Sri Sanjeev Vora v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC6 Nov 2025CRL.P/12438/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Sanjeev Vora v. State of Karnataka (Jeevan Bheemanagar P.S.) and another — Crl.P. No. 12438 of 2025 under S.482 Cr.P.C./S.528 BNSS seeking quashment of S.C.No.1164/2010 (Crime No.69/2010; Ss.304, 338 r/w 34 IPC) arising from the 23-02-2010 Carlton Towers fire; allowed on 06-11-2025 by Justice M. Nagaprasanna; proceedings against the last remaining accused quashed on parity with co-accused; mens rea held essential under S.304 IPC per Anbazhagan v. State.

What did the court decide?

Quashing of the proceedings in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending before the LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, arising out of Crime No.69 of 2010. ¶161

Sri Sanjeev Vora Vs State of Karnataka — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Karnataka HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Quashing of the proceedings in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending before the LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, arising out of Crime No.69 of 2010.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the criminal proceedings in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 against the petitioner (accused No.1), the only accused whose proceedings remained, should be quashed on parity with the co-accused whose proceedings stand quashed. +2 more

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Court's answer

The petitioner being the co-accused, and quashment having happened qua the other accused, the petition deserves to succeed with the same relief granted to all other accused.

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Ratio / Principle

The essential ingredient of Section 304 IPC is mens rea; the petitioner can neither be alleged of an offence of causing death by rash and negligent act nor of the offence made penal under Section 304 IPC.

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Key takeaways

The facts of the case, considered on the touchstone of the ingredients of Section 301 IPC, can by no stretch of imagination become an offence under Section 304 IPC; permitting further proceedings against the petitioner would run foul of the provision and its interpretation and result in miscarriage of justice.ratio¶149
Criminal Petition allowed; proceedings in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending before the LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, arising out of Crime No.69 of 2010, stand quashed.ratio¶163

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Crl.P. No. 12438 of 2025 (High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru; M. Nagaprasanna J.; decided 06-11-2025): Proceedings in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 (arising out of Crime No.69 of 2010, the Carlton Towers fire of 23-02-2010 in which 9 persons died and 70 were injured; offences under Sections 304 and 338 read with Section 34 IPC) quashed against the petitioner Sanjeev Vora, the sole remaining accused after quashment of proceedings against all co-accused. Held: (i) the essential ingredient of Section 304 IPC is mens rea (guilty intention/knowledge), per Anbazhagan v. State (2023 SCC OnLine SC 857); (ii) the facts, tested on the touchstone of the ingredients of Section 301 IPC, can by no stretch of imagination become an offence under Section 304 IPC, and permitting further proceedings would run foul of the provision and result in miscarriage of justice; (iii) on parity with the co-accused, the petitioner is entitled to the same relief. Petition allowed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / Section 528 BNSS.

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NC: 2025:KHC:44943 CRL.P No. 12438 of 2025

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 6^TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

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CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 12438 OF 2025 (482(Cr.P.C.) / 528(BNSS))

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BETWEEN:

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SRI. SANJEEV VORA S/O. LATE VORA, AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS, NO.24/9, MARIYANNA PALYA BEHIND LUMBINI GARDEN, BANGALORE NORTH H A FARM, BANGALORE – 560 024.

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…PETITIONER

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(BY SMT. ANITHA R., ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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STATE OF KARNATAKA BY

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JEEVAN BHEEMANAGAR, POLICE STATION, REP BY SPP, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT BANGALORE, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU -560 001.

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Digitally signed by VISHAL NINGAPPA PATTIHAL Location: High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, Dharwad

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MOUNESHWAR SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE, JEEVAN BHEEMANAGAR POLICE STATION, BANGALORE – 560 075.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. M.R.PATIL, HCGP)

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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNNS) PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 08.10.2010 PASSED BY THE PRL. SESSION JUDGE AT BANGALORE FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 304, 338 R/W 34 OF IPC. QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SC NO.1164/2010 AGAINST THE PETITIONER PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE LXIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AT BANGALORE AND ETC.,

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THIS CRIMINAL PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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ORAL ORDER

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The petitioner is accused No.12 qua all the other accused, this Court or the Co-ordinate Benches of this Court have quashed the proceedings. I deem it appropriate to notice the order passed by this Court.

