Kailash Roofing Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Vs Steel Hypermart India Pvt. Ltd.

KAILASH ROOFING SOLUTIONS PVT LTD A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1 OF 1956 HAVING ITS OFFICE AND PLACE OF BUSINESS AT PLOT NO.69/B, 69/C PARTS OF SURVEY NO.18 AND 19 VASANTHANARASAPURA INDUSTRIAL AREA NAGENAHALLI, KORA HOBLI TUMKURU TALUK AND DISTRICT REP. BY ITS DIRECTOR MR. UMED SINGH.

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MR. UMED SINGH S/O JAGANATH SINGH AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS DIRECTOR OF KAILASH ROOFING SOLUTIONS PVT LTD PLOT NO.69/B, 69/C PARTS OF SURVEY NO.18 AND 19 VASANTHANARASAPURA INDUSTRIAL AREA NAGENAHALLI, KORA HOBLI TUMKURU TALUK AND DISTRICT.

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R/AT NO.148, 1ST MAIN ROAD 1ST CROSS, S V G NAGAR, MOODALAPALYA BANGALORE-560072.

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MR. KISHORE SINGH S/O JAGANATH SINGH AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS DIRECTOR OF KAILASH ROOFING SOLUTIONS PVT LTD PLOT NO.69/B, 69/C PARTS OF SURVEY NO.18 AND 19 VASANTHANARASAPURA INDUSTRIAL AREA NAGENAHALLI, KORA HOBLI TUMKURU TALUK AND DISTRICT. R/AT NO.148, 1ST MAIN ROAD 5TH CROSS, MOODALAPALYA BANGALORE-560072.

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…APPELLANTS

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(BY SRI. D. ASWATHAPPA, ADV., FOR

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SRI. M. SUBRAMANI, ADV.,)

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AND:

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STEEL HYPERMART INDIA PVT LTD A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1 OF 1956 HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT MANNAJ, NO.2/1A, GROUND FLOOR NANJAPPA ROAD, SHANTHINAGAR BENGALURU-560027 REP. BY ITS DIRECTOR MAHENDRA KUMAR SINGHI.

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THE ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER STATE BANK OF INDIA BANGALORE CITY BRANCH NO.22, J C ROAD BANGALORE-560002.

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INDIA BULLS HOUSING FINANCE LTD NO.87/6, RICHMOND ROAD RICHMOND TOWN

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OPP. ELANZA HOTEL BANGALORE-560025.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. LAKSHAY AGARWAL, ADV., FOR SRI. ROSHAN JACOB, ADV., FOR R1 R2 & R3 SERVICE OF NOTICE IS D/W V.C.O. DTD:15.07.2024) - - -

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THIS COMAP/COMMERCIAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 13 (1A) OF THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT R/W ORDER 41 RULE 1 AND 2 OF CPC, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 10.01.2022 PASSED BY THE COURT OF LXXXII ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE (CCH-83) ALLOWED I.A.NO. 2 UNDER ORDERXIII-A OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE IS ALLOWED IN COM.O.S. NO. 26084/2017 FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT AND DECREED THE SUIT OF RESPONDENT NO.1 BY ALLOWING THE APPEAL & ETC.

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THIS COMAP HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 12.11.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT, THIS DAY VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN and HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL

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CAV JUDGMENT

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(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL)

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This appeal is filed by the appellants-defendant Nos.1 to 3 under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with Order XLI Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the CPC'), challenging the judgment and decree dated 10.01.2022 passed in Com.O.S.No.26084/2017 by the LXXXII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trial Court').

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The respondent No.1-plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.2,72,58,080/- against the respondents with an interest at the rate of 24% p.a. from the date of suit till realization of the amount with costs. In the said suit, the defendant Nos.1 to 3 failed to file a written statement refuting any claim made by the plaintiff.

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The Trial Court, on consideration of the case, in view of the absence of the written statement and also on an

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application filed by the plaintiff under Order XIII-A, proceeded to pass a summary judgment allowing the suit and directing the appellants-defendant Nos.1 to 3 to jointly and severally pay a sum of Rs.2,72,58,080/- with the interest at the rate of 24% p.a. from date of suit till realization. Being aggrieved, the present appeal is filed along with an application in I.A.No.1/2024 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay of 721 days in filing the appeal.

