Sri B.R. Ramesh Vs Kanthamma Dead by Lr Smt Manjula

SMT. PATHUR UMADEVI, W/O NAGABHUSHANA POTTURU, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, R/AT NO.1149 AND 1150, 13^TH MAIN, OPP. TO JAKKUR AERODROME, JUDICIAL LAYOUT, GKVK POST, YELAHANKA, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK -560 065.

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SMT. PATHUR SRIDEVI, D/O LATE SHEKARA NAIDU AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS R/AT NO.33, GREEN ASH STREET. MONROE TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -08831

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SMT. VAIKUNTAM RAMADEVI D/O LATE SHEKARA NAIDU AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS R/AT 8-3-320/1 FLAT NO.202M, SRI SAI RAM RESIDENCY, YELLAREDDYGUDA, BEHIND SARADHI STUDIO, KHAIRTABAD, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA – 500 073

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SMT. SUDHA RANI VAIKUNTAM DAKSHAYANI W/O P.SRINIVASULA NAIDU AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS R/AT 8-3-320/1, FLAT NO.202M, SRI SAI RAM RESIDENCY YELLAREDDYGUDA, BEHIND SARADHI STUDIO KHAIRTABAD, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA – 500 073.

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SRI. VAIKUNTAM SRINIVASA RAO S/O LATE SHEKARA NAIDU AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS R/AT 105, BRIGHTURST DRIVE, CHESTER FIELD, CHICAGO,

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HC-KAR

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 63005

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SRI K.B.MURALI S/O K.P.BYRAPPA AGE 38 YEARS RESIDING AT KONDENAHALLI VILLAGE, NANDI HOBLI, CHICKBALLAPUR TALUK

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. ARUNKUMARA.K, SR. ADVOCATE FOR

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SRI. D. BHANU PRADEEP, ADVOCATE FOR R2 AND R3 AND C/R7)

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THIS MFA FILED U/O 43 RULE 1(r) OF CPC, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 05.06.2025 PASSED ON I.A.NO.17 IN O.S.NO.121/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND CJM, CHICKBALLAPURA, DISMISSING I.A.NO.17 FILED UNDER ORDER 39 RULE 1 AND 2 AND 7 OF CPC.

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IN MFA NO.5678/2025:

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BETWEEN:

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SRI. B R RAMESH S/O B RANGAIAH SHETTY, AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS, R/AT 2^ND CROSS, M.G.ROAD, CHICKBALLAPUR CITY

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...APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. KRUTIKA RAGHAVAN, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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KANTHAMMA DEAD BY LR

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HC-KAR

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SMT MANJULA, D/O LATE KANTHAMMA, HINDU, AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS, R/AT GONDLAMUDDENAHALLI VILLAGE, VIJAYAPURA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK.

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SRI. V.SHEKAR NAIDU DEAD BY LRS

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SMT. PATHUR UMADEVI, W/O NAGABHUSHANA POTTURU, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, R/AT NO.1149 AND 1150, 13^TH MAIN, OPP. TO JAKKUR AERODROME, JUDICIAL LAYOUT, GKVK POST, YELAHANKA, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK -560 065.

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SMT. PATHUR SRIDEVI, D/O LATE SHEKARA NAIDU AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS R/AT NO.33, GREEN ASH STREET. MONROE TOWNSHIP, NEW JERSEY. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -08831

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SMT. VAIKUNTAM RAMADEVI D/O LATE SHEKARA NAIDU AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS R/AT 8-3-320/1 FLAT NO.202M, SRI SAI RAM RESIDENCY, YELLAREDDYGUDA, BEHIND SARADHI STUDIO, KHAIRTABAD, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA – 500 073

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SMT. SUDHA RANI VAIKUNTAM DAKSHAYANI W/O P.SRINIVASULA NAIDU AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS R/AT 8-3-320/1, FLAT NO.202M, SRI SAI RAM RESIDENCY

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YELLAREDDYGUDA, BEHIND SARADHI STUDIO KHAIRTABAD, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA – 500 073.

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SRI. VAIKUNTAM SRINIVASA RAO S/O LATE SHEKARA NAIDU AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS R/AT 105, BRIGHTURST DRIVE, CHESTER FIELD, CHICAGO, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 63005

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SRI K.B.MURALI S/O K.P.BYRAPPA AGE 38 YEARS RESIDING AT KONDENAHALLI VILLAGE, NANDI HOBLI, CHICKBALLAPUR TALUK

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……RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. ARUNKUMARA.K, SR. ADVOCATE FOR

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SRI. D. BHANU PRADEEP, ADVOCATE FOR R2 AND R3 AND C/R7)

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THIS MFA FILED U/O 43 RULE 1(r) OF CPC, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 12.03.2024 PASSED ON I.A.NO.15 AND 16 IN OS. NO. 121/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND CJM, CHICKBALLAPURA, REJECTING THE I.A.NO.15 FILED UNDER ORDER 39 RULE 1 OF CPC AND ALLOWING THE I.A.NO. 16 FILED BY DEFENDANTS NO. 2 AND 3 UNDER SECTION 151 OF CPC.

