M/S Filtrex Technologies Pvt. Ltd., Vs State of Karnataka

SRI KRISHNAMURTHY. B. N., S/O SRI BOMMI NARASIMHALU REDDY AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS RESIDING AT NO 20 BUDDA VIHARA ROAD, FRAZER TOWN BANGALORE NORTH BANGALORE - 560 005.

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SMT LATHA HARI BABU W/O SRI KRISHNA HARI BABU AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS RESIDING AT NO 4, DEFENCE AVENUE BEHIND KALAYANA NAGAR BUS DEPOT, CHELEKERE, KALYANANAGAR BENGALURU - 560 043.

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SRI KRISHNA HARI BABU S/O SRI B N KRISHNAMURTHY

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AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS RESIDING AT NO 4, DEFENCE AVENUE BEHIND KALAYANA NAGAR BUS DEPOT, CHELEKERE, KALYANANAGAR BENGALURU - 560 043.

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…PETITIONERS

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(BY SRI. P B RAJU, ADVOCATES)

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AND:

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STATE OF KARNATAKA BY HOSKOTE POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT BUILDING BENGALURU - 560 001.

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SMT LAKSHMI SREEKUMAR AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS WIFE OF SREE KUMAR, T 76 HARMONY HOMES HENNUR MAIN ROAD KALYAN NAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 043.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SMT. SOWMYA R., HCGP FOR R1 SRI. KASINAGALINGAM, ADVOCATE FOR R2)

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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR DATED 22.11.2024 REGISTERED IN CRIME NO. 359/2024 FOR OFFENCES PUNISHABLE SECTIONS 120B, 467,468,471, 474 AND 405 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) & CJM COURT, HOSAKOTE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT (ANNEXURE-A) REGISTERED BY THE 1^ST RESPONDENT POLICE I.E., HOSKOTE POLICE STATION POLICE AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN BASED ON THE COMPLAINT LODGED BY THE 2^nd RESPONDENT..

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IN CRL.P NO. 1352/2025

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BETWEEN:

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M/S FILTREX TECHNOLOGIES PVT LTD., FACTORY AT JADIGENAHALLI, 7^TH KM, HOSKOTE MALUR ROAD, HOSKOTE 562 114 REP BY ITS DIRECTOR MR.PRADEEP KUMAR TOTLA

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...PETITIONER

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(BY SRI. P B RAJU, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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STATE OF KARNATAKA BY HOSKOTE POLICE STATION REPRESENTED BY

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STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT BUILDING BANGALORE - 560 001.

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SMT. LAKSHMI SREEKUMAR AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS WIFE OF SREE KUMAR T 76, HARMONY HOMES HENNUR MAIN ROAD KALYAN NAGAR BANGALORE - 560 043.

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...RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. .,ADVOCATE)

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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.P.C (U/S 528 BNSS) BY PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR DTD 22.11.2024 REGISTERED IN CR.NO.359/2024, FOR OFFENCES P/U/S 120(B),467,468,471,474,405 OF IPC, 1860, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) AND CJM COURT, HOSAKOTE, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT (ANNEXURE-A) REGISTERED BY THE 1^st RESPONDENT POLICE i.e., HOSKOTE P.S., AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN BASED ON THE COMPLAINT LODGED BY THE 2^nd RESPONDENT.

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THESE PETITIONS ARE BEING HEARD AND RESERVED ON 10.07.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR

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CAV ORDER

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Both these petitions arise out of the impugned complaint dated 22.11.2024 registered as an FIR in Crime No.359/2024 lodged by the 2^nd respondent – de facto complainant before the 1^st respondent – police authorities for the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 467, 468, 471, 474 and 405 IPC.

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Petitioners in Crl.P.No.262/2025 are arraigned accused Nos. 1 to 4, while petitioner in Crl.P.No.1352/2024 is arraigned as accused No.5 and both the petitions are filed seeking quashing of the impugned complaint and the FIR and for other reliefs.

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The 2^nd respondent- de facto complainant has filed statement of objections to both the petitions and contended that the same are liable to be dismissed.

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Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned HCGP for 1^st respondent as well as learned counsel for the 2^nd respondent and perused the material on record.

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In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned counsel

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for the petitioner would contend that the dispute between the parties is essentially civil in nature relating to immovable property and is sought to be given a cloak of criminality which is an abuse of process of law. It was submitted that there is long and inordinate delay in lodging the complaint, which is barred by limitation and deserves to be quashed. It was therefore submitted that both the petitions deserve to be allowed by quashing the impugned compliant and FIR as sought by the petitioners. In support of his contentions, learned counsel paced reliance upon the following

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judgments:-

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(i) Usha Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal - (2023) 15 SCC 135;

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(ii) Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh - (2010) 8 SCC

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775;

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(iii) S. Dutt (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh - 1965 SCC OnLine SC 6 ;

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(iv) Dr. Vimla v. State (NCT of Delhi) - (1963) 33 COMP CAS 279;

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(v) Ravichandra v. State - 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1192;

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(vi) Ravi Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh - 2019 SCC OnLine HP 642.

