Allowed

Shankareppa S/O. Satteppa Nadagouda v. Shivangouda S/O. Satteppa Nadagouda Mudhol

Karnataka HC16 Sept 2025RFA/100049/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court of Karnataka allowed the appeal by an unsuccessful plaintiff in a partition suit. The trial Court had dismissed the suit due to non-joinder of parties in an earlier compromise decree, despite finding that the respondent had failed to prove the decree was fraudulent. The High Court held that the trial Court erred in setting aside the valid compromise decree and ordered the suit to be

What did the court decide?

Impugned judgment and decree of trial court set aside; suit decreed as prayed for.

Shankareppa S/O. Satteppa Nadagouda Vs Shivangouda S/O. Satteppa… — Partition | Karnataka HC (2025)

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD DATED THIS THE 16^TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2025

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PRESENT

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR AND

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 100049 OF 2024 (DEC/INJ-)

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BETWEEN:

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SHANKAREPPA S/O. SATTEPPA NADAGOUDA, AGE: 73 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, YARGUDRI VILLAGE, GOKAK-591136, BELAGAVI DISTRICT.

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…APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. HARSH DESAI, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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YASHAVANT NARAYANKAR Digitally signed by YASHAVANT NARAYANKAR Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH DHARWAD

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SHIVANGOUDA S/O. SATTEPPA NADAGOUDA, AGE: 60 YEARS, OCC: NIL, MUDHOL-583236, BAGALAKOTE DISTRICT.

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(BY SRI. DINESH M. KULKARNI & SRI. PAVAN B. DODDATTI, ADVOCATES)

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…RESPONDENT

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THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC., PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 06.10.2023 PASSED BY THE COURT OF THE II ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AT GOKAK IN O.S.NO.527/2018 AND DECREE THE SUIT BY ALLOWING THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL WITH COSTS, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

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THIS APPEAL IS COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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HC-KAR

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CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR)

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This appeal is by the unsuccessful plaintiff in OS No.527/2018 is directed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 06.10.2023 whereby the said suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff against the respondents-defendants for declaration and permanent injunction and other reliefs in relation to the suit schedule immovable property was dismissed by the trial Court.

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A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the appellant-plaintiff is none other than the brother of the respondents-defendants. On 04.11.1991, the appellant instituted a suit in OS No.340/1991 against his father, brothers and others for partition and separate possession of his share in the suit schedule immovable properties. In the said suit, the respondent herein is arrayed as defendant

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No.4. On 30.07.1992, the parties entered into a compromise in OS No.340/2021 pursuant to which, out of the total extent of land bearing survey No.142/1 measuring 9 acres 12 guntas, an extent of 5 acres was allotted in favour of appellant-plaintiff in terms of the compromise. It was contended that pursuant to the aforesaid compromise decree dated 30.07.1992, a khata in relation to the aforesaid 5 acres which is subject matter of present suit in OS No.527/2018 was mutated into the name of the appellant-plaintiff and revenue records continue to stand in his name thereafter.

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Subsequently on 25.05.1998, the father of the parties Satteppa Nadagouda expired and on 09.04.2002 one more brother of the appellant and respondents, Sripathi filed one more suit in OS No.185/2002 against the respondents herein and others in which the respondent herein was arrayed as defendant No.2. On 20.04.2002 the said suit in OS 185/2002 in which the respondent herein was defendant No.2 along with his brother who are

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remaining parties, except the plaintiff was compromised vide a compromise decree dated 20.04.2002 wherein, the remaining extent of 4 acres 12 guntas out of total extent of 9 acres 12 gutnas (excluding 5 acres allotted in favour of appellant-plaintiff in the compromise decree dated 30.07.1992 passed in OS 340/1991) was distributed among the parties.

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Subsequently, after long lapse of 26 years from the date of compromise decree dated 30.07.1992 passed in OS No.340/1991, the respondents challenged the said compromise decree by preferring W.P.103234/2018 before this Court which is pending adjudication.

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At this juncture, it is necessary to state that there is no interim order passed in favour of the respondent who is the writ petitioner in the said petition.

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Thereafter, the appellant-plaintiff instituted the

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present suit inter alia contending that the respondent was attempting to get the khata changed to his name by filing an appeal before Assistant Commissioner, under Section

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136(2) of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964¹ . A result of which, the appellant-plaintiff was constrained to file the present suit for declaration, permanent injunction and other reliefs in relation to the suit schedule property.

