suit schedule property. For which, the defendants have produced

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documents Exs.D-8 to D-13 proving that the defendants are the owners of suit schedule property. This fact of ownership is not disputed by the plaintiff.

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It is the case of the plaintiff that Sanjeevappa had executed an agreement of sale as per Ex.P-1 dated 26.09.2006, which is denied by the defendants. It is the case of the defendant that Sanjeevappa had received a hand loan of Rs.2,50,000/- and had never executed agreement of sale and therefore, agreement of sale is a created and concocted document.

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Therefore, upon considering this aspect, the circumstances are to be considered to ascertain as to whether the agreement of sale was executed or not. The total sale consideration amount was Rs.6,00,000/-. The agreement of sale is dated 26.09.2006. It is the argument of learned counsel for the appellants/defendants that when the schedule property is situated within the Bangalore city limits and during the year 2006, there was no occasion for

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late Sanjeevappa to sell the property for such meagre sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/- as on that date. The actual value of the suit property at that time was more than Rs.20,00,000/-. Therefore, it is contended that there was no occasion for Sanjeevappa to sell the property for such a meagre sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/-.

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Learned counsel for the appellants has also filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC seeking permission to produce the additional evidence and has produced the Sub-Registrar’s guidelines value as fixed by the Government of Karnataka for the year 2005. As per the guidelines value of the Sub-Registrar, it is stated that the Sub-Registrar calculated the total SR value of the property as Rs.23,92,518.75. Therefore, there was no occasion for Sanjeevappa to execute the sale deed agreeing for sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/-. This application filed for production of additional evidence is liable to be allowed for the reason that this is the Gazette

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Notification copy as well as Certified copy of the Sub-

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Registrar guidelines value as it is certified copy one and hence, for this Gazette Notification and SR value, there would not be any objection by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the said additional evidence is accepted and accordingly, allowed and considered for the purpose of assessment of

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evidence in this case.

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When it is not the disputed fact that the total area of the site is 1050 sq., feet and there is 1800 sq., feet building, then why for such lesser amount of Rs.6,00,000/- Sanjeevappa had executed the agreement of sale is the question for consideration before the Court. As per the Sub-Registrar’s guidelines value, which is produced as additional evidence, the Sub-Registrar has made endorsement with his official seal that as on the year 2005, the property valuation was Rs.23,92,518.75. Therefore, on all its preponderance of probabilities, there could not have been chances of execution of agreement of sale for such lesser amount of Rs.6,00,000/-. Therefore, when these evidences are considered on all its

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preponderance of probabilities, Ex.P.1-agreement of sale might have been for the purpose of security towards the loan of Rs.2,50,000/- given by the appellants/defendants to Sanjeevappa. Therefore, the trial Court is not correct in holding that the agreement of sale is proved that Sanjeevappa had executed such agreement.

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Here for considering the evidence on record, the intention on the part of executor is also to be gathered on the circumstances involved in the case. It is not mere by proving agreement of sale that the plaintiff is entitled for decree, but the intention on the part of executing agreement of sale is also to be considered. Therefore, considering the above said factual aspects and circumstances, why Sanjeevappa had agreed to sell the property for such lesser amount of Rs.6,00,000/- by executing agreement of sale is the question, for which, there is no satisfactory proof by the plaintiff. Therefore, in this regard, the findings given by the trial Court is not correct.

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Further as per Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, it is the burden on the plaintiff to prove that he

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was ever ready and willing to perform the contract, but here the plaintiff has not produced any material to show that he was ever ready and willing to perform the contract, except the legal notice. It is quite natural that in a legal notice the plaintiff shows that he was ready and willing to perform the contract, but apart from that some more probable evidence is required to be produced by the plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness to perform the contract, but that is lacking on the part of the plaintiff.

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In this regard, I place reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of U.N.KRISHNAMURTHY (SINCE DECEASED) AND OTHERS LRS. vs. A.M.KRISHNAMRTHY¹ , at paragraph Nos.32, 33 and 34, it is held as under:

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“ 32 . In a suit for specific performance of a contract, the Court is required to pose unto itself the following questions, namely:

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1 (2023) 11 SCC 175

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32.1. Whether there is a valid agreement of sale binding on both the vendor and the vendee.

