Plaintiff sued for declaration of a 2 1/3 guntas share as joint family property and permanent injunction. The trial Court partly decreed, but the first Appellate Court reversed and dismissed the suit. The High Court upheld the reversal, holding the plaintiff failed to prove joint family character or possession.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2024 BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO.997 OF 2008 (DEC)
BETWEEN:
EERAPPA S/O.BATHEPPA AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS R/AT PURNAPALLI VILLAGE RONUR HOBLI, SRINVIASAPURA TQ. KOLAR DISTRICT-563 135
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI K.N,CHANDRASHEKHARA REDDY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed by B LAVANYA Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
2(a) SMT.BHAGYAMMA AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS W/O.LATE VENKATARAMANAPPA
2(b) PEDDA REDDAPPA AGED ABOUT 10 YEARS S/O.LATE VENKATARAMANAPPA
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ALL ARE RESIDING AT PURNAPALLI VILLAGE, RONUR HOBLI SRINIVASAPUR TALUK KOLAR DISTRICT-563 135
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI J.V.SRINIVASAIAH, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 & R-3; SRI NARASIMHA REDDY, ADVOCATE FOR R-2(a) to (c); SRI L.M.RAMAIAH GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R-4)
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC PRAYING TO SET-ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 04.02.2008 PASSED IN R.A.NO.339/2005 BY THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT, FTC-IV, KOLAR AND CONFIRM THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 09.02.2005 PASSED IN O.S.NO.16/2002 BY THE CIVIL JUDGE (JR.DN.) AND JMFC, SRINIVASPUR.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE PRADEEP SINGH YERUR
ORAL JUDGMENT
This appeal is preferred by the plaintiff questioning the
judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, (FTC-IV), Kolar (for short, 'the first Appellate Court') in R.A.No.339/2005 dated 04.02.2008, whereby the appeal of defendant No.4 came to be allowed, consequently the
original suit in O.S.No.16/2002 dated 09.02.2005, passed by the Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) Shrinivasapur (for short, 'the trial Court') came to be dismissed.
It is the case of the plaintiff that one Eerappa constituted a Hindu Undivided Family with his sons namely, Dodda Munivenkatappa alias Peddanna, Venkataramana and Batheppa. Dodda Munivenkatappa @ Peddanna succeeded as Kartha after the death of Eerappa. Dodda Munivenkatappa had a son by name Munivenkatappa. Defendant No.1 is the son of late Dodda Munivenkatappa, defendant No.2 is the son of said Munivenkatappa and defendant No.3 is the wife of said Munivenkatappa. Plaintiff Sri.Eerappa is the son of one Batheppa. Defendant Nos.1 to 3 constituted joint family till 1976. Sri Dodda Munivenkatappa alias Peddanna acted as a Manager of the family and purchased the suit schedule property on
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16.11.1970 from late Dodda Munivenkatappa @ Peddanna, S/o.Yarravenkatammagari Ramanna of Purnapalli village. According to the plaintiff, this property was purchased out of the joint family funds in his name. The fathers of defendant Nos.1 and 2 namely, Dodda Munivenkatappa, Munivenkatappa respectively and father of plaintiff Batheppa were in possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property and after their death, the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 3 have continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
3.1 It is the further case of the plaintiff that his uncle
and defendant Nos.1 to 3 divided suit schedule property orally in the year 1976 equally. Defendant No.4 is the son of late Dodda Munivenkatappa and grandson of Yarravenkatammagari Ramanna of Purnapalli village. Defendant Nos.1 to 4 are not in good terms with the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 3 in collusion with defendant No.4 created document to defraud 1/3rd share of the plaintiff from the suit schedule property.
3.2 According to the plaintiff, at the time of oral partition, out of 7 1/4th guntas of eastern portion, 2 1/3rd share was allotted to the share of the plaintiff and 2 1/3rd share was allotted to defendant Nos.2 and 3 and western portion of the same extent was allotted to defendant No.1. The plaintiff states that defendant Nos.1 to 3 are not ready to record their respective entries in a separate khata.
