Jayalakshmi Vs Gireesh M

THIS MFA IS FILED U/O 43 RULE 1(r) R/W SECTION 151 OF CPC, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 23.07.2024 PASSED ON I.A.NO.1 IN OS.NO.4803/2024 ON THE FILE OF THE XXXVIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU CCH-39, DISMISSING THE IA.NO.1 FILED UNDER ORDER 39 RULE 1 AND 2 R/W SECTION 151 OF CPC.

¶24

THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

¶25

CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR

¶26

CAV JUDGMENT

¶27

The plaintiff being aggrieved by the order of dismissal dated 23.07.2024 passed on I.A.No.1 filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC by the XXXVIII Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru City, in O.S.No.4803/2024, thereby, not granting an order of temporary injunction, the present appeal is filed.

¶28

3 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶29

CASE OF PLAINTIFF:

¶30

The plaintiff has filed suit praying decree of permanent injunction against the defendants and also for mandatory injunction to remove the construction made on the suit schedule property by contending that plaintiff is the owner of residential site bearing No.323/208 formed by the REMCO BHEL House Building Co-operative Society (hereinafter referred to as ‘Society’ for short). The society has formed layout in the year 1990 and the suit schedule property was allotted to one K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma, one of the member of the Society under registered sale deed dated 17.11.1992 and in turn, said K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma had sold it to one Gopal Raju under registered sale deed dated 07.02.1996 and in turn, said Gopal Raju had sold the suit property to the plaintiff under registered sale deed 26.03.2002 and thereafter other revenue documents have been changed in the name of plaintiff and the plaintiff has been paying property taxes regularly and she is in possession. Thus, in this way, the plaintiff became the owner of property.

¶31

4 -

¶32

NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶33

With the allegation against the defendants

¶34

having encroached the suit schedule property and started to put up construction on the property, the plaintiff had filed an application - I.A.No.1 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC praying temporary injunction, but same was dismissed. Hence, the present appeal is filed praying to set aside the dismissal order passed by the trial court.

¶35

Defendant Nos.1 to 4 have appeared through their counsel. Defendant Nos.3 and 4 have filed their written statement and objections to I.A.No.1, but defendant Nos.1 and 2 have adopted the written statement filed by defendant Nos.3 and 4. It is contended that originally Sy.No.25/4 (Old Sy.No.25) measuring 3 acres 1 gunta along with other lands was ancestral property of defendant No.3. The BDA had acquired the said land for the formation of residential layout in favour of REMCO BHEL Society. Thereafter, defendant No.3 and his family members have challenged the said acquisition proceedings initiated by the BDA in favour of Society

¶36

5 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶37

before this Court in W.P.No.21920/2010 and this Court has quashed the acquisition proceedings and said judgment is reported in ILR 1991 KAR 2248. Thereafter Society had challenged the said decision before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court has affirmed the decision taken by this Court. Therefore, as per the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court defendant No.3 has refunded the amount received in lieu of acquisition proceedings to the Special Land Acquisition Officer and BDA. Thus, in this way the BDA reconveyed the said land in favour of defendant No.3. Thereafter, defendant No.3 has got converted the land from agricultural to nonagricultural and defendant No.3 has paid betterment amount to the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (for short ‘BBMP’).

¶38

After re-conveying the land to defendant No.3 and put the defendant No.3 in possession, defendant No.3 had sold the property to defendant Nos.1 and 2. When this being the fact, Society has already formed the layout

¶39

6 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶40

and allotted some of the sites to its employees/members. Thus, Society had allotted the suit schedule property to one K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma vide sale deed dated 17.11.1992. In turn, said K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma sold the suit schedule property to one Gopal Raju on 07.02.1996. Said Gopal Raju sold the schedule property of plaintiff through registered sale deed on 26.03.2002.

¶41

When this being the fact, the Society had entered into transactions with the land owners vide a deed of title for declaration cum ratification deed. By virtue of this deed of declaration cum ratification, the Society has purchased the property and the residential layout continued to be in possession of the Society and its allottees/members.