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Sri.D.Aswathappa, learned counsel appearing for Sri.M.Subramani, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants have filed an affidavit accompanying the application for condonation of delay and also additional affidavits explaining the cause for the delay. It is submitted that the impugned judgment is passed on 10.01.2022 and only after receipt of the execution notice, the appellants entered appearance in the execution proceedings and filed vakalath on 16.12.2023 and thereafter, filed an appeal. It is further submitted

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that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had excluded the period

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of limitation during the Covid-19 pandemic from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 and hence, the said period is required to be excluded while computing the period of limitation. It is also submitted that the appellant No.2 underwent surgery and he was admitted to the hospital on 12.08.2022 and discharged on 13.08.2022. Similarly, the appellant No.3 had undergone medical treatment on different dates and also underwent surgery which has been explained in the affidavits filed by both the appellants. Hence, the delay is required to be condoned by considering the cause shown in the affidavits. It is contended that the appellants have deposited the principal amount before the Trial Court and the matter is required to be remanded back to the Trial Court as the Trial Court, without considering the scope of Order XIII-A Rule 3 of the CPC, has proceeded to accept the plaint version and decreed the suit, which is impermissible. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the decision of the

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Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.N.RAMAPPA GOWDA Vs. C.C.CHANDRE GOWDA (DEAD) BY LRS AND ANOTHER¹ and the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of BRIGHT ENTERPRISES PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANR. Vs. M.J. BIZCRAFT LLP AND ANR.² . He further contended that one opportunity is required to be given to the appellants to place their defense before the Trial Court as they have a good case on merits. Therefore, he seeks to condone the delay and consider the appeal on merits.

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Per contra , Sri.Lakshay Agarwal appearing for Sri.Roshan Jacob, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 supports the impugned order of the Trial Court and submits that the appellants have filed vakalath before the Trial Court but they failed to file a written statement and hence, the matter was dragged on for many years and considering the material available on record, by a well reasoned order, the Trial Court decreed the suit, which

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1 (2012) 5 SCC 265

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2 (2017) SCC Online Delhi 6394

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does not call for any interference. It is submitted that the

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Court should not condone the delay in the commercial suits in a mechanical manner unless there is sufficient cause. It is further submitted that the statement of objections filed by the respondent No.1-plaintiff contains various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to consideration of application for condonation of delay. He seeks to consider those judgments and reject the application filed by the appellants for condonation of delay and consequently, reject the appeal.

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We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1, perused the material available on record and have given our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced, judgments relied and the material on record.

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The point that arises for consideration is:

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" Whether the appellants have shown 'sufficient cause' to condone the delay of 721 days in filing the appeal ?"

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The answer to the above point is in the negative

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for the following reasons:

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(a) Before considering the cause shown by the appellants seeking for condonation of delay of 721 days, it would be useful to refer to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the subject. In the case of JHARKAND

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URJA UTPADAN NIGAM LTD. AND ANOTHER VS. BHARAT

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HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED³ at paragraphs 20 and 21 held as under:

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"20. The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to answer the aforesaid question as under:

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“19. In order to answer this question, we cannot lose sight of the whole purpose of enactment of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 i.e., to provide for speedy disposal of high value commercial dispute.

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20. No doubt there was a similar provision in Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 framed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which was considered by the Supreme

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3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 910

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Court in the case of Housing Board, Haryana (1 supra).

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The said provision in the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 also provided for communication of the order of the District forum to the parties free of charge in order to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the burden of expenses that may he incurred for obtaining the certified copy.

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The Supreme Court held that the scheme of the Consumer Protection Act was to provide for better protection of the interest of the consumers as a measure for economical and speedy remedy for the settlement of the dispute and the matters connected therewith and therefore, the said rule should be understood in a manner so that it would protect the interest of the parties before the District forum by making it obligatory on the District forum to provide a copy of the order duly signed and dated by the members of the Bench; and the period of limitation prescribed with regard to filing of an appeal under Section 15 of the said Act therefore, has to be computed as commencing from the date of communication of the order in the manner laid down in the rules.

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It was in that context that it was Held that mere pronouncement of an order in the open Conn would not be enough, but under the scheme of the rules copy of the said judgment has to be communicated to the parties affected by the said order so that the parties adversely affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable opportunity of knowing the text, reasons and contents thereof so as to formulate grounds of attack before the appellate or before the higher forums. In

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absence of such communication of signed and dated order, it was held that the parties adversely affected by it will have no means of knowing the contents of the order so to challenge the same and get it set aside by the appellate authority or by the higher forums.