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Per contra, learned counsel for the 2^nd respondent - complainant would reiterate the various contentions urged in the statement of objections and submits that the impugned complaint and the FIR discloses the commission of the cognizable offences which are made out, would require investigation and cannot be interfered with in the present petitions, which are liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the following judgments:

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(i) Delhi Development Authority v. Lila D. Bhagat

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-(1975) 1 SCC 410;

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(ii) Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana -

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(1977) 4 SCC 451;

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I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record.

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Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be

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apposite to refer to the impugned complaint which reads as under:-

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"22 November 2024

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From

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Mrs Lakshmi Sreekumar T 76, Harmony Homes

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Hennur Main Road Kalyan Nagar Bangalore 560043 Whatsapp Ph: +91 9611 530 543

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Resident of: 142 Westchester Drive Churton Park Wellington 6037 New Zealand

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To The Ponce Inspector Haskote Police Stution Hoskate Taluk Bangalore Rural

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Sub: Submitting Police Complaint for the following:

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A) Section 336 (3) BNS - Forgery

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B) Section 338 BNS-Forgery to benefit from financial and property transactions.

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C) Section 340 BNS-Use of a forged document as genuine

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D) Section 339 BNS - Possession of a forged document intended to be used as genuine

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E) Section 316-Breach of trust

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F) Section 61 - Criminal Conspiracy

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G) Section 3(8) - Common Intention

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Respected Sir.

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1) This is to inform that my signature has been forged in a GPA in the year 2000 by my maternal uncle B.N.Krishnamurthy, witnessed by his daughter in law Latha Hari and notorised by an advocate N.Dorairajulu Naidu on 24 June 2000 in Bangalore while I was away overseas.

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2) This forged GPA has been used to re-register my property survey number 269, Jadegenahalli, Hoskote Taluk in 2002 and converted to industrial status in 2008 and leased to a factory since 2008 without my consant and knowledge by B.N.Krishnamurthy and he has been collecting exorbitant rents on my land since 2008.

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3) As recent as last week Bangalore Metro and Rural Development (BMRD) has confirmed that the approval and building plan was given in the name of B. N. Krishnamurthy as the owner of my land 269.

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4) I nad issued clarification and legal notice to Fitrex to confirm the same and have evidence in their response to show that there has been a collusion between B.N. Knishnamurthy, his son Hari Babu and Filtrex.

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5) BMRD has confirmed that there is no legal route to segregate my land 269 from the combination of B. N. Krishnamurty's lands as it has been granted the Industrial status and BMRD approval as a combination of lands due to the nature of application made in 2008. And the only way to segregate is to cancel the DC order for industrial conversion which means all lands will lose the industrial status and Filtrex buildings will be demolished and another fresh application has to be made for industrial conversion with new costs. This was also confirmed through the DD, Zilla Panchayat at DC office, Doddaballapur.

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6) Basically while the RTC confirms I am the owner, I cannot legally do anything on it as it is leased to Filtrex. BMRD has

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confirmed that it cannot be leased separately either so it is still leased as a bundle with other survey numbers of B.N.Krishnamurthy. While Filtrex and B. N. Krishnamurthy and Hari Babu may ignore this fact, as a victim of this situation caused by them I want to lodge this complaint on the grounds of breach of trust, criminal conspiracy and forgery, fraud and cheating with an intent to destroy me as well as grab my lands.

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7) I have evidence to prove that B.N.Krishnamurthy and his family members have conspired to grab my land through the years. His daughter in law has witnessed the forgery as well as signed the lease agreement on behalf of Filtrex despite knowing it includes my land 269.

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I am filing this complaint with evidence of such criminal acts and request you to register this complaint and investigate further and file a FIR for criminal case.

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Please find enclosed my complaint against the following:

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1) B.N.Krishnamurthy Son of Narasimhalu Reddy, residing at 20, Buddha Vihara Road, Frazer Town, Bangalore 20. Ph no: +91 98440 68994

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2) Latha Hari, wife of Hari Babu and daughter in law of B.N.Krishnamurthy, residing at 5 Defence Avenue, Chelekere, Kalyan Nagar, Bangalore 560043. Ph по:+91 98454 48031

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3) N Dorairajulu Naidu, 445, 15th main road, 8th block, Koramangala, Ph: not known.