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The petitioner/accused No.1 in Sessions Case No.1164 of 2010 pending before the 69th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru is knocking at the doors of this Court calling in question continuance of proceedings in the aforesaid Sessions case registered for offences punishable under Sections 304 and 338 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

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Heard Sri S. Shankarappa, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for the respondent.

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The facts, in brief, germane are as follows:It is the case of the prosecution that on 23-02-2010 fire broke out in Carlton Towers, a commercial complex in the City of Bangalore at 4.20 p.m. resulting in 9 persons losing their lives and 70 people getting injured. The petitioner along with 20 accused were drawn into the web of crime on the score that their acts were rash and negligent and, therefore, would attract offences punishable under Sections 304 and 338 of the IPC. The crime comes to be registered in Crime No.69 of 2010. The petitioner is accused No.1. The respondent-police initially filed a charge sheet and later on, an additional charge sheet. Today it is only the petitioner who remains in the entire web of crime to be proceeded against, as proceedings against all the other accused have been quashed. It is, therefore, the petitioner has now knocked at the doors of this Court in the subject petition, seeking quashment of proceedings against him as well.

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The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri S. Shankarappa taking this Court through the orders passed by 4 this Court quashing the proceedings against all other accused would submit that

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the petitioner also stands on the same footing, as the petitioner was not even present in the Commercial complex at the time when the mishap took place. The entire mishap happens due to accused No.21 installing cable duct and the cable duct was used to supply power to the shops. The short circuit that happened in the cable duct has resulted in the mishap. The allegation is directly against accused No.21 who installed aluminum cable and not got the place cleaned due to which short circuit occurred. All other civil remedies were held in favour of the accused, as the Electrical Inspector who had inspected the property has held that there was no fault of any of the persons and it was due to short circuit that has happened and the unit owners of Unit Nos. 111 to 113 had not taken proper care of aluminum cables. With these findings and notwithstanding the same, the Police had filed a charge sheet and proceedings were registered as S.C.No.1164 of 2010. He would, therefore, on parity along with other reasons, seek quashment of the proceedings.

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Per-contra, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor would seek to refute the submissions to contend that the petitioner is accused No.1. All other accused had no role of play. Though the petitioner has literally no role to play, the proceedings against him need not be quashed. He would submit that it is a matter of trial in which the petitioner should come out clean and seeks dismissal of the petition.

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I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.

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The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. Following earlier order passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in T.G.MANDANNA V. STATE OF KARNATAKA – Criminal Petition No.769 of 2011, I had allowed Criminal Petition No.4726 of 2012 decided on 21-10-2021 in the case of SANJAY GOEL V. STATE OF KARNATAKA filed by accused No.18 in the very crime with the following reasoning:

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“…. …. …. 7. The petitioner is accused No.18 in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending before the Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court-XV, Bangalore. The reason for the petitioner being arraigned as an

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accused is the incident that occurred on 23-022010 when the fire broke out in Carlton Towers, a commercial complex in the City of Bangalore which took 9 lives and left 70 injured. The petitioner is arrayed as an accused as he is the Director of the Company.

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The Company which had its office in the same Towers had entered into an agreement for annual maintenance and house-keeping at Carlton Towers with the Carlton Towers Owners Association. The agreement was entered into on 01-05-2009 and it was an annual maintenance contract. On 16-12-2009 M/s Shivaji Electricals was entrusted to rectify the defects in compliance with the Electrical Inspector’s report who had found certain defects in electrification. The defects were rectified by M/s Shivaji Electricals on 17-12-2009 and the same was communicated to the Electrical Inspector, Bangalore East Division under whose jurisdiction the building came.

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After the said job being entrusted to M/s Shivaji Electricals, the Carlton Towers Owners Association also communicated to the Electrical Inspector that the defects have been rectified by M/s Shivaji Electricals. This communication was sent on 15-02-2010. In the interregnum the petitioner travelled abroad i.e., to the United Kingdom on 31-01-2010 and returned to India on 5-03-2010. A memo along with immigration details is also placed on record which would clearly depict that the petitioner was out of the country from 3101- 2010 up to 05-03-2010.

