Partly allowed

Smt. Anitha v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC27 Sept 2024WP/4627/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court of Karnataka upheld the validity of notifications under the KIAD Act acquiring land for industrial connectivity, rejecting challenges based on vague purposes and deceased owner names. However, the Court quashed compensation awards passed under the repealed 1894 Act, directing fresh awards under the 2013 Act.

What did the court decide?

Quashed of general awards passed under the 1894 Act; direction to KIADB to pass fresh awards under the 2013 Act. Challenge to notifications dismissed.

Smt. Anitha Vs State of Karnataka — Land Acquisition | Karnataka HC (2024)

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NC: 2024:KHC:40652 WP No. 4627 of 2024

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27^TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2024 BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE N.S. SANJAY GOWDA WRIT PETITION NO.4627 OF 2024 (LA-KIADB)

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BETWEEN:

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SMT. ANITHA, W/O MURALI, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,

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SMT. AMRUTHA, W/O RANGASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,

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Digitally signed by KIRAN KUMAR R Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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SRI. ARVIND BABU, S/O LATE HANUMANTHRAYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,

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ALL RE R/AT NAGADENAHALLI VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, DODDABALLAPURA TLAUK, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT-562 163.

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…PETITIONERS

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(BY SRI. JAYAKUMAR.S.PATIL., SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI.K.H.SOMASEKHARA, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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STATE OF KARNATAKA,

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BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES & COMMERCE, M.S.BUILDING, AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-560 001.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY

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INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

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DEVELOPMENT BOARD, M.S.BUIDLING, BENGALURU-560 001.

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THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER-II KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD, No.488-B, (BMIC), No.14/3 CFC, BUILDING, MAHARSHI ARVIND, BHAVAN, 1^ST FLOOR, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD, BENGALURU-560 001.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL ALONG WITH SMT.HEMALATHA.V., AGA FOR R-1 & R-2; SRI. SHASHI KIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL ALONG WITH SRI.B.B.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R-3)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO CALL FOR RECORDS FROM THE RESPONDENTS WHICH ULTIMATELY RESULTED INPASSING OF THE IMPUGNED NOTIFICATIONS AND QUASH THE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DATED 18.03.2022 IN No.ci/198/SPQ (E) 2021 ISSUED UNDER SECTION 28(1) OF THE ACT, VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND FINAL NOTIFICATION DATED 07/03/2023 IN No.CI/198 SPQ(E) 2023 ISSUED UNDER SECTION 28(4) OF THE ACT, VIDE ANNEXUREE, ISSUED BY THE R3 IN SO FAR AS PETITIONERS LANDS ARE CONCERNED ISSUED BY ITS RESPONDENTS, ETC.

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THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 02.07.2024, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING :

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.S. SANJAY GOWDA

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CAV ORDER

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The Notifications issued declaring an extent of 123 acres 23 guntas to be an industrial area under Section 3(1), the Notification making Chapter VII of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (“ the KIAD Act ”) applicable to said lands, and the Notifications issued under Section 28(1) and 28(4) of the KIAD Act are challenged in this writ petition.

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The lands involved in the writ petition are Sy.No.39/3 measuring 1 acre 33 guntas, and Sy.No.43 measuring 4 acres 10 guntas — both situated at Nagadenahalli, Kasaba Hobli, Doddaballapur Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District.

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The petitioners had initially challenged the vires of Sections 28 and 30 of the KIAD Act, but a submission was made on 27.06.2024 by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that these prayers were not being pressed and that the arguments would be confined only to their other

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prayers. Thus, it is only the validity of the Notifications mentioned above which are the subject matter of this petition.

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The undisputed facts of the case are as follows.

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An extent of 867 acres and 37 guntas was notified in certain villages for the development of an industrial area. Since it was found necessary to provide a direct approach to the Industrial area, it was decided to acquire land abutting the National Highway.