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4) Hari Babu, son of B.N.Krishnamurthy, residing at 5 Defence Avenue, Chelekere, Kalyan Nagar, Bangalore 560043. Ph nó: +91 98450 19274

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5) Pradeep Kumar Totla, Director, M/s Filtrex Technologies Pvt Ltd, factory at Jadigenahalli, 7th KM., Hoskote Malur Road, Hoskote-562 114, Phone No. 080 49206500, 080 2792 1001

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I can be contacted on +91 9611 530 543 for any questions related to this complaint.

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Thanking you Yours sincerely Sd/- Lakshmi Sreekumar"

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A perusal of the aforesaid complaint would indicate that the 2^nd respondent – de facto complainant has specifically stated that she has been residing in New Zealand from a long time and the accused persons had forged her signature in the year 2000 and used the forged GPA in relation to transactions relating to immovable property without her consent or knowledge. The complainant alleged that about a week prior to the complaint, the allegations were confirmed by the BMRCL who had informed her about the same. The complainant further alleged that there has been collusion between accused Nos. 1 to 5 and the alleged tenant

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accused No. 6 and that various illegal transactions as well as illegal acts, deeds and things done by the accused persons were also confirmed by the Zilla Panchayat and Deputy Commissioner, Doddaballpur. It was further alleged that taking advantage of her absence from India, the accused persons committed the offences of forgery, breach of trust, criminal conspiracy, fraud and cheating with an intention to destroy the complainant and grab her lands. The complainant further stated that she was enclosing the evidence along with the complaint in support of her allegation.

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A careful perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate that prima facie necessary ingredients constituting the offences are contained and forthcoming in the complaint, which discloses and makes out a prima facie commission of the offences which are cognizable in nature warranting investigation; in fact, the complainant has given material particulars and details in relation to immovable property, documents, transactions in support of her allegations. In the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, it cannot be said that the complaint contains vague or omnibus or general allegations warranting interference by this

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Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C or

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Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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In the case of Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra - (2021) 19 SCC 401, the Apex Court held as under:-

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12.7. In CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh [CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305] and in State of U.P. v. Naresh [State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216] , it is observed and held by this Court that FIR is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. In para 20 in Tapan Kumar Singh [CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305] , it is observed and held as under : (Tapan Kumar Singh case [CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305] , SCC pp. 183-84)

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“20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must

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provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the police officer concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can.”

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13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.

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33.12. The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned

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Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.

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A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the subject matter of the complaint relates to offences said to have been committed by the petitioners in respect of documents, transactions, acts, deeds and things pertaining to immovable properties; as stated supra, the 2^nd respondent - complainant has enclosed various documents in support of her allegations which are disputed and denied by the petitioners - accused persons; similarly, in the instant petitions, both sides have produced several documents in support of their rival contentions with both parties disputing and denying not only the allegations but also the documents produced by the rival party; the pleadings of the parties as well as the complaint, FIR and documents produced by both sides leads to the sole / unmistakable conclusion that there exists serious, complicated and disputed questions of fact that arise for consideration between the parties, which would necessarily have to be investigated into by the 1^st respondent - police authorities and consequently, the question of interfering with or scuttling the investigation to be conducted, pursuant to the impugned complaint

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and FIR would not arise in the facts and circumstances of the instant case; in other words, the various allegations and counter allegations made by the complainant and accused persons against each other by placing reliance upon disputed documents and facts would clearly indicate that at this stage, it is not a fit case for this court to interfere by exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially in the light of the well settled position of law that it is impermissible to conduct a mini trial while considering or examining a challenge at the initial stage of complaint and FIR without conducting any investigation.

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The petitioners contend that the dispute between the parties is purely civil in nature and the complaint seeks to give a cloak of criminality to an essentially civil dispute which would amount to an abuse of process of law and the same deserves to be quashed; it is well settled that mere availability of civil remedies and pendency of civil disputes between a de facto complainant and accused persons will not by itself ipso facto entail quashing of criminal proceedings or operate as a bar/embargo to initiate criminal action.

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14. In the case of P.Swaroopa Rani vs. N.Harinarayana -

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(2008) 5 SCC 765, the Apex court held as under:-

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" 11. It is, however, well settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case. (See M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [AIR 1954 SC 397] , Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] and Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Assn. of Chartered Certified Accountants [(2005) 12 SCC 226 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 544] .)

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12. It is furthermore trite that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not be attracted where a forged document has been filed. It was so held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] stating : (SCC pp. 387-88, paras 25-26)

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“25. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision would also operate where after commission of an act of forgery the document is subsequently produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] after preparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself or through someone set up by him and simply file the document in the said proceeding. He would thus be protected from

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prosecution, either at the instance of a private party or the police until the court, where the document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of such a person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly detrimental to the interest of the society at large.