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The fire mishap occurred on 23-022010. Admittedly the petitioner was not in the country at that point in time. A FIR came to be registered in Crime No.69 of 2010 against 20 accused for offences punishable under Sections 338, 304(A) and 304 read with Section 34 of the IPC. A report was called for from the Deputy Chief Electrical Inspector with regard to the incident. The Deputy Chief Electrical Inspector submits his report on 1-03-2010 opining that if electrical instruments had been maintained in a sustainable condition when electrical 7 arcing occurred and paper, cloth

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pieces and other material which are vulnerable to fire were not dumped into the cable duct and also other precautions had been taken the fire could have been avoided. This had led to the fire mishap. The report reads as follows:

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"RRR C¥ÀWÁvÀzÀ §UÉÎ C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ:

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vÀ¤SÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ ªÀgÀ¢ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ ¸ÀzÀj PÀlÖqÀzÀ°è ªÉÆzÀ®£ÉÃ CAvÀ¹Û£À°è PÁAiÀÄð¤ªÀð»¸ÀÄwÛgÀÄªÀ ªÉÄ: mÉPÉÆß«ÄPï ¸ÁÜªÀgÀPÉÌ «zÀÄåvï ¸ÀgÀ§gÁdÄ PÀ°à¹gÀÄªÀ 4 C + 50 Sq.mm aluminium Armoured calbe, PÉÃ§¯ï qÀPïÖ£À JAnæ ¥Á¬ÄAmï¤AzÀ ¸ÀÄªÀiÁgÀÄ 1 jAz À 2 CrAiÀÄ CAvÀg À zÀ° è PÉÃ§¯ï C£ÀÄß J¼ÉAiÀÄÄªÀ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄz À °è Internal conductor fracture ¤AzÀ CxÀªÁ conductor deterioration ¤AzÀ Cx À ªÁ abrasion ¤AzÀ QëÃt Â ¹zÀÄÝ PÁ®PÀæªÉÄÃt CzÀgÀ «zÀÄåvï PÁåj¬ÄAUï ±ÀQ ÛAiÀÄÄ PÀrªÉÄAiÀiÁV «zÀÄåvï ¥Àæª À »¸ÀÄwÛgÀÄªÀ vÀAw ºÁUÀÆ ¥ÀPÀ Ì zÀ UËæAqÉqï ¯ÉÆÃºÀzÀ ¨sÁUÀPÉÌ (Cable Armour) DQðAUï DV ¨ÉAQ GAmÁVzÀÄÝ, CzÉÃ ¸ÀAzÀ¨sÀðzÀ° è PÉÃ§¯ï qÀPïÖ £À° è ±ÉÃRgÀuÉAiÀiÁVzÀÝ ¥ÉÃ¥Àgï ¦Ã¸ï UÀ¼ÀÄ, §mÉÖ vÀÄAqÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ, ºÁUÀÆ EvÀgÉ ¸ÀÄ®¨sÀªÁV ¨ÉAQAiÀiÁV DºÀÄwAiÀiÁUÀÄªÀ EvÀgÉ ªÀ¸ÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸ÉÃjPÉÆAqÀÄ, ¨ÉAQAiÀÄ wÃª À ðv É AiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÉaÑ¹zÀÄÝ, F ¨ÉAQAiÀÄÄ EvÀgÉ PÉÃ§¯ïUÀ¼À E£ÀÄì¯ÉÃ±À£ïUÀ¼ À £ÀÄß ¸ÀÄnÖzÀÄÝ, EzÀjAzÀ CwAiÀiÁzÀ PÁ§ð£ï ºÉÆUÉAiÀÄÄ GvÀàwAiÀiÁVzÀÄÝ, F PÁ§ð£ï ºÉÆUÉAiÀÄÄ PÉÃ§¯ï ªÀÄÄSÁAvÀgÀ ºÉÆgÀUÉ ºÉÆÃUÀ®Ä CªÀPÁ±À«®èzÉ, PÉÃ§¯ï qÀPïÖ £À°è ±ÉÃRgÀuÉUÉÆArzÀÄÝ, ºÁUÀÆ F ºÉÆUÉAiÀÄÄ wÃªÀðvÉAiÀÄÄ eÁ¹ÛAiÀiÁV PÉÃ§¯ï qÀPï Ö ¨ÁV®ÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß QvÀÄÛPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆgÀUÉ §AzÀÄ, ºÉÆUÉAiÀÄÄ J¯Á è ªÀÄºÀrUÀ¼À®Æ è «¹Ûj¹zÀÄÝ, «±ÉÃµÀªÁV 6 ªÀÄvÀÄ Û 7£ÉÃ ªÀÄºÀrAiÀÄ°è §ºÀ¼ À µÀÄÖ vÀÄA©PÉÆArzÀÄÝ, PÀlÖqÀzÀ° èzÀÝ d£ÀgÀÄ EzÀ£ÀÄß £ÉÆÃr UÁ§j¥Àn ÖgÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ F CªÀWÀq À PÉÌ PÁgÀtªÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.