¶42

It is further alleged in the plaint that when this being the fact defendant No.3 under the partition deed between him and other legal heirs of Basappa in respect of Sy.No.25/4 suppressed the declaration cum ratification deed, but defendant No.3 based on the partition deed got

¶43

7 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶44

conversion order from the revenue authorities in set of lands, which were already tagged under BBMP in the name of allottees including the appellant.

¶45

The BBMP had revoked the khatha which is allotted by the Society and had challenged the same in W.P.No.21920/2010 before this Court and this Court had allowed the writ petition, set aside the revocation of order of khatha considering the fact that Society has formed residential layout notwithstanding setting aside of acquisition, as thereafter the Society had entered into declaration cum ratification deed.

¶46

When things stood thus, the plaintiff being purchaser of the suit property through registered sale deed dated 05.03.2002 filed suit in O.S.No.4435/2013 for permanent injunction against defendants with allegation that defendants have started interfering with the possession of plaintiff and started construction. Said suit namely, O.S.No.4435/2013 came to be dismissed for non prosecution.

¶47

8 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶48

Defendant No.3 executed a gift deed in favour

¶49

of his wife - defendant No.4. Subsequently, defendant No.4 transferred the suit property of Sy.No.25/4 to defendant Nos.1 and 2. Further defendant No.4 executed sale deed in favour of one B.R.Mallikarjuna in respect of Site No.2 in layout formed in Sy.No.25/4. Said B.R.Mallikarjuna sold the said property in favour of defendant Nos.1 and 2. It is contended that the said property was sold by defendant No.3 to defendant No.4 and defendant No.4 sold the same to B.R.Mallikarjuna, is imaginary one. But defendant Nos.1 and 2 are falsely claiming that this property belongs to defendant Nos.1 and 2.

¶50

Thereafter plaintiff filed a Miscellaneous Petition No.300/2021 for restoration of O.S.No.4435/2013 and also filed an application for temporary injunction, but this was dismissed. Further plaintiff has stated that similarly placed allottee one Radhamani filed suit O.S.No.4053/2021 in respect of Site No.207 for

¶51

9 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶52

permanent injunction against defendant Nos.1 and 2 and application filed for temporary injunction was dismissed. Said Radhamani had preferred MFA No.2839/2021 before this Court and this Court has allowed the said MFA No.3829/2021 and granted an order of temporary injunction. Therefore, in the present case, plaintiff being aggrieved by the order of dismissal of application filed for temporary injunction has preferred the present appeal.

¶53

SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/ PLAINTIFF:

¶54

Learned counsel for the appellant in support of

¶55

the points raised in the appeal has argued that though acquisition proceedings was quashed by this Court and upheld by the Supreme Court, by that time the Society had already formed layout and allotted sites to its members. Though acquisition of the land on behalf of Society was quashed, later on the said Society had entered into transactions with the land owners for title deed as declaration cum ratification deed. Thus, the

¶56

10 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶57

Society is in possession of the property and never parted with the possession and therefore, in this way the plaintiff has become the owner of suit property from one Gopal Raju. Said Gopal Raju had purchased the suit property from K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma and K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma had purchased the suit property from the Society.

¶58

Therefore, there is title in favor of plaintiff and he is in possession of the property, but the defendants have started illegal construction by encroaching the property of the plaintiff. Therefore, order by the trial court in this application for temporary injunction is not correct.

¶59

Further submitted that though BBMP has

¶60

revoked the khatha of the sites formed by it, later on the Society had filed W.P.No.21920/2010 challenging the revocation of khatha and said writ petition is allowed and set aside the order of revocation of khatha considering the fact that the Society had already formed layout and had entered into declaration cum ratification deed with the owners. Further submitted that in this regard there is a

¶61

11 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶62

valid conveyance of title in favour of plaintiff, but defendants have illegally encroached the suit schedule property and started the construction. Thus, for injuncting the said construction the application filed by the plaintiff had made out prima facie case for grant of order of temporary injunction and balance of convenience and if an order of temporary injunction is not granted, then the plaintiff would be put into irreparable loss and injury. Therefore prays for allowing the appeal by granting an order of temporary injunction.

