of the Act, yet it had no consequential or incidental power to specify a day for holding of such hat or fair, is manifestly erroneous and cannot be supported. It failed to appreciate that under the Act the power of general administration of the local area vests in the Panchayat Samiti only to grant a licence to hold a hat or fair under Section 117 of the Act, but such power of general administration necessarily carries with it the power to supervise, control and manage such hat or fair within its territorial jurisdiction. The conferment of the power to grant a licence for the holding of a hat or fair under Section 117 of the Act includes the power to make incidental or consequential orders for specification of a day on which such hat or fair shall be held. The decision of the High Court runs counter to the well accepted principles. It overlooks that the statutory bodies like the Panchayat Samiti enjoy a wide “incidental power” i.e. they may do everything which is ‘calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions’ and the doctrine of ultra vires is not to be applied narrowly. It is well accepted that the conferral of statutory powers on these local authorities must be construed as impliedly authorising everything which could fairly and reasonably be regarded as incidental or consequential to the power itself. See : De Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn., p. 95, HWR Wade's Administrative Law, 5th Edn., p. 217, Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn., p. 276, Attorney-General v. Great Eastern Railway [LR (1880) 5 AC 473] , Baroness Wenlock v. River Dee Co. [LR (1885) 10 AC 354] De Smith in his celebrated work Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn. at p. 95 puts the law tersely in these words:
