Vasu Vs the State of Karnataka

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 10^TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 11827 OF 2025 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)

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BETWEEN:

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VASU S/O, LATE N.P. RAMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, R/AT, NAGAYYANAKOPPALU VILLAGE, SHRAVANABELAGOLA HOBLI, CHANNARAYAPATNA TALUK, HASSAN DISTRICT - 01.

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SUJATHA, W/O VASU, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS, R/AT, NAGAYYANAKOPPALU VILLAGE, SHRAVANABELAGOLA HOBLI, CHANNARAYAPATNA TALUK, HASSAN DISTRICT - 01.

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…PETITIONERS

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(BY SRI. PRATHEEP.K.C., ADVOCATE)

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Digitally signed by CHANDANA B M Location: High Court of Karnataka

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AND:

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THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY SHRAVANABELAGOLA POLICE STATION HASSAN DISTRICT, REP. BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU - 560 001

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SHEKARA, S/O NATARAJA, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/AT SAKETHA BADAVANE, HUNSUR TOWN AND TALUK, MYSORE DISTRICT - 571 105

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. M. R. PATIL, HCGP FOR R1; R2 IS SERVED & UNREPRESENTED)

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.P.C (U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SC.NO.114/2024 ARISING OUT OF CR.NO.18/2024 REGISTERED BY SHRAVANABELAGOLA POLICE, PENDING ON THE FILE OF IV ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AT HASSAN, SITTING AT CHANNARAYAPATNA, FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 498(A), 304(B), 504, 323, 109 OF IPC, U/S 3,4,6 OF D.P ACT, IN SO FAR AS PETITIONERS ARE CONCERNED.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR

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ORAL ORDER

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In this petition, petitioners have sought for the following

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reliefs:-

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"Wherefore the petitioners most humbly pray that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to quash the entire proceedings in S.C.No.114/2024 (Cr.No.18/2024) by Shravanabelagola Police, pending on the file of IV Addl. District & Sessions Judge at Hassan, sitting at Channarayapatna for the offence under section 498A, 304-B, 504, 323 & 109 of IPC R/W section 3, 4 & 6 of DP Act in so far as petitioners are concerned in the interest of justice and equity."

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Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned HCGP for the 1^st respondent and perused the material on record. Though the notice of this petition has been served on the 2^nd respondent, he has chosen to remain absent and unrepresented.

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the 2^nd respondent - complainant is the father of the deceased Smt.Surabhi, who said to have expired on 22.02.2024 by committing suicide. It is a matter of record that the aforesaid Smt.Surabhi was married to one Darshan - accused No.1 and the petitioners herein are his parents. Accused No.4 is one Smt.Sushma, who is alleged to be the girl friend of accused No.1. The 2^nd respondent - complainant having filed the complaint dated 22.02.2024, an FIR came to be registered in Crime No.18/2024 by the 1^st respondent - Police against accused Nos. 1 to 4 for alleged offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 504, 323, 109 r/w Section 34 of IPC and under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the D.P.Act.

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In pursuance of the aforesaid complaint and FIR, the police authorities conducted investigation and filed charge sheet, which is pending in S.C.No.114/2024 before the Sessions Court. Subsequently, accused No.4 - Smt.Sushma approached this Court in Crl.P.No.683/2025 which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 18.06.2025,, quashing the proceedings qua accused No.4 as hereunder:-

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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In this petition, the petitioner has sought for the following relief:

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" WHEREFORE the petitioner most humbly prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to quash the entire proceedings qua the petitioner in S.C.NO.114/2024 in crime No.18/2024 by Shravanabelagola police, pending on the file of IV addl district & Sessions judge at Hassan, sitting at Channarayapatna for the offence under section 498A, 304B, 504, 323 & 109 of IPC R/w section 3, 4 & 6 of DP act in the interest of justice and equity."

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2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned HCGP for respondent No.1 and learned counsel for respondent No.2 and perused the material on record.

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3. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that respondent No.2/defacto-complainant is the father of one Surabhi, who is said to have expired on 22.02.2024. It is an undisputed fact and material on record that respondent No.2 was the father of the deceased Surabhi whose husband was one Darshan and Vasu and Sujatha were her father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively. On 22.02.2024, respondent No.2, father of the deceased Surabhi filed the instant complaint which is registered in FIR in crime No.18/2024 against the petitioner/accused No.1, Darshan, husband of the deceased Surabhi and Vasu and Sujatha, father and mother of Darshan as accused Nos.1 to 3 respectively for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, 504 and 34 IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. After investigation, the police authorities filed a chargesheet for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B, 504 and 34 IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 along with Section 109 IPC which is currently pending in the impugned S.C.No.114/2024 before the trial Court.