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THESE APPEALS, COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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HC-KAR

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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MFA No.5938/2025 is filed by the plaintiff questioning the order dated 05.06.2025 passed by the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM at Chikkaballapur, in O.S.No.121/2019 on I.A.No.17 filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1, 2 and 7 of CPC, thereby, I.A.No.17 filed for grant of order of ad-interim temporary injunction to restrain the defendants is dismissed.

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MFA No.5678/2025 is filed by the plaintiff questioning the common order dated 12.03.2024 passed by the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM at Chikkaballapur, in O.S.No.121/2019, on I.A.No.15 filed under Order XXXIX Rule 1 of CPC and on I.A.No.16 filed under Section 151 of CPC, thereby, I.A.No.15 filed for extension of the interim order granted on 17.08.2023 is rejected and I.A.No.16 filed requesting the Court to record that order dated 17.08.2023 granting temporary injunction

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in favour of plaintiff stands vacated on 17.02.2024, is allowed.

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The plaintiff has filed suit for specific performance pleading that the defendant No.1 is the owner of the suit schedule property and there was an agreement of sale between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 on 01.12.2006 for a sale consideration of Rs.36,25,000/- and an advance amount of Rs.15,00,000/was paid in cash, but thereafter, the defendant No.1 had not come forward to execute the registered sale deed. Therefore, the plaintiff has filed the suit for specific performance.

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The defendant Nos.2 and 3 have filed a written statement denying the plaint averments and submitted that defendant Nos.2 and 3 are bonafide purchasers and before filing the suit, the defendant No.1 had already sold the schedule land in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3. Therefore, prays for dismissal of the suit.

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HC-KAR

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The plaintiff while filing the suit has also filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC praying for grant of exparte order of temporary injunction restraining the defendants from making alienation of the suit schedule properties, which was on 25.04.2019 and subsequently, the said order was confirmed on 17.08.2023. It was ordered by the trial Court while granting an order of temporary injunction that the order of temporary injunction has been in force for a period of six months from the date of order and further extension of temporary injunction order will be depending on the conduct of the case by the plaintiff expeditiously. Thereafter, the matter came to be posted on 30.02.2024. In the meantime, on 21.02.2024 the plaintiff has filed an application seeking extension of the temporary injunction, but it was dismissed and it is ordered that the order of temporary injunction dated 17.08.2023 stands vacated on

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17.02.2024.

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The defendants have filed an application

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I.A.No.16 seeking to record that the order dated 17.02.2023 granting order of temporary injunction stands vacated. Therefore, the order is passed dismissing

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I.A.No.15 filed under Order 39 Rules 1 CPC and allowed the application I.A.No.16 filed by the defendant Nos.2 and 3. Further the trial court has dismissed I.A.No.17, which is filed for restraining the defendants from alienating the plaint schedule property and other properties. Against these two orders, the above said appeals are filed.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submitted that the trial court while considering the applications for temporary injunction has not considered the fundamental aspects of prima facie case, balance of convenience and if order of temporary injunction is not granted, then what would be the loss/injury sustained by the plaintiff is also not considered. Therefore, without considering these three aspects, the trial court has mechanically passed the order. Therefore, submitted that

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the order passed is perverse in nature. This is the only principal contention taken by the learned Senior Counsel that wherever an application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC is to be considered, then the questions have

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to be framed regarding prima facie case, balance of convenience and if the order of temporary injunction is not granted then what would be loss/injury sustained by the plaintiff and without considering the same the order passed are not sustainable in the eye of law. Therefore, prays to allow the appeals and remand the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration upon consideration of these three aspects.

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On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/defendant Nos.2 and 3 submitted that there is no perversity in the order passed by the trial court and considering the settled principles of law governing the grant of injunction has correctly passed the order, which needs no interference. Further submitted that the plaintiff has no diligence to prosecute the suit and in the year

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2020, issues were framed, but till today the plaintiff has not lead the evidence. Further submitted that when on 17.08.2023 the trial Court has granted an order of temporary injunction for a period of six months with a specific direction to the plaintiff to lead evidence, but the plaintiff has not at all led evidence. Therefore, this conduct itself shows that the plaintiff does not have prima facie case as well as balance of convenience and it is rightly considered by the trial court. Therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeals.