3.3 According to the plaintiff, defendant No.4 is an utter stranger to the suit schedule property and he has no right, title, interest or possession over the suit schedule property. So also defendant Nos.1 to 3 have no right to purchase the suit schedule property from defendant No.4. Hence, the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration to declare that the suit schedule property is a joint family property and share of plaintiff is 2 1/3rd guntas in the eastern side and for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their henchmen from interfering with the possession of the suit schedule property of the plaintiff.
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3.4 Upon service of summons, defendant Nos.1 to 3 remained absent and they were placed ex-parte. Defendant No.4 appeared and contested the matter by filing written statement, wherein it is stated as follows :-
According to defendant No.4, late Dodda
Munivenkatappa alias Peddanna, the father of defendants had purchased the property in Sy.No.64/5 measuring 1 acre 21 guntas from its previous owner Sri.R.Sanjeevalu on 21.10.1970 along with other properties. After the death of his father, defendant No.4 continued to be in possession of
all these properties he had purchased and consequent to the death of his father, he succeeded to all the properties and his name was recorded in the revenue record. Hence, defendant No.4 is in possession of the suit schedule property. Neither the plaintiff nor defendant Nos.1 to 3 have any right, title or interest over the suit schedule property. It is further stated that defendant No.4 is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property for more than 32 years. He further denied all other averments made in the plaint.
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3.5 On the basis of the pleadings of the plaintiff and defendant No.4, the trial Court framed the following issues for consideration:
3.6 In order to substantiate the issues and prove the case, plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and examined two other witnesses as PW.2-Venkataswamy and PW.3-
Batheppa and got marked documents as Exs.P1 to P11, whereas, defendant No.4 examined himself as DW.1 and also examined two other witnesses as DW.2-Seethappa and DW.3-Munivenkata Shetty and got marked documents as Exs.D1 to D6 in support of his case.
3.7 On the basis of the material records, both oral and documentary, the trial Court found favour with the plaintiff and decreed the suit partly and granted relief of declaration of 1/3rd share in the suit schedule property and also for separate possession thereof by metes and bounds. Further, the trial Court did not find favour with the plaintiff for grant of relief of permanent injunction on the ground that plaintiff did not prove his possession as on the date of the suit.
3.8 Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court partly decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff, defendant No.4 preferred an appeal in R.A.No.339/2005. The summons were issued to the respondents therein and the plaintiff appeared and contested the matter and defendant No.4 who was the
appellant before the first appellate Court, argued the matter by contending that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is perverse and contrary to the material evidence on record and sought for setting aside the same on several grounds urged in the appeal memo. Having heard the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff and the learned counsel defendant No.4, The first Appellate Court formulated the following points for consideration:
3.9 On careful consideration of the materials on record, both oral and documentary and upon
re-examination of the entire materials by calling the trial Court records, the first Appellate Court found favour with the contentions put-forth by defendant No.4 and disagreed with the arguments put-forth by the plaintiff and accordingly, allowed the appeal reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court and consequently, set aside and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction.
3.10 Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree rendered by the first appellate Court, allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit, the plaintiff is before this Court by preferring this second appeal.
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further contended that defendant No.4 has not placed any material to prove that his father has sold the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff's uncle who was the father of defendant No.1. It is further contended that the plaintiff has proved that the suit schedule property was purchased by his uncle from the father of defendant No.4 and also took possession of the same except the fact that the khatha could not be changed in the name of the uncle of the plaintiff. Therefore, he contends that the right acquired by the uncle of the plaintiff cannot be evaporated and extinguished merely for the reason that the names were not mutated in the RTC register.
4.1 Learned counsel further contends that defendant No.4 has not placed any cogent material evidence to prove his adverse possession over the suit schedule property, which fact has been appreciated by the trial Court and has rightly negatived the said contention and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Learned counsel further contends that ignoring all these crucial relevant aspects, the first
Appellate Court has committed a serious error on facts and in law by not appreciating the materials, both oral and documentary and the finding given by the trial Court and has erroneously set-aside and reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and consequently, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.