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26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminal complaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads to a situation where a person alleged to have committed an offence of the type enumerated in Clause (b)(ii) is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principle that an unworkable or impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd Edn.), Para 313, the principle has been stated in the following manner:

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‘The court seeks to avoid a construction of an enactment that produces an unworkable or impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Sometimes, however, there are overriding reasons for applying such a construction, for example, where it appears that Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is too strong.’ ”

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In regard to the possible conflict of findings between civil and criminal court, however, it was opined : (SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)

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“32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between

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the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.”

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It was concluded : (SCC p. 390, para 33)

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“33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 660] has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.”

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13. Filing of an independent criminal proceeding, although initiated in terms of some observations made by the civil court, is not barred under any statute."

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In the case of Kathyayini v. Sidharth P.S. Reddy -

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 1428, the Apex Court held as under:

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7. It is clear from the facts that a prima facie case for criminal conspiracy and cheating exists against respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It appears that they, along with their uncles Guruva Reddy and Umedha Reddy,

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have attempted to defraud their aunts by creating a forged family tree and partition deed with a motive to gain all the monetary award for land in question bypassing the appellant and her sisters. They succeeded in their plan until Sudhanva Reddy revealed it to the authorities by a letter. The High Court has erroneously relied upon the statement of Sub-Registrar who stated that partition deed dated 24.03.2005 was presented for registration on 26.03.2005 and due to health reasons concerning K.G. Yellappa Reddy, his thumb impressions were secured at his house in presence of the SubRegistrar. However, we must note this statement of the Sub-Registrar has not been put to cross examination. It would be unwise to rely on unverified testimony of a Sub-Registrar to ascertain the genuineness of Partition deed. The High Court erred in heavily relying on his statement to conclude that the Partition deed was genuine and thus no offence is made out against the respondents under Sections 463 and 464 IPC.

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18. Further, the High Court could not find any justification to deny that respondents misrepresented the family tree. The Court itself has acknowledged that respondents were bound to disclose the names of daughters of K.G. Yellappa Reddy and Jayalakshmi in the family tree. Considering the fact that both the partition deed and the family tree were used in gaining the monetary

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compensation awarded for the land, it is necessary that genuineness of both the documents is put to trial.

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19. We now come to the issue of bar against prosecution during the pendency of a civil suit. We hereby hold that no such bar exists against prosecution if the offences punishable under criminal law are made out against the parties to the civil suit. Learned senior counsel Dr.Menaka Guruswamy has rightly placed the relevant judicial precedents to support the above submission. In the case of K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S. - (2020) 14 SCC 552, this Court has reviewed its precedents which clarify the position. The relevant paragraph from the above judgment is extracted below:

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“8. It is thus well settled that in certain cases the very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in motion the proceedings in criminal law.”

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20. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar - (1985) 2 SCC 370, this Court summed up the distinction between the two remedies as under:

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“21. … There are a large number of cases where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his

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liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents, etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to take the stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no action against him can be taken as no offence is committed is to override and distort the real intent of the law.”

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21. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B- (2002 1 SCC 555),

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“17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings.”

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22. After surveying the abovementioned cases, this Court in K. Jagadish (supra) set aside the holding of High Court to quash the criminal proceedings and

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held that criminal proceedings shall continue to its logical end.

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23. The above precedents set by this Court make it crystal clear that pendency of civil proceedings on the same subject matter, involving the same parties is no justification to quash the criminal proceedings if a prima facie case exists against the accused persons. In present case certainly such prima facie case exists against the respondents. Considering the long chain of events from creation of family tree excluding the daughters of K.G. Yellappa Reddy, partition deed among only the sons and grandsons of K.G. Yellappa Reddy, distribution of compensation award among the respondents is sufficient to conclude that there was active effort by respondents to reap off the benefits from the land in question. Further, the alleged threat to appellant and her sisters on revelation of the above chain of events further affirms the motive of respondents. All the above factors suggest that a criminal trial is necessary to ensure justice to the appellant.

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24. Therefore, we set aside the Impugned order of High Court dated 23.11.2023 in Writ Petition No. 23106 of 2021. Accordingly, we direct the Trial Court to continue its proceedings against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in accordance to law

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In the case of Priti Saraf v. State (NCT of Delhi) -

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(2021) 16 SCC 142 , the Apex Court held as under:-

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31. In the instant case, on a careful reading of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet, in our view, it cannot be said that the complaint does not disclose the commission of an offence. The ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420IPC cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/chargesheet. We would like to add that whether the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the course of trial. Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings initiated at the instance of the appellants, that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482CrPC for quashing such proceedings.