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The respondent-defendant filed his written statement inter alia disputing and denying the various allegations and claims made by the plaintiff. Though the defendants admitted the institution of the aforesaid suit in OS 340/1991 by the plaintiff against his father and other brothers, the defendant contended that the said compromise decree was fraudulent, illegal and invalid and that he had challenged the same in the aforesaid WP No.103234/2018. The respondent herein also contended that even the subsequent compromise decree in OS No.185/2002 was also fraudulent and invalid, which has been assailed by him in WP No.11056/2019 in which there is an interim order of stay. It was therefore contended that since the subject matter of the compromise decree which

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1 Hereinafter for short ‘ the Act’

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was also the subject matter of the suit i.e., suit schedule properties involved in OS 527/2018 was pending adjudication in WP No.103234/2018 before this Court, the present suit of the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed.

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Based on the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:

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“ISSUES

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1. Whether plaintiff proves his ownership and lawful possession over the suit property?

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2. Whether plaintiff proves the alleged interference of defendant?

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3. Whether the defendant proves that the decrees in OS No.340/1991 and OS No.185/2002 are collusive hence the same are not binding on his share?

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4. Whether plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration?

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5. Whether plaintiff is entitled for the relief of permanent injunction?

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6. What order or decree?

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The appellant-plaintiff examined himself as PW.1 and documentary evidence at Ex.P1 to P25 were marked and three witnesses as PW2 to PW4 were examined on behalf of the plaintiff.

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The defendant examined himself as DW1 and documentary evidence at Ex.D1 to D10 were marked by the defendants.

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The trial Court proceeded to answer issue Nos.1 and 3 by recording a finding that respondent-defendant had failed to establish the compromise decree passed in OS 340/1991 dated 30.07.1992, which was a fraudulent and invalid decree and proceeded to reject the said contention urged on behalf of the respondent. However, despite having come to the conclusion that the respondent-defendant had failed to establish that the compromise decree was fraudulent or invalid and was not binding upon him, the trial Court proceeded to dismiss the suit on the sole ground that the earlier suit in OS 340/1991 which was compromised did not contain all joint family members/co-sharers and did not

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include all joint family properties and that the order of the Assistant Commissioner passed under the Land Revenue Act was not challenged by the appellant. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree, the appellant-plaintiff is before this Court by way of present appeal.

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Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material on record.

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On perusal of the material on record the following points arise for consideration of this Court:

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i) Whether the trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit for declaration and permanent injunction filed by the appellant-plaintiff?

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ii) Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court warrants interference by this Court in the present appeal?

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Regarding point Nos.(i) and (ii)

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A perusal of the material on record including the impugned judgment and decree will indicate that in order to establish that the suit schedule property was allotted to the

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plaintiff in the compromise decree dated 30.07.1992 passed in OS No.340/1991, the appellant-plaintiff has produced exhibit P.21 which is a certified copy of the said compromise decree. A perusal of the said compromise decree will clearly indicate that out of the total extent of 9 acres 12 guntas in re-survey No.142/1, the present suit schedule property measuring 5 acres was completely allotted in favour of the appellant-plaintiff. In pursuance of the same, the katha was mutated into the name of the plaintiff, as can be seen from the revenue records comprising of RTC extracts, mutation register extracts, etc., produced as exhibits P1 to P16 and P24 and P25 respectively. Interestingly, the factum of the plaintiff being allotted the suit schedule property in the compromise decree dated 30.07.1992 passed in OS No.340/1991 stands fortified, confirmed and affirmed by certified copies of plaint, order sheet and joint memo in OS No.340/1991 produced by the respondent-defendant himself as exhibits D2 to D4 which, clearly indicate that the

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respondent-defendant has signed the said compromise/joint memo and order sheet before the trial Court.