4.2 Learned counsel further contends that the first Appellate Court has committed a serious error in not understanding the facts, the evidence adduced, the applicable law and the finding rendered by the trial Court and on its own imaginary surmises, has set-aside the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court, which is erroneous and the same requires to be set-aside. Learned counsel further contends that the first Appellate Court has only taken all the contentions urged by defendant No.4 including the plea of adverse possession, which has not been proved and established and passed an illegal and erroneous order. Learned counsel further contends that the first Appellate Court has ignored the fact that the father of
defendant No.4 had executed a sale in favour of the uncle of plaintiff and therefore, they are in peaceful possession and lawful enjoyment of the suit schedule property of the joint family including the uncle of the plaintiff without disturbance from anybody. The first Appellate Court has committed a serious error by relying upon the nonexistence of RTC entry of 7 1/4th guntas in the name of the plaintiff's uncle and thereafter, in the name of the joint family. By coming to a conclusion that it was standing in the name of defendants' forefathers and later transferred to defendant No.4. It is further contended that mere transfer of RTC in the name of defendant No.4 would not extinguish the absolute right of the plaintiff's uncle and consequently, the joint family over the suit schedule property.
4.3 It is further contended by learned counsel that defendant No.4 is a stranger to the suit schedule property, who is illegally trying to interfere with the suit schedule property belonging to the plaintiff in collusion with defendant Nos.1 to 3. Learned counsel further contends the
first Appellate Court has not understood the prayer made in the suit so also the evidence produced, both oral and documentary and finding rendered by the trial Court and on the basis of imaginary reasoning, has passed an erroneous order by setting aside the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court.
4.4 It is further contended that the first Appellate Court has committed a serious error in coming to the conclusion that the title and possession of the suit schedule property is with defendant No.4. Therefore, these reasoning rendered by the trial Court have not been appreciated by the first Appellate Court and the reasoning provided by the first Appellate Court being contrary to the material evidence on record, the same requires to be set-aside restoring the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court.
4.5 Learned counsel for appellant-plaintiff has relied on the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Rajkumar @ Rajendra Kumar Dandoti, since
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deceased by his LRs. vs. Smt.Ratnamma and another
in RSA 1588/2008 [DD.22.07.2021].
5.1 Learned counsel further contends that there is no error committed by the first Appellate Court in setting aside the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court as the same is well reasoned after considering and taking into note
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all the relevant materials, both oral and documentary and on the basis of the judgments relied on by the parties to the proceedings. In fact, he further contends that the trial Court committed an error in not appreciating the facts of the case and the first Appellate Court has rightly set-aside the
judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and therefore, the judgment and decree rendered by the first Appellate Court is sustainable and does not call for interference. Learned counsel further contends that the plaintiff has not come before the Court with clean hands
and neither has he properly drafted the plaint seeking proper relief before the Court so also the plaintiff has suppressed the correct fact before the Court. He also contends that there is no prayer made for partition except for claiming declaratory relief and relief of permanent injunction.
5.2 Learned counsel further contends that the finding
of the trial Court with regard to the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 3 being not in possession of the suit schedule
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property, has been neither set-aside nor questioned. It is also contended further that the possession of the suit schedule property by defendant No.4 is unchallenged. Learned counsel further contends that the suit filed by the plaintiff for declaration without seeking the relief of possession, is not maintainable and the same is bad in law.
5.3 Learned counsel further contends that the plaintiffPW.1 in his evidence has clearly admitted that he is not in possession of the suit schedule property. It is also contended by learned counsel that there is no specific plea with regard to joint family status and the same has not been proved or established as to the relinquishment and so also, no material evidence is placed to establish that the suit schedule property is purchased from the joint family funds, which is very essential requirement to prove and establish the property being a joint family property. It is also vehemently contended by learned counsel that defendant Nos.1 to 3 had remained absent and were placed ex parte and there is no dispute with regard to relationship
of the plaintiff with defendant Nos.1 to 3. Therefore, there is no illegality or perversity or patent error committed by the first Appellate Court, so also, he contends that there are no justifiable grounds made out to answer the substantial question of law in favour of the plaintiff as this Court would only have to look into the aspect as to whether there is any illegality or perversity rather than re-looking and going through the evidentiary value to appreciate evidence once again, which is not permissible. On these grounds, he seeks to dismiss the appeal.