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32. We have perused the pleadings of the parties, the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and orders of the courts below and have taken into consideration the material on record. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the issue involved in the matter under consideration is not a case in which the criminal trial should have been short-circuited. The High Court was not justified in quashing the criminal proceedings in

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exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has primarily adverted on two circumstances,

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(i) that it was a case of termination of agreement to sell on account of an alleged breach of the contract and;

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(ii) the fact that the arbitral proceedings have been initiated at the instance of the appellants.

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Both the alleged circumstances noticed by the High Court, in our view, are unsustainable in law. The facts narrated in the present complaint/FIR/charge-sheet indeed reveal the commercial transaction but that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such transaction. In fact, many a times, offence of cheating is committed in the course of commercial transactions and the illustrations have been set out under Sections 415, 418 and 420IPC.

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33. Similar observations have been made by this Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] : (SCC p. 690, para 9)

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“9. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the provision incorporated in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence. Arbitration is a remedy for affording reliefs to the party affected by breach of the agreement but the arbitrator cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an offence albeit the same act may be connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence,

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those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] .”

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In the case of K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S., -

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(2020) 14 SCC 552, the Apex Court held as under:-

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7. One of the striking features of the matter is that on the day when the Sale Deed was executed, not a single paisa was actually received by way of consideration. Three post-dated cheques were handed over to the appellant and one of those three cheques was deposited in the bank for encashment on the next date. It is a matter of record that subsequent cheques were not even sought to be encashed and the appellant showed his willingness to deposit even the sum of Rs.15 lakhs received by encashment of first cheque. Further, neither the conveyance deed was preceded by any agreement of sale nor any advertisement was issued by the appellant showing his inclination to dispose of the property in question.

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8. It is true that civil proceedings have been subsequently initiated to get the registered Sale Deed setaside but that has nothing to do with the present criminal proceedings.

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9. It is thus well settled that in certain cases the very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in motion the proceedings in criminal law. 10. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another1 this Court summed up the distinction between the two remedies as under:

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“21. ………… There are a large number of cases where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to take the stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no action against him can be taken as no offence is committed is to override and distort the real intent of the law.”

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11. In Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and others

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- this Court observed:

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“10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such a

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transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions. One of the illustrations set out under Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code [Illustration f] is worthy of notice now: “(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not intending to repay it. A cheats.”

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11. The crux of the postulate is the intention of the person who induces the victim of his representation and not the nature of the transaction which would become decisive in discerning whether there was commission of offence or not. The complainant has stated in the body of the complaint that he was induced to believe that the respondent would honour payment on receipt of invoices, and that the complainant realised later that the intentions of the respondent were not clear. He also mentioned that the respondent after receiving the goods had sold them to others and still he did not pay the money. Such averments would prima facie make out a case for investigation by the authorities.

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12. The High Court seems to have adopted a strictly hypertechnical approach and sieved the complaint through a colander of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients under Section 415 IPC. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial, but certainly not during the stage of investigation. At any rate, it is too premature a stage for the High Court to step in and stall the investigation by declaring that it is a commercial transaction simpliciter wherein no semblance of criminal offence is involved.”

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12. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Kamladevi

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Agarwal v. State of West Bengal and others as under:

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“9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also pending. After referring to judgments in State of Haryana v.

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Bhajan Lal and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, this Court inTrisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal held: (SCC p. 690, paras 7-8)

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“7. Time and again this Court has been pointing out that quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions (vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal4 and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi5).

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8. In the last referred case this Court also pointed out that merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. We quote the following observations: (SCC p. 263, para 10) ‘10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions.”

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After referring to various decisions it was finally concluded as under:

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“17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and

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authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings.”

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13. In R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and others, this Court culled out propositions concerning interference under Section 482 of the Code as under:

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“15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are: (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first information report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.

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(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.

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(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.

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(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.

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14. In the light of the principles as mentioned hereinabove, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decision rendered by the High Court and direct that criminal

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proceedings shall be taken to logical conclusion in accordance with law.

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In the case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar - (1985) 2

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SCC 370, the Apex Court held as under:-

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21. After all how could any reasonable person expect a newly married woman living in the same house and under the same roof to keep her personal property or belongings like jewellery, clothing etc., under her own lock and key, thus showing a spirit of distrust to the husband at the very behest. We are surprised how could the High Court permit the husband to cast his covetous eyes on the absolute and personal property of his wife merely because it is kept in his custody, thereby reducing the custody to a legal farce. On the other hand, it seems to us that even if the personal property of the wife is jointly kept, it would be deemed to be expressly or impliedly kept in the custody of the husband and if he dishonestly misappropriates or refuses to return the same, he is certainly guilty of criminal breach of trust, and there can be no escape from this legal consequence. The observations of the High Court at other places regarding the inapplicability of Section 406 do not appeal to us and are in fact not in consonance with the spirit and trend of the criminal law. There are a large number of cases where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and

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consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to take the stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no action against him can be taken as no offence is committed is to override and distort the real intent of the law.