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It is also significant to note that the respondent specifically contends that out of the total extent of 9 acres 12 guntas in survey No.142/1 5 acres having been allotted to the plaintiff in the compromise decree passed in OS No.340/1991, the remaining 3 acres was allotted to one more brother Krishnappa, who in turn relinquished the same in favour of the defendant herein. In fact, the defendant (DW1), in his cross examination admits that he was residing in the house situated in the said 4 acres 12 guntas in survey No.142/1 which was obtained by him by virtue of Krishnappa (defendant no.3) in OS No.341/1991 relinquishing the same in favour of the respondent herein. To put it differently, the conduct of the parties including the defendant in doing all acts, deeds and things pursuant to the compromise decree dated 30.07.1992 passed in OS No.340/1991, is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the compromise decree was acted upon and

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confirmed/affirmed by all the parties including the respondent herein, who is clearly estopped from putting forth a contrary claim subsequently.

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A perusal of the impugned judgment and decree will indicate that insofar as the various allegations and claims made by the respondent-defendant as regards the earlier compromise decree passed in OS No.340/1991 dated 30.07.1992 being obtained by fraud is concerned, the said contention have been clearly negatived by the trial Court, which has recorded categorical findings in this regard against the respondent by rejecting his contentions, as hereunder:

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“24. On the other hand, the DW1 has deposed in his examination-in-chief by reiterating the averments of written statement. At the page 9 and 10 of crossexamination, he has denied all the suggestions made by the plaintiff in support of his case, and also denied the suggestion that he appeared in O.S.No.340/1991 through A. S. Matapathi Advocate, but he admits that no action is taken against that advocate and no complaint was given to the police. Even, he has not taken action against the parties of the said suit i.e., plaintiff, Hanamant, Goudappa, Krishanappa, Sripateppa, Chandru. Therefore, as rightly argued by the plaintiff inaction of the defendant amounts to admission of the decree of OS.No.340/1991.

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25. Further, the DW1 admits that Krishnappa relinquished 04 acres and 12 guntas of land in his favour towards the eastern portion of Sy.No.142/1 in the NorthSouth direction and towards the western portion of the said survey number 05 acres of land is situated and as per the diary No.17/1992, katha of the said property was mutated in the name of the defendant. In view of the said admission, a question arises that if there is no partition as alleged by the plaintiff how Krishnappa could relinquish 04 acres and 12 guntas of land infavour of the defendant. Absolutely, there is no explanation from the side of defendant in this regard.

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Therefore, as rightly argued by the plaintiff the said admission amounts to admission of the decree of OS.No.340/1991.

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26. At the page 13 of cross-examination, the DW1 has admitted that he appeared through one Sri. B. R. Doddatti, advocate in the case before the Assistant Commissioner, Bailhongal and has identified and admitted the Ex.P22- vakalath but he has denied the suggestion that he signed the vakalath stating the he put LTM. Further, he admits that he filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka through Sri. Pavan Doddatti, Advocate but has denied the suggestion that he signed the vakalath as S.S.N., and stated that he put LTM. The said vakalath was marked as Ex.P23. As could be seen from the said vakalaths they were filed in the said proceedings and there is no contra evidence to disbelieve the same and they are signed by the defendant as S.S.N.

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27. That apart, at the page 14 of crossexamination, the DW1 admits that he borrowed a loan from the SBI Bank in 1995 and got executed a mortgage deed towards the loan but has denied the signatures found on the certified copy of the mortgage deed. However, no contra evidence is produced to disbelieve the execution of the said mortgage deed. By the above evidence, it is explicit that the defendant makes signature on the documents. No doubt, as rightly argued by the defendant difference can be found in the

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signatures of the defendant found on the compromise petition, memo and order sheet of OS.No.340/1991, but in view of the said evidence, his contention that he will not sign any document and he only puts LTM cannot be accepted, and the arguments submitted by him in this regard do not hold water.

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28. Further, at the page 15 of the crossexamination, the DW1 admits that the mortgaged property is 04 acres and 12 guntas of Sy.No.142/1 and fact of availing of the loan was got entered in the RTC vide diary No.1870 as per the Ex.P24- mutation register extract. Total measurement of the land of Sy.No.142/1 is 09 acres and 12 guntas and as per the partition, he got 04 acres and 12 guntas and plaintiff got 05 acres and diary of the same is 1792 i.e., Ex.P25-mutation register extract. Therefore, as rightly argued by the plaintiff, the defendant has admitted that the plaintiff acquired the land of 05 acres in the partition. “

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A perusal of the aforesaid findings will clearly establish that the trial Court has categorically held that the plea of fraud put forth by the respondent-defendant to assail the compromise decree has been rejected by the trial Court and we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the said finding recorded against the respondent-defendant by the trial Court.