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4. As stated supra, the petitioner is only alleged to be the girlfriend of accused No.1-Darshan, husband of the deceased Surabhi and is arraigned as accused No.5 only in relation to offences punishable under Section 498A and Section 109 IPC. A perusal of the material on record will also indicate that the petitioner/accused No.5 filed an application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. seeking discharge which was rejected by the Sessions Court vide impugned order which is assailed in the present petition.

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In this context, it is relevant to state that the petitioner not being a family member or relative of accused No.1, the husband of the deceased Surabhi, the petitioner cannot be incriminated of the offences punishable under Section 498A IPC as held by the Apex Court in the case of Dechamma

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I.M. @ Dechamma Koushik Vs. the State of Karnataka and Another in SLP (Crl.) No.3421/2022 decided on 04.12.2024 , it is held as under:

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"Leave granted.

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2 . Though Respondent No.2 has been duly served with notice, she has chosen not to appear.

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3 . The present appeal arises out of the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, thereby dismissing the criminal petition filed by the present appellant for quashing the proceedings in Crime No. 339 of 2019 on the file of Court of Sr. Civil Judge and JMFC, Gundlupete, Chamarajnagar, which has registered Gundlupete P.S. Cr. No. 172 of 2019 as against the appellant for offence punishable under Sections 498A, 504, 109 of Penal Code, 1860 (for short,

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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‘IPC’) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, against the appellant.

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4 . The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal by way of special leave are as under:

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4.1 On 19th April 2019, an FIR came to be lodged by respondent No.2 against her husband, namely, Adishetty, and Avinash Shetty (brother of her husband), Nataraju (paternal uncle of accused No.1), Prakash (son-in-law of the paternal uncle of accused No.1) and the appellant herein.

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4.2 As per the said FIR, respondent No.2/complainant got married to one Adishetty on 6th November 2017. It is alleged that at the time of marriage a sum or Rs.3 Lakhs, 25 grams of gold ornaments and other articles were given in dowry. It is stated by her that she lived happily for six months in her matrimonial house at Gundlapete. It is further alleged that the husband of respondent No.2, namely, Adishetty and accused Nos.3 and 4 have colluded with each other and have harassed respondent No.2 physically as well as mentally.

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4.3 Insofar as the allegation against the appellant herein is concerned, it is alleged that prior to the marriage of respondent No.2 with Adishetty, the present appellant was in a relationship with the said Adishetty which has continued even after marriage. It is further alleged that when the same was questioned, respondent No.2 was assaulted mentally and physically. It is also alleged that the appellant herein had also scolded respondent No.2/complainant in a filthy language through phone. After the conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet came to be filed against five accused persons on 1st August 2019.

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4.4 After filing of the charge-sheet, the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1873 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) praying for quashing of the proceedings in Crime No.339 of 2019. However, the learned Single Judge vide impugned judgment and order rejected the said petition. Hence this appeal by way of special leave.

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5 . We have heard Smt. K.V. Bharathi Upadhyaya, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri D.L..Chidananda, learned counsel for the respondent No.1/State.

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6 . Smt. Upadhyaya submits that even if the allegations in the FIR or in the charge-sheet are taken at their face

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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value, no case under Section 498A of IPC is made out against the appellant herein. She further submits that the allegations are false and fabricated as the appellant is residing 200 kms., away with her husband. Relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector of Police and Another, Ms. Upadhyaya submits that the appellant cannot be construed to be a relative within the meaning of the relatives of the husband under the purview of Section 498A of IPC. She, therefore, submits that the proceedings deserve to be quashed.

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7 . It is further submitted that respondent No.2 and accused No.1 have amicably settled the matter as amongst them and a decree of divorce by mutual consent has also been passed dissolving the marriage between respondent No.2 and accused No.1.

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8 . This Court, in the case of U. Suvetha (supra), had an occasion to consider a question as to whether the girlfriend or a woman with whom a man has had romantic or sexual relations outside of marriage would be a “relative of the husband” for the purposes of prosecution under Section 498A of IPC.

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9 . This Court, after considering the earlier judgments of this Court and the dictionary meaning of a relative, observed thus:-

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“ 18 . By no stretch of imagination would a girlfriend or even a concubine in an etymological sense be a “relative”. The word “relative” brings within its purview a status. Such a status must be conferred either by blood or marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not arise.”

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10 . It could thus be seen that this Court has, in unequivocal terms, held that a girlfriend or even a woman with whom a man has had romantic or sexual relations outside of marriage could not be construed to be a relative.

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11 . Apart from that for bringing a case under Section 498A of IPC, the material placed on record should show that the ill treatment was meted out by the husband or a relative, which is connected with non-fulfilment of demand of dowry.