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In the case of Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of West

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Bengal - (2002) 1 SCC 555, the Apex Court held as under:

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9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also pending. After referring to judgments in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999

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SCC (Cri) 401] this Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] held: (SCC p. 690, paras 7-8)

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“7. Time and again this Court has been pointing out that quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions (vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] ).

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8. In the last referred case this Court also pointed out that merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. We quote the following observations: (SCC p. 263, para 10)

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‘10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions.’ ”

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10. In Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615] this Court again reiterated the position and held: (SCC pp. 272 & 278, paras 2 & 14)

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“2. Exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent power as envisaged in Section 482 of the Code to have the complaint or the charge-sheet quashed is an exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution. With the

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lodgement of first information report the ball is set to roll and thenceforth the law takes its own course and the investigation ensues in accordance with the provisions of law. The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and restricted and its undue expansion is neither practicable nor warranted. In the event, however, the court on a perusal of the complaint comes to a conclusion that the allegations levelled in the complaint or charge-sheet on the face of it does not constitute or disclose any offence as alleged, there ought not to be any hesitation to rise up to the expectation of the people and deal with the situation as is required under the law.

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14. Needless to record however and it being a settled principle of law that to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code, the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint and the High Court at that stage has no authority or jurisdiction to go into the matter or examine its correctness. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. But the offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint. The observations

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in Nagawwa v. VeerannaShivalingappaKonjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] lend support to the above statement of law: (SCC p. 741, para 5)

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‘(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;

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(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

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(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

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(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.’

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The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings.”

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11. In Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001) 2 SCC 17: 2001 SCC (Cri) 275] this Court held: (SCC p. 19, para 8)

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“8. There could be no dispute to the proposition that if the complaint does not make out an offence it can be quashed. However, it is also settled law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. In this case, on the facts, it cannot be stated, at this prima facie stage, that this is a frivolous

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complaint. The High Court does not state that on facts no offence is made out. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed.”

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12. Again in M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] this Court held that while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court should be slow in interfering with the proceedings at the initial stage and that merely because the nature of the dispute is primarily of a civil nature, the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed because in cases of forgery and fraud there is always some element of civil nature. In a case where the accused alleged that the transaction between the parties is of a civil nature and the criminal court cannot proceed with the complaint because the factum of document being forged was pending in the civil court, the Court observed: (SCC pp. 647-48, para 5)

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“5. Accepting such a general proposition would be against the provisions of law inasmuch as in all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole transaction, there is generally some element of civil nature. However, in this case, the allegations were regarding the forging of the documents and acquiring gains on the basis of such forged documents. The proceedings could not be quashed only because the respondents had filed a civil suit with respect to the aforesaid documents. In a criminal court the allegations made in the complaint have to be established independently, notwithstanding the adjudication by a civil court. Had the complainant failed to prove the allegations made by him in the complaint, the respondents were entitled to discharge or acquittal but

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not otherwise. If mere pendency of a suit is made a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings, the unscrupulous litigants, apprehending criminal action against them, would be encouraged to frustrate the course of justice and law by filing suits with respect to the documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of criminal proceedings or in anticipation of such proceedings. Such a course cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distinguished from the criminal action, have to be adjudicated and concluded by adopting separate yardsticks. The onus of proving the allegations beyond reasonable doubt, in a criminal case, is not applicable in the civil proceedings which can be decided merely on the basis of the probabilities with respect to the acts complained of.”

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13. Referring to the judgments of this Court in Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col. M.S. Paintal [(1982) 2 SCC 412 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 459] , Sardool Singh v. Nasib Kaur [1987 Supp SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 672] and Karamchand Ganga Pershad v. Union of India [(1970) 3 SCC 694 : AIR 1971 SC 1244] the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the High Court was justified in quashing the complaint which does not require any interference by this Court in this appeal.

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14. In Manju Gupta case [(1982) 2 SCC 412 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 459] the criminal proceedings were quashed under the peculiar circumstances of the case. After referring to para 20 of the complaint and holding (at SCC p. 414, para 4) “such an averment in our view, is clearly inadequate and insufficient to bring home criminality of the appellant in the matter of the alleged offences”, the

