Allowed¶73

Sri C Basavaraju v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC23 Jan 2025CRL.P/82/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Quashing of proceedings; S.482 Cr.P.C.; want of prior sanction under S.197 Cr.P.C.; public servant / Government servant protection; SC/ST (POA) Act S.3(1)(q); IPC Ss.196, 197, 198, 199, 420 r/w 34; abuse of process of law; Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3726; Tahsildar / KIADB Special Land Acquisition Officer as accused No.4; Spl.C.No.407/2019, III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumakuru; FIR dated 21.03.2019; NC: 2025:KHC:2779.

What did the court decide?

Petition allowed; impugned proceedings in Spl. Case No.407/2019 pending before the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumakuru quashed qua the petitioner (accused No.4). ¶73

Sri C Basavaraju Vs State of Karnataka — Karnataka HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Petition allowed; impugned proceedings in Spl. Case No.407/2019 pending before the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumakuru quashed qua the petitioner (accused No.4).

¶73

Issue for consideration

Whether the proceedings against the petitioner (accused No.4), a public servant, are liable to be quashed for want of prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. before filing of the charge sheet and taking of cognizance. +1 more

¶31

Court's answer

The petitioner being an undisputed public servant / Government servant, prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was mandatorily required before filing of the charge sheet and taking of cognizance; the respondents did not obtain it, and in its absence the proceedings qua the petitioner deserve to be quashed.

¶66

Ratio / Principle

There are no allegations whatsoever against the petitioner - accused No.4 so as to attract the offence under Section 3(1)(q) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989.

¶28

Key takeaways

With the necessary ingredients constituting the alleged offences conspicuously absent from the FIR, statements of witnesses, charge sheet and documents, continuation of the proceedings qua the petitioner would amount to abuse of process of law warranting interference by this Court.ratio¶67

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Criminal petition under S.482 Cr.P.C. by accused No.4, a retired Assistant Commissioner (Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, Bengaluru) earlier working as Tahsildar, seeking quashing of proceedings in Spl. Case No.407/2019 on the file of the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumakuru, for offences punishable under Sections 196, 197, 198, 199, 420 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 3(1)(q) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The FIR arose from a complaint dated 21.03.2019 filed by respondent No.2 (Deputy Superintendent of Police) against T. Ramesha (accused No.1); the petitioner was later arraigned as accused No.4 in the charge sheet. Held: (i) there are no allegations whatsoever against the petitioner attracting Section 3(1)(q) of the Act; (ii) the petitioner being an undisputed public servant, prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was mandatorily required before filing of the charge sheet and taking of cognizance and was not obtained, the Court relying on Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3726; and (iii) with the necessary ingredients conspicuously absent from the FIR, witness statements, charge sheet and documents, continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law. Petition allowed; proceedings quashed qua the petitioner.

¶1

1 - NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

¶3

DATED THIS THE 23^RD DAY OF JANUARY, 2025

¶4

BEFORE

¶5

THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR

¶6

CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 82 OF 2023

¶7

BETWEEN:

¶8

SRI. C. BASAVARAJU, AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, SON OF R. CHENNARASAPPA, DOOR NO. 570, 15TH MAIN ROAD, 10TH CROSS, PADMANABHANAGARA, BENGALURU - 560 070.

¶9

…PETITIONER

¶10

(BY SRI. RAVISHANKAR A., ADVOCATE FOR SRI. KARTHIK V., ADVOCATE)

¶11

AND:

¶12

STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY PAVAGADA POLICE STATION, Digitally signed by TUMAKURU DISTRICT, KAVYA R REPRESENTED BYLocation: High STATE PUBLIC PERSECUTOR, Court of HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, Karnataka BENGALURU - 560 001.

¶13

THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT, TUMKUR UNIT, 4TH CROSS, N. MALLAPPA ROAD,

¶14

2 - NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

SIRA GATE,

TUMKUR - 562 106.