5.4 Learned counsel for defendant No.4 has relied on
the following judgments in support of his case:
i) Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society Ltd and others reported in 2014 AIR SCW 580;
ii) Srinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango reported in AIR 1954 SC 379;
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by L.Rs. reported in AIR 2003 PUNJAB AND
HARYANA 142;
ix) Batoola Jan vs. G.Mohd. Basheer reported in ILR 2002 KAR 369;
xi) Mehar Chand Das v. Lal Babu Siddique and
Ors. reported in AIR 2007 SC 1499;
xii) T.L.Nagendra Babu vs. Manohar Rao Pawar reported in ILR 2005 KAR 884;
xiii) National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad and Ors. reported in 2011 AIR SCW 6180;
xiv) Vinod Kumar Arora v. Smt.Surjit Kaur reported in AIR 1987 SC 2179;
xv) A.Krishnappa v. Thimmarayappa and others reported in AIR 2001 KAR 470;
xvi) Vasudev and Others vs. Tukaram Bhimappa
Naik and Others reported in ILR 2014 KAR
4716;
"Whether the First Appellate Court misread the evidence of PW-1 and whether it wrongly came to the conclusion that 2 1/3 guntas is already allotted and in possession of the plaintiff?"
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and located for grant of any relief. Admittedly, the name of
the plaintiff does not find in the RTC extract. On the contrary, the property stands in the name of defendant No.4 and prior to that, in the name of father of defendant No.4. It is also seen that the trial Court, while decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, clearly held that the relief of permanent injunction cannot be granted as per the boundaries claimed by the plaintiff, as the plaintiff has not proved his possession as on date of filing of the suit. When the plaintiff comes before the Court to ascertain his right or
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declaration, it is for the plaintiff to identify the property so also the location and for the relief of permanent injunction, he would have to prove his possession as on date of filing of the suit. These aspects have not been established and the first Appellate Court, having taken into consideration all these aspects, appreciated evidence of defendant No.4 on the basis of the materials placed and negatived the plea of status of joint possession and the property having been purchased out of the joint family funds and accordingly, allowed the appeal of defendant No.4 and consequently, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.
8.1 In the case of Vasavi Co-op. Housing Scoiety
Ltd. stated supra, the Apex Court has held at para-15 as under:
"15. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not.
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We are of the view that even if the title set up by the defendants is found against, in the absence of establishment of plaintiff's own title, plaintiff must be non-suited."
8.2 In the case of Srinivas Krishnarao Kango stated
supra, the Apex Court has held at para-10 as under:
"10. Whether the evidence adduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to shift the burden which initially rested on him of establishing that there was adequate nucleus out of which the acquisitions could have been made is one of fact depending on the nature and the extent of the nucleus. The important thing to consider is the income which the nucleus yields. A building in the occupation of the members of a family and yielding in income could not be a nucleus out of which acquisitions could be made, even though it might be of considerable value. On the other hand, a running business in which the capital invested is comparatively small might conceivably produce substantial income, which may well from the foundation of the subsequent acquisitions. These are not abstract questions of law, but questions of fact to be determined on the evidence in the case.
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xxxxxxxxxx"
8.3 In the case of Ibrahim Uddin stated supra, the
Apex Court has held at paras-46 to 49 as under:
"46. In view of above, the law becomes crystal clear that it is not permissible to claim the relief of declaration without seeking consequential relief. In the instant case, suit for declaration of title of ownership had been filed though, the plaintiff/respondent No.1 was admittedly not in possession of the suit property. Thus, the suit was barred by the provision of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, ought to have been dismissed solely on this ground. The High Court though framed a substantial question on this point but for unknown reasons did not consider it proper to decide the same.