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Court found that simply because the accused was the Secretary of the Society, the Magistrate was not justified in presuming her connection or complicity with the offence merely on that ground. The allegations in the complaint pertinent to forgery of rent receipts were held to be vague and indefinite. Sardool Singh case [1987 Supp SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 672] was also decided on its facts on the basis of law earlier settled by this Court. In Karamchand Ganga Pershad case [(1970) 3 SCC 694 : AIR 1971 SC 1244] an observation was made that “it is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true” (SCC p. 695, para 4). In that case the appellants had filed a writ petition in the High Court for the issuance of appropriate directions requiring the Union of India to release and deliver to them some consignments of maize transported from the State of Haryana to Howrah. Alleging that the movement of maize had been controlled by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act read with the Northern Inter-Zonal Maize (Movement Control) Order, 1967 promulgated by the State Government, the restrictions on export imposed by the Order were removed by the State of Haryana in October 1967 which was duly published and advertised. The contention of the Union was that the State of Haryana had not lifted the ban on export and further that it had no power to lift the ban. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the sole ground that in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings before some court

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in the State of West Bengal it was inappropriate for the High Court to pronounce on the question arising for decision in the writ petition. In that context the Court held: (SCC p. 695, para 4)

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“In our opinion the High Court seriously erred in coming to this conclusion. If the appellants are able to establish their case that the ban on export of maize from the State of Haryana had been validly lifted all the proceedings taken against those who exported the maize automatically fall to the ground. Their maintainability depends on the assumption that the exports were made without the authority of law. It is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true. The High Court after entertaining the writ petitions and hearing arguments on the merits of the case should not have dismissed the petitions merely because certain consequential proceedings had been taken on the basis that the exports in question were illegal.”

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15. We have already noticed that the nature and scope of civil and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof required in both matters is different and distinct. Whereas in civil proceedings the matter can be decided on the basis of probabilities, the criminal case has to be decided by adopting the standard of proof of “beyond reasonable doubt”. A Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with similar circumstances, in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [AIR 1954 SC 397 : 1954 Cri LJ 1019] held that where civil and criminal cases are pending, precedence shall be given to criminal proceedings. Detailing the reasons for the conclusions, the Court held: (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16)

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“15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.

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16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.

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This however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished.”

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16. In the present case we have noticed that before issuance of the process, the trial Magistrate had

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recorded the statement of the witnesses for the complainant, perused the record including the opinion of the expert and his deposition and prima facie found that the respondents were guilty for the offences for which the process was issued against them. The High Court rightly did not refer to any of those circumstances but quashed the proceedings only on the ground:

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“Consideration is and should be whether any criminal proceeding instituted before a court subordinate to this Court should be allowed to continue when the very foundation of the criminal case, namely, forgery of document is under scrutiny by this Court in a civil proceeding instituted by same person i.e. the complainant in the criminal case. In my considered view it would not be proper to allow the criminal proceeding to continue when the validity of the document (deed of dissolution) is being tested in a civil proceeding before this Court. Judicial propriety demands that the course adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manju Gupta [(1982) 2 SCC 412 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 459] and Sardool Singh [1987 Supp SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 672] should be followed. If such course of action is adopted by this Court, that would be in consonance with the expression used in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure — ‘or otherwise to secure the ends of justice’. In both the cases referred to above civil suits were pending, where the validity and genuineness of a document were challenged. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when the question regarding validity of a document is sub judice in the civil courts, criminal prosecution, on the allegation of the document being forged, cannot be instituted.”

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17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not

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justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings.

¶316

In the case of Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi) -

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, the Apex Court held as under:

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MERE INSTITUTION OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ACT AS A BAR TO INVESTIGATION OF COGNIZABLE OFFENCES

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28. It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a further

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investigation and if necessary, a trial. [See : Syed AksariHadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.), (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee KunHee v. State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 and Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686].

¶323

In the instant cases, as stated supra, a perusal of the complaint, FIR, pleadings of the parties and documents produced by both sides are sufficient to come to the conclusion that mere availability of civil remedies to the complainant or pendency of civil proceedings would not come in the way of further investigation to be conducted by the 1^st respondent-police authorities, particularly when the petitioners-accused persons have failed to establish that the de facto complainant intends or seeks to give a criminal colour, which is clearly not borne out from the material on record so as to warrant interference by this Court in the present petitions and consequently, this contention urged by the petitioners cannot be accepted.

¶324

Petitioners have also contended that the complaint is barred by limitation and delay and latches, since the same relates to documents and transactions during the period from 2000 to 2008; in this context, it is relevant to state that it is well settled that

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mere delay by itself is not sufficient to infer that a complaint is barred by limitation or vitiated or latches, especially when the complaint allegations disclose the reason / explanation / cause for the delay; in the instant case, a perusal of the material on record comprising of the complaint, pleadings of the parties and documents will indicate that the complainant has specifically alleged that she has been residing in New Zealand from 1988 onwards and that her uncle Sri.B.N.Krishnamurthy - accused No.1 along with his family members and other persons including accused No. 5, who was a tenant were guilty of the alleged offences, about which she came to know and became aware only after returning to Bangalore; it is therefore clear that the complainant has offered sufficient, reasonable and plausible explanation as to the delay in filing the complaint and in light of the fiduciary relationship between the parties, it cannot be said that the delay, if any, in lodging the complaint would either be fatal or vitiate the impugned proceedings.