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12 . Taking the allegations at their face value in the FIR or even in the entire material placed in the charge-sheet, it will show that there is no averment or material to show that the appellant was in any way concerned with causing harassment to respondent No.2 on account of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry.

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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13 . In that view of the matter, we are of the considered view that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellant herein would be nothing else but an abuse of process of law. We find that the present appeal deserves to be allowed.

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14 . In the result, we pass the following order:

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(i) The appeal is accordingly allowed;

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(ii) The judgment and order of the High Court dated 12th April 2021 is quashed and set aside; and

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(iii) The proceedings in Crime No.339 of 2019 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Gundlupete for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 504, 109 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, are quashed and set aside qua the appellant herein.

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14. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. "

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So also in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit

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Singh-(2014) 9 SCC 632 , it is held as under:

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The State of Punjab aggrieved by the order dated 7-92005, passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gurmit Singh v. State of Punjab whereby it has set aside the order of the trial court dated 24-1-2000 summoning the respondent Gurmit Singh to face trial under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has preferred this special leave petition.

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2 . Leave granted. The facts lie in a very short compass. On the basis of a report, a case under Section 304-B of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) was registered at Police Station Kharar. In the first information report, the names of various accused persons figured including Gurmit Singh, the respondent herein. The police after usual investigation, submitted the charge-sheet in which the respondent did not figure as an accused. However, the respondent along with some other accused persons who were not charge-sheeted were summoned to face the trial. They challenged the said order before the High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 1584-M of 1999 and the High Court by its order dated 25-2-1999 set aside the order summoning those accused persons including the respondent but while doing so gave liberty to take recourse to the provisions of Section 319 of the Code of

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), at an appropriate stage of the trial.

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3 . During the course of trial, evidence of one Shakuntla Rani, PW 1 was recorded, who averred that the respondent herein was also responsible for the death of Gurjit Kaur, the wife of Paramjit Singh. Thereafter, an application was filed by the prosecution for summoning the aforesaid Gurmit Singh and the other accused persons before the trial court in exercise of the power under Section 319 of the Code. The trial court by its order dated 24-1-2000, summoned the respondent besides the other accused persons to face trial, for commission of the offence under Section 304-B IPC, inter alia, observing that the names of those persons figured in the FIR, statement of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code and the evidence of Shakuntla Rani, PW 1.

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4 . The respondent challenged the aforesaid order in a revision application filed before the High Court inter alia on the ground that he cannot be tried for offence under Section 304-B of the Code because he is not a relative of the husband of the deceased. It was pointed out that Paramjit Singh happened to be the husband of the deceased whereas the respondent is the brother of his aunt (chachi) and, therefore, cannot be said to be a relative of the deceased's husband.

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5 . The aforesaid submission found favour with the High Court and, accordingly, it quashed the order summoning the respondent to face the trial. While doing so, the High Court observed as follows: [Gurmit Singh case, RCR (Cri) 562 (P&H)] , RCR (Cri) p. 563, para 12]

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“12. Even the dictionary meaning of a relative is one who is related by blood or marriage. Gurmit Singh is certainly not related to Paramjit Singh either by blood or by marriage. Gurmit Singh would not fall in the category of relative of the husband. Therefore, Gurmit Singh must be excluded from the array of the accused. It is not necessary to try him under Section 304-B IPC for the dowry death of Paramjit Singh's wife.”

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6 . Mr V. Madhukar, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submits that the High Court erred in holding that the respondent is not a relative of the husband of the deceased. He points out that Balbir Kaur is the wife of Paramjit Singh's father's brother

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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and Gurmit Singh, the respondent herein happens to be Balbir Kaur's brother, hence, a relative of Paramjit Singh. According to him, the High Court erred in holding that he is not a relative of the husband of the deceased. Mr.C.D.Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, submits that the respondent cannot be said to be related to the husband of the deceased in any manner and, therefore, cannot be prosecuted for the offence under Section 304-B IPC.

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7 . The rival submissions necessitate the examination of

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Section 304-B IPC, same reads as follows:

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“ 304-B.Dowry death .—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

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Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

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(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” (emphasis supplied)

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From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident that when a woman dies by any burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of the marriage, her husband or any relative of her husband shall be deemed to have committed the offence of dowry death if it is shown that soon before the death the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband, or by any relative of her husband. This section therefore, exposes the husband of the woman or any relative of her husband for the commission of offence of the dowry death.