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32.2. Whether the plaintiff has all along been and still is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as envisaged under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

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33. There is a distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the contract and both ingredients are necessary for the relief of specific performance. In Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar [Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526] cited by Mr Venugopal, this Court said that there was a difference between readiness and willingness to perform a contract. While readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which would include his financial position, willingness relates to the conduct of the plaintiff. The same view was taken by this Court in Kalawati v. Rakesh Kumar [Kalawati v. Rakesh Kumar, (2018) 3 SCC 658: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 609] .

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34. Even in a first appeal, the first appellate court is duty-bound to examine whether there was continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform the contract. This proposition finds support from Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan [Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396] and H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa [H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa, (2006) 2 SCC 496] where this Court approved the views taken by the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon [Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43 : (1927-28) 55 IA 360 at p. 372 : AIR 1928 PC 208] .”

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In the case of P.DAIVASIGAMANI vs.

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S.SAMBANDAN² at paragraph Nos.21, 22, 23, 24 and 25,

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it is held as under:

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“21.Readiness and willingness are not one, but two separate elements. Readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract, which would include the financial position to pay the purchase price. Willingness refers to the intention of the plaintiff as a purchaser to perform his part of the contract. Willingness is inferred by scrutinising the conduct of the plaintiff purchaser, including attending circumstances³ . Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff purchaser from the date the balance sale consideration was payable in terms of the agreement to sell, till the decision of the suit, is a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance⁴ .

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The expression “readiness and willingness” used in Section 16 (c) of the said Act, has been interpreted in a catena of decisions by this Court, in the light of facts and circumstances of the cases under consideration for the purpose of granting or refusing to grant the relief of Specific Performance of a contract. The said expression cannot be interpreted in a straitjacket formula. In a very apt decision of this Court in Syed Dastagir vs. T.R. Gopalakrishna Setty (1999) 6 SCC 337, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, construing a plea of “readiness and willingness to perform” in view of the requirement of Section 16(c) and its explanation, observed as under: (SCC p. 341, para 9)

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“9. So the whole gamut of the issue raised is, how to construe a plea specially with reference to Section 16(c) and what

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2 (2022) 14 SC 793

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3 See para 2 in Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526

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4 See para 5 in N.P.Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115. Also see Anleshir Manu v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC Online PC 43: (1927-28) 55 IA 360 : AIR 1928 PC 208

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are the obligations which the plaintiff has to comply with in reference to his plea and whether the plea of the plaintiff could not be construed to conform to the requirement of the aforesaid section, or does this section require specific words to be pleaded that he has performed or has always been ready and is willing to perform his part of the contract. In construing a plea in any pleading, courts must keep in mind that a plea is not an expression of art and science but an expression through words to place fact and law of one's case for a relief. Such an expression may be pointed, precise, sometimes vague but still it could be gathered what he wants to convey through only by reading the whole pleading, depending on the person drafting a plea. In India most of the pleas are drafted by counsel hence the aforesaid difference of pleas which inevitably differ from one to the other. Thus, to gather true spirit behind a plea it should be read as a whole. This does not distract one from performing his obligations as required under a statute. But to test whether he has performed his obligations, one has to see the pith and substance of a plea. Where a statute requires any fact to be pleaded then that has to be pleaded may be in any form. The same plea may be stated by different persons through different words; then how could it be constricted to be only in any particular nomenclature or word. Unless a statute specifically requires a plea to be in any particular form, it can be in any form. No specific phraseology or language is required to take such a plea. The language in Section 16(c) does not require any specific phraseology but only that the plaintiff must aver that he has performed or has always been and is willing to perform his part of the contract. So the compliance of “readiness and willingness” has to be in spirit and substance and not in letter and

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form. So to insist for a mechanical production of the exact words of a statute is to insist for the form rather than the essence. So the absence of form cannot dissolve an essence if already pleaded”.