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On 18.03.2022, notifications under Section 3(1) were issued declaring an extent of 123 acres 23 guntas in three villages in Nagadenahalli as an industrial area. In respect of Nagadenahalli village, an extent of 42 acres 18 guntas was notified and declared to be an industrial area and in this, the lands of the petitioners bearing No.39/3 and 43 were included, and the kathedar in possession was stated to be N. B. Hanumantharayappa S/o. Late Chikkappanna.

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A Notification was also issued making the provisions

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of Chapter VII applicable to the 123 acres 23 guntas notified as industrial area under Section 3(1).

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A Notification under Section 28(1) was issued by the State Government since the State was of the opinion that the lands mentioned therein i.e., 123 acres 23 guntas was needed for providing connectivity (“ ಸಂಪಕ� ”) to the ITIR

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industrial area.

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After the publication of the notification under Section 28(1), notices as required under Section 28(2) were issued by the State Government i.e., the Special Land Acquisition Officer (“ the SLAO ” — who would be the State Government for the purpose of Section 28(2) under the KIAD Act in view of Rule 14 of the KIAD Rules, 1966). A notice was also issued to Mr. N. B. Hanumantharayappa S/o. Late Chikkappanna calling upon him to show cause within 30 days as to why his lands should not be acquired.

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It may be pertinent to state here that Mr. N. B.Hanumantharayappa–the father of petitioners herein had actually passed away on 17.03.2021. Thus, the Notifications contained the name of a dead person as the owner / person in possession, and the notice issued under Section 28(2) was also addressed to a dead person.

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It appears that the notices issued under Section 28(2) were received by the petitioners — the three sons of Mr. N. B. Hanumantharayappa, and they voluntarily filed objections to the show-cause notice. In this reply, they stated that their father–N. B. Hanumantharayappa had passed away, but the pahanis continued in the name of their father and since their father had three sons i.e., the petitioners, they had succeeded to said properties.

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They also stated that they had no other lands apart from the notified lands and were completely dependent on them. They requested that the lands be deleted from the purview of the acquisition. They also stated that nobody in their family had a job and were completely dependent

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upon the crops raised in the land for eking of their livelihood and, therefore, the lands ought not to be acquired. The objections issued in response to both the notices for acquisition of lands in respect of Sy.Nos.43 and 39/3 were identical in the terms stated above.

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On 28.04.2022, a personal hearing was conducted where the petitioners were given an opportunity of being heard by the SLAO. The SLAO thereafter proceeded to over-rule the objections by his order dated 21.06.2022, as contemplated under Section 28(3), in the following terms–

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17.	39/3	1-33	J£ï.©.ºÀ£ÀÄªÀÄAvÀgÁAiÀÄ¥Àà ©£ï ¯ÉÃ aPÀÌ¥ÀàtÚ	¢£ÁAPÀ 28.04.2022gÀAzÀÄ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtªÀ£ÀÄß PÀÆV¸À¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ. SÁvÉzÁgÀgÀÄ ¥Ëw ªÀÄUÀ CgÀ«Azï ¨Á§Ä JA§ÄªÀgÀÄ ºÁdgÁV ¨sÀÆ¸Áé¢üÃ£ÀPÉÌ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉ ¸À°è¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.	¸ÀÜ¼À ¥Àj²Ã®£É ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVzÉ. DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ. F d«ÄÃ£ÀÄ GzÉÝÃ²vÀ AiÉÆÃd£ÉUÉ CvÀåªÀ±ÀåPÀªÁV ¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ, ¨sÀÆ¸Áé¢üÃ£À EgÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß wgÀ¸ÀÌj¹ F ¸ÀªÉð £ÀA§gï d«ÄÃ£À£ÀÄß ¨sÀÆ¸Áé¢üÃ£À¥Àr¸À®Ä DzÉÃ²¹zÉ.
26.	43	4- 10.08	J£ï.©.ºÀ£ÀÄªÀÄAvÀgÁAiÀÄ¥Àà ©£ï ¯ÉÃ aPÀÌ¥ÀàtÚ	¢£ÁAPÀ 28.04.2022gÀAzÀÄ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtªÀ£ÀÄß PÀÆV¸À¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ. SÁvÉzÁgÀgÀÄ ¥Ëw ªÀÄUÀ CgÀ«Azï ¨Á§Ä JA§ÄªÀgÀÄ	¸ÀÜ¼À ¥Àj²Ã®£É ªÀiÁqÀ¯ÁVzÉ. F ¸ÀªÉð £ÀA§gï d«ÄÃ¤£À «¹ÛÃtðzÀ ¥ÉÊQ 0-07_½_ UÀÄAmÉ «¹ÛÃtðzÀ d«ÄÃ£ÀÄ gÁ¶ÖçÃAiÀÄ ºÉzÁÝjUÉ ¨sÀÆ¸Áé¢üÃ£ÀªÁVgÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ, F «¹ÛÃtðªÀ£ÀÄßCAwªÀÄ