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¸ÀzÀj PÀl ÖqÀzÀ ¤ªÁðºÀP À gÀÄ / ªÀiÁ°ÃPÀgÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¨ÉAQ CªÀWÀqÀ ¸ÀA¨sÀ«¸À®Ä PÁgÀtªÁzÀ electrical Arcing GAmÁzÀ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄz À °è «zÀÄåvÀ ¸ÀÄgÀPÁë G¥ÀPÀgÀtUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸ÀÄ¹ÜwAiÀÄ° è ElÄ Ö PÁAiÀÄð¤ªÀð»¸ÀÄªÀAvÉ £ÉÆÃrPÉÆArzÀÝgÉ ºÁUÀÆ PÉÃ§¯ï qÀPïÖ C£ÀÄß ¸ÀéZÀÒªÁV ElÄÖPÉÆArzÀÄÝ, ¨ÉAQUÉ DºÀÄwAiÀiÁUÀÄªÀAvÀ ¥ÉÃ¥ À gï ªÀÄvÀÄ Û §mÉÖ ¦Ã¸ïUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ EvÀgÉ ªÀ¸ÀÄ ÛUÀ¼ÀÄ C°è ±ÉÃRgÀu É AiÀiÁUÀzÀAvÉ £ÉÆÃrPÉÆArzÀÝgÉ ªÀÄvÀÄ Û ªÀÄÄ£ÉßZÀ Ñ jPÉ PÀæªÀÄ vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ J¯Á è vÀÄvÀÄð ¤UÀðªÀÄ£ÀzÀ ¨ÁV®ÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß vÉgÉ¢lÄÖ ºÁUÀÆ PÁjqÁgï UÀ¼À°è ¸Áé¨sÁ«PÀ UÁ½ ¨É¼ÀPÀÄ½UÉ ªÀéªÀ¸ÉÜ ªÀiÁrzÀÝ°è F CªÀWÀqÀªÀ£ÀÄß vÀ¦ à¸À§ºÀÄzÀÉAzÀÄ C©ü¥ÁæAiÀÄ¥ÀqÀ¯ÁVzÉ."

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After all the aforesaid events, charge sheet is also filed by the Police in which the petitioner is arrayed as accused No.18 and an additional charge sheet is filed against one Sri Suresh Kumar S.K.,

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Proprietor of the Company arraigning him as accused No.21.

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It is not in dispute that among the accused, one of them had approached this Court i.e., accused No.3 one Mr. T.G. Mandanna in Criminal Petition No.769 of 2011 under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. This Court by its order dated 21-022011 holding that the petitioner therein was not the owner of any of the units in the building, allowed the petition by observing as follows:

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"3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that though there are 20 persons named in the charge sheet, the petitioner herein was not the owner of any one of the apartments, but on the other hand, he is the co-opted treasurer of the Carlton Towers Owner’s Association. He further submits that nothing is stated in the charge sheet filed against the petitioner that he is the owner of the apartments of the said building and is responsible for the mishap that took place and as such, the question of the petitioner being proceeded with does not arise. Referring to the contents of the charge sheet, submission made is that reason for the fire said to have been not taking proper precautions by the building owners and as such, this petitioner is nothing to do with the maintenance of the building as he was only the treasurer who is looking after the account matters.