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23. It was further observed therein that: (Syed Dastagir case⁵ , SCC p.342, para11)

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“11........It is significant that this explanation carves out a contract which involves payment of money as a separate class from Section 16(c). Explanation (i) uses the words “it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court”. (emphasis supplied) This speaks in a negative term what is not essential for the plaintiff to do. This is more in support of the plaintiff that he need not tender to the defendant or deposit in court any money but the plaintiff must [as per Explanation (ii)] at least aver his performance or readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract”. (emphasis in original)

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24. In Sukhbir Singh v. Brij Pal Singh⁶ this Court had laid down that law is not in doubt and it is not a condition that the respondents (Plaintiffs) should have ready cash with them. It is sufficient for the respondents to establish that they had the capacity to pay the sale consideration. It is not necessary that they should always carry the money with them from the date of the suit till the date of the decree. The said principle was followed in A. Kanthamani v. Nasreen Ahmed⁷ , in case of C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy⁸ etc.

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5 Syed Dastagir v. T.R. Gopalakrishna setty, (1999) 6 SCC 337

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6 (1997) 2 SCC 200

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7 (2017) 4 SCC 654 : (2017) 2 SCC (Civ) 596

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25. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (Preamendment), which confers discretion on the court to exercise jurisdiction to decree of specific performance, states that this exercise should not be arbitrary, but guided by sound and reasonable judicial principles. Interpreting and elucidating on Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (pre-amendment) and factors to be considered, this Court in Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi⁹ has also referred to Sections 16(c), 22, 23 and 24 of the Specific Relief Act and Forms 47/48 of Appendix A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to summarise: (SCC pp.705-706, paras 7-8)

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“7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance are:

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7.1 First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property;

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7.2 Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract.

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7.3 Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract.

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7.4 Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what

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8 (2020) 3 SCC 280 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 90

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9 (2019) 3 SCC 704 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 405

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manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff.

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7.5 Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money etc. and, if so, on what grounds.

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8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the statutory requirements [See Sections 16 (c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendix A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure]. These requirements have to be properly pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings and proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It is only then the Court is entitled to exercise its discretion and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the case made out by the parties on facts.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

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J.P.BUILDERS AND ANOTHER VS. A.RAMDAS RAO

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AND ANOTHER¹⁰ , at paragraph Nos.20, 21, 23, 24, 25,

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26 and 27, it is held as under:

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Readiness and willingness

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“20. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides for personal bars to relief. This provision states that:

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“16.Personal bars to relief:--- Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person ---

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a) who would not be entitled to recover compensation for its breach; or

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b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or

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c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.

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Explanation.- For the purposes of clause (c),-

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(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court;

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(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction."

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21. Among the three clauses, we are more concerned about clause (c). "Readiness and willingness" is enshrined in clause (c) which was not present in the old Act of 1877. However, it was later inserted with the recommendations of the 9th Law Commission's report. This clause provides that the person seeking specific performance must prove that he has performed or has been ready and willing to perform the

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essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him.

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23. In N.P. Thirugnanam vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao¹¹ ., at SCC para 5, this Court held: (SCC pp. 117-18)

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"5......Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract."

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11 (1995) 5 SCC 115

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24. In P.D'Souza vs. Shondrilo Naidu¹² , this Court observed: (SCC p. 654, paras 19 and 21)

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"19. It is indisputable that in a suit for specific performance of contract the plaintiff must establish his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. The question as to whether the onus was discharged by the plaintiff or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down in this behalf....

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21......The readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract would also depend upon the question as to whether the defendant did everything which was required of him to be done in terms of the agreement for sale."

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25. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates "readiness and willingness" on the part of the plaintiff and it is a condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific performance. It is also clear that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must allege and prove a continuous "readiness and willingness" to perform the contract on his part from the date of the contract. The onus is on the plaintiff.

¶183

26. It has been rightly considered by this Court in R.C. Chandiok. vs. Chuni Lal Sabharwal¹³ ., that "readiness and willingness" cannot be treated as a straightjacket formula. This has to be determined from the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned.

¶184

27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is noncompliance with this statutory mandate, the Court is

¶185

12 (2004) 6 SCC 649

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13 (1970) 3 SCC 140

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not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. "Readiness and willingness" to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.”