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ºÁdgÁV	C¢ü¸ÀÆZÀ£ÉAiÀÄ°è¸ÉÃ¥ÀðqÉ
¨sÀÆ¸Áé¢üÃ£ÀPÉÌ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉ ¸À°è¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.	ªÀiÁqÀ¢gÀ®Ä DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ. F d«ÄÃ£ÀÄ GzÉÝÃ²vÀ AiÉÆÃd£ÉUÉ CvÀåªÀ±ÀåPÀªÁV ¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ, ¨sÀÆ¸Áé¢üÃ£À EgÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß wgÀ¸ÀÌj¹ F ¸ÀªÉð £ÀA§gï d«ÄÃ£À£ÀÄß ¨sÀÆ¸Áé¢üÃ£À¥Àr¸À®Ä DzÉÃ²¹zÉ.

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After the SLAO over-ruled the objections, the State Government, on being satisfied that the lands notified were required to be acquired, proceeded to issue a declaration under Section 28(4) of the Act on 07.03.2023. In this declaration, as against the originally notified 123 acres 23 guntas, an extent of 118 acres 37 guntas was notified in respect of Nagadenahalli, as against 123 acres 23 guntas, an extent of 39 acres 14.5 guntas was declared to be needed for the purpose stated in the Notification issued under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act.

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On 13.09.2023, a notice under Section 28(6) was issued to the petitioners to surrender / deliver possession within 30 days. It is stated in the counter filed by the

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KIADB that possession was taken over on 01.02.2024 under a mahazar.

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General awards were also passed on 05.02.2024 in respect of the petitioners’ lands by which a sum of Rs.4,68,01,090/was awarded at the rate of Rs.75,23,600/- per acre i.e., Rs.1,88,090/-. This award was also approved on 08.02.2024.

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It is also stated in the counter that these lands were handed over to the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (“ the KIADB ”) as contemplated under Section 28(8) of the KIAD Act.

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On 13.02.2024, the petitioners have presented this petition and on the following day, an interim order was granted directing the KIADB to not dispossess the petitioners from the concerned lands other than that portion which was actually required for the formation of a road. It was stated that the lands of the petitioners were being acquired for the formation of a road, for which the

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petitioners had no objection, but for the formation of the road, the entire extent was not required and that the same had been notified mechanically.

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The KIADB has entered appearance and has also filed

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its objections refuting the contentions advanced by the petitioners.

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Mr. Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that –

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(i) The issuance of the impugned Notifications was clearly without any application of mind since they had been issued in the name of a dead person.

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(ii) Since the Notifications indicated that the lands were notified for the formation of a road, only the land as required by the Board for the formation of the road should be acquired, but lands in excess of the requirement had been notified. Reliance was placed on the sketch that was annexed to the objections

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filed by the Board, which indicated the exact location of the road.

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(iii) In Sy.No.43, only an extent of 1 acre 19 guntas would be required for the formation of the road and in respect of Sy.No.39/3, only an extent of 17+16 guntas would be required — and for these extents, the petitioners had no objection. But the petitioners had serious objections to the Notification of the remaining extent in said survey numbers.