…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. VINAY MAHADEVAIAH, HCGP FOR R1; SRI. C. JAGADISH, SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR R2)

¶19

THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN SPL.C.NO.407/2019 ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF THE III ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE AT TUMAKURU FOR OFFENCE P/U/S.196, 197, 198, 199, 420 R/W SEC.34 OF IPC AND U/S.3(1)(q) OF SC/ST (POA) ACT 1989 IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONER IS CONSIDERED.

¶20

THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,

¶21

ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

¶22

CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR

¶23

ORAL ORDER

¶24

In this petition, the petitioner seeks quashing of the proceedings in Spl. Case No.407/2019 insofar as the petitioner - accused No.4 is concerned for offences punishable under Sections 196, 197, 198, 199, 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC and under Section 3(1)(q) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short).

¶25

3 - NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶26

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner,

¶27

the learned HCGP for respondent No.1 as well as the learned Special counsel for respondent No.2 and perused the material on record.

¶28

A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the petitioner is a retired Assistant Commissioner (Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, Bengaluru) and he was earlier working as a Tahsildar, on 21.03.2019, on which date, respondent No.2 - the Deputy Superintendent of Police filed a complaint, pursuant to which, the FIR was registered against one T. Ramesha - accused No.1 for the aforesaid offences. Subsequently, after investigation, the petitioner has been arraigned as accused No.4 in the charge sheet. In this context, a perusal of the complaint / FIR, charge sheet, statement of witnesses, document etc., will indicate that there are no allegations whatsoever as against the petitioner - accused No.4 in so far as the commission of alleged offences as stated supra so as to attract the offence under Section 3(1)(q) of the Act.

¶29

¶30

NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶31

It is also pertinent to note that it is an undisputed fact that the petitioner was a public servant in relation to whom, necessary sanction ought to have been obtained before filing the charge sheet and the Special Court taking cognizance of the offences as against the petitioner, in the absence of which, the entire proceedings deserves to be quashed, as held by the various judgments of the Apex Court and this Court including the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of OM PRAKASH YADAV

¶32

V. NIRANJAN KUMAR UPADHYAY AND OTHERS - 2024 SCC

¶33

OnLine SC 3726 , wherein, it is held as under:

¶34

"65. Thus, the legal position that emerges from a conspectus of all the decisions referred to above is that it is not possible to carve out one universal rule that can be uniformly applied to the multivarious facts and circumstances in the context of which the protection under Section 197 CrPC is sought for. Any attempt to lay down such a homogenous standard would create unnecessary rigidity as regards the scope of application of this provision. In this context, the position of law may be summarized as under:—

¶35

(i) The object behind the enactment of Section 197 CrPC is to protect responsible public servants against institution of possibly false or vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act in their official capacity. It is to ensure that the public servants are not prosecuted for anything which is done by them in the discharge of their official duties, without any reasonable cause. The provision is in the form of an assurance to the honest and sincere officers so that they can perform their public duties honestly, to the best of their ability and in furtherance of public interest, without being demoralized.

¶36

5 - NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶37

(ii) The expression “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” in Section 197 CrPC must neither be construed narrowly nor widely and the correct approach would be to strike a balance between the two extremes. The section should be construed strictly to the extent that its operation is limited only to those acts which are discharged in the “course of duty”. However, once it has been ascertained that the act or omission has indeed been committed by the public servant in the discharge of his duty, then a liberal and wide construction must be given to a particular act or omission so far as its “official” nature is concerned.

¶38

(iii) It is essential that the Court while considering the question of applicability of Section 197 CrPC truly applies its mind to the factual situation before it. This must be done in such a manner that both the aspects are taken care of viz., on one hand, the public servant is protected under Section 197 CrPC if the act complained of falls within his official duty and on the other, appropriate action be allowed to be taken if the act complained of is not done or purported to be done by the public servant in the discharge of his official duty.

¶39

(iv) A public servant can only be said to act or purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such that it lies within the scope and range of his official duties. The act complained of must be integrally connected or directly linked to his duties as a public servant for the purpose of affording protection under Section 197 CrPC. Hence, it is not the duty which requires an examination so much as the “act” itself.

¶40

(v) One of the foremost tests which was laid down in this regard was - whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office.

¶41

(vi) Later, the test came to be re-modulated. It was laid down that there must be a reasonable connection between the act done and the discharge of the official duty and the act must bear such relation to the duty such that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that his actions were in the course of performance of his duty. Therefore, the sine qua non for the applicability of this section is that the offence charged, be it

¶42

6 - NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶43

one of commission or omission, must be committed by the public servant either in his official capacity or under the color of the office held by him such that there is a direct or reasonable connection between the act and the official duty.

¶44

(vii) If in performing his official duty, the public servant acts in excess of his duty, the excess by itself will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from protection under Section 197 CrPC if it is found that there existed a reasonable connection between the act done and the performance of his official duty.

¶45

(viii) It is the “quality” of the act that must be examined and the mere fact that an opportunity to commit an offence is furnished by the official position would not be enough to attract Section 197 CrPC.

¶46

(ix) The legislature has thought fit to use two distinct expressions “acting” or “purporting to act”. The latter expression means that even if the alleged act was done under the color of office, the protection under Section 197 CrPC can be given. However, this protection must not be excessively stretched and construed as being limitless. It must be made available only when the alleged act is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act.

¶47

(x) There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down such a rule. However, a “safe and sure test” would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of would have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the protection under Section 197 CrPC can be granted since there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant.

¶48

(xi) The provision must not be abused by public servants to camouflage the commission of a crime under the supposed color of public office. The benefit of the provision must not be extended to public officials who try to take undue advantage of their position and misuse the authority vested in them for committing acts which are otherwise not permitted in law. In such circumstances, the

¶49

7 - NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶50

acts committed must be considered dehors the duties which a public servant is required to discharge or perform.

¶51

(xii) On an application of the tests as aforesaid, if on facts, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused has been charged has a reasonable connection with the discharge of his official duty, the applicability of Section 197 CrPC cannot be denied.

¶52

66. At the cost of repetition, we say that the position of law on the application of Section 197 CrPC is clear - that it must be decided based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. This Court has held in a legion of decisions that any misuse or abuse of powers by a public servant to do something that is impermissible in law like threatening to provide a tutored statement or trying to obtain signatures on a blank sheet of paper; causing the illegal detention of an accused; engaging in a criminal conspiracy to create false or fabricated documents; conducting a search with the sole object of harassing and threatening individuals, amongst others, cannot fall under the protective umbrella of Section 197 CrPC.

¶53

67. In light of the same, it follows that when a police official is said to have lodged a false case, he cannot claim that sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC was required since it can be no part of the official duty of a public official to lodge a bogus case and fabricate evidence or documents in connection with the same. On examining the quality of the act, it is evident that there exists no reasonable or rational nexus between such an act and the duties assigned to the public servant for the claim that it was done or purported to be done in the discharge of his official duty. The mere fact that an opportunity to register a false case was furnished by the official duty would certainly not be sufficient to apply Section 197 CrPC. Allowing so, would enable the accused to use their status as public servants as a facade for doing an objectionable, illegal and unlawful act and take undue advantage of their position. If the Case Crime No. 967 of 2007 registered at the Murar Police Station, Gwalior, by respondent nos. 3, 4 and 5 respectively, was a false case, then there is no doubt that the refusal to grant sanction would not operate as a bar for their prosecution. Moreover, as far as the case of respondent no. 1 is concerned, it is an undisputed fact that he was not even posted as the S.H.O or T.I at the Murar

¶54

8 - NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶55

Police Station when the said false case was registered. The same is evident from the affidavit submitted by the IO at Firozabad before the High Court. Additionally, the respondent no. 1 has himself admitted in his submissions before us that he was in fact posted at District Shivpuri which is 120 kms away from Gwalior during the relevant time. Therefore, any act or offence committed by the respondent no. 1 in the present case can safely be said to have been outside the scope of his official duty which obviates the question of sanction for his prosecution.