¶190

Further rely on the judgment of Hon’ble

¶191

Supreme Court in the case of ZARINA SIDDIQUI vs. A. RAMALINGAM ALIAS R.AMARNATHAN¹⁴ at paragraph

¶192

Nos.30, 33, it is held as under:

¶193

“30. In a recent judgment dated 22.9.2014 in Civil Appeal No.9047 of 2014 entitled K. Prakash vs. B.R. Sampath Kumar¹⁵ , this Court observed that: (SCC p.605 and paras 16 & 18-19)

¶194

“16. The principles which can be enunciated are that where the plaintiff brings a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, the law insists a condition precedent to the grant of decree for specific performance: that the plaintiff must show his continued readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract in accordance with its terms from the date of contract to the date of hearing. Normally, when the trial court exercises its discretion in one way or other after appreciation of entire evidence and materials on record, the appellate court should not interfere unless it is established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles. The appellate court should also not exercise its discretion against the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations. It is true, as

¶195

14 (2015) 1 SCC 705

¶196

15 (2015) 1 SCC 597

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contemplated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, that a party is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless once an agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and further requirements for getting such a decree are established then the Court has to exercise its discretion in favour of granting relief for specific performance.

¶200

18. Subsequent rise in price will not be treated as a hardship entailing refusal of the decree for specific performance. Rise in price is a normal change of circumstances and, therefore, on that ground a decree for specific performance cannot be reversed.

¶201

19. However, the court may take notice of the fact that there has been an increase in the price of the property and considering the other facts and circumstances of the case, this Court while granting decree for specific performance can impose such condition which may to some extent compensate the defendant owner of the property. This aspect of the matter is considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nirmala Anand vs. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd…¹⁶

¶202

33. The equitable discretion to grant or not to grant a relief for specific performance also depends upon the conduct of the parties. The necessary ingredient has to be proved and established by the plaintiff so that discretion would be exercised judiciously in favour of the plaintiff. At the same time, if the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppresses material facts and evidence and misled the Court then such discretion should not be exercised by refusing to grant specific performance.”

¶203

Further I place reliance on the judgment of

¶204

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.SHAMA NAIK vs.

¶205

16 (2002) 8 SCC 146

¶206

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G.SRINIVASAIAH¹⁷ at paragraph Nos.8, 9, 10 and 11, it

¶210

is held as under:

¶211

“ 8. Section 16(C) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (prior to amendment w.e.f. 1.10.2018) bars the relief of the specific performance of a contract in favour of a person who fails to aver readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.

¶212

9. There is a legion of precedents on the subject of readiness and willingness.

¶213

10. The law is well settled. The plaintiff is obliged not only to make specific statement and averments in the plaint but is also obliged to adduce necessary oral and documentary evidence to show the availability of funds to make payment in terms of the contract in time.

¶214

11. There is a fine distinction between readiness and willingness to perform the contract. Both the ingredients are necessary for the relief of specific performance.”

¶215

Therefore, as per the principles of law laid down

¶216

in catena of decisions (stated supra), the plaintiff has failed to prove that he was ready and willing to perform the contract. Hence, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that whether he was maintaining sufficient balance in the account and whatever his financial capacity to pay the balance amount, but that is not proved in this case by

¶217

17 2024 SCC ONLINE 3586

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the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff fails to prove that he was ready and willing to perform the contract.

¶221

Even assuming that if execution of the agreement of sale is proved, but still the Court has discretion either to grant decree for specific performance or not as per Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Just because, the agreement of sale is proved and passing decree is lawful to do so, but still the Court had discretion whether to grant decree or not upon the parameters involved under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. If the defendants are able to prove that there is an unfair advantage over the defendants by the plaintiff, the judgment and decree could not be passed. Therefore, to exercise the discretionary relief under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for the sake of brevity) these factors are to be taken into consideration based on the evidence on record by taking a judicial note of the fact in the background of evidence on record.

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26. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (Before

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Amendment), 2018, is a discretionary relief, which reads

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as follows:

¶228

“ 20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance .— (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal.

¶229

(2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance:—

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(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or

¶231

(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or

¶232

(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.

¶233

Explanation 1.— Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the

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contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b).

¶237

Explanation 2.— The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract.

¶238

(3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance.