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However, having recorded a finding that the respondent-defendant has failed to establish that the compromise decree was vitiated by fraud or

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misrepresentation, the trial Court proceeds to non-suit the plaintiff on the sole ground that in the compromise decree, all co-sharers and all properties were not included in the suit or in the compromise decree. In this context, it is significant note that in the present suit, the respondentdefendant has not put forth any plea/defence that the earlier compromise decree was invalid on account of noninclusion of all properties and non-joinder of parties. Further the trial Court has also failed to consider that the validity of the earlier compromise decree was neither questioned nor assailed by the defendant by way of a separate suit or otherwise and the only challenge to the earlier compromise decree passed in OS No.340/1991 was by way of preferring the WP No.103234/2018 in which there was no interim order of stay. In fact, there is no counter claim filed by the respondent-defendant in the present suit, challenging/assailing the compromise decree dated 30.07.1992 passed in OS No.340/1991.

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The cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts and circumstances is sufficient to come to the conclusion that mere filing of WP No.103234/2018 in which there was interim order, could not have been made the basis by the trial Court to non-suit the plaintiff especially after having come to the conclusion that he had acquired the suit schedule property under a compromise decree which was upheld by the trial Court.

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The trial Court also failed to consider and appreciate the various admissions in the cross examination of DW.1 wherein he not only confirms the title of the plaintiff, but also the compromise decree passed in OS No.340/1991 and his subsequent claim over the remaining 4 acres 12 guntas as having been obtained by relinquishment, from his brother Krishanappa and nonconsideration of the said material evidence by the trial Court, has resulted in erroneous conclusion.

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In the case of Raghavendra Reddy Vs. Channareddy and others² , this Court considered the scope and ambit of a challenge to a compromise decree and held as under:

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“6. A perusal of the impugned order will indicate that the trial court has come to the conclusion that the present petition was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, and in the light of the well settled position of law as held by the Apex Court in the cases of Pushpa Devi Bhagat vs. Rajinder Singh – (2006) 5 SCC 566, Triloki Nath Singh vs. Anirudh Singh – (2020) 6 SCC 629 and Navratan Lal Sharma vs. Radha Mohan Sharma – 2024 INSC 970. In the aforesaid recent judgment in Navratan’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under:-

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10. The relevant provisions under the CPC that govern compromise decrees are contained in Order 23, Rules 3 and 3A, which are extracted hereunder:

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“3. Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole or any part of the subject � matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be

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2 WP No.200680/2024

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recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to 6 the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:

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Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but not adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.

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Explanation.— An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.

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3A. Bar to suit.—No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”

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11. This Court in Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi – (1993) 1 SCC 581, has laid down the law on the disposal of a proceeding in accordance with a compromise between the parties and on recall of a compromise decree. It held that under Order 23, Rule 3, the Court must be satisfied upon applying judicial mind that the agreement between the parties is lawful before accepting the same and disposing the suit. Further, the proviso and the Explanation to Order 23, Rule 3

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mandate that the court must “decide the question” of whether an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, and it is clarified that void and voidable agreements under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Hereinafter “the Contract Act”) shall be deemed to be not lawful [Banwar Lal (Supra) Paras 11-13]. Upon such reading of the provision, it held that the court recording the compromise can examine the legality of the agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the Contract Act, even after the compromise decree is passed and when a party moves an application for recall (ibid para 14)

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12. The law on the issue is summarised in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh – (2006) 5 SCC 566 . In this case, the Court also took note of Section 96(3) of the CPC7 and the deletion of Order 43, Rule 1(m) of the CPC by way of an amendment in 1976, as well as Order 23, Rule 3A. The consequence of these is that an appeal against a consent decree and an order recording (or refusing to record) a compromise is not maintainable, nor can a fresh suit be filed for setting aside such decree. Hence, the only remedy available to the aggrieved party is to approach the court that recorded the compromise under the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3. The Court held:

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“17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:

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(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.

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(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.

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(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.

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(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.

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Section 96(3) of the CPC reads: “96. Appeal from original decree.— (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.”