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8 . Admittedly, the respondent is not the husband of the woman who died and, therefore, the question which falls for determination is as to whether he comes within the ambit of “any relative of her husband”. The expression “relative” has not been defined in IPC. The provision with which we are

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NC: 2025:KHC:40135 CRL.P No. 11827 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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concerned is a penal provision which deserves strict construction. It is well settled that when the words of a statute are not defined, it has to be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense. For this purpose, it shall be permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which the word is understood in common parlance. In Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon (Vol. 4, 3rd Edn.), the word “relative” means any person related by blood, marriage or adoption. A large number of dictionaries give this word “relative”, in context, the same meaning.

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9 . It is relevant here to state that the expression “relative of the husband” has been used in Section 498-A IPC. While interpreting the said expression, this Court in U.Suvetha v. State held it to mean a person related by blood, marriage or adoption. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: (SCC p. 762, para 10)

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“10. In the absence of any statutory definition, the term ‘relative’ must be assigned a meaning as is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of an individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word ‘relative’ would depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood, marriage or adoption.”

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10 . The expression “relative of the husband” further came up for consideration in Vijeta Gajra v. State and while approving the decision of this Court in U. Suvetha, it was held that the word relative would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations by marriage. It is appropriate to reproduce the following passage from the said judgment: (Vijeta Gajra case, SCC p. 621, para 12)

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“12. Relying on the dictionary meaning of the word ‘relative’ and further relying on P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon (Vol. 4, 3rd Edn.), the Court went on to hold that Section 498-A IPC being a penal provision would deserve strict construction and unless a contextual meaning is required to be given to the statute, the said statute has to be construed strictly. On that behalf the Court relied on the judgment in T. Ashok Pai v. CIT. A reference was made to the decision in Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of M.P. After quoting from various decisions of this Court, it was held that reference to the word ‘relative’ in Section 498-A IPC would be limited only to the blood relations or the relations by marriage.”

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HC-KAR

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11 . It is a well-known rule of construction that when the legislature uses same words in different parts of the statute, the presumption is that those words have been used in the same sense, unless displaced by the context. We do not find anything in context to deviate from the general rule of interpretation. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that the word “relative of the husband” in Section 304-B IPC would mean such persons, who are related by blood, marriage or adoption. When we apply this principle the respondent herein is not related to the husband of the deceased either by blood or marriage or adoption. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court did not err in passing the impugned order. We hasten to add that a person, not a relative of the husband, may not be prosecuted for the offence under Section 304-B IPC but this does not mean that such a person cannot be prosecuted for any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in case the allegations constitute offence other than Section 304-B IPC.

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12 . In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly."

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5. In the instant case, as stated supra, the petitioner alleged to be a girlfriend cannot be treated on par or equated with family member or relative as contemplated under Section 498A IPC and in the light of the principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgment, I am of the view that the trial Court fell in error in rejecting the discharge application filed by the petitioner/accused No.5 and accordingly, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the petitioner deserves to be discharged from impugned proceedings.

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6. Insofar as alleged offences for abetment of the offence under Section 498A are concerned, in the light of the finding recorded by me above that the petitioner not being the family member or relative of accused No.1 cannot be arraigned as an accused or dragged into the impugned proceedings for 498A IPC, the question of the petitioner

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HC-KAR

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being guilty for abetment of the offences punishable under Section 498A IPC also would not arise in the facts and circumstances of the instant case and consequently, the impugned proceedings in S.C.No.114/2024 qua petitioner/accused No.5 deserves to be quashed. In the result, the following:

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ORDER

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(i) Petition is hereby allowed.

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(ii) The impugned order dated 04.12.2024 passed in S.C.No.114/2024 on the file of IV Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Hassan (Sit at Channarayapatna) is hereby quashed. (iii) Discharge application filed by the petitioner/accused No.5 stands allowed;

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(iv) The petitioner is discharged from the impugned proceedings.

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A perusal of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the material on record comprising of complaint, FIR, charge sheet material, statement of witnesses, documents, diary notes etc., are sufficient to come to the conclusion that the petitioners cannot be held to be guilty for the offences alleged against them, especially when there is no material to indicate that the petitioners committed the overt act or cruelty or responsible for the demise of the aforesaid Smt.Surabhi due to harassment of dowry and consequently, continuation of proceedings against the petitioners

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would amount to an abuse of process of law warranting

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interference by this Court in the present petition.

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In the result, I pass the following:

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ORDER

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(i) Petition is hereby allowed.

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(ii) The proceedings in S.C.No.114/2024 arising out of FIR in Crime No.18/2024 registered by the 1^st respondent – Police, pending on the file of IV Addl.District and Sessions Judge, Hassan, sitting at Channarayapatna, for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 504, 323, 109 r/w Section 34 of IPC and under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the D.P.Act insofar as the petitioners are concerned are hereby quashed.

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Sd/(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE

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Srl.

Vasu v. the State of Karnataka

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Vasu v. the State of Karnataka

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