¶63

The learned counsel for appellant/plaintiff submitted several documents with memo and submitted prima facie case is made out.

¶64

Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff in support of his arguments has filed a memo along with several documents. He also places reliance on the following judgments:

¶65

12 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶66

Sl. No.	Particulars
1	1990 (SUPP) SCC 727: Wander Ltd. And Another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd., (Wander’s Case)
2.	(1975) AC 396: American Cyanamid Co. Vs. Ethicon Ltd., (Ethicon’s Case)
3.	Extract of Commercial Injunctions – Steven Gee Z.C. 6^thEdition published by SWEET & MAXWELL
4.	(2004) 8 SCC 488: Maharwalkhewaji Trust (Retd.) Faridkot Vs. Baldev Dass (Maharwalkhewaji’s Case)
5.	RFA No.2196/2017: Kanchanmalaa Vs. Girija V Raj (Kanchanamalaa’s Case)
6.	(1990) 2 SCC 117: Dorab Cawasji Warden Vs. Coomi Sorab Warden And Others (Dorab’s Case)
7.	(2018) 17 SCC 203: Samir Narain Bhojwani Vs Aurora Properties And Investments And Another (Samir Narain’s Case)
8.	AIR 1965 SC 295: Suraj Rattan Thirani and Others Vs. Azamabad Tea Co. Ltd. And Others (Suraj Rattan’s Case)
9.	(2018) 12 SCC 647: Sunkamma (Dead) By Legal Representatives Vs. S. Pushparaj (Dead) By Legal Representatives (Sukamma’s Case)

¶67

SUBMISSION OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS/ DEFENDANTS:

¶68

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that defendant No.3 is the owner of land. Defendant No.3 has gifted the suit property to his wife - defendant No.4. In turn, defendant No.4 had sold

¶69

13 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶70

the suit property in favour of defendant Nos.1 and 2. Therefore submitted that though initially the Society had formed layout as the land belonged to defendant No.3 was acquired by BDA in favour of the Society for forming layout, but said acquisition proceedings was quashed by this Court and upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and as such the Society is no more owner of the land on which sites were formed. Whatever the plaintiff is claiming title through Gopal Raju and K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma is not a valid conveyance as Society was not having any title to make allotment of sites in favour of K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma, whereas defendant Nos.1 and 2 have purchased the property from the owner as the valid conveyance of title. Therefore submitted that when there is dispute regarding title, then the suit filed only for relief of claiming permanent injunction is not maintainable and the plaintiff ought to have filed the suit for declaration. Therefore submitted that this is correctly appreciated by the trial court as plaintiff has not made out prima facie case and

¶71

14 -

¶72

NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶73

hence, there is no balance of convenience in favour of

¶74

plaintiff and thus, rightly dismissed the application.

¶75

In support of arguments learned counsel for the

¶76

respondents/defendants has filed a Memo along with several documents. Learned counsel for the respondents

¶77

also places reliance on the following judgments:

¶78

Sl. No.	Particulars
1	(1995) 2 SCC 677:H.M.T.House Building Cooperative Society Vs. Syed Khader and Others (Syed Khader’s Case)
2	SLP (C) No.990/2023: M. Haroonal Rasheed Vs. Rajlaxmi N. Palagulla& Ors. (M. Haroonal’s Case)
3	MFA Nos.6158/2019 & connected matters:Basi Reddy Jayarami Reddy & Ors. Vs. G. Vasundara Lakshmi & Ors. (Basi Reddy’s Case)
4	(2018) 4 KCCR 3269:S.C.Gangadharaiah Vs. Remco (Bhel), House Building Co-Operative Society Limited, Bengaluru and Others(S.C.Gangadharaiah’s Case)
5	RFA No.66/2018:Dr.V.Ramachandran Vs. Uddi Prabhu & Another (Uddi Prabhu’s Case)
6	ILR 1996 Kar 1618: Mirza Mohammed Yousuf Baig Vs. M/s.Deccan Enterprises (Deccan Enterprises’s Case)
7	MFA No.2563/2023: A. Nagaraja Vs. B.K.Ravi (A. Nagaraja’s Case)
8	MFA No.722/2021: B.S.Ramesha Vs. Latha B. Singh and Others (B.S.Ramesha’s Case)
9	ILR 1991 Kar 2248: Narayana Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka (Narayana Reddy’s Case)
10	ILR 1995 KAR 1962: H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society Vs. Syed Khader (Syed Khader’s Case)

¶79

15 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶80

Upon hearing the arguments from both sides,

¶81

the points that would arise for consideration are as follows:

¶82

(1) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case and the materials produced, the plaintiff makes out prima facie case?

¶83

(2) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, plaintiff proves there is balance of convenience in favour of her?

¶84

(3) Whether, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, plaintiff proves that in case an order of temporary injunction is not granted, the plaintiff suffers irreparable loss and injury?

¶85

The plaintiff has filed suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff and for mandatory injunction to remove construction made on it by defendant Nos.1 and 2. The plaintiff is claiming title and ownership through Gopal Raju by virtue of registered sale deed 07.02.1996. The said Gopal Raju had purchased suit schedule property from one K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma through registered sale deed dated 17.11.1992, K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma

¶86

16 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶87

had purchased property from Society. Therefore, in this way, the plaintiff is claiming title, but defendant Nos.1 and 2 have contended that they have purchased suit schedule property from defendant No.4. Originally, defendant No.3 is the owner of land bearing Sy.No.25/1, on which the suit schedule site was formed. Defendant No.3 had executed gift in favour of defendant No.4 (wife of defendant No.3) therefore, defendant Nos.1 and 2 are claiming title through defendant No.3, but the suit is filed only for permanent injunction. Here there is a rival claim by both the plaintiff and defendants regarding title. The suit schedule property on which land the site is formed is in dispute that who is the owner of land whether the Society or defendant No.3. When this being the fact the Trial Court is correct in observing that how the suit only for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction is maintainable.

¶88

20. Admittedly, defendant No.3 was original owner

¶89

of the land bearing Sy.No.25. The BDA had acquired the

¶90

17 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶91

said land in favour of Society for the formation of layout and sites thereon, then defendant No.3 and other owners have challenged the said land acquisition proceedings and the land acquisition proceedings were quashed by this Court and the same was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, thus Special Leave Petition No.2477/2022 came to be dismissed. Though the Society is claiming that the acquisition proceedings were quashed, but later on the Society has made transaction of declaration cum ratification deed with some of the owners, but in this deed of declaration cum ratification defendant No.3 was not party therefore, the ownership was remained with defendant No.3 since the acquisition proceedings were quashed. Therefore, the Society was no more remained as owner of the land, but the Society might have entered into transactions of declaration cum ratification deed with other land owners after quashment of acquisition proceedings and there is no material to show that the BHEL Society had been transacted with defendant No.3 by executing declaration cum ratification deed. Thus, when

¶92

18 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶93

the ownership of the land bearing Sy.No.25 was remained with defendant No.3, therefore later on as per pleadings of the defendants, defendant No.3 had got converted the land and formed layout. Defendant No.3 being owner had gifted the said land in favour of his wife (defendant No.4). Defendant Nos.1 and 2 have purchased the property from defendant No.4. Therefore, when this being the rival pleadings, possession always follows title and in this regard, it is significant to note the observations made by the Trial Court while considering the application.