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Further submitted that admittedly the

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agreement of sale is dated 01.12.2006, but the plaintiff has filed a suit on 25.04.2019 after a lapse of nearly 13 years, which itself is going to show that the plaintiff does not have prima facie case and balance of convenience as it is barred by limitation. When there is threshold bar of limitation, then there is no question of case that it is having prima facie case. Therefore, on this count also the plaintiff does not have a prima facie case and balance of

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convenience and in turn, if such an order of temporary injunction is granted, then the defendants would be put into loss and injury. Therefore considering all the aspects, the trial Court has rightly passed the order on the applications.

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Further submitted that the defendant No.1

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already sold the suit schedule property in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 on 19.01.2019 before filing the suit by the plaintiff and an exparte order of temporary injunction was granted on 25.04.2019, but before that the defendant No.1 sold the said property to the defendant Nos.2 and 3. Therefore, considering all these aspects, it is contended that the plaintiff does not have a prima facie case or balance of convenience. Hence, justified the order

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passed by the trial court and prays to dismiss the appeal.

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He places reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of WANDER LTD. AND ANOTHER vs ANTOX INDIA PVT. LTD.¹ .

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Though the trial court has not formulated points regarding prima facie case and balance of convenience and if an order of temporary injunction is not granted, then what would be the loss or injury to the plaintiff, but after considering the arguments addressed by the both the learned Senior Counsels, this Court is going to formulate the following points for consideration to ascertain the plaintiff is entitled to an equitable relief of order of temporary injunction:

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(i) Whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff makes out prima facie case on the basis of the materials produced before the trial court?

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(ii) Whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the plaintiff makes out case of balance of convenience on the basis of the

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1 1990 (Supp) SCC 727

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materials produced before the trial court so as to grant an order of temporary injunction? (iii) Whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, if an order of temporary injunction is not granted then plaintiff would suffer any irreparable loss or injury?

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(iv) Whether the impugned order passed by the trial court requires any interference or not?

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The plaintiff has filed the suit for specific performance simpliciter by making pleading that the defendant No.1 was the owner of the suit schedule property and she has offered the schedule land for sale and accordingly, the plaintiff has agreed to purchase the same and hence, an agreement of sale is executed on 01.10.2006 for total sale consideration of Rs.36,25,000/and it is the case of plaintiff that an amount of Rs.15,00,000/- was paid as advance through cash. Thereafterwards, the plaintiff's with an allegation that defendant No.1 has not come forward to execute the sale deed, filed a suit for specific performance of contract.

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Initially on the date of filing of the suit on 25.04.2019, the trial Court has passed an exparte order of temporary injunction. Later on, it was after contest of the said application the trial Court has passed an exparte order of temporary injunction on 17.08.2023. The trial court in exercise of its discretion has granted an order of temporary injunction for a period of six months subject to the condition that expeditiously conducting the trial by the plaintiff. The said period of six months period was lapsed on 17.02.2024. While granting the order of temporary injunction, the next date is posted on 30.08.2023. On 21.02.2024, the plaintiff has filed an application for extension of the order of temporary injunction and the defendants have filed I.A.No.16 seeking for vacating the order of temporary injunction and on 12.03.2024, the trial court has passed an order rejecting I.A.No.15 filed by the plaintiff and allowing I.A.No.16 filed by the defendant Nos.2 and 3 and ordered that temporary injunction granted on 17.08.2023 stands vacated on 17.02.2024.

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Further the trial court has also dismissed the application I.A.No.17 filed by the plaintiff.

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While considering the orders passed of not continuing the order of temporary injunction, though the trial Court has not formulated points for consideration regarding prima facie case, balance of convenience and if order of temporary injunction is not granted whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss or injury, but whether there is any illegality, arbitrariness or perversity in the impugned order is to be considered in the light of principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court. It is worthwhile to refer several judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of WANDER LTD. AND ANOTHER vs ANTOX INDIA PVT.

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LTD.² . at paragraphs 9, 13, 14 has held as under:

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“9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at

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2 1990 (Supp) SCC 727

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this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated

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“...is to protect the plaintiff against

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injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the ‘balance of convenience’ lies.”

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The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted.”

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“13 . On a consideration of the matter, we are afraid, the appellate bench fell into error on two important propositions. The first is a misdirection in regard to the very scope and nature of the appeals before it and the limitations on the powers of the appellate court to substitute its own discretion in an appeal preferred against a discretionary order. The second pertains to the infirmities in the ratiocination as to the quality of Antox's alleged user of the trademark on which the passing-off action is founded. We shall deal with these two separately.

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14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not

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interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [(1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC 1156] : (SCR 721)

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“... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’.”

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The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.”

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Regarding the power of appellate court to make

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interference with the discretionary order of the trial court on the injunction, it is worth to refer the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of

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RAMAKANT AMBALAL CHOKSI vs HARISH AMBALAL

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CHOKSI AND OTHERS³ at paragraphs 31, 32 and 33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principle of law for granting temporary injunction as follows:

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“31. The appellate court in an appeal from an interlocutory order granting or declining to grant interim injunction is only required to adjudicate the validity of such order applying the well-settled principles governing the scope of jurisdiction of the appellate court under Order 43CPC which have been reiterated in various other decisions of this Court. The appellate court should not assume unlimited jurisdiction and should guide its powers within the contours laid down in Wander case [Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727] .