¶239

(4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party.”

¶240

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in various

¶241

judgments by interpreting Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SR Act’ for short), has laid down principle of law that granting relief of decree for specific performance is discretionary relief, subject to the principles laid down in Section 20 of the SR Act. Just because an agreement of sale is proved, that cannot be

¶242

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made a reason to grant decree for specific performance,

¶246

though it is lawful to do so.

¶247

The grant of decree for specific performance is guided by the principle of law laid down and what are the criteria that the Court shall consider upon the facts and circumstances involved in the case. It is worthwhile to refer some of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are as follows:

¶248

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of JAYAKANTHAM AND OTHERS v. ABAYKUMAR¹⁸ , at

¶249

paragraph Nos.7, 8 and 9 has held as follows:

¶250

“ 7. While evaluating whether specific performance ought to have been decreed in the present case, it would be necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principles of law. The court is not bound to grant the relief of specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 indicates that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary. Yet, the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but is “sound and reasonable”, to be “guided by judicial principles”. The exercise of discretion is capable of being corrected by a court of appeal in the hierarchy of appellate courts. Subsection (2) of Section 20 contains a stipulation of those cases where the court may exercise its

¶251

18 (2017) 5 SCC 178

¶252

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discretion not to grant specific performance. SubSection (2) of Section 20 is in the following terms:

¶255

“ 20. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance-

¶256

(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or

¶257

(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its nonperformance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff;

¶258

(c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.”

¶259

8. However, Explanation 1 stipulates that the mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, will not constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Moreover, Explanation 2 requires that the issue as to whether the performance of a contract involves hardship on the defendant has to be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract, except where the hardship has been caused from an act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract.

¶260

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9. The precedent on the subject is elucidated below:

¶263

9.1. In Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son¹⁹ , this Court held that: (scc p. 345, para 14)

¶264

“…14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion of Courts as to decreeing specific performance. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The Court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff…”

¶265

9.2 A similar view was adopted by this Court in Sardar Singh v. Krishna Devi²⁰ : (SCC p.26, para 14)

¶266

“14……. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief, merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. The grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary. The circumstances specified in Section 20 are only illustrative and not exhaustive. The court would take into consideration the circumstances in

¶267

19 1987 Supp SCC 340 :AIR 1987 SC 2328

¶268

20 (1994) 4 SCC 18

¶269

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each case, the conduct of the parties and the respective interest under the contract.”

¶273

9.3. Reiterating the position in K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd²¹ , this Court held thus: (SCC p.91, para 29)

¶274

“29…… Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the defendant. The principle underlying Section 20 has been summed up by this Court in Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy²² by stating that the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be used arbitrarily; the discretion should be exercised on sound principles of law capable of correction by an appellate court.”

¶275

9.4. These principles were followed by this Court in A.C. Arulappan v. Ahalya Naik²³ , with the following observations: (SCC pp.604 & 606, paras 7 & 15)

¶276

21 (1999) 5 SCC 77

¶277

22 (1996) 5 SCC 589

¶278

23 (2001) 6 SCC 600

¶279

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“7…… The jurisdiction to decree specific relief is discretionary and the court can consider various circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be granted. Merely because it is lawful to grant specific relief, the court need not grant the order for specific relief; but this discretion shall not be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Certain circumstances have been mentioned in Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as to under what circumstances the court shall exercise such discretion. If under the terms of the contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant, the court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. So also, specific relief may not be granted if the defendant would be put to undue hardship which he did not foresee at the time of agreement. If it is inequitable to grant specific relief, then also the court would desist from granting a decree to the plaintiff.”

¶283

“15…… Granting of specific performance is an equitable relief, though the same is now governed by the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. These equitable principles are nicely incorporated in Section 20 of the Act. While granting a decree for specific performance, these salutary guidelines shall be in the forefront of the mind of the court…..”