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21. Normally petitioners before the District forums under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are individuals and not corporate entities like the appellant/instrumentality of the State. So, there is justification for taking the view as regards petitioners in District forums that the provisions in the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 which mandated communication of the order of the said forums to the parties free of charge was to save the parties from the burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining the certified copy.

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22. We are afraid that the logic behind the provision contained in Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 framed under the Consumer Protection Act. 1986 cannot be applied to the litigants before the Commercial Court. For Commercial entities and in particular litigants like the applicants herein who are the State Government Undertakings, the expenses of obtaining a certified copy of a judgment of the Commercial Court would be very small compared to the stakes involves in the litigation.

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23. Therefore, they cannot be put on the same footing as a petitioner before the District Consumer forum; and the logic of counting the period of limitation from the date of communication of the order of consumer forum, cannot be applied to a Commercial dispute to which Commercial entities are parties.

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24. In our opinion. Order XX Rule 1 CPC as amended and made applicable to the Commercial Courts is to be treated as only directory and not mandatory. So notwithstanding the provision contained in the amended Order XX Rule 1 CPC (mandating issuance of copies to the parties to the dispute through electronic mail or otherwise), if such copies are not issued within a reasonable time, the parties to the dispute have to apply for the same, and after obtaining it, prefer an appeal within the time prescribed in Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

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25. This is because the speedy resolution of high value commercial dispute cannot be lost sight of. Such an interpretation would be in tune with the scheme and object of the Commercial Couns Act, 2015 and any interpretation of the nature advanced by the counsel for the applicants would defeat the whole purpose of the object of the Commercial Courts Act. 2015 to provide for speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes.

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26. Therefore, we reject the contention of the counsel for the applicants that the period of limitation for filing the appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court would not commence unless the judgment of the Commercial Court in the Commercial suit was communicated by the said Commercial Court to the parties.

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27. We shall next consider whether the delay of 301 days in filing this Commercial Appeal can be condone in exercise of power conferred on this Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

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28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to cases falling under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra).

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29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it's judgment in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) discussed the statement of objects and reasons behind enacting of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of limitation must always to some extent be arbitrary and may result in some hardship, but this is no reason as to why they should not be strictly followed.

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In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be seen in the context of the object of speedy resolution of the dispute.

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In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the object sought to be achieved under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 i.e., the speedy resolution of the disputes, expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself; and that the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims.

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In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that in exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date on which the appeal could have been filed can be condoned (i.e., below 120 days from the date of pronouncement of the judgment) by

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invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but where there is negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides, such power ought not to be exercised.

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It went further in para 59 by observing that merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. (This rule would thus apply equally to instrumentalities of Government like the applicants herein).

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It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the applicants or the appellants to have the delay condoned.

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It concluded in para 63 as under:

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“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration An and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals pled under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(l-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days. respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, he condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice,

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what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches.” (emphasis supplied)

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30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) permitted condonation of delay beyond 60 days in a case falling under the Commercial Courts Act only by way of exception and not by way of rule. If the applicants for condonation of delay had not acted bona fide and had acted in a negligent manner as in the instant case, the delay is not liable to be condoned.

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31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the appeal is 301 days - way beyond 60 days + 60 days = 120 days permitted by the judgment of the Supreme Court to be condoned in exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, such inordinate delay caused by negligence of the applicants is not liable to be condoned.

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(emphasis supplied)

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32. We may also point out that the applicants were represented before the Commercial Court, Ranchi by counsel and the judgment was obviously pronounced in the presence of the counsel. Though the order was pronounced on 09.10.2023 it appears that the application for issuance of certified copy was made on 30.08.2024, it was made ready on 07.09.2024, and the appeal was filed on 04.10.2024.

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If the Commercial Court had not communicated the copy of its judgment to the

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applicants within the reasonable time, it was incumbent on the part of the counsel for the applicants or the employees in the Legal Department of the applicants to apply for issuance of certified copy from the Commercial Court, but they have failed in their duty to apply for it when they did not receive it within a reasonable time.

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Their negligence resulted in the inordinate delay of 301 days in filing this appeal.