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Principles governing grant of temporary injunction

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32. In Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad [Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad, (2001) 5 SCC 568] , it was held by this Court that it would not be appropriate for any court to hold a mini-trial at the stage of grant of temporary injunction.

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33. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition precedent for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party

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3 (2024) 11 SCC 351

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seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely, one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. (See Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719]).”

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering

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the various judgments has crystalized and laid down the principle of law regarding the power of appellate court to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial court as above stated.

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Considering the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and applying to the fact of present case is considered, whether the plaintiff has made

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out prima facie case and balance of convenience, firstly, it is worth to consider the dates and events of agreement of sale and when the plaintiff has chosen to exercise his right for special performance. Admittedly, the agreement of sale is dated 01.12.2006 and the plaintiff has filed the suit on 25.04.2019. The plaintiff has taken nearly 13 years time to file the suit to exercise his right of specific performance. It is submitted that the plaintiff has explained as to what is the cause for delay in filing the suit after 13 years. Whatever may be the explanations for the delay offered in the plaint that has to be considered during the trial, but the fact remains that there is a delay of 13 years in filing the suit. Prima facie the claim attracts bar under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. This is one of the circumstances that an order of temporary injunction cannot be given in favour of the plaintiff.

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Secondly, when the trial Court has granted

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order of temporary injunction on 17.08.2023 for a period of six months and in its discretion the trial Court has

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directed the plaintiff to conduct trial expeditiously, but the plaintiff has not lead evidence. The order sheet shows that the issues framed on 02.01.2020 and invited the plaintiff for evidence, but the order sheet shows that till today the plaintiff has not lead evidence. Therefore, this conduct of the plaintiff also negates his entitlement to the benefit of the discretionary and equitable relief of order of temporary injunction.

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The aspect of prima facie and balance of convenience are required to be considered according to the pleadings and conduct of both the plaintiff and defendants. As above discussed, there is 13 years delay in filing the suit. This is also one of the factors to be considered in the light of the law as per Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The relief of grant of decree of permanent injunction is discretionary one. Where there is delay in approaching the Court and also considering the conduct of the plaintiff in not leading evidence even after six years from the date of filing of the suit, also constitute

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the fact that the plaintiff does not have prima facie case so as to grant the discretionary relief of necessarily main relief of specific performance. Therefore, on these counts the plaintiff has failed to prove both prima facie case and

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balance of convenience.

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Further the defendant Nos.2 and 3 have purchased the suit schedule property from defendant No.1 on 19.01.2019, which is before filing of the suit. No doubt, at that point of time the agreement of sale was in subsistence, but before filing the suit the defendant Nos.2 and 3 have purchased the suit schedule properties from defendant No.1. Therefore, the trial court is correct in dismissing the applications filed by the plaintiff.

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Considering the observations made by the trial Court, there is no perversity found in the order passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not assume unwarranted jurisdiction and should exercise its powers within the contours of the law laid down in WANDER

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LTD.’s case above stated. When considering the factual matrix as above discussed, just because the trial Court has not formulated the three points like prima facie case, balance of convenience and if injunction is not granted then what would be the irreparable loss or injury suffered by the plaintiff, but in totality the appellate court has to see whether there is perversity in the order passed by the trial court. Just because the trial court has not formulated these three points, it could not be seen in a magnified glass to see whether there is perversity in the order of the trial court, but this Court while considering the factual matrix does not see any perversity in the order. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to make out prima facie case and balance of convenience. Accordingly, I answer Point Nos.(i) and (ii) in the negative.

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The plaintiff is merely an agreement holder, whereas the defendant Nos.2 and 3 have purchased the suit schedule property before filing the suit and therefore, if an order of temporary injunction is not granted, then

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there would not be loss or injury to plaintiff rather, if granted, the defendant Nos.2 and 3 would suffer irreparable loss and injury. Therefore, the plaintiff has not made out sufficient grounds to show that if temporary injunction is not granted, there would be loss or injury to the plaintiff. Accordingly, I answer Point No.(iii) in the negative.

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Consequently, the appeals are liable to be dismissed without causing interference with the order of trial court. Hence, I answer Point No.(iv) in the negative.

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For the reasons aforestated, I proceed by following order:

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ORDER

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(i) The appeals are hereby dismissed .

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SD/(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR) JUDGE

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DR

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List No.: 1 Sl No.: 31

Sri B.R. Ramesh v. Kanthamma Dead by Lr Smt Manjula

Case brief

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Sri B.R. Ramesh v. Kanthamma Dead by Lr Smt Manjula

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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