¶56

68. Having said the above, the question whether sanction is required or not is a question that may arise at any stage of the proceeding. There might arise situations where the complaint or the police report may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty. However, the facts subsequently coming to light may establish the necessity for sanction. That the necessity of sanction may also reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case as was laid out in Matajog (supra) as follows:

¶57

“20. Is the need for sanction to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained? At first sight, it seems as though there is some support for this view in Hori Ram case [1939 FCR 159, 178] and also in Sarjoo Prasad v. King-Emperor [1945 FCR 227]. Sulaiman, J. says that as the prohibition is against the institution itself, its applicability must be judged in the first instance at the earliest stage of institution. Varadachariar, J. also states that the question must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the criminal proceeding. But a careful perusal of the later parts of their judgments shows that they did not intend to lay down any such proposition. Sulaiman, J. refers (at P-179) to the prosecution case as disclosed by the complaint or the police report and he winds up the discussion in these words:“Of course, if the case as put forward fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in execution of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped and the complaint dismissed on that ground”. The other learned Judge also states at p. 185, “At this stage we have only to see whether the case alleged against the appellant or sought to be proved against him relates to acts done or purporting to be

¶58

9 - NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶59

done by him in the execution of his duty”. It must be so. The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty; but facts subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case.”

¶60

(emphasis supplied)

¶61

69. In Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, (1973) 2 SCC 701, the 2^nd respondent was alleged to have abused and kicked his clerk who was his subordinate and was charged under Sections 323 and 504 IPC. The Court opined that such an act cannot be said to be in the purported exercise of his duty and held that sanction under Section 197 CrPC was not necessary. However, it was also observed that the necessity of sanction may reveal itself in the course of progress of the case and that it would be open to the accused to place materials on record during the trial for showing what his duty was and also that the acts complained of were so interrelated to his duty that protection under Section 197 CrPC must be granted to him. It was observed as follows:

¶62

“3. We must also make it clear that this is not the end of the matter. As was pointed out in Sarjoo Prasad v. KingEmperor [AIR 1946 FC 25 : 1954 FCR 227 : 47 Cri LJ 838] referring to the observations of Sulaiman, J. in Hori Ram Singh case the mere fact that the accused proposes to raise a defence of the act having purported to be done in execution of duty would not in itself be sufficient to justify the case being thrown out for want of sanction. At this stage we have only to see whether the acts alleged against the 2^nd respondent can be said to be in purported execution of his duty. But facts subsequently coming to light during the course of the judicial inquiry or during the course of prosecution evidence at the trial may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to depend from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case [see

¶63

10 - NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶64

observations in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari]. In Bhagwan Prasad Srivastava v. N.P. Misra also it was pointed out that it would be open to the appellant (the 2^nd respondent in this case) to place the material on record during the course of the trial for showing what his duty was and also that the acts complained of were so inter-related with his official duty so as to attract the protection afforded by Section 197 CrPC.”

¶65

As stated supra , in the instant

¶66

the respondents have not obtained prior sanction as mandatorily required under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. and consequently, in the absence of necessary / requisite sanction being obtained, the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner - accused No.4, who is undisputedly a Government Servant deserves to be quashed.

¶67

So also, in the light of the material on record which indicates that in the absence of necessary ingredients constituting the offences punishable under the aforesaid provisions being conspicuously absent in the FIR, statement of witnesses, charge sheet, documents etc., the continuation of the impugned proceedings qua the petitioner - accused No.4 for the aforesaid alleged offences would amount to the abuse of process of law, warranting interference by this Court in the present petition.

¶68

11 -

¶69

NC: 2025:KHC:2779 CRL.P No. 82 of 2023

¶70

In the result, I pass the following:

¶71

ORDER

¶72

(i) Petition is hereby allowed.

¶73

(ii) The impugned proceedings in Spl. Case No.407/2019 pending on the file of the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumakuru, is hereby quashed qua the petitioner.

¶74

Sd/-

¶75

(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE

¶76

SJK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 0 CT: BHK

Sri C Basavaraju v. State of Karnataka

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Sri C Basavaraju v. State of Karnataka

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Megha Arora, Vs State of Karnataka

Sri Pranav S Kodgi Vs the State by Geologist

Sri Arun Kumar R Wali Vs H.N. Naveen Kumar

Sri Manjunath K R Vs State of Karnataka

A M Manjunatha Kumar Vs State of Karnataka

N Kalyankumar Vs the State by Karnataka