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33. The applicants cannot blame the respondent for not communicating to them about the disposal of the appeal and for not making any demand of payment in terms of the decree of the Commercial Court.

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34. They also cannot take advantage of the negligence of the counsel engaged by them in not informing the applicants about the judgment of the Commercial Court. This is because the applicants have a Legal Department and employees engaged by the applicants in that department have a duty to monitor what is happening in the cases to which the applicants are parties, keep track of the progress of the said cases and the decisions therein, and ensure that applications for issuance of certified copy are made to the concerned court so that the appeals, if required, can be preferred within the period of limitation prescribed by law.”

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21. We are in complete agreement with the line of reasoning assigned by the High Court."

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(b) In the case BORSE BROTHERS ENGINEERS AND

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CONTRACTORS PRIVATE LIMITED⁴ at paragraphs 58 to

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63, it has been held as under:

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"58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81] , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)

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“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view

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4 (2021) 6 SCC 460

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of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770] , Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012)5 SCC 157:(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .)

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10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.

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11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only [ Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned [ Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] , whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Sh yamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .)

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12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

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13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:

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‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.’

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An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh, (1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)

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14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts

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to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .

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15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)

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Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] [“Postmaster General”], as follows : (SCC pp. 57374, paras 27-29)

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“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

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29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of

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procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”

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60. The decision in Postmaster General [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] has been followed in the following subsequent judgments of this Court:

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(i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur [State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592] at paras 8-8.2;

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(ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav [State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422] at paras 2-3;

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(iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721] at paras 11-13; and

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(iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] at paras 3-4.

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61. In a recent judgment, namely, State of M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade [State of M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 111 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 120 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 87] , this Court referred to Postmaster General [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC

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563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , and held as follows : (SCC pp. 668-69, paras 1-5)

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“1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] in terms of our order dated 15-102020.

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2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department!

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3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)

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Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]

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4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing.

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5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up.”

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62. Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 : AIR 1962 SC 361] as follows : (SCR p. 771 : AIR p. 365, para 12)

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“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a

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sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14.”

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63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and

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not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches."

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(c) The Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the

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object of the Act, has held that the object of the Act is speedy resolution of disputes, expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself, and that the expression "sufficient cause" is not in itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and strayed claims. In commercial matters, the condonation of delay should not be in a routine manner and it should be an exception on showing sufficient cause. In a fit case, in which a party otherwise acted bonafide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can in the discretion of the Court be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired

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both equity and justice what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence, or laches.

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(d) Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra , we need to consider whether the explanation / cause shown by the appellants in the affidavit filed along with the application seeking condonation of delay and later two affidavits filed by the appellant Nos.2 and 3 are sufficient to condone the delay of 721 days.

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(e) The impugned judgment of the Trial Court is dated 10.01.2022 and admittedly, the appeal is filed on 01.03.2024. The appeal is accompanied with an application seeking for condonation of delay. The said application is accompanied with an affidavit with one Umed Singh-the appellant No.2 in the appeal. Paragraph 2 of the affidavit indicates that the Trial Court had conducted an enquiry during the Covid pandemic and there was no access to the general public. Further, it is

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deposed that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has excluded the period of limitation during the Covid pandemic from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 and the defendant Nos.1 to 3 were not aware about the passing of the impugned order by the Trial Court during the pandemic and only when the Execution Court issued notice to the appellants, they came to know about the passing of the judgment and they applied for the certified copy. In the meantime, the appellant Nos.2 and 3 underwent open heart surgery and medical records to that effect are produced. It is to be noticed that the period of limitation excluded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred surpa would not help the appellants as the impugned judgment is passed on 10.01.2022 and if the said period is excluded, the appellants may get the benefit of 39 days. It is also noticed that the appellants have entered appearance before the Trial Court through the counsel and filed vakalath on 03.04.2019. On 28.05.2019, the appellants' counsel filed an interlocutory application seeking direction

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to the respondent No.1-plaintiff to furnish copies of the documents. The order sheet indicates that the respondent No.1-plaintiff served the documents to the appellantsdefendant Nos.1 to 3 and based on such memo filed by the respondent No.1, the application was disposed of and the matter was adjourned and the Trial Court recorded that the defendant Nos.1 to 3 and 5 have not filed written statement. The affidavit accompanying the application indicates that the appellants came to know about the judgment only in the execution which cannot be believed as the appellants appeared before the Trial Court, filed vakalath, filed an application to furnish documents which were furnished and thereafter, they failed to file written statement. A further statement is made by the deponent in the affidavit that the appellant No.2 underwent open heart surgery and medical records are produced. A perusal of the medical records indicate that PTCR regular was conducted on 12.08.2022 and the appellant No.2 was discharged on the next day i.e. on 13.08.2022. The

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deponent has falsely deposed that he underwent open

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heart surgery.

