M/S Mafatlal Industries Ltd. Vs Sri. Prasad Dugar

M/S MAFATLAL INDUSTRIES LTD A COMPANY REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED PERSON/ DEPUTY GENERAL MANAGER, SRI. DILIP ACHARYA, O/AT 6TH FLOOR, OFFICE NO 03, HDIL KALEDONIA BUILDING, SAHAR ROAD, ANDHERI EAST, MUMBAI - 400069. A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER THE INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1956 HAVING THEIR REGD. OFFICE AT 301/302 HERITAGE, HORIZON 3RD FLOOR, OFF. G.C. ROAD, NAVARANGPURA, AHMEDABAD - 380009 CORPORATE OFFICE AT MAFATLALA HOUSE, 5TH FLOOR, H.T. PAREKH MARG, BACKBAY, RECLAMATION, CHRUCHGATE, MUMABAI - 20. …APPELLANT (BY SRI. V SRINIVAS, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. H M MADHUSUDHANA, ADVOCATE)

¶14

AND:

¶15

SRI. PRASAD DUGAR S/O SOHANLAL DUGAR

¶16

2 - NC: 2025:KHC:42334-DB COMAP No. 471 of 2025

¶17

HC-KAR

¶18

AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS PROPRIETOR OF M/S KEYTONE APPEARLS ADD: 141-2-1 3RD CROSS, PIPELINE WEST, BENGALURU - 02 REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER AND GPA HOLDER, AMITJAIN S/O BHAWARLAL JAIN

¶19

…RESPONDENT

¶20

THIS COMAP IS FILED UNDER SEC. 13(1-A) OF COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER ON PETITION PASSED BY THE LXXXVIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, (CCH 89) AT BENGALURU IN COM.MISC. PETITION NO. 35/2021 DATED 08.08.2022 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE A AND ALLOW THE PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER AND PASS SUCH OTHER ORDERS THE THIS HONBLE COURT DEEMS FIT TO GRANT IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

¶21

THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

¶22

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE and

¶23

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA

¶24

ORAL JUDGMENT

¶25

(PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE)

¶26

The appellant has filed the present appeal under Section

¶27

13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, inter alia impugning

¶28

the order dated 08.08.2022 passed by the LXXXVIII Addl.City Civil

¶29

& Sessions Judge (Exclusive Commercial Court) Bengaluru City, (CCH-89) (hereinafter referred to as 'Commercial Court' ) in

¶30

3 - NC: 2025:KHC:42334-DB COMAP No. 471 of 2025

¶31

HC-KAR

¶32

Com.Misc. Petition No.35/2021 [ impugned order ] whereby the appellant's application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was rejected. The appellant had filed the said application praying that the order dated 09.08.2021 passed in Com.O.S. No.236/2021 be set aside and the said suit be restored.

¶33

It is the appellant's case that it was completely unaware of the pendency of the said suit and was not served with any summons. The learned counsel contended that Commercial Court has erroneously proceeded on the basis that the summons had been served and despite service, the appellant was not represented.

¶34

The learned Commercial Court had examined the rival contentions and had rejected the contention that the summons of the suit issued had not been served on the appellant.

¶35

The appellant has filed the present appeal after an inordinate delay of 782 days. The appellant has filed an application seeking condonation of delay. The appellant claims that the Advocate who was practicing in Mumbai was appointed to file an appeal against the impugned order. However, he could not act within time, due to

¶36

4 - NC: 2025:KHC:42334-DB COMAP No. 471 of 2025

¶37

HC-KAR

¶38

his father's illness, leading to a delay of about eight months. The appellant also claims that its officials recognised the delay and transferred the case to another law firm. The said firm retained the brief for ten months and returned it without explanation, hence, causing further delay. Subsequently, the company engaged a local firm in Bengaluru. However, "communication barriers and logistical challenges between the company's representatives and the firm created additional delay".

¶39

We are unable to accept the said explanation. The appellant is a Public Company and as is averred in the present appeal is involved in several litigations. It is the appellant's case that its officials had discovered the ex-parte decree on conducting search online of various litigations pending against the appellant-company. Thus, it cannot be accepted that the appellant was not aware that the appeal had not been filed. Yet it waited for eight months before deciding to engage another law firm.