¶328

In the case of Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi),

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, the Apex Court held as under:-

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DELAY CANNOT BE A GROUND FOR QUASHING THE PRESENT FIR

¶333

36. Further, accepting the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order that ‘there had been a delay in registration of the FIR and because of such delay, the allegations made by the Appellant are unbelievable’ and the submissions of learned senior counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that no complaint/FIR should be entertained ‘at this distance of time’, would mean in effect in accepting the argument that delay is a sufficient ground for quashing of the present FIR/complaint.

¶334

37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…..”

¶335

38. Further, as per the allegations in the complaint/FIR during 2004-2020 the accused persons kept representing that they were in the process of getting

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the property unencumbered and converted to freehold. Upon the failure of the accused persons to show documents for clear title of the property, the Appellant had initially instituted a suit for specific performance, and it was only during the suit proceedings that it came to light that after the Agreement to Sell with the Appellant, the property was subsequently mortgaged to SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI Equipment Finance Limited and the same was subsequently sold to J.K. Paper Limited vide sale deed dated 02^nd December 2021. The fact that Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2) was the Karta of the Bhai Manjit Singh HUF at the relevant time was also allegedly revealed for the very first time through the aforesaid sale deed dated 02^nd December 2021, certified copy of which was obtained by the Appellant on 28^th December 2021. Consequently, the fact of misrepresentation and deception at the inception, that is, at the time of execution of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12^th April 2004, came to the knowledge of the Appellant (according to the complaint) only on 28^th December 2021.

¶339

39. The Appellant had, admittedly, filed the complaint before the Economic Offences Wing on 12^th January 2022. Section 469 Cr. P.C. provides that the period of limitation commences from the date on which the offence comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved. In the present case, as noted above, the Appellant became aware of the offence only on

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28^th December 2021. Consequently, prima facie there is no delay in filing the criminal proceedings.

¶343

40. Even otherwise, as the learned senior counsel for the Appellant has rightly pointed out, in terms of Section 468 Cr. P.C., there is no period of limitation for offences which are punishable with imprisonment of more than three years.

¶344

So also in the case of Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India)

¶345

(P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., - (2021) 5 SCC 795, the Apex Court held as under:-

¶346

15. The main contentions of the petitioner are:

¶347

15.1. That the police cannot investigate an issue, the substratum of which is sub judice before this Court in the civil appeals arising out of the order of the NGT.

¶348

15.2. That the High Court failed to take note of the long delay on the part of the third respondent in lodging the complaint and also the fact that VAHAN portal of the Government shows the purchase of only 3 vehicles as against the claim of the third respondent to have purchased 7 vehicles.

¶349

16. Let us take up the second contention first, since it is capable of being dealt with, without much ado. The second contention has two parts, namely,

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(i) that there is a long delay in lodging the complaint, and

¶353

(ii) that the third respondent complainant, appears to have purchased only 3 vehicles as against his claim to have purchased 7 vehicles.

¶354

17. The question whether the third respondent complainant purchased 3 vehicles as revealed by VAHAN portal of the Government or 7 vehicles as claimed by him in his complaint, is a question of fact which has to be established only in the course of an investigation/trial. In a petition for quashing the FIR, the Court cannot go into disputed questions of fact.

¶355

18. The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents. Therefore, the second ground on which the petitioner seeks to quash the FIR cannot be countenanced.

¶356

If the material on record is examined bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, I am of the considered opinion that mere delay, if any, in filing the complaint would by itself ipso facto not be sufficient for this Court to interfere with the impugned complaint and the FIR, especially when the complainant was undisputedly residing

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in New Zealand from 1988 onwards and had made serious allegations of forgery, breach of trust, fraud, cheating, land grabbing, criminal conspiracy etc., against the petitioners - accused persons. Under these circumstances even this contention urged by the petitioners cannot be accepted.

¶360

Insofar as the various judgments relied upon by both sides are concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances narrated hereinbefore, coupled with the fact that the said decisions would not be applicable to the facts of the instant cases and as such, the same are not elaborately dealt with for the purpose of the present order.

¶361

In view of the forgoing discussion, I do not find any merit in both the petitions and accordingly, both Crl.P.No.262/2025 and Crl.P.No.1352/2024 are devoid of merit and the same are hereby

¶362

dismissed.

¶363

Srl.

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Sd/(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE

M/S Filtrex Technologies Pvt. Ltd., v. State of Karnataka

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M/S Filtrex Technologies Pvt. Ltd., v. State of Karnataka

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