¶284

9.5. A Bench of three Judges of this Court considered the position in Nirmala Anand Vs.

¶285

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Advent Corporation (P) Ltd²⁴ ., and held thus : (SCC p.150, para 6)

¶288

“6…... It is true that grant of decree of specific performance lies in the discretion of the court and it is also well settled that it is not always necessary to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that the court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while granting or refusing decree of specific performance. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given case, one of the considerations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation. While balancing the equities, one of the considerations to be kept in view is as to who is the defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind whether a party is trying to take undue advantage over the other as also the hardship that may be caused to the defendant by directing specific performance. There may be other circumstances on which parties may not have any control. The

¶289

24 8 (2002) 8 SCC 146

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totality of the circumstances is required to be seen.”

¶293

In the case of Parakunnan Veetill Joseph’s Son Mathew Vs. Nedumbara Kuruvila’s son²⁵ , at

¶294

paragraph No.14, it is held as follows:

¶295

”14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion of courts as to decreeing specific performance. The court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff. The High Court has failed to consider the motive with which Varghese instituted the suit. It was instituted because Kuruvila could not get the estate and Mathew was not prepared to part with it. The sheet anchor of the suit by Varghese is the agreement for sale Exhibit A-1. Since Chettiar had waived his rights thereunder, Varghese as an assignee could not get a better right to enforce that agreement. He is, therefore, not entitled to a decree for specific performance.”

¶296

31. In the case of SARDAR SINGH VS. KRISHNA

¶297

DEVI²⁶ at paragraph No.14, it is held as follows:

¶298

25 (1987) Supp SCC 340

¶299

26 (1994) 4 SCC 18

¶300

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¶302

“14. The next question is whether the courts below were justified in decreeing the suit for specific performance. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief, merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. The grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary. The circumstances specified in Section 20 are only illustrative and not exhaustive. The court would take into consideration the circumstances in each case, the conduct of the parties and the respective interest under the contract.”

¶303

In the case of K. Narendra Vs. Riviera

¶304

Apartments (P) Ltd.,²⁷ at paragraph Nos.29, 30, 31, 32,

¶305

33 and 34, it is held as follows:

¶306

“29. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over

¶307

27 (1999) 5 SCC 77

¶308

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the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the defendant. The principle underlying Section 20 has been summed up by this Court in Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy [(1996) 5 SCC 589 : AIR 1996 SC 2814] by stating that the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be used arbitrarily; the discretion should be exercised on sound principles of law capable of correction by an appellate court.

¶312

30. Chitty on Contracts (27th Edn., 1994, Vol. 1., at p. 1296) states:

¶313

“Severe hardship may be a ground for refusing specific performance even though it results from circumstances which arise after the conclusion of the contract, which affect the person of the defendant rather than the subject-matter of the contract, and for which the plaintiff is in no way responsible.”

¶314

31 . Very recently in K.S.Vidyanadam v. Vairavan [(1997) 3 SCC 1] this Court has held: (SCC p. 7, para 10)

¶315

“10. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time-limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits

¶316

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prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the time-limit(s) specified in the agreement have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani [(1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742] : (SCC p. 528, para 25)

¶319

‘… it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract, the court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are (evident?): (1) from the express terms of the contract; (2) from the nature of the property; and (3) from the surrounding circumstances, for example, the object of making the contract.’

¶320

In other words, the court should look at all the relevant circumstances including the time-limit(s) specified in the agreement and determine whether its discretion to grant specific performance should be exercised. Now in the case of urban properties in India, it is well-known that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few decades — particularly after 1973.”

¶321

32 . Referring to the principle that mere rise in prices is no ground for denying the specific performance the Court has emphasized the need for being alive to the realities of life and inflationary tendencies judicially noticeable and observed: (SCC p. 9, para 11)

¶322

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“Indeed, we are inclined to think that the rigor of the rule evolved by courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of immovable properties — evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown — requires to be relaxed, if not modified, particularly in the case of urban immovable properties. It is high time, we do so.”

¶325

33 . The Court has further proceeded to hold: (SCC pp. 9-10, para 11)

¶326

“All this only means that while exercising its discretion, the court should also bear in mind that when the parties prescribe certain time-limit(s) for taking steps by one or the other party, it must have some significance and that the said time-limit(s) cannot be ignored altogether on the ground that time has not been made the essence of the contract (relating to immovable properties).”