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(iv) The layout map of Devanahalli General Industrial Area (produced at Annexures-R1 and R2) indicated that the lands of the petitioners had been earmarked for residential and parking purposes, which had nothing to do with the formation of an industrial area and the acquisition proceedings could thus not be sustained.

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(v) The acquisition of the lands for the KIADB was governed by the two Government Orders which

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prohibited the acquisition of fertile lands and since the lands of the petitioners were admittedly fertile, they ought not to have been notified.

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(vi) Under the provisions of the KIAD Act, lands could be acquired for the formation of an industrial area or for providing facilities which contributed to the development of the industries established in the industrial area and since the formation of residential sites would not contribute to the development of the industrial area, the entire acquisition was illegal.

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(vii) Section 30 of the KIAD Act had been substituted with effect from 05.04.2022 and, therefore, compensation for said lands was to be awarded as provided under the KIAD Act, but, in the instant case, the award had been passed under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (“ the 1894 Act ”).

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(viii) The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

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Resettlement Act, 2013 (“ the 2013 Act ”) would

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have to be applied for awarding compensation in the

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instant matter.

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Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner—Mr. Patil relied on the following citations in support of his submissions:

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(i) Nagpur Improvement Trust & Anr. v. Vithal Rao

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& Ors., AIR 1973 SC 689 : classification of land for

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the purpose of compulsory acquisition — whether different principles can be adopted . This judgment, however, dealt with acquisition under the 1894 Act vis-à-vis the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936.

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(ii) P. Vajravelu Murdaliar v. the Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras &

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Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1017 : on “just and equivalent compensation” awarded in matters pertaining to compulsory acquisition of land and the principles laid

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therein, and the purpose of acquisition of lands must be directly relatable to the object of the enactment.

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(iii) Union of India & Anr. v. Tarsem Singh & Ors.,

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AIR 2019 SC 4689 : acquisition of land restricted to the two clauses of Section 7(3) of the 1894 Act constituting a statutory embargo, and principles of compensation. This judgment, however, dealt with acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 read with The Land Acquisition Act, 2013.

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(iv) Mohan Singh Gill & Ors. v. State of Punjab &

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Ors., (2015) 8 SCC 345 : the acquired land was intended for purposes different from what was initially stated and whether the purpose of acquisition can vary.

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Mr. Shashi Kiran Shetty, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the KIADB, supported the acquisition. His submissions were as follows –

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(i) The only issue raised in the objections that had been filed by the petitioners before the SLAO was that they had no other lands apart from the notified lands and were entirely dependent on the same. Therefore, apart from this objection, the petitioners cannot contend anything else.

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(ii) The petitioners were being adequately compensated, their grievance that they had no other land and that they were completely dependent on the land would not survive.

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(iii) An extent of 300 acres out of the 867 acres notified was intended to be allotted to M/s. Foxconn, a MultiNational Company which had undertaken the project of manufacturing electronic devices (iPhones) in said lands and the Company had assured the Government that it would provide at least one lakh jobs. He submitted that this project envisaged an investment of Rs.22,000 crores and, having regard to the vast employment opportunities being offered by Foxconn,

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the State was absorbing the difference in the cost of acquisition in the larger interest of the State and its citizens and, therefore, there is no justification to interfere with the acquisition.

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(iv) The impugned Notification had already been upheld in W.P. No.3667/2023 C/w. W.P. No.12961/2023 and there was thus no justification for taking a different view in the present petition.

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(v) The petitioners were also entitled to receive land that was already developed and offered under the Scheme by the KIADB, which would fetch the petitioners an enormous market value and could be encashed, ensuring that there is no prejudice caused to the petitioners.

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The learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents—Mr. Shetty relied on the below to substantiate his arguments:

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(i) P. Narayanappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 578 : public purpose of acquisition — the complete details need not be mentioned in the preliminary notification. What is to be considered is the purpose for which the land is acquired.