¶40

As noted above, the appellant states the law firm had returned the brief after ten months without any explanation as to the delay. This also indicates that appellant itself does not know why the appeal was not filed for ten months. The delay beyond the

¶41

5 - NC: 2025:KHC:42334-DB COMAP No. 471 of 2025

¶42

HC-KAR

¶43

period of ten months is also unexplained. It is stated that the said delay is attributed to "communication barriers and logistical challenges". Learned counsel is also unable to explain as to what language barriers prevented the appellant from filing the appeal and what were logistical challenges it had faced. It is apparent that the appellant had adopted a casual and indifferent approach that cannot be countenanced.

¶44

It is also relevant to note the following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra v. M/s. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd. : (2021) 6 SCC 460:

¶45

"53. However, the matter does not end here. The question still arises as to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a uniform 60day period of limitation. At one extreme, we have the judgment in N.V. International [N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 : (2020) 1 SCC (Civ) 275] which does not allow condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and at the other extreme, we have an open-ended provision in which any amount of delay can be condoned, provided sufficient cause is shown. It is between these two extremes that we have to steer a middle course.

¶46

54. One judicial tool with which to steer this course is contained in the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat. This maxim was fleshed out in CIT v. Hindustan Bulk

¶47

6 -

¶48

NC: 2025:KHC:42334-DB COMAP No. 471 of 2025

¶49

HC-KAR

¶50

Carriers [CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57] as follows : [ Followed in the separate opinion delivered by Pasayat, J. in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1 : 3 SCEC 35 (see paras 333-34).] (SCC pp. 73-74, paras 14-21)

¶51

“14. A construction which reduces the statute to a futility has to be avoided. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat i.e. a liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. [See Broom's Legal Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 361, Craies on Statutes (7th Edn.), p. 95 and Maxwell on Statutes (11th Edn.), p. 221.]

¶52

15. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. (See Whitney v. IRC[Whitney v. IRC, 1926 AC 37 (HL)] , AC at p. 52 referred to in CIT v. S. Teja Singh [CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352] and Gursahai Saigal v. CIT [Gursahai Saigal v. CIT, AIR 1963 SC 1062] .)

¶53

16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe[Salmon v. Duncombe, (1886) LR 11 AC 627 (PC)] , AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [Curtis v. Stovin, (1889) LR 22 QBD 513 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352] .)

¶54

17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would

¶55

7 - NC: 2025:KHC:42334-DB COMAP No. 471 of 2025

¶56

HC-KAR

¶57

reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. [Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., 1940 AC 1014 (HL)] referred to in Pye v. Minister for Lands for NSW [Pye v. Minister for Lands for NSW, (1954) 1 WLR 1410 (PC)] .) The principles indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India [Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 455] .

¶58

18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.

¶59

19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka[R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 1 SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286] .) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a headon clash between two sections of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 373] .)

¶60

20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. It should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other.

¶61

8 - NC: 2025:KHC:42334-DB COMAP No. 471 of 2025

¶62

HC-KAR

¶63

21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a “useless lumber” or “dead letter” is not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy.”

¶64

55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, the object and context provided by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. To read Section 5 of the Limitation Act consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to discover as to what the expression “sufficient cause” means in the context of condoning delay in filing appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

¶65

__**

¶66

58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims….

¶67

** ** **

¶68

**

¶69

63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section

¶70

9 -

¶71

NC: 2025:KHC:42334-DB COMAP No. 471 of 2025

¶72

HC-KAR

¶73

37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches."

¶74

In view of the above, we are unable to accept that the inordinate delay of 782 days can be condoned in the matters relating to commercial disputes. The application is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed.

¶75

Sd/(VIBHU BAKHRU) CHIEF JUSTICE

¶76

Sd/(C.M. POONACHA) JUDGE

¶77

BS - List No.: 1 Sl No.: 28

M/S Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Sri. Prasad Dugar

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

M/S Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Sri. Prasad Dugar

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

B. S. Venkatesh Vs State of Karnataka

Dr Nisarga v Vs State of Karnataka

Smt Maniben Arjun Patel Vs Sri Shivakumar Beeradar

Sri.P.B.Chandrashekar Vs the State of Karnataka

Mr Anoop Shyamsundar Vs Mr Jagadeesha G

Sri Srinivas Vs N Jayaram