Section 100 CPC:
47. Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a Second Appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law.
48. In State Bank of India & Ors. v. S.N.Goyal, AIR 2008 SC 2594, this Court
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explained the terms "substantial question of law" and observed as under :
"The word 'substantial' prefixed to 'question of law' does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. 'Substantial questions of law' means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. ..... any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final out-come, will not be a substantial question of law. There cannot, therefore, be a strait-jacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case."
Similarly, in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, this Court for the purpose of determining the issue held:-
"The proper test for determining whether a question of law raises in the case is substantial,
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would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties…."
49. In Vijay Kumar Talwar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, (2011) 1 SCC 673, this Court held that, a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be 'substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case, whether a question of law is a substantial one or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable
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obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis." (See also: Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria, (2005) 7 SCC 60)."
8.4 In the case of Sri Aralappa stated supra, the
Court has held at paras-27, 30 to 32 held as under:
"27. The Supreme Court in the case of Vinay Krishna vs. Keshav Chandra and Another held that the plaintiff is not in exclusive possession of the property and defendants and other tenants were in occupation of the property, the relief of possession ought to have been asked for as a consequential relief to the relief of declaration. The failure to do so undoubtedly bars the discretion of the Court in granting the decree of declaration. Merely because, the plaint says in the prayer column such other relief may be granted to the plaintiff, it does not mean that without a specific plea for possession and disregarding the bar under Section 42 (proviso) of the Specific Relief Act, the suit could be decreed even with reference to the portions of which the plaintiff has been in possession.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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30. In a suit, for declaration of ownership and permanent injunction, not only the plaintiff has to prove his title to the property, but also his possession over the property on the date of the suit. When the plaintiff is not in possession of the property on the date of the suit, relief of permanent injunction is not an appropriate consequential relief. The appropriate relief consequential to declaration of ownership would be recovery of possession of the property. When the plaintiff is out of possession of the property and does not seek relief for possession, a mere suit for declaration is not maintainable. The reason is not far to seek. It is well settled that no Court would grant any relief which is not useful, or futile and not effective. If title of the plaintiff is to be declared and he is not in possession and possession is with the defendant or some other person, the plaintiff would be having title of the property and the person in possession would be having possessory title to the property. It would lead to anomalous situation and create confusion in the public, which is to be avoided.
31. Even if the plaintiff comes to Court asserting that he is in possession and that if it is
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found after trial that he was not in possession on the date of the suit, even then, the suit for declaration and permanent injunction is liable to he dismissed as not maintainable, as no decree for permanent injunction can be granted if the plaintiff is not in possession on the date of the suit. In such circumstances, it is necessary for the plaintiff to amend the plaint before the judgment and seek relief of possession. Therefore, a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction, by the plaintiff who is not in possession on the date of the suit, when he is able to seek further relief of recovery of possession also, omits to do so, the Court shall not make any such declaration and the suit is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.
32. In the instant case, it is established that the defendant took possession of the suit schedule property from the plaintiff and their father in execution of a decree passed. Therefore, on the date, the suit was filed for declaration and permanent injunction, the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit schedule property. No doubt, in the plaint he asserts that he is in possession of the suit
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schedule property. When the defendant in the written statement set out particular of the previous proceedings and also the fact that they took possession of the suit schedule property from the plaintiffs and their father through the Court, the plaintiff did amend the plaint seeking a declaration that the decree obtained by the defendants against their father is not binding on him. But the defendants did not choose to seek the relief of possession. The plaintiff in spite of the fact that the earlier Court proceedings showed that the defendant was in possession and the plaintiff was not in possession, omitted to seek the relief of possession. The suit of the plaintiff for declaration and permanent injunction without seeking the relief of possession was not maintainable. Therefore, the Court below was justified in declining to grant the declaration sought for on the ground that the suit was not maintainable."