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Having thus heard the petitioner’s Counsel and after going through the charge sheet material, though there are 20 accused persons named in the charge sheet, except this petitioner, others according to the petitioner’s Counsel are the owners of the building. Therefore, having regard to the nature of the incident that took place on the aforementioned date and the charge sheet also putting the blame entirely on the building owners being negligent in taking necessary precautions to prevent the occurrence of fire in the building, in my view, continuation of proceedings as far as this petitioner is concerned is not warranted as there are no specific mention in the charge sheet against this petitioner attracting the aforesaid offence.

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For the above said reasons, petition is allowed and proceedings against this petitioner in S.C.No.1164/10 pending on the file of the Presiding Officer, FTC-XV (Sessions), Bangalore, stands quashed. But, however as regards the other accused persons are concerned, i.e., accused Nos.1, 2 & 4 to 20, the trial court shall proceed with the matter in accordance with law."

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The subject petition has to be now considered on the grounds that are urged by the petitioner on the facts that are narrated hereinabove.

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It is not in dispute that the petitioner is one of the Directors of the Company and the Company is not arrayed as an accused. The Company not being arrayed as one of the accused and only the Director of the Company being arrayed, the complaint cannot be maintainable and the proceedings cannot be continued in the light of the law laid down by the Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of ANEETA HADA v. GODFATHER TRAVELS AND TOURS PRIVATE LIMITED – (2012) 5 SCC 661. Therefore, the complaint against the petitioner who is the Director of the Company without arraigning the Company as a party was not even maintainable.

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The allegations against the petitioner in the charge sheet are for offences punishable under Sections 304 and 338 of the IPC. This Court in identical circumstances in the case of MELVIN KUMAR AND OTHERS v. K.S. HARISHA AND ANOTHER (Crl.P.No.2619 of 2014 decided on 31st January 2019) which concerned offences punishable under Section 304A read with Section 34 of the IPC against several accused who were teachers of Mother Theresa School who had taken the children studying 3rd, 4th and 5th standards for a school picnic at Residency Holiday Resort and the students got drowned in the swimming pool, a complaint was registered against the owner or the management, the Head Master as well as the Manager of Residency Holiday Resort. The teachers of the school who had been arrayed as accused had approached this Court in Criminal Petition No.2619

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of 2014 for offences punishable under Section 304A of IPC. This Court after considering the purport of Section 304-A of IPC which deals with causing death by negligence has held as follows:

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"12. Viewed from another angle, in order to fasten criminal liability for the offence under section 304A of Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is required to prove that the act of the accused was the proximate and immediate cause of death and that the death was caused without the intervention of another person’s negligence. As held in SUSHIL ANSAL’s case, supra, it must have been the causa causans; and not mere causa sine qua non.

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In Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Bangawalla’s case, referred to supra, the allegation against the appellant therein was that he allowed the burners to be used in the same room in which varnish and turpentine were stored, which were alleged to be negligent act and fire resulted because of the proximity of the burners. But the said contention was not found favour with the Hon’ble Supreme Court in view of the above proposition of law.

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The law casts a higher degree of care on the occupiers of the building or premises wherein visitors or the licensees are allowed to use the facilities provided therein. What is the degree of care expected from the occupiers of a Cinema building came up for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of SUSHIL ANSAL, referred to above. In paragraph No.95 thereof, it is observed thus:

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“What is the degree of care expected from the occupier of a cinema is the next question to which we must advert at this stage. Two fundamental principles must be noticed at the threshold while answering that question. The first is that the degree and nature of care expected of an occupier depends upon the fact situation in which the duty to care arises. The second and equally important principle at common law is that the

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degree of care in a given fact situation would depend upon whether the person to whom the duty is owed is a contractual visitor, invitee, licensee or trespasser. Of these the occupier owes the highest degree of care to a contractual visitor viz., a person who pays consideration to be present on the premises for some purpose; whatever that purpose be. At common law there is an implied term in the contract between the occupier and the visitor that the occupier’s premises shall be reasonably safe. The occupier’s duty must be held to have been breached if any injury is caused to a contractual visitor by any defect in the premises apart from a latent defect.”