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(ii) Smt. S. Jalaja & Ors. v. the Union of India & Ors., W.A.1105/2019 and connected matters (Kar HC–Blr) : upholding the constitutionality of the 2013 Act.

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Having heard the learned Senior Counsels, the only issue that would arise for consideration in this writ petition is:

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Whether the impugned Notifications issued under Section 3(1), 1(3), 28(1) and 28(4) of the KIAD Act are valid.

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Mr. Patil, as noticed above, put forth the principal objection that the Notifications were bad in law since they had stated that the lands being notified were only for the

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purpose of — “ ಸಂಪಕ��ಾ�� ”. According to Learned Senior

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Counsel, the acquisition was only for the formation of a road. He submitted that since the Notifications declared that the land was indeed being acquired for the formation of a road and the sketches produced by the KIADB indicated that only a 45 metre road was proposed in the lands of the petitioners, the inclusion of the entire extent of said lands was wholly illegal, more so, when they were earmarked to be used for registration purposes under the layout plan.

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He relied upon a decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Mohan Singh Gill ( supra ) to contend that the Notifications were illegal for the reason that the requirement of stating the specific stipulation — that the lands were required for the formation of a road — had not been stated in the Notification.

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It is thus necessary that the provisions of the Act applicable to the acquisition of the subject lands are to be

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briefly examined by this Court before answering the question involved in this petition.

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Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act empowers the State Government to declare any area in the State to be an “industrial area” and the Notification issued is required to define the limits of the area to which it relates. Thus, the moment an extent of land is declared to be an industrial area, such land can be used only of the development of an industrial area.

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If this notification declaring it to be an industrial area is followed by a Notification enabling the applicability of Chapter VII — which relates to the acquisition of land declared to an industrial area — it is obvious that the lands can only be acquired for an industrial area.

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Section 2(6)¹ of the KIAD Act defines an “ industrial area ” to mean any area declared to be an industrial area

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1 Section 2: (6) “industrial area” means any area declared to be an industrial area by the State Government by notification which is to be developed and where industries are to be accommodated and industrial

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requiring to be developed, and industries in such notified area are also required to be accommodated while providing industrial infrastructure facilities and amenities.

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Thus, once an area is declared to be an ‘industrial area’ and the provisions of the KIAD Act relating to the land acquisition are made applicable, it is clear that lands in this regard can be acquired for developing industries and for accommodating them, while providing industrial infrastructure facilities and amenities.

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Section 2(7a) of the KIAD Act defines “industrial infrastructural facilities” to mean facilities which contribute to the development of industries established in industrial areas and the same is an inclusive definition where illustrative examples are given — such as research and development, communication, transport, banking, marketing, technological parks and townships for the purpose of establishing trade and tourism centres.

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infrastructural facilities and amenities are to be provided and includes, an industrial estate

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Therefore, once an area is declared as an ‘industrial area’, apart from acquiring land for accommodating industries, land can also be acquired for the facilities which contribute to the development of industries and since the facilities include communications and townships, it is obvious that the lands could be acquired for the purposes defined under

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Section 2(6) and 2(7a) of the KIAD Act.

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Admittedly, even as per the Layout Plan produced by the respondent No.3–KIADB upon which reliance was placed, it is indicated that there is an industrial area abutting the area included in the notified Layout Plan. The original record produced by the KIADB indicates that two bul allotments of 200 acres and 300 acres were made for

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the establishment of a University and a plan by Foxconn respectively.