¶94

On earlier occasion, the plaintiff has filed suit in O.S.No.4435/2013, but, it was dismissed for nonprosecution on 17.06.2018. Thereafter, Misc. Petition No.300/2021 was filed for restoration of the suit in O.S.No.4435/2016 and also filed an application for temporary injunction but both were dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiff has filed the instant suit, but at initial point of time the plaintiff was unsuccessful in O.S.No.4435/2013.

¶95

19 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶96

The plaintiff is claiming flow of title from BHEL Society, but the land acquisition proceedings initiated in favour of BHEL Society were quashed therefore, in this regard whatever the flow of title by BHEL Society is doubtful. Whereas, the flow of title by defendant Nos.1 and 2 originated from defendant No.3, undisputedly, defendant No.3 is the owner of the land bearing Sy.No.25. In this regard, it is significant to observe here that how the suit only for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction is maintainable.

¶97

Though the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff argued that the BHEL Society has allotted the site towards one K.B.Anantakrishna Sarma and khatha was effected by BBMP, but the khatha is not title deed. Though the plaintiff is claiming that the declaration cum ratification deed was executed on 02.03.2000 and document is produced in this regard, either defendant No.3 or his father Basappa was not party to the said declaration cum ratification deed. This Court in

¶98

20 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶99

W.P.No.21920/2010 by the order dated 13.02.2013 while challenging the revocation of khatha standing in the name

¶100

of allottees by the BHEL Society and the order of revocation of khatha was quashed, but it is observed that the land owners would have to get their right decided in Civil Suit in view of several subsequent developments leading to several complicated questions. Therefore, in this regard the BHEL Society could not make claim on the base of khatha issued to its members that they have become the owners of the property. The title over the land is yet to be decided. Though the plaintiff is claiming that she has purchased property on 05.03.2002 through registered sale deed and also khata was issued, but the very flow of title as above discussed as per material produced by both the parties is the question to be decided in the suit, but the suit is filed only for permanent injunction and for mandatory injunction. Now, at this stage whether prima facie case is made out or not, is to be considered.

¶101

21 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶102

Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff

¶103

places reliance on the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and it is worthwhile to refer one of the decision relied on by the counsel for the appellant in the case of Wander’s Case (supra) at paragraph No.9 observed as follows:

¶104

“ 9 . Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated:

¶105

“….is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the ‘balance of convenience’ lies.“

¶106

The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie case. The Court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration

¶107

22 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶108

whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted.”

¶109

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharwal khewaji’s Case (supra) has observed regarding the principle governing of granting of an order of temporary injunction at paragraph No.10, which reads as under:

¶110

“10. Be that as it may, Mr Sachar is right in contending that unless and until a case of irreparable loss or damage is made out by a party to the suit, the court should not permit the nature of the property being changed which also includes alienation or transfer of the property which may lead to loss or damage being caused to the party who may ultimately succeed and may further lead to multiplicity of proceedings. In the instant case no such case of irreparable loss is made out except contending that the legal proceedings are likely to take a long time, therefore, the respondent should be permitted to put the scheduled property to better use. We do not think in the facts and circumstances of this case, the lower appellate court and the High Court were justified in permitting the respondent to change the nature of the property by putting up construction as also by permitting the alienation of the property, whatever may be the conditions on which the same is done. In the event of the appellant’s claim being found baseless ultimately, it is always open to the respondent to claim damages or, in an appropriate case, the court may itself award damages for the loss suffered, if any, in this regard. Since the facts of this case do not make out any extraordinary ground for permitting the respondent to put up construction and alienate the same, we think both the courts below, namely, the lower appellate

¶111

23 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶112

court and the High Court erred in making the impugned orders. The said orders are set aside and the order of the trial court is restored.”

¶113

26. In similar circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme

¶114

Court in the case of Dorab’s Case (supra) has observed

¶115

at paragraph Nos.16 and 17 as follows:

¶116

“16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:

¶117

(1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction.

¶118

(2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money.

¶119

(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief.

¶120

17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or

¶121

24 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶122

absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.”