8.5 In the case of Mehar Chand Das stated supra,
the Apex Court has held at para-12 as under:
"12. The High Court, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in not relying upon the decision of this Court in Vinay Krishna (supra). The said
decision categorically lays down the law that if the plaintiff had been in possession, then a suit for mere declaration would be maintainable: the logical corollary whereof would be that if the plaintiff is not in possession, a suit for mere declaration would not be maintainable."
8.6 In the case of National Textile Corporation
stated supra, the Apex Court has held at para-7 as under:
"7. Pleadings and particulars are necessary to enable the court to decide the right of the parties in the trial. Therefore, the pleadings are more of help to the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that "as a rule relief not found on the pleadings should not be granted". A decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide: M/s.Trojan and Co. v. RM N.N.Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235; State of Maharashtra v. M/s.Hindustan Construction
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Company Ltd., AIR 2010 SC 1299; and Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P.Joshi, AIR 2011 SC 1127)."
ORDER
This Regular Second Appeal is dismissed .
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In view of dismissal of the appeal, pending interlocutory application, if any, shall stand consigned to
record.
Sd/(PRADEEP SINGH YERUR) JUDGE
KGK/LB List No.: 8 Sl No.: 1
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the first Appellate Court misread PW-1's evidence and wrongly concluded that the plaintiff's share was already allotted and in his possession?
Whether a suit for declaration and injunction without seeking recovery of possession is maintainable when the plaintiff is not in possession?
Whether the plaintiff proved that the suit property was purchased out of joint family funds?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Rajkumar @ Rajendra Kumar Dandoti (deceased) by his LRs. vs. Smt. Ratnamma and anotherDistinguished¶202
RSA 1588/2008 [DD.22.07.2021]
Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society Ltd and othersRelied on¶145
2014 AIR SCW 580 · Who else cites this
Srinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji KangoRelied on¶151
AIR 1954 SC 379 · Who else cites this
Kulwant Singh v. Makhan Singh (deceased) by L.Rs.Referred
AIR 2003 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 142 · Who else cites this
Ramesh Srinivasa Jannu vs. Srinivas Vittoba JannuReferred
ILR 2001 KAR 1215 · Who else cites this
D.S. Lakshmaiah and another v. L. Balasubramanyam and anotherReferred
AIR 2003 SC 3800 · Who else cites this
Thimma and Others vs. Smt. Doddamma and anotherReferred
ILR 2014 KAR 4491 · Who else cites this
Sri Lakhi Baruah and others v. Sri Padma Kanta Kalita and othersReferred
AIR 1996 SC 1253 · Who else cites this
Union of India v. Ibrahim UddinRelied on¶157
2013 AIR SCW 2752 · Who else cites this
Batoola Jan vs. G.Mohd. BasheerReferred
ILR 2002 KAR 369 · Who else cites this
Sri Aralappa vs. Sri Jagannath and OthersRelied on¶176
ILR 2007 KAR 339 · Who else cites this
Mehar Chand Das v. Lal Babu Siddique and Ors.Relied on¶191
AIR 2007 SC 1499 · Who else cites this
T.L. Nagendra Babu vs. Manohar Rao PawarReferred
ILR 2005 KAR 884 · Who else cites this
National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad and Ors.Relied on¶196
2011 AIR SCW 6180 · Who else cites this
Vinod Kumar Arora v. Smt. Surjit KaurReferred
AIR 1987 SC 2179 · Who else cites this
A. Krishnappa v. Thimmarayappa and othersReferred
AIR 2001 KAR 470 · Who else cites this
Vasudev and Others vs. Tukaram Bhimappa Naik and OthersReferred
ILR 2014 KAR 4716 · Who else cites this
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Eerappa S/o. Batheppa
Maleppa S/o. Doddamunivenkatappa @ Peddanna
Venkataramanappa S/o. Munivenkatappa (since dead) by his LRs.
Smt. Venkatamma W/o. Late Munivenkatappa
M. Rama Reddy S/o. Dodda Munivenkatappa
Pradeep Singh Yerur
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