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The Layout Plan indicates the ‘Land Use Analysis’ for the 489 acres in which the industrial area was to be formed and also indicating the Bulk allotment of 197.11

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acres to the University and 300 acres to Foxconn, as per Annexure-R1 as under –

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Sl. No.	DESC	RIPTION	AREA ACRES	PERCENTAGE%
1		INDUSTRIAL	240.24	49.10
2		COMMERCIAL	17.42	3.56
2		RESIDENTIAL	14.76	3.02
3		AMENITY	15.03	3.07
4		UTILITY	9.45	1.93
5		PARK/BUFFER YETHINAHOLE CORRIDOR	63.03 4.62	13.82
6		PARKING	24.48	5.00
7		ROAD	100.33	20.50
	TOTAL	EXTENT	489.46	100.00

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BULK LAND - 497.11Acre

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It can be seen from the Layout Plan itself that 49.10% of the land is said to be used for industrial purposes, 20.50% is earmarked for the formation of roads, 5% is earmarked for Parking, 13.82% is earmarked for Park / Buffer for Yettinahole Corridor, and only a small percentage of 3.56% is earmarked as a commercial area, in addition to 3.02% earmarked for residential purposes and 3.07% allotted for amenities. It is, therefore, clear that the subject lands are acquired to provide facilities to

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the 50% of the land which is being earmarked for industrial purposes.

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Learned Advocate General Mr. Shetty also made a submission that having regard to the magnitude of the project, it had been proposed that a portion of the area would be used for residential purposes to accommodate the employees engaged in the unit proposed to be set up by M/s. Foxconn and that this facility would also contribute to the development of the industry that is proposed to be set up and, consequently, the acquisition for these purposes cannot be questioned.

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As for the argument of Mr. Patil that the Notification only stipulated that the lands were being specifically notified for the formation of a road (where the land to be acquired was 6 acres 28 guntas) due to which the remaining lands could not be notified, this Court is of the view that such an approach cannot be accepted for a simple reason the term “ಸಂಪಕ��ಾ��” cannot be held to

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mean that the subject lands were being acquired only for the purpose of formation of a road.

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The term “ಸಂಪಕ��ಾ��” would also mean and include

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communication and, essentially, connectivity to the industrial area. If the lands are to be acquired for an ‘industrial area’ (as defined supra ), there would be no need to mention the nature of industries that are to be set up in the acquired land. This is because the lands that are ultimately acquired can only be used for the development of an industrial area or for providing facilities to the industries accommodated in that area, and for no other purpose.

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Therefore, strictly speaking, there is no necessity to even mention the actual use for which the lands have been notified for acquisition under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act as long as the acquisition is for the formation of industries and for providing facilities as contemplated under Section 2(7a) of the KIAD Act. The non-mentioning of the specific

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requirement in a Section 28(1) Notification would not vitiate the acquisition itself.

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40. In the judgment rendered in Nagpur Improvement

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Trust ( supra ), the Apex Court considered two legislations pertaining to acquisition in awarding compensation and opined that the legislation more beneficial to the land-loser would have to be considered. The same has accordingly been adopted in the present petition as well, and the citations relied upon by Mr. Jayakumar Patil in the matters of Nagpur Improvement Trust , P. Vajravelu Murdaliar and Tarsem Singh ( all supra ) would thus be of no avail.

¶150

Reliance placed on the decision rendered in Mohan Singh Gill ( supra ) by Mr. Patil can have no application because, essentially, the challenge in that petition was in respect of a notification issued under the Land Acquisition Act, under which lands can be acquired for various public purposes and, in that context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

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made an observation that there was a requirement of stating the specific stipulation in the Notification itself.

¶153

Since the lands in the instant case are being notified for the purpose of developing an industrial area as defined under Section 2(6) of the Act — which can permit acquisition only for establishing ‘ industries ’ and ‘ industrial infrastructural facilities ’ — the non-mentioning of the actual industries to be set up would not vitiate the acquisition.

¶154

Furthermore, as stated above, the word, “ಸಂಪಕ��ಾ��”

¶155

cannot be construed as ‘acquisition of land’ only for the purpose of a road, but can also include any other purpose per Section 2(6) and 2(7a) of the KIAD Act. This argument is, therefore, rejected.

¶156

It is to be noticed here that the only objection that had been raised by the petitioners before the SALO in response to the Section 28(2) notice was that the notified lands were the only lands owned by the family and the

¶157

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family was entirely dependent on these lands for their livelihood. It is settled law that private interest would have to yield to a larger public interest, and as the land losers are compensated, this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners would also be of no avail.