¶123

In similar circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SAMIR NARAIN’s case (supra) at paragraph No.26 has held as follows:

¶124

“26. The principle expounded in this decision has been consistently followed by this Court. It is well established that an interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily granted. It is an order that is passed only in circumstances which are clear and the prima facie material clearly justify a finding that the status quo has been altered by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of justice demanded that the status quo ante be restored by way of an interim mandatory injunction. [see Metro Marins v. Bonus Watch Co. (P) Ltd.¹ , Kishore Kumar Khaitan v. Praveen Kumar Singh² and Purshottam Vishandas Raheja v. Shrichand Vishandas Raheja³ ]”

¶125

Therefore, upon the principle of law laid down above stated relied on by the counsel for the appellant/plaintiff grant of relief of an order of temporary injunction is based on principle of equity and is discretionary on the Court to decide to grant an order of temporary injunction. The party desires to obtain an order

¶126

1 (2004) 7 SCC 478

¶127

2 (2006) 3 SCC 312

¶128

3 (2011) 6 SCC 73: (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 204

¶129

25 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶130

of temporary injunction shall make out prima facie case and this prima facie case shall be lawful one. The plaintiff shall have to prove possession on it but upon perusal prima facie materials, defendant Nos.1 and 2 by claiming title through defendant Nos.3 and 4 by virtue of registered sale deed is putting up construction which prima facie shows that the plaintiff is not in possession over the suit schedule property.

¶131

Further, defendant Nos.1 and 2 have more probable prima facie material showing conveyance by flow of title compared to the plaintiff’s flow of title as discussed above. The plaintiff and defendants have produced volume of documents but upon perusal of the same the fact that the land acquisition proceedings were quashed is not in dispute. Thereafter, defendant No.3 has refunded the amount to the BHEL Society and got retained the original land with him. These are the prima facie materials produced before this Court.

¶132

26 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶133

This Court in respect of the very same land in which defendant No.3-BHEL Society and allottees are claiming through BHEL were parties in MFA No.7776/2015 decided on 30.11.2015 has observed at paragraph No.21 has follows:

¶134

“21. As rightly urged by the learned Senior counsel, Sri. Nanjunda Reddy, if there was a ratification deed executed on 02.03.2000 by defendant No.2 – owner of the property or his predecessor in title, the letter dated 09.10.2002 could not have been written by the Society to the Principal Secretary. In addition, when the entire acquisition was quashed by the Apex Court directing restoration of the land to the land owners and when as per the letter referred to above, the Society had received the amount paid to the land owners and had put them in possession, question of transferring title back to the society by the land owners by way of the alleged unregistered ratification deed would not arise. The ratification deed, prima facie, cannot be relied upon to establish restoration of title and possession in favour of the Society.”

¶135

31. Therefore, when this being the fact emerged

¶136

prima facie from the material produced before the Trial Court and this Court, the plaintiff cannot take benefit of the order passed in MFA No.3829/2021 decided on 22.10.2021 as this appeal is pertaining to the site No.207. The appellant/plaintiff therein was claiming to be allottee from the BHEL Society. Though this Court has granted an

¶137

27 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶138

interim order of temporary injunction but later on the said appellant Smt. Radhamani had withdrawn the suit in O.S.No.4053/2021, this fact is not disputed by the counsel for the appellant. The said Smt. Radhamani in O.S.No.4053/2021 has filed a memo seeking withdrawal of the suit and accordingly, the suit was dismissed as withdrawn. In this regard, this Court in similar circumstances where the allottees from BHEL Society were unsuccessful in obtaining the order of temporary injunction culminating into filing of appeal in MFA No.6158/2019 by

¶139

Basi Reddy Jayarami Reddy and others against the land owners, it is observed at paragraph Nos.14 and 15 as follows:

¶140

”14. I have already observed that the plaintiffs have produced sale deeds standing in their names. All the suits are founded on a common premise, therefore suffice it to examine documents produced in one of the suits. In O.S.No.1452/2018, the plaintiff is G. Santhiram. Copy of the sale deed dated 14.10.1992 shows that REMCO (BHEL) House Building Cooperative Society Limited sold site No.108 in the layout said to have been formed by it to J.S. Basavaraj. Then on 14.09.1995 J.S. Basavaraj sold the said site to J. Rajendra Prasad. On 26.08.2002, J. Rajendra Prasad sold the very same site to G. Santhiram, the plaintiff. There are other documents like, khata endorsement, possession certificate, encumbrance certificate etc. The main documents are the sale deeds. It is very

¶141

28 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶142

important to note here that the plaintiffs admit quashing of acquisition in the writ petitions. All the writ petitions were allowed on 18.06.1991 and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals preferred challenging the order in the writ petitions. While dismissing the appeals, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed that the possession of the lands must be restored to the land owners and that the land owners must refund the amounts received by them towards compensation.

¶143

15. Perusal of the documents produced by the defendants shows that one Niranjana Murthy, representing the owner of land in Sy.No.24/4 of Pattanagere returned the compensation amount to the Special Land Acquisition Officer. This becomes evident from a letter dated 09.10.2006 signed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The indemnity bond dated 23.08.2004 shows that the society received back a sum of Rs.36,21,794/- which was deposited by it with the Land Acquisition Officer. There are two more letters that have significance in the context of taking a decision as to possession. The letter dated 19.01.2004 written in the letter head of the society and addressed to the Special Land Acquisition Officer shows that after the Supreme Court gave its judgment, the Society made every effort for a period of 8 years to retain the ownership of the land, and since the Land Acquisition Officer did not respond to the request of the society positively, it requested for refunding the amount deposited with the Land Acquisition Officer in connection with acquisition. One more letter dated 09.10.20.. (year not clearly printed) addressed to the Principal Secretary of the Department of Revenue, Govt. of Karnataka very clearly indicates possession and ownership of the lands being restored to the land owners.”

¶144

32. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot rely upon the

¶145

confirmation/ratification deed. When the BHEL Society is claiming through confirmation/ratification deed executed

¶146

29 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶147

by the land owners subsequent to the quashing of acquisitions proceedings from this Court and the same was affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but this deed is unregistered deed. This Court in the aforesaid judgment had expressed its opinion at paragraph No.18 that the reliability of the confirmation and ratification deed is doubtful.

¶148

Upon considering the materials made available

¶149

to this Court and also to the Trial Court establish no prima facie case on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff. Therefore when there is no prima facie case is made out then there is no question of holding balance of convenience in favour of appellant/plaintiff. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 are constructing the building on the suit schedule property but it is at the risk of pending the suit and prima facie proves that since defendant Nos.1 and 2 have started construction, this shows prima facie that defendant Nos.1 and 2 are in possession over the suit schedule property. Therefore, there are several disputes to be resolved in the

¶150

30 - NC: 2025:KHC:14120 MFA No. 5410 of 2024

¶151

suit hence, the Trial Court is correct in dismissing the application filed for temporary injunction, which needs no interference by this Court. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

¶152

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. However, whatever observations made above shall not be construed as observations and discussions on the merits involved in the suit. But the above are only for the purpose of considering the aspect whether the appellant/plaintiff has made out prima case or not. The Trial Court without being influenced by the above said observations and discussions shall proceed with the case on merits on its own independently and shall dispose of the suit in accordance with law.

¶153

SD/(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR) JUDGE

¶154

SRA/DR List No.: 1 Sl No.: 70

Jayalakshmi v. Gireesh M

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Jayalakshmi v. Gireesh M

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Smt C Geetha Vs Union of India

Smt Tukkamma Vs Union of India

M/S Krishvedha Ventures Pvt. Ltd. Vs Sri Sibqathulla Baig

Thippavva @ Thippamma Vs the Union of India

Sri C D Raghavendra Vs Smt Uma Srinivasan R

Sri. Sreenivasa @ Prakash Vs Sri. Venkatasubhaiah