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(f) The appellant No.2 has filed another affidavit dated 14.10.2025 which indicates that the appellants have a strong case on merits. He was admitted in the Apollo hospital, Bangalore on 12.08.2022 and discharged on 13.08.2022. In his affidavit, he admits that he underwent diagnostic coronary angiography. The present statement of the appellant No.2, on oath, falsifies the earlier statement on oath with regard to the open heart surgery which clearly demonstrates that the appellants have falsely deposed before this Court in the affidavit filed along with the application seeking for condonation of delay. The affidavit dated 14.10.2025 speaks about prolonged illness, recovery time and also about Covid pandemic period which does not inspire the confidence of the Court to condone the delay of 721 days. The appellant No.2 also deposed that he has deposited Rs.2,50,25,000/- in the execution proceedings. They are the matter of facts which would not

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help the appellants seeking for condonation of enormous

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delay.

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(g) The appellant No.3 also for the first time filed an affidavit on 14.10.2025 in support of the application seeking condonation of delay. It is to be noticed that the application seeking for condonation of delay is accompanied with the affidavit of the appellant No.2. The appeal is accompanied with other applications and the affidavits to such applications were also sworn by the appellant No.2. The affidavit of the appellant No.3 indicates his medical history. However, it is noticed that on 02.12.2019, the said appellant underwent PTCA treatment at Ramaiah Narayan Heart Centre, Bengaluru, and again on 30.03.2022 and 01.04.2022, he was admitted for right shoulder orthoscopic rotator cuff repair. The other treatments referred in paragraph 6 of the affidavit are only regular follow up and consultation. If those averments are considered and the documents are perused, it cannot be said that the appellant No.3 was

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unable to move for 721 days to file the appeal. The explanation offered by the appellant No.3 with regard to deposit of the amount and pandemic are replica of that of the averments made in the affidavit of the appellant No.2. A perusal of the entire averments of the affidavit of the appellant No.3 and the documents, indicates that it is an attempt to overcome the enormous delay. However, that cannot be construed as a sufficient cause or a genuine cause to condone the delay of 721 days in the matters of this nature. We have also noticed that the appellants who were the defendants filed vakalath, participated in the proceedings for some time and thereafter, failed to file written statement and based on the material available on record, the Trial Court proceeded to pass the impugned judgment and decree. We are of the considered view that the appellants who were not diligent in prosecuting the proceedings before the Trial Court, now cannot come and contend that the Trial Court has failed to consider the ambit and scope of Order XIII-A Rule 3 of the CPC and the

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judgment relied on by the appellants with regard to the scope of the proceedings before the Trial Court cannot be gone into while considering the application for condonation of enormous delay of 721 days. There is no dispute with regard to the preposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred by the appellants with regard to the scope and ambit of Order XIII-A and also how the application under Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC is required to be considered. The case on hand is only with regard to the consideration of the delay in filing an appeal and as to whether the appellants have shown the sufficient cause to condone the delay. In our considered view, the cause shown in 3 affidavits referred supra does not show the sufficient cause to condone the delay of 721 days.

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(h) The Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that the condonation of delay in commercial cases is the discretion of the Court which is required to be exercised sparingly for a short delay and that too as an exception. On considering the cause shown by the appellants in the

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affidavit filed along with the application as well as the additional affidavits, we find that they do not show sufficient cause to condone the enormous delay of 721 days. Hence, we are of the considered view that the application in I.A.No.1/2024 filed seeking for condonation of delay is devoid of merits and accordingly, the same is rejected.

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Consequently, the appeal stands rejected .

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Sd/(ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE

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Sd/(VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL) JUDGE

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RV

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List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1

Kailash Roofing Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Steel Hypermart India Pvt. Ltd.

Case brief

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Kailash Roofing Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Steel Hypermart India Pvt. Ltd.

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