¶159

The next argument of Mr. Patil that the Notifications are vitiated since they were issued in the name of a dead person — even though the petitioners appeared in response to the notice under Section 28(2) of the KIAD Act and had informed the SLAO that the notified kathedar was dead — and yet the Government issued the declaration and subsequent notices in the name of said dead person which indicates a complete non-application of mind also cannot be accepted.

¶160

It is to be stated here that under Section 28(2) of the Act, there is an obligation cast on the SLAO to serve a notice on the owner or on the occupier of the land calling upon him to show cause. In this case, though the owner / notified kathedar (in whose name the notices were issued)

¶161

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was dead, his sons i.e., the present petitioners nevertheless accepted the notice and appeared before the SLAO to show cause as to why the land should not be acquired.

¶163

Since the requirement of issuing a notice under Section 28 is to enable the owner to object to the acquisition, and, in the instant case, the petitioners did appear and raise objections to the acquisition, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners by the issuance of the Notifications in the name of their deceased father.

¶164

Now considering the argument that the lands of the petitioners were fertile and the circular issued by the Government barred the acquisition of these lands, it is to be stated here that the very circulars themselves state that if the lands are contiguous and are required for a project, the same could be acquired notwithstanding the fact that they are fertile lands. Therefore, this argument is also of no avail.

¶165

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It may also be pertinent to state here that a coordinate bench of this Court in W.P. No.3667/2023 and

¶167

connected matters , by its order dated 26.02.2024, has upheld the acquisition as well. It is noticed that in said judgment, though this contention regarding the nonstipulation of the purpose of the Notification was not advanced, other contentions — such as non-consideration of the objections raised by the petitioner and the effect of the two circulars, which were both repelled by this Court — were advanced. Since this Court has already held that the two circulars dealt with in this writ petition would have no bearing on the present acquisition, this argument of Mr.Patil cannot be accepted either.

¶168

During the course of arguments, Mr. Shetty made a submission that if the petitioners were to give up their claim for acquisition, they would be allotted 10,000 sq.ft. of land alternatively, which could be utilized for the purpose that they had been earmarked in the Layout Plan. The petitioners, however, were not inclined to accept this

¶169

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offer and were insisting on the allotment of an extent larger than 10,000 sq. ft. He therefore submitted that this claim cannot be entertained since it would be a deviation from the policy of the State and would lead to multiple claims, virtually nullifying the policy. It was stated that if the petitioners are still interested in availing of the offer,

¶171

they may do so, and in such an event, the KIADB shall allot them 10,000 sq.ft. for every acre of land in Sy.No.43 itself. This, would, however, be subject to the rider that they accept the acquisition without demur.

¶172

As far as the argument of Mr.Patil that the provisions of the 2013 Act would have to be applied for awarding compensation is concerned, it cannot be in dispute that Section 30 was substituted in its entirety prior to 05.04.2022. The KIADB, therefore, should not have awarded compensation under the 1894 Act. Since the award in the instant case has been passed after 05.04.2022, i.e., on 05.02.2024 and approved on 08.02.2024 under the 1894 Act, the general awards

¶173

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cannot be sustained (though there is no specific prayer made in the present petition) and the same are, accordingly, quashed .

¶175

The KIADB would thus have to pass fresh awards in

¶176

respect of the lands notified, by applying the provisions of the 2013 Land Acquisition Act as provided under Section 30 of the KIAD Act.

¶177

In view of the above, the general awards passed under the 1894 Act are quashed and a direction is issued to the Board to pass a fresh award under the 2013 Act.

¶178

The challenge, however, to the validity of the impugned notifications — by which the land of petitioners is declared to be needed by the State for establishing connectivity to the industrial area — is dismissed .

¶179

Sd/(N S SANJAY GOWDA) JUDGE

¶180

HNM

¶181

List No.: 9 Sl No.: 2

Smt. Anitha v. State of Karnataka

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Smt. Anitha v. State of Karnataka

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