The Office of the Deputy Director Vs M/S M.M. Hanchinmani

THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR LEGAL ENFORCEMENT CELL (NORTH) APMC, AMARGOL, MARKET YARD, HUBBALLI, NOW RE-DESIGNATED AS JOINT DIRECTOR LEGAL ENFORCEMENT CELL (NORTH ZONE), APMC YARD, AMARGOL, HUBBALLI.

¶10

…APPELLANT

¶11

(BY SRI. G.I. GACHCHINAMATH, ADVOCATE)

¶12

AND:

¶13

M/S. M.M. HANCHINMANI, AGE: MAJOR, OCC. TAMARIND BUSINESS, R/O. TAMARIND MARKET, NEW GANDHI NAGAR, BELAGAVI

¶14

Digitally signed byYASHAVANT YASHAVANT NARAYANKAR NARAYANKAR Date: 2025.06.27 14:32:24 +0530

¶15

(BY SRI. A.A. MULAWADAMATH, ADVOCATE)

¶16

…RESPONDENT

¶17

THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(4) OF CR.P.C., SEEKING TO GRANT LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL PASSED IN C.C.NO. 1579 OF 2008 DATED 11.01.2017 PASSED BY THE JMFC-II BELAGAVI AND SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT DATED 11.01.2017 MADE IN C.C.NO. 1579 OF 2008 PASSED BY THE JMFC-II, BELAGAVI AND CONVICT THE ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 114, 115, 116, 117 AND 117(A) OF THE KARNATAKA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKETING (REGULATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT) ACT, 1966.

¶18

2 -

¶19

NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶20

HC-KAR

¶21

THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

¶22

ORAL JUDGMENT

¶23

(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K)

¶24

The appellant in this appeal has assailed the judgment in C.C.No.1579/2008 dated 11.01.2017 passed by the JMFC-II Court, Balagavi (hereinafter referred to as “the Trial Court”) whereby the Trial Court acquitted the respondent-accused for the offence punishable under Sections 114, 117 and 117(A) of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and Development) Act, 1966, (for short “the Act”).

¶25

For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rankings before the trial Court.

¶26

The factual matrix of the case of the complainant is that the Deputy Director of Leal Enforcement Cell (North), APMC, Amargol Market Yard, Hubballi filed a private complaint under Section 200(a) of Cr.P.C., against the respondent-accused for the offences

¶27

3 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶28

HC-KAR

¶29

punishable under Sections 114, 115, 116, 117 and 117(A)

¶30

of the Act alleging that the accused was running a business of tamarind i.e., notified agricultural produce, at APMC Belagavi since 2001-02 to 2004-05 without obtaining any licence from the APMC. It is also alleged that the accused has not paid the market fee as required under the Act. It is further alleged in the complaint that in the year 2006, the Secretary of APMC, Belagavi issued a letter to the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Office, Belagavi and sought for the details of business particulars submitted by the accused from the year 2001 to 2004. Accordingly, on 23.06.2006, the office of the Commercial Taxes, Belagavi replied and furnished the details of the business carried by the accused during the year 2001 to 2005. After scrutinizing the said details, the Secretary of APMC, Belagavi issued a notice to the accused demanding market fee and fine for unauthorized trade. Though the said notice was served to the accused, the accused neither replied nor paid the fine amount. On calculation, it is found

¶31

4 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶32

HC-KAR

¶33

that the accused had purchased tamarind worth ₹19,85,136/- between 2001 to 2004 without obtaining licence and without paying the market fee. As such, he is liable to pay ₹29,776/- as a fee as provided under Section 65(2) of the Act and also fine of ₹89,331/- as provided under Section 70 of the Act. Thus, in all the accused is liable to pay ₹1,19,108/- to the complainant. Hence, the private complaint was filed against the accused since he failed to pay the fee and fine by violating the provisions of the Act.

¶34

After taking cognizance of the offences, the

¶35

Trial Court secured the presence of the accused and framed charges against him for the aforementioned offences.

¶36

In order to prove the charges leveled against the accused, the complainant examined one witness as PW1 and marked 5 documents as Ex.P1 to Ex.P5. The

¶37

5 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶38

HC-KAR

¶39

accused neither examined any witness nor produced any document on his behalf.

¶40

On assessment of oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court acquitted the accused for the aforementioned offences vide its judgment dated 11.01.2017 as stated supra. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal is filed by the complainant seeking to set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and to convict the accused for the aforementioned offences.