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Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent

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decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made…”

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13. In the present case, the appellant has alleged fraud by 13. In the present case, the appellant has alleged fraud by the respondents in his recall application, which he bears the burden to prove (Shanti Budhiya Vesta Patel v. Niramala Jayprakash Tiwari, (2010) 5 SCC 104; K.Srinivasappa v. M.Mallamma (2022) 17 SCC 460.. The Explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 clearly states that void and voidable agreements under the Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful. By alleging fraud in his recall application, the appellant is effectively impugning the legality of the compromise as proving the same would render the agreement voidable under the Contract Act (Section 19 of the Contract Act provides that when consent to an agreement is caused by fraud, it is voidable at the opinion of the party whose consent was so caused). When the court disposes of a proceeding pursuant to a compromise under Order 23, Rule 3, it bears the duty to examine this issue and be satisfied that the agreement or compromise is lawful. The proviso explicitly obligates the court that entertains the petition of compromise to determine this issue, and as per the law laid down by this Court in Banwari Lal (supra), this

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issue can be agitated by way of a recall application even after the compromise decree has been passed.

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14. By the impugned order, the High Court dismissed the application solely on the ground that the order dated 14.07.2022 recording the compromise does not grant liberty to restore the appeal. We are of the opinion that this is not the correct approach, as it defeats the statutory right and remedy available to the appellant under the CPC. This Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat (supra), as well as several other cases,10 has held that only the court that entertains the petition of compromise can determine its legality, at the time of recording the compromise or when it is questioned by way of a recall application. No other remedy is available to the party who is aggrieved by the compromise decree as an appeal and fresh suit are not maintainable under the CPC.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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As stated supra, except challenging the compromise decree by filing WP No.103234/2018 in which there was no stay, the respondent has not placed any legal or acceptable evidence to establish that the compromise

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decree was illegal and invalid and not binding upon him, especially in the light of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the respondent had failed to prove that the compromise decree was vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation.

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As stated supra, in the absence of the compromise decree being set aside by a competent Court in a manner known to law, mere non-inclusion of all alleged co-sharers and all alleged joint family properties and mere allegation of non-joinder of all alleged co-sharers and noninclusion of all alleged joint family properties in OS No.340/1991 could not have been the basis to come to the conclusion that the compromise decree was illegal or invalid, especially when the respondent was a party to the compromise decree and as such the trial Court clearly misdirected itself in coming to the erroneous conclusion that the compromise decree was invalid for alleged non-joinder of parties and non-inclusion of alleged joint family

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properties and the said finding recorded by the trial Court deserves to be set aside.

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Insofar as the finding recorded by the trial Court as regards the appeal filed by the respondent before the Assistant Commissioner having been allowed is concerned, the said order relates to change of katha, which was passed immediately prior to the filing of the suit, which was instituted on 15.11.2018 and in the light of the judgment of the full bench of this Court, in the case of Jayamma versus State of Karnataka and others³ , no reliance would have been placed upon the order of the Assistant Commissioner to non-suit the plaintiff in the present suit.

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Under these circumstances, upon reappreciation, re-consideration and re-evaluation of the entire material on record, we are of the considered opinion that the trial Court committed a grave and serious error of law and fact, in dismissing the suit filed by the appellantplaintiff by improper and erroneous application of law and

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3 ILR 2020 Karnataka 1449

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material on record, warranting interference by this Court in the present appeal, which deserves to be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree and by decreeing the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff and issuing certain directions in this regard.

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Accordingly, the following:

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ORDER

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I) Appeal is hereby allowed.

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II) Impugned judgment and decree dated 06.10.2023 passed in OS No.527/2018 by the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Gokak is hereby set aside.

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III) Suit of the plaintiff is hereby decreed as prayed for in the suit. It is however made clear that this order and finding recorded herein are restricted to the present appeal and suit. All rival contentions between the parties in WP No.103234/2018 are kept open, and to be decided in accordance with law.

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IV) It is made clear that the order and the findings recorded in this appeal will not come in the way of both parties urging their rival contentions in WP No.103234/2018 in accordance with law.

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V) Modified decree to be drawn accordingly.

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Sd/(S.R. KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE

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Sd/(C.M. POONACHA) JUDGE

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HMB CT-MCK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 62

Shankareppa S/O. Satteppa Nadagouda v. Shivangouda S/O. Satteppa Nadagouda Mudhol

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Shankareppa S/O. Satteppa Nadagouda v. Shivangouda S/O. Satteppa Nadagouda Mudhol

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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