¶327

34 . Having noticed the Constitution Bench decision in Chand Rani [(1993) 1 SCC 519 : AIR 1993 SC 1742] the Court has further held: (SCC p. 11, para 14)

¶328

“Even where time is not of the essence of the contract, the plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all the surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property.”

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¶332

In the case of A.C. Arulappan Vs. Ahalya Naik²⁸ at paragraph No.7, 8, 9, 10 and 15, it is held as

¶333

follows:

¶334

“7. The jurisdiction to decree specific relief is discretionary and the court can consider various circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be granted. Merely because it is lawful to grant specific relief, the court need not grant the order for specific relief; but this discretion shall not be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Certain circumstances have been mentioned in Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as to under what circumstances the court shall exercise such discretion. If under the terms of the contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant, the court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. So also, specific relief may not be granted if the defendant would be put to undue hardship which he did not foresee at the time of agreement. If it is inequitable to grant specific relief, then also the court would desist from granting a decree to the plaintiff.

¶335

8. In Damacherla Anjaneyulu v. Damcherla Venkata Seshaiah [1987 Supp SCC 75 : AIR 1987 SC 1641] the High Court declined to grant a decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff, even though the defendant was guilty of breach of agreement. That was a case where the defendant had constructed costly structures and if a decree for specific performance was granted, the defendant would have been put to special hardship. This Court directed the

¶336

28 (2001) 6 SCC 600

¶337

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¶338

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defendant to pay compensation to the plaintiff.

¶340

9. In Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son [1987 Supp SCC 340 : AIR 1987 SC 2328] this Court cautioned and observed as under: (SCC p. 345, para 14)

¶341

“14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion to courts as to decreeing specific performance. The court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff.”

¶342

10. In Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy [(1996) 5 SCC 589 : AIR 1996 SC 2814] the plaintiff, who sought for specific performance of an agreement to purchase immoveable property, filed a suit with incorrect and false facts. In the plaint, it was alleged that the plaintiff was already given possession of Door No.2/53 as a lessee and he was given possession of Door No.1/53 on the date of the agreement itself. But he did not give any evidence that he had got possession of Door No.1/53 on the date of the agreement. It was found that his case as regards Door No.1/53 was false. He also alleged that he had paid Rs.400 in addition to the sum of Rs.4000 paid as advance, but this was proved to be an incorrect statement. He alleged that the third defendant had inspected the house during the course of negotiations, but this also was found to be false. This Court held that it is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the jurisdiction of a court

¶343

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¶345

and specific performance being equitable relief, must come to the court with clean hands. In other words, the party who makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to the equitable relief.

¶346

15. Granting of specific performance is an equitable relief, though the same is now governed by the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. These equitable principles are nicely incorporated in Section 20 of the Act. While granting a decree for specific performance, these salutary guidelines shall be in the forefront of the mind of the court. The trial court, which had the added advantage of recording the evidence and seeing the demeanour of the witnesses, considered the relevant facts and reached a conclusion. The appellate court should not have reversed that decision disregarding these facts and, in our view, the appellate court seriously flawed in its decision. Therefore, we hold that the respondent is not entitled to a decree of specific performance of the contract.”

¶347

Therefore, the trial Court is not correct in

¶348

swaying away upon the proof of execution of sale deed. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the trial

¶349

Court is liable to be interfered with. Accordingly, I answer point Nos.1 to 5 in affirmative .

¶350

Hence, I proceed to pass the following

¶351

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ORDER

¶355

i. The appeal is allowed .

¶356

ii. The impugned judgment and decree dated 28.08.2018 passed by the Court of XXXIV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, in O.S.No.974/2008 is hereby set aside.

¶357

iii. The suit is decreed for alternative reliefs.

¶358

iv. The defendants are directed to refund an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% pa., from the date of execution of agreement of sale dated 26.09.2006 within a period of five months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

¶359

v. Draw decree accordingly.

¶360

SD/(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR) JUDGE

¶361

DR: Para 1 to 13 PB: Para 14 to 22 List No.: 1 Sl No.: 9

Smt. Siddagangamma v. Sri. Rangaswamy

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Smt. Siddagangamma v. Sri. Rangaswamy

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