¶41

I have heard Sri. G.I.Gachchinamath, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. A.A. Mulawadmath, learned counsel for the respondent.

¶42

The primary contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is the Trial Court has miserably failed to appreciate the evidence on record in a right perspective. He contended that the evidence of PW1-the officer of the APMC categorically establishes that the accused, without obtaining any licence from the APMC, had illegally and

¶43

6 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶44

HC-KAR

¶45

unauthorizedly carried tamarind business from 2001 to 2005 and failed to pay the necessary fee to the APMC as provided under the relevant provisions of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the evidence of PW1 corroborates to the documents i.e., Ex.P1 to Ex.P5. Despite, the Trial Court acquitted the accused without assigning valid reasons. He further contended that the Trial Court acquitted the accused significantly relying on the aspect that there is a delay in issuing demand notice and the documents are not summoned by the Tax Department and PW1 is an interested witness to the case. However, the APMC issued notice to the accused after obtaining necessary documents from the Commercial Tax Office, Belagavi and PW1 cannot be termed as an interested witness only for the reason that he is an official of the APMC. With these submissions, he prays to allow the appeal.

¶46

Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent-

¶47

accused contended that there is no perversity or illegality

¶48

7 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶49

HC-KAR

¶50

in the impugned judgment since the Trial Court after meticulously examining the evidence on record, passed a well reasoned judgment, which does not call for any interference. He contended that the complainant has failed to prove the prima facie aspect that the accused was carrying the business of tamarind in the notified area of the APMC by placing sufficient evidence. He contended that except notice issued by the APMC and the Commercial Tax, no other documents were placed by the complainant to prove that the accused was illegally carrying the business of tamarind. He also contended that there is no reason whatsoever assigned by the complainant for not collecting fee or issuing notice for illegal running the business in the notified area of APMC for a period of four years, if really the accused had carried any business in the said place. As such, the complainant has miserably failed to prove the charges leveled against the accused and the Trial Court has rightly acquitted the accused. Hence, he prays to dismiss the appeal.

¶51

8 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶52

HC-KAR

¶53

Having heard the learned counsel for the

¶54

respective parties and having perused the evidence and documents made available before me, the only point that would arise for my consideration is:

¶55

“Whether the Trial Court is justified in acquitting the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 114, 117 and 117(A) of the Act?”

¶56

I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by both the learned counsel and also perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record.

¶57

As could be gathered from records, it is the case of the complainant that the accused was carrying tamarind business in the notified area of APMC, Belagavi from the year 2001-02 to 2004-05 without any license or paying prescribed market fee to the APMC as per the Act. Finally, in the year 2005, they summoned the documents from the Commercial Tax Department and came to know

¶58

9 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶59

HC-KAR

¶60

that the accused purchased tamarind worth ₹19,85,136/-

¶61

from the year 2001 to 2005 and he is liable to pay ₹1,19,108/- in total i.e., prescribed market fee and fine amount for the said period.

¶62

The complainant produced documents obtained

¶63

from the Commercial Tax Department and the notice issued to the accused. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent-accused, the complainant has not produced any document to substantiate the aspect that the accused was carrying the business of tamarind in particular notified area in APMC. Admittedly, there is no mahazar drawn in the alleged place of business of the accused or there is no such address forthcoming in the notice issued to him mentioning that the accused was doing business inside the said APMC market yard. There is an inordinate delay of 5 years in filing the private complaint. According to the complainant, the accused was carrying the business from the year 2001 to 2004. The notice was issued by the complainant in the

¶64

10 - NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶65

HC-KAR

¶66

year 2005. Thereafter, private complaint was filed against the accused. There is no reason forthcoming as to why the complainant has not issued notice to the accused since 2001 to 2005, if he had really carried the business in the APMC premises. The complainant being officer of the APMC cannot claim that he had no knowledge about the business carried by the accused in the APMC for a period of 5 years. In such circumstances, I am of the view that the complainant has failed to establish the primary aspect that the accused was running the business of tamarind in APMC market yard without any licence. This aspect of the matter is rightly dealt by the learned Trial Court.

¶67

Further, this appeal is against the judgment of acquittal. It is a settled position of law by this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court, if a plausible view is taken by the Trial Court in acquitting the accused, the Appellate Court shall not interfere in such judgment of acquittal. In the instant case, the view taken by the Trail Court is a plausible one and interference by this Court does not call

¶68

NC: 2025:KHC-D:8079 CRL.A No. 100174 of 2017

¶69