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On the aforesaid reasoning, the criminal petition was allowed and the proceedings against those teachers were quashed.

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In an yet another circumstance, this Court in the case of M.SRINIVAS v. STATE – (Criminal Petition No.9124 of 2016 decided on 15th February 2019) again considering offences punishable under Section 304A of IPC in a case where the allegations against the petitioner therein who was a Supervisor-Engineer of M/s Malu Constructions (India) Private Limited which was executing works in terms of a work order issued by the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board pertaining to laying down of water pipes had negligently left a heap of mud on the road without taking precautionary measures leading to accident which resulted in death of a rider of a motorcycle and the allegation against the said Supervisor Engineer was for offences punishable under Section 304-A of IPC inter alia. This Court allowed the criminal petition holding as follows:

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"11. It is now well settled that in order to constitute an offence under section 304A of Indian Penal Code, the negligence imputed to the accused must be gross in nature. Though the term “gross” has not been used in section 304A of Indian Penal Code, in JACOB MATHEW vs. STATE OF PUNJAB & Others in (2005) 6 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining a case of criminal medical negligence by a Doctor under section 304A of

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Indian Penal Code, has reviewed the case law on the subject and in para 48 thereof, has held as under:

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“(5) The jurisprudential concept of negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What may be negligence in civil law may not necessarily be negligence in criminal law. For negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist. For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be much higher i.e., gross or of a very high degree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of a higher degree may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution.

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(6) The word ‘gross’ has not been used in Section 304-A IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal law negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must be of such a high degree as to be ‘gross’. The expression ‘rash or negligent act’ as occurring in Section 304-A IPC has to be read as qualified by the word ‘grossly’.”

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12. xx xx xx xx

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It is now well settled that, in order to fasten criminal liability for the offence under section 304A of Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is required to establish that the act of the accused No.1 was the proximate and immediate cause of death and that the death was caused without the intervention of another person’s negligence. As held in SUSHIL ANSAL’s case, supra, it must have been the causa causans; and not mere causa sine qua non.

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In the instant case, petitioner herein is implicated in the alleged offence on the allegation that he was responsible for causing 12 the accident by leaving heap of mud on the accident site. In Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla, supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with an identical situation. In the said case, the allegation against the appellant therein was that he allowed the burners to be used in the same room in which varnish and turpentine were stored, which were

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alleged to be negligent act and fire resulted because of the proximity of the burners. But the said contention was negatived by the Hon’ble Supreme Court by endorsing the view taken in EMPEROR vs. OMKAR RAMPRATAP in (1902) 4 Bombay LR 679, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that,

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“This view has been generally followed by High Courts in India and is in our opinion the right view to take of the meaning of S.304-A. It is not necessary to refer to other decisions, for as we have already said this view has been generally accepted. Therefore, the mere fact that the fire would not have taken place if the appellant had not allowed burners to be put in the same room in which turpentine and varnish were stored, would not be enough to make him liable under S.304-A, for the fire would not have taken place, with the result that seven persons were burnt to death, without the negligence of Hatim. The death in this case was, therefore, in our opinion not directly the result of a rash or negligent act on the part of the appellant and was not the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s negligence. The appellant must, therefore, be acquitted of the offence under S.304-A.”

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In the instant case also, the proposition laid down in the above decision, in my view, is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. A plain reading of the charge-sheet discloses that the material allegations constituting negligence are directed only against accused No.1. The material on record indicates that the deceased died on account of the rash and negligent act of accused No.1 in hitting the motorcycle driven by the accused. Therefore, the act of accused No.1 was the proximate and immediate cause of death of the deceased. The act of the petitioner/accused No.2 in leaving heap of mud on the road may amount to an offence under section 134 of Indian Motor Vehicles Act, but the same does not amount to an act of negligence within the meaning of section 304A of Indian Penal Code. Thus, on consideration of all the above facts and circumstances of the case, in the

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light of the law applicable to the facts of this case, I am of the clear opinion, that petitioner/accused No.2 cannot be proceeded for negligence in causing the death of the deceased within the meaning of Sections 304A and 279 of Indian Penal Code. Consequently, the prosecution of the petitioner being illegal, the same amounts to abuse of process of Court.

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As a result, the petition is allowed. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner in C.C.No.10878/2016 pending on the file of Metropolitan Magistrate Traffic Court-III, Bengaluru is hereby quashed."

¶102

Therefore, the offence of Section 304A of IPC alleged against the petitioner who is the Director of the Company and was not present at the place of incident and the negligence attributable to accused No.21, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted or trial cannot be continued against the petitioner for the said offence of Section 304A of IPC. Section 338 of IPC which is the other offence alleged against the petitioner deals with causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others and reads as follows:

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“338. Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others.— Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

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The section makes it clear that whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life shall be punishable in terms of law. There is no act committed by the petitioner which attracts Section 338 of the IPC.

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In the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ANEETA HADA and the law laid down by this Court in the afore-extracted

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judgments, the petitioner cannot be held to be responsible for the act of other accused. Therefore, continuance of the proceedings against the petitioner would result in miscarriage of justice and be an abuse of the process of law.”

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This order has been subsequently followed by this Court in Criminal Petition No.2376 of 2022 decided on 0704-2022 in the case of SHRI SHYAM KEDARE V. STATE. Further, in Criminal Petition 14 No.7687 of 2022 decided on 22-08-2022 in the case of SMT. MALTI HIRANI V. STATE OF KARNATAKA and also in Criminal Petition No.11620 of 2022 decided on 29-11-2022 in the case of KEMPEGOWDA V @ KIRAN V. STATE OF KARNATAKA.

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In all the aforesaid orders, the proceedings qua the respective accused as on today, stood obliterated. Whose proceedings are pending in the entire episode of crime is the petitioner/accused No.1 herein, so therefore, except the petitioner, every other person is now free of the rigmarole of proceedings. The allegation against the petitioner as was the allegation against every other accused is for offence punishable under Sections 304 and 338 of the IPC. The primary offence being offence under Section 304 of the IPC, it reads as follows:

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“304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.—Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with 339[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;

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or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the 15 act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.”

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Section 304 of the IPC deals with culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The ingredients of Section 304 of the IPC are found in Section 301 of the IPC. It reads as follows:

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“301. Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended.—If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.”

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If a person by doing anything which he intends or knows that it is likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide, by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself, would become culpable homicide. Therefore, essential ingredient of Section 304 of the IPC is mens rea. It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of 16 ANBAZHAGAN V. STATE1 , wherein the Apex Court holds as follows:

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“66. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:—

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(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate:‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient

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in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.

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(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions 1 2023 SCC OnLine SC 857 17 enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.

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(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.

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(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.

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(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is 18 generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.

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To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.

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(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.

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(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of

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the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, 19 namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.

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(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

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(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.

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(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.

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(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

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(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.”

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The Apex Court considers what should be the ingredient of Section 304 of the IPC and holds that Section 304 of the IPC would become applicable only when the accused has acted with guilty intention or as observed hereinabove, the necessary ingredient is mens rea. Therefore, the petitioner can neither be alleged of offence of causing death by rash and negligent act nor can be alleged of offence made penal under Section 304 of the IPC.

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If the facts obtaining in the case at hand are considered on the touchstone of the ingredients of Section 301, it can by no stretch of imagination become an offence under Section 304 of the IPC. It is on this score, the co-ordinate bench of this Court, as also this Court in the judgments noted to supra, have obliterated crimes against all the accused except the petitioner herein, holding that there was no mens rea on the part of those accused and what has happened in the case at hand was a mishap. In that light, permitting further proceedings against this petitioner would run foul of the very provision and its interpretation by this Court in the aforesaid judgments and results in miscarriage of justice.

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For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

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O R D E R

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(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

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(i) Proceedings in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending before the 69th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru arising out of Crime No.69 of 2010 stand quashed.

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Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2023 also stands disposed.”

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In the light of the petitioner being the co-accused and the

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quashment happening qua the other accused, the petition deserves to succeed with the same relied that is granted to all other accused. Accordingly, the following:

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ORDER

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(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

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(ii) Proceedings in S.C.No.1164 of 2010 pending before

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the LXIX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru arising out of Crime No.69 of 2010 stand quashed.

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Sd/-

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(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE