Allowed

Sri Jayarama v. Smt. Munirathnamma

Karnataka HC1 Oct 2024RFA/969/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeals by defendants against decree declaring plaintiffs absolute owners of Bengaluru lands and defendants' documents fraudulent. The High Court held the plaint failed to plead fraud with particulars, no direct challenge was made to the sale deeds, plaintiffs were not in possession, and the suit was time-barred.

What did the court decide?

Trial court judgment and decree in O.S.No.6045/1989 set aside; suit dismissed; cross-objection dismissed; no costs

Sri Jayarama Vs Smt. Munirathnamma — Property and Title | Karnataka HC (2024)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 1^ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2024

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BEFORE

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THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

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RFA NO. 969 OF 2014 (DEC/INJ) C/W RFA NO. 912 OF 2015 (DEC/INJ) RFA NO. 342 OF 2022 (DEC/INJ) RFA NO. 343 OF 2022 (DEC/INJ) RFA CROB. NO. 21 OF 2024 (DEC/POS)

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IN RFA NO. 969/2014

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BETWEEN:

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1 . SRI JAYARAMA

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S/O DODDATHAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS R/AT NO.17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA, 11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010. SINCE DEAD BY LRS

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1(A) SMT. RUKMINI W/O LATE JAYARAMA AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS

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1(B) SMT. SHASHIKALA D/O LATE JAYARAMA AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS

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1(C) SRI. RAMAMURTHY S/O LATE JAYARAMA AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS

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1(D) SRI. RAMACHANDRA S/O LATE JAYARAMA AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS

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1(E) SRI. RAMGOPAL S/O LATE JAYARAMA AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS

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1(F) SRI. SUNIL S/O LATE JAYARAMA AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS R/AT NO.17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA, 11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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2 . SRI. DODDABAYANNA S/O LATE DODDATHAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/ NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA, 11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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3 . SRI. CHIKKABAYANNA S/O LATE DODDATHAMANNA AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS R/NO.17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA, 11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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...APPELLANTS

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(BY SRI. T.M. VENKATA REDDY, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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1 . SMT. MUNIRATHNAMMA W/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 90 YEARS

¶25

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R/A NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY BANGALORE-560 050.

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2 . SMT. H. SHAKUNTHALA D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS

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3 . SMT. H. ANURADHA D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS

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4 . SRI. H. SATHISH S/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS

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5 . SMT. H. LAKSHMI D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS

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6 . SRI. B.S. NARAYANA SHETTY S/O LATE S.P. SUBBARAYA SHETTY AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS

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7 . SRI. B.N. SUBRAMANI S/O B.S. NARAYANA SETTY AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS

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RESPONDENTS NO. 2 TO 7 ARE R/AT NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY BANGALORE-560 050.

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8 . SRI. SHRISHA R.BHATTA AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS S/O LATE VADIRAMANANDA BHATTA R/AT HESARAGHATTA ROAD, DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 057.

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9 . SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIAH S/O DODDARAMAIAH AGED: MAJOR R/AT ANDRAHALLI, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK.

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10 . SRI. PYGA DODDA MUNISWAMY

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AGED: MAJOR R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1^ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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11 . SRI. K.M. KRISHNAPPA S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS

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12 . SRI. MADHU S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS

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13 . SRI. MURALI S/O LATE MUTHANNA AGED MAJOR

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RESPONDENTS NO. 10 TO 12 ARE R/AT NO.77/1112, 13TH CROSS 1^ST K BLOCK, KETHAMARANAHALLI RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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14 . SRI.T.G. NARAYANA SWAMY S/O GANGANNA AGED MAJOR R/AT THEERTHAPURA VILLAGE, YESHWATHAPURA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK.

¶44

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15 . SRI. RAJENDRA

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S/O LATE GOVINDARAJU AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS R/A NO.399, 5TH MAIN ROAD, BEHIND VENKATESHWARA SANITARY WARE, KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, MARIYAPPANA PALYA, BANGALORE-560 021.

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16 . SRI. SRINIVASA S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS

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17 . SRI. RAMAKRISHNA S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS

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RESPONDENTS NO. 16 AND 17 ARE R/AT MARIYAPPANA PALYA, KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, BENGALURU-560 021.

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18 . SRI. SADASIVAIAH S/O PARNNA AGED MAJOR

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R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK.

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19 . SRI. T. RAMEGOWDA S/O DASE GOWDA AGED MAJOR

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R/A SHIVAPURA VILLAGE, PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK, BENGALURU-560 058.

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20 . SRI. KANNIKAMBA W/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS

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21 . SRI. KRISHNA MURTHY S/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS

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RESPONDENTS NO. 20 AND 21 ARE R/AT NO.18, KIRSHAN KRUPA, SHOE LAND BUILDING, 1ST FLOOR, NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE, RAJAGOPAL NAGAR MAIN ROAD, PEENYA 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU-560 058.

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22 . SRI. MUNISWAMAIAH S/O GARUDAPPA AGE MAJOR

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R/AT T. DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 057.

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23 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI S/O DODAMUNISWAMY BOVI AGE MAJOR

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R/O SUDDAGUNTEPALYA, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK.

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24 . SRI. K.N. LAKSHMAMMA W/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS

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25 . SRI. K.L. BABU S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS

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26 . SRI. K.L. SATISH S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS

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RESPONDENTS NO. 24 TO 26 ARE R/AT NO.59, 10TH A CROSS, WEST OF CHORD ROAD, 2ND STAGE, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BANGALORE-560 086.

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27 . SRI. K.N. VENKATESH S/O NANJAPPA AGED MAJOR

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28 . SRI. K N CHOWDAPPA S/O NANJAPPA AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS

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RESPONDENTS NO. 27 AND 28 ARE R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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29 . SRI. R.VENUGOPALA REDDY S/O LATE N.RAMALINGA REDDY AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS R/A NO.181, LINK ROAD, MALLESWARAM, BENGALURU-560 003.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. D.P. MAHESH, SRI. HARISHITH .B.S AND SRI. KIRAN, ADVOCATES FOR R1, R3 TO R7; SRI. RAVI .H.K, ADVOCATE FOR R17; SRI. SRINIVASA, ADVOCATE FOR R19; R11, R12, R13, R15, R26 AND R27 ARE SERVED; V/O/D 24.07.2023 APPEAL AGAINST R8, R10, R14, R20 TO R25, R28 AND R29 ARE DISMISSED;

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V/O/D 24.07.2023 APPEAL AGAINST R2, R9, R16 AND R18 STANDS ABATED)

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THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 R/W.ORDER XLI RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 8.4.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.6045/1989 ON THE FILE OF THE VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION.

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IN RFA NO. 912/2015

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BETWEEN:

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1 . SHRI. C RAMAKRISHNA

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S/O CHINNAPPA MUDAILIAR

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@ ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR

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AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS R/A. Q-10, MARIAPPANAPALYA, KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, SRIRAMAPURA POST BANGALORE-560 021.

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...APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. RAVI H.K., ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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1 . SMT. MUNIRATHNAMMA W/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 90 YEARS R/A NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY BANGALORE-560 050.

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2 . SMT. H. SHAKUNTHALA D/O HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS

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3 . SMT. H. ANURADHA D/O HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS

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4 . SRI. H. SATHISH S/O HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS

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5 . SMT. H. LAKSHMI

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D/O HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS

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6 . SRI. B.S. NARAYANA SHETTY S/O LATE S.P. SUBBARAYA SHETTY AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS

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7 . SRI. B.N. SUBRAMANI S/O B.S. NARAYANA SETTY AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS RESPONDENTS NO. 2 TO 7 ARE R/AT NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY BANGALORE-560 050.

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8 . SRI. SHRISHA R.BHATTA AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS S/O LATE VADIRAMANANDA BHATTA R/AT HESARAGHATTA ROAD, DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 057.

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9 . SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIAH S/O DODDARAMAIAH AGED: MAJOR R/AT ANDRAHALLI, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK.

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10 . SRI. PYGA DODDA MUNISWAMY AGED: MAJOR R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1^ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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11 . SRI. K.M. KRISHNAPPA S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS

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12 . SRI. MADHU S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS

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13 . SRI. MURALI S/O LATE MUTHANNA AGED MAJOR

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RESPONDENTS NO. 10 TO 12 ARE R/AT NO.77/112, 13TH CROSS 1^ST K BLOCK, KETHAMARANAHALLI RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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14 . SHRI. T. JAYARAM

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S/O LATE DODDA THAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA 11^TH CROSS, 1^ST BLOCK

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RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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15 . SHRI DODDABAYANNA

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S/O DODDATHAMMANA

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AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA 11^TH CROSS, 1^ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR

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BANGALORE-560 010.

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16 . SHRI. CHIKKABAYANNA S/O DODDATHAMMANA AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA 11^TH CROSS, 1^ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR BANGALORE-560 010.

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17 . SRI.T.G. NARAYANA SWAMY S/O GANGANNA AGED MAJOR R/AT THEERTHAPURA VILLAGE, YESHWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK.

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18 . SRI. RAJENDRA S/O LATE GOVINDARAJU

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AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS R/A NO.399, 5TH MAIN ROAD, BEHIND VENKATESHWARA SANITARY WARE, KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, MARIYAPPANA PALYA, BANGALORE-560 021.

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19 . SRI. SRINIVASA S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS

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R/AT MARIAPPANAPALYA, KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, BENGALURU-560 021.

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20 . SRI. SADASIVAIAH S/O PARNNA AGED MAJOR

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R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK.

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21 . SRI. T. RAMEGOWDA S/O DASE GOWDA AGED MAJOR

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R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK, BENGALURU-560 058.

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22 . SRI. KANNIKAMBA W/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS

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23 . SRI. KRISHNA MURTHY S/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS

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RESPONDENTS NO. 20 AND 21 ARE R/AT NO.18, KIRSHAN KRUPA, SHOE LAND BUILDING, 1ST FLOOR, NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE, RAJAGOPAL NAGAR MAIN ROAD, PEENYA 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU-560 058.

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24 . SRI. MUNISWAMAIAH S/O GARUDAPPA AGE MAJOR R/AT T. DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 057.

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25 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI S/O DODAMUNISWAMY BOVI AGE MAJOR R/O SUDDAGUNTEPALYA, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK.

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26 . SRI. K.N. LAKSHMAMMA W/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS

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27 . SRI. K.L. BABU S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS

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28 . SRI. K.L. SATISH S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS RESPONDENTS NO. 26 TO 28 ALL ARE R/AT NO.59, 10TH A CROSS, WEST OF CHORD ROAD, 2ND STAGE, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BANGALORE-560 086.

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29 . SRI. K.N. VENKATESH S/O NANJAPPA AGED MAJOR R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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30 . SRI. K N CHOWDAPPA S/O NANJAPPA

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¶132

AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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31 . SRI. R.VENUGOPALA REDDY S/O LATE N.RAMALINGA REDDY AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS R/A NO.181, LINK ROAD, MALLESWARAM, BENGALURU-560 003.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. D.P. MAHESH, SRI. HARISHITH .B.S AND SRI. KIRAN, ADVOCATES FOR R3, R4, R5 AND R7; SRI. T.M. VENKATA REDDY, ADVOCATE FOR R14 TO R16; SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE FOR R18; SRI. SRINIVASA, ADVOCATE FOR R21; SRI. T.N. VISHWANATHA, ADVOCATE FOR R24; V/O DATED 08.09.2016 NOTICE TO R11 HELD SUFFICIENT; R29 IS SERVED;

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V/O DATED 19.10.2016 NOTICE TO R1, R2, R6, R8, R9, R10, R12, R13, R17, R19, R20, R22, R23, R25, R26, R27, R28, R30, R31 ARE HELD SUFFICIENT)

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THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 R/W.ORDER 41 RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 8.4.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.6045/1989 ON THE FILE OF THE VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION.

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IN RFA NO. 342/2022

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BETWEEN:

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1 . SRI. RAJENDRA G

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S/O LATE C GOVINDARAJU

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¶143

AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS R/AT NO.399, 5TH MAIN ROAD BEHIND VENKATESWARA SANITARY KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET SRIRAMPUARA, MARIYAPPANA PALYA BENGALURU-560 021

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...APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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1 . SMT. MUNIRATNAMMA W/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 96 YEARS R/A NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY BANGALORE-560 050.

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2 . SMT. H. SHAKUNATALA D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS

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3 . SMT. H. ANURADHA

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D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS

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4 . SRI. H. SATISH

¶152

S/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT YEARS

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5 . SMT. H. LAKSHMI D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT YEARS

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6 . SRI. B.S. NARAYANA SEETY S/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT YEARS

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7 . SRI. B.N. SUBRMANI S/O B.S. NARAYANA SETTY AGED ABOUT YEARS

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APPELLANTS NO. 2 TO 5 ARE ALSO LRS OF DECEASED PLAINTIFF NO.1 ALL ARE R/AT NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY BANGALORE-560 050.

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8 . SRI. SHRISHA R.BHATTA AGED ABOUT YEARS S/O LATE VADIRAMANDA BHATTA R/AT HESARAGHATTA ROAD, DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 057.

¶159

9 . SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIH

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S/O DODDARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT YEARS

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R/AT ANDRAHALLI, YESHWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK BENGALURU 560091.

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10 . SRI. PAYA DODDA MUNISWAMY AGED: MAJOR R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1^ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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11 . SRI. K.M. KRISHNAPPA S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS

¶164

12 . SRI. MADHU S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS

¶165

RESPONDENTS NO. 11 TO 12 ARE R/AT NO.77/1112, 13TH CROSS 1^ST K BLOCK, KETHAMARANAHALLI

¶166

¶167

RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

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13 . SRI. MURALI S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS

¶169

14 . SHRI. JAYARAMA AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS

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15 . SHRI DODDABYANNA AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS

¶171

16 . SHRI. CHIKKABYARANNA AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS

¶172

R13 TO 15 ARE ALL R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMINILAYA 11^TH CROSS, 1^ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR BANGALORE-560 011.

¶173

17 . SRI.T.G. NARAYANASWAMY S/O GANGANNA AGED MAJOR R/AT THEERATHAPURA VILLAGE, YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK BANGALORE - 560 022.

¶174

18 . SRI. SRINIVASA S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR AGED ABOUT 85 YEARS R/AT MARIYAPPANAPALYA, KALMMA TEMPLE STREET, BENGALURU-560 021.

¶175

19 . SRI. RAMAKRISHNA S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS

¶176

¶177

R/AT Q-10, MARIYAPPANAPLAYA SRIRAMPURA POST, KALMMA TEMPLE STREET BENGALURU-560 021.

¶178

20 . SRI. SADASHIVAIAH S/O PARNNA AGED MAJOR R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI, YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU-560 058.

¶179

21 . SRI. T. RAMEGOWDA S/O DASE GOWDA AGED MAJOR R/AT SHIVAPURA VILLAGE PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA YESWANTAPURA HOBLI BENGALURU NORHT TALUK BENGALURU-560 058.

¶180

22 . SRI. KANNIKAMBA W/O LATE VENAKTARAMAIH AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS

¶181

23 . SRI. KRISHNAMURTHY S/O LATE VENAKATARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS

¶182

RESPONDENTS NO. 22 AND 23 ARE R/AT NO.18, KIRSHAN KRUPA, SHOE LAND BUILDING, 1ST FLOOR, NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE, RAJGOPALNAGAR MAIN ROAD, PEENYA 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU-560 058.

¶183

24 . SRI. MUNISWAMAIAH S/O GARUDAPPA

¶184

¶185

AGE MAJOR R/AT T. DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 057.

¶186

25 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI S/O DODDAMUNISWAMYA BOVI AGE MAJOR R/O SUDDAGUNATEPALYA VILLAGE YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU-560 022.

¶187

26 . SMT. LAKSHMMA W/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS

¶188

27 . SRI. K.L. BABU S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS

¶189

28 . SRI. K.L. SATISH S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS

¶190

RESPONDENTS NO. 26 TO 28 ARE R/AT NO.59, 10TH A CROSS, WEST OF CHORD ROAD, 2ND STAGE, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BANGALORE-560 086.

¶191

29 . SRI. K.N. VENKATESH S/O NANJAPPA AGED MAJOR R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

¶192

30 . SRI. K N CHODAPPA S/O NANJAPPA AGED MAJOR

¶193

¶194

R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

¶195

31 . SRI. R.VENUGOPLA REDDY S/O LATE N.RAMALINGA REDDY AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS R/A NO.181, LINK ROAD, MALLESWARAM, BENGALURU-560 003.

¶196

…RESPONDENTS

¶197

(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. D.P. MAHESH, SRI. HARISHITH .B.S AND SRI. KIRAN, ADVOCATES FOR R3, R4, R5 AND R7; SRI. RAVI .H.K, ADVOCATE FOR R19; V/O/D 3.08.2022 NOTICE TO R8 TO R11 ARE DISPENSED WITH;

¶198

V/O/D 09.09.2022 R3 TO R5 ARE LRS OF DECEASED R1-R2, R7 IS LR OF DECEASED R6;

¶199

V/O/D 27.09.2024 NOTICE TO R12 TO R18 AND R20 TO R31 ARE DISPENSED WITH)

¶200

¶201

IN RFA NO. 343/2022

¶202

BETWEEN:

¶203

1 . SRI. D. RAMEGOWDA AGED MAJOR S/O LATE DASEGOWDA

¶204

RESIDING AT SHIVAPURA VILLAGE

¶205

¶206

PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI BENGALURU-560 058.

¶207

PRESENTLY RESIDING AT NO.25, AKSHAYA GRUHALAKSHMI LAYOUT, 1ST STAGE OPP SHAMBAVA MURTHY PARK BASAVASHWARANAGARA BENGALURU-560 079

¶208

...APPELLANT

¶209

(BY SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE)

¶210

AND:

¶211

1 . SMT. H. MUNIRATNAMMA W/O LATE SRI. HANUMANTHRAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 96 YEARS R/A NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY BANGALORE-560 050.

¶212

2 . SMT. H. SHAKUNATALA

¶213

D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS

¶214

3 . SMT. H. ANURADHA D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS

¶215

4 . SRI. H. SATISH S/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS

¶216

5 . SMT. H. LAKSHMI D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS

¶217

¶218

6 . SRI. B.S. NARAYANA SEETY S/O LATE S.P. SUBBARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS

¶219

7 . SRI. B.N. SUBRMANI S/O B.S. NARAYANA SETTY AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS

¶220

APPELLANTS NO. 2 TO 5 ARE ALSO LRS OF DECEASED PLAINTIFF NO.1 ALL ARE R/AT NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY BANGALORE-560 050.

¶221

8 . SRI. SHRISHA R.BHATTA AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS S/O LATE VADIRAMANDA BHATTA R/AT HESARAGHATTA ROAD, DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 057.

¶222

9 . SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIH S/O DODDARAMAIAH AGED MAJOR R/AT ANDRAHALLI, YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK BENGALURU 560091.

¶223

10 . SRI. PYGA DODDA MUNISWAMY AGED: MAJOR R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1^ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

¶224

11 . SRI. K.M. KRISHNAPPA S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS

¶225

¶226

12 . SRI. MADHU S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS

¶227

13 . SRI. MURALI S/O LATE MUTTHANNA AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS

¶228

RESPONDENTS NO. 11 TO 12 ARE R/AT NO.77/1112, 13TH CROSS 1^ST K BLOCK, KETHAMARANAHALLI RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

¶229

14 . SHRI. JAYARAMA AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS

¶230

15 . SHRI DODDABYANNA AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS

¶231

16 . SHRI. CHIKKABYARANNA AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS

¶232

R13 TO 15 ARE ALL

¶233

R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMINILAYA 11^TH CROSS, 1^ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR BANGALORE-560 011.

¶234

17 . SRI.T.G. NARAYANASWAMY S/O GANGANNA AGED MAJOR R/AT THEERATHAPURA VILLAGE, YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK BANGALORE - 560 022.

¶235

18 . SRI. RAJENDRA .G S/O LATE C. GOVINDARAJU

¶236

¶237

AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS R/AT NO. 399, 5^TH MAIN ROAD BEHIND VENKATESWARA SANITARY KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET SRIRAMAPURA, MARIYAPPANA PLAYA BENGALURU-560 021.

¶238

19 . SRI. SRINIVASA S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR AGED ABOUT 85 YEARS R/AT MARIYAPPANAPALYA, SRIRAMPURA KALMMA TEMPLE STREET, BENGALURU-560 021.

¶239

20 . SRI. RAMAKRISHNA S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS R/AT Q-10, MARIYAPPANAPLAYA SRIRAMPURA POST, KALMMA TEMPLE STREET BENGALURU-560 021.

¶240

21 . SRI. SADASHIVAIAH

¶241

S/O PRANNA AGED MAJOR R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI, YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU-560 058.

¶242

22 . SRI. KANNIKAMBA W/O LATE VENAKTARAMAIH AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS

¶243

23 . SRI. KRISHNAMURTHY S/O LATE VENAKATARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS

¶244

¶245

RESPONDENTS NO. 22 AND 23 ARE R/AT NO.18, KIRSHNA KRUPA, SHOE LAND BUILDING, 1ST FLOOR, NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE, RAJGOPALNAGAR MAIN ROAD, PEENYA 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU-560 058.

¶246

24 . SRI. MUNISWAMAIAH S/O GARUDAPPA AGE MAJOR R/AT T. DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 057.

¶247

25 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI S/O DODDAMUNISWAMYA BOVI AGE MAJOR R/O SUDDAGUNATEPALYA VILLAGE YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU-560 022.

¶248

26 . SMT. LAKSHMMA W/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS

¶249

27 . SRI. K.L. BABU S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS

¶250

28 . SRI. K.L. SATISH S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS

¶251

RESPONDENTS NO. 26 TO 28 ARE R/AT NO.59, 10TH A CROSS, WEST OF CHORD ROAD, 2ND STAGE, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BANGALORE-560 086.

¶252

¶253

29 . SRI. K.N. VENKATESH S/O NANJAPPA AGED MAJOR R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

¶254

30 . SRI. K N CHODAPPA S/O NANJAPPA AGED MAJOR R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.

¶255

31 . SRI. R.VENUGOPLA REDDY S/O LATE N.RAMALINGA REDDY AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS R/A NO.181, LINK ROAD, MALLESWARAM, BENGALURU-560 003.

¶256

D.M. RAMAKRISHNA S/O SRI MARIYANNA AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS R/AT DHUMMANAHALLI VILLAGE VITTHALAPURA POST, MYSANDRA HOBLI TURUVEKERE TALUK, TUMKUR DISTRICT.

¶257

B. GANESH AITHAL S/O B. VASUDEV AITHAL AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS R/AT NO. 487/3, 5^TH CROSS, 1^ST MAIN T.R. NAGAR, VIDYAPEETH LAYOUT BENGALURU-560 028.

¶258

ANANTHARAM HOLLA S/O SRI KRISHNA HOLLA AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS

¶259

¶260

R/AT NO. 79/2 JALADEV NEAR JAIN TEMPLE, 3^RD MAIN 3^RD BLOCK, T.R. NAGAR BENGALURU-560 028.

¶261

SRI. VASU S/O CHIKKAHANUMAIAH AGED 38 YEARS NO. 47, NEAR KG VIDYAMANDIRA SCHOOL BALAJI NAGAR, THIGGALARAPALYA MUKYA RASTHE PEENYA 2^ND STAGE, PEENYA POST BENGALURU-560 058.

¶262

SHASHIKALA D/O LATE GOVINDAPPA AGED 51 YEARS R/AT NO. 1073, 4^TH CROSS, 3^RD MAIN KALYAN NAGAR, T DASARAHALLI BENGALURU-560 057.

¶263

AKASH PRIYADARSHI S/O B. ASHOK PRIYADARSHI AGED 34 YEARS R.AT 329, 14^TH MAIN, RAJMAHAL VILAS EXTENSION BENGALURU-560 080.

¶264

BHAGYALAKSHMI W/O B. ASHOK PRIYADARSHI AGED 62 YEARS R/AT 329, 14^TH MAIN, RAJMAHAL VILAS EXTENDION BENGALURU-560 080.

¶265

…RESPONDENTS

¶266

(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. D.P. MAHESH, SRI. HARISHITH .B.S AND

¶267

SRI. KIRAN, ADVOCATES FOR R3, R4, R5 AND R7;

¶268

¶269

NOTICE TO R8 TO R31 DISPENSED WITH; SRI. RAVI .H.K, ADVOCATE FOR R20; SRI. M.N. UMASHANKAR, ADVOCATE FOR PROPOSED IMPLEADING APPLICANT R32 TO R38; SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE FOR R11 TO R13, R24, R27, R31 AND LRS OF R21(A) AND (B); V/O DATED 06.04.2022 NOTICE TO R21 IS D/W; V/O DATED 09.09.2022, R3 TO R5 ARE LRS OF R1 AND R2; R6 DIED, HIS LRs ALREADY ON RECOND AS R7)

¶270

¶271

IN RFA CROB. NO. 21/2024

¶272

BETWEEN:

¶273

1 . SMT H ANURADHA D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS

¶274

2 . SRI. H. SATISH D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS

¶275

3 . SMT. H. LAKSHMI D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS

¶276

4 . SRI. B N SUBRMANI S/O B S NARAYANA SETTY AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS THE APPELLANTS NO. 1 TO 4 ARE LRs OF PLAINTIFF NO. 1 SMT. H. MUNIRATHNAMMA

¶277

¶278

AND PLAINTIFF NO.2 SMT. H. SHAKUNTHALA

¶279

ALL ARE RESIDING AT NO. 977 ITI SOCIETY LAYOUT PAPREDDY PALYA BENGALURU-560 072

¶280

...CROSS OBJECTORS

¶281

(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. D.P. MAHESH, ADVOCATE)

¶282

AND:

¶283

1 . SRI MUNISWAMAIAH S/O GARUDAPPA MAJOR IN AGE RESIDING AT T. DASARAHALLI BENGALURU - 560 057

¶284

2 . SRI. SHRISHA R BHATTA MAJOR IN AGE S/O LATE VADIRAMANDA BHATTA RESIDING AT HESARAGHATTA, ROAD, DASARAHALLI, BENGALURU - 560 057

¶285

3 . SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIAH S/O LATE DODDARAMAIAH, MAJOR IN AGE R/O ANDRAHALLI, YESHWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BENGLAURU NORTH TALUK, BENGALURU - 560 091

¶286

4 . SRI. PAYA DODDA MUNISWAMY AGED MAJOR

¶287

¶288

R/O KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1st BLOCK, RAJAJINAGARA, BENGALURU - 560 010

¶289

5 . SRI. K M KRISHNAPPA S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS

¶290

6 . SRI. MADHU S/O LATE RAJANNA AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS

¶291

7 . SRI. MURALI S/O LATE MUTTHANNA AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS

¶292

R5 TO R7 ARE R/AT NO. 126 13th CROSS, 1 K BLOCK, KETHAMARANAHALLI, RAJAJINAGAR, BENGALURU 560 010

¶293

8 . SRI. JAYARAMA AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS

¶294

9 . SRI. DODDABYANNA AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS

¶295

10 . SRI. CHIKKABYARANNA AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS

¶296

R8 TO R10 ARE ALL RESIDING AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMINILAYA, 11th CROSS, 1st BLOCK, RAJAJINAGARA BENGALURU 560 011

¶297

¶298

11 . SRI. T G NARAYANASWAMY AGED MAJOR S/O GANGANNA R/O THEERATHAPURA VILLAGE, YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK BENGALURU - 560 022

¶299

12 . SHRI. RAJENDRA G S/O LATE C GOVINDARAJU AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/AT 399, 5tH MAIN ROAD, VENKATESHWARA SANITARY KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, SRIRAMPURA MARIYAPPANA PALYA BENGLAURU - 560 021

¶300

13 . SRI. SRINIVASA S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS RESIDING AT MARIYAPPANAPALYA, SRIRAMPURA KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, BENGLAURU - 560 021

¶301

14 . SRI. RAMAKRISHNA S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS RESIDING AT Q-10 MARIYAPPANAPLAYA, SRIRAMPURA POST, KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, BENGALURU - 560 021

¶302

15 . SRI. SADASHIVAIAH AGED MAJOR

¶303

¶304

S/O PRANNA RESIDING AT KARIVOBANAHALLI, YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU - 560 058

¶305

16 . SRI. T RAMEGOWDA AGED MAJOR S/O LATE DASEGOWDA RESIDING AT SHIVAPURA VILLAGE, PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560 058

¶306

17 . SMT. KANNIKAMBA W/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 87 YEARS

¶307

18 . SRI. KRISHNAMURTHY S/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS

¶308

R17 AND R18 ARE R/AT NO. 18 KRISHNA KRUPA SHOE LAND BUILDING Ist FLOOR, NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE, RAJAGOPALANAGARA MAIN ROAD, PEENYA 2ND STAGE, BEGNALURU - 560 058

¶309

19 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI S/O DODDAMUNISWAMYA BOVI MAJOR IN AGE R/AT SUDDAGUNATEPALYA VILLAGE, YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU - 560 022

¶310

¶311

20 . SMT. LAKSHMAMMA W/O LATE K N LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS

¶312

21 . K.L. BABU S/O LATE K N LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS

¶313

22 . SRI. K L SATISH S/O LATE K N LAKSHMAIAH AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS

¶314

R20 TO R22 ARE RESIDING AT NO. 59, 10th A CROSS, WEST OF CORD ROAD, 2ND STAGE MAHALAKSHMPIPURAM, BEGNALURU-560 086

¶315

23 . SRI. K N VENKATESH S/O NANJAPPA MAJOR IN AGE R/O KETHAMARANAHALLI Ist BLOCK, RAJAJINAGARA BENGALURU - 560 010

¶316

24 . SRI. K N CHOWDAPPA S/O NANJAPPA MAJOR IN AGE R/O KETHAMARANAHALLI, Ist BLOCK, RAJAJINAGARA, BENGALURU-560 010

¶317

25 . SRI. R VENUGOPAL REDDY S/O LATE N RAMALINGA REDDY AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS R/AT NO.181, LINK ROAD,

¶318

¶319

MALLESHWARAM, BENGALURU-560 003.

¶320

…RESPONDENTS

¶321

(BY SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE FOR R1, R8, R16)

¶322

THIS RFA.CROB. IS FILED UNDER ORDER 41 RULE 22(1) OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 8.4.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.6045/1989 ON THE FILE OF THE VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION, POSSESSION AND INJUNCTION.

¶323

THESE RFAs AND RFA.CROB HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 27.09.2024, THIS DAY JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER:

¶324

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

¶325

C.A.V. JUDGMENT

¶326

These batch of appeals are by the defendants questioning the judgment and decree rendered in O.S.No.6045/1989, thereby declaring plaintiffs as absolute owners and consequently, the Court has declared that the documents obtained by the defendants, if any, are collusive, fraudulent, colorable and nominal documents and they do not bind on the plaintiffs and consequently, relief of perpetual injunction is granted.

¶327

¶328

For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court.

¶329

The plaintiffs have filed suit seeking relief of declaration and consequential relief of injunction. The subject matter of the suit are agricultural lands bearing Sy.No.45 measuring 11 acres 6 guntas, Sy.No.55 measuring 21 acres 7 guntas, Sy.No.56 measuring 12 acres 12 guntas and Sy.No.57 measuring 7 acres 12 guntas, all situated at Karivobanahalli, Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. Plaintiffs contend that one S.P.Subbaraya Shetty was the original owner who was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties.

¶330

The present plaintiffs claim to be the sons of Late S.P.Subbaraya Shetty. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that late S.P.Subbaraya Shetty has not meddled with the suit lands during his lifetime. Plaintiffs allege that after death of their father S.P.Subbaraya Shetty, the lands were not subjected to cultivation and therefore, they were

¶331

¶332

left fallow. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants are not having any semblance of right and title with the suit schedule properties. Alleging that plaintiffs learnt that defendants have managed and fabricated the documents in their favour and have got their names mutated to the revenue records, suit is filed seeking relief of declaration and injunction.

¶333

Trial Court in absence of contest by the defendants dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to substantiate that they are the legal heirs of late S.P.Subbaraya Shetty. Plaintiffs feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court, preferred appeal. This Court allowed the appeal filed and the matter was remitted back. Even after remand, there was no serious contest by the defendants. While some of the defendants filed written statement and cross-examined the plaintiffs, however, defendants did not chose to lead any rebuttal evidence. Trial Court has decreed the suit as prayed in the plaint.

¶334

¶335

Sri. Pradeep, learned counsel appearing for the defendants reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal filed in RFA.No.343/2022 c/w 342/2022 referring to the documentary evidence placed by the plaintiffs has vehemently argued and contended that plaintiffs maternal uncle under compelling reasons had to sell the properties under registered sale deed dated 17.01.1946. Though this sale deed is not reflected in the RTC placed on record by the plaintiffs, however, the RTCs' at Exs.P-3 to P-8 clearly demonstrates that the property has changed hands by passage of time and third party rights are created. The alienations are clearly reflected in the RTCs' and in column No.9, several purchasers names are mutated to the RTC based on registered sale deed for valuable sale consideration. Therefore, he would contend that the suit in the present form seeking a declaration that the documents obtained by the defendants are fraudulent and concocted is not maintainable. He has further pointed out that plaintiffs

¶336

¶337

on account of they being minor had to return to the maternal uncles village namely Malur and the documents produced at Exs.P-21 to P-29 clearly demonstrates that petitioners have done their schooling at Malur and at no point of time, resided at Bengaluru.

¶338

Referring to Ex.P-32, learned counsel has vehemently argued and contended that plaintiffs mother Sheshamma is married to niece of Kempu Shetty and therefore relations were cordial even upto 1961. Therefore, he would point out that the present suit is filed with malafide intention and by suppressing material facts. The fact that encumbrance certificate is produced from 1937 to 1945 vide Ex.P-42 also clinches the fact that plaintiffs are aware of the sale deed executed by plaintiffs' maternal uncle which was in fact in the interest of the minors. At this juncture, he would also point out that no allegations are made against maternal uncle who have alienated the property as plaintiffs had lost their parents. Referring to

¶339

¶340

the additional evidence, he has tried to impress upon this Court that sale consideration of Rs.1,440/- was kept as Fixed Deposit in State Bank of Mysuru.

¶341

Learned counsel has taken this Court through the admissions elicited in cross-examination of PW.3 regarding plaintiffs acquaintance with the suit schedule property. He has also cited material admissions elicited in cross-examination of PW.3 who has admitted that defendants are in possession and sites are formed. Citing additional evidence produced along with the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27, the counsel appearing for the defendants has tried to place reliance on the registered sale deed dated 17.01.1946. He has also brought to the notice of this Court while referring to the additional evidence that nearly 2000 residential houses are occupied by the residents and they are living there for three decades and their possessory rights is preceded by registered sale deed obtained by them for valuable sale consideration. Referring

¶342

¶343

to the conduct of plaintiffs who have tried to meddle with the property taking advantage of decree in their favour, he has pointed out that inspite of there being status quo order to the entire extent, plaintiff Nos.2 to 5 and 7 despite being not in possession have entered into a registered agreement to sell on 07.02.2022 with one Ramachandra and the properties are agreed to be sold for a whopping sum of Rs.16 Crores and therefore, he has brought to the notice of this Court that contempt in that regard is pending adjudication before this Court.

¶344

Learned counsel has further brought to the notice of this Court that plaintiff No.7 has filed execution and has sought appointment of Commissioner for demolition of structures corresponding to 860 individual site owners and on this ground, he would question the finding recorded by the trial Court in regard to plaintiffs' possession over the suit schedule property. He would vehemently argue and contend that consequential relief of injunction

¶345

¶346

granted by trial Court by recording a finding that plaintiffs have succeeded in substantiating their lawful possession as on the date of filing of the suit stands clearly contradicted in the light of the prayer sought in the execution proceedings which is obviously beyond the decree.

¶347

Learned counsel has further brought to the notice of this Court that plaintiff No.7 has filed an application under Order 26 Rule 9 seeking local inspection to ascertain the extent of vacant land available, extent of residential properties acquired by judgment debtors, extent of industrial establishments acquired by judgment debtors and also mesne profits.

¶348

Referring to these significant details, he has placed reliance on the following judgments:

¶349

1) Asma Lateef vs. Shabbir Ahmad - (2024) 4 SCC 696;

¶350

2) Jagdish Prasad Patel (D) Thr. Lrs. vs. Shivnath - (2019) 6 SCC 82;

¶351

¶352

3) Union of India & Ors. vs. Vasavi Co-Op. Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. - (2014) 2 SCC 269;

¶353

4) Balraj Taneja & Anr. vs. Sunil Madan & Anr. - (1999) 8 SCC 369;

¶354

5) Sri Aralappa vs.Sri Jagannath - ILR 2007 Kar 339;

¶355

6) Jamila Begum (D) Thr. Lrs. vs. Shami Mohd. - (2019) 2

¶356

SCC 727;

¶357

7) Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath - (1994) 1 SCC 1;

¶358

8) Alla Baksh vs. Mohd. Hussain - ILR 1996 Kar 1340;

¶359

9) Pandurang Jivajirao Manglekar vs. The State of Karnataka - ILR 2007 Kar 3602;

¶360

10) Gangappa Yamanappa Chalawadi vs. The State of Karnataka - 2007 SCC Online Kar 392;

¶361

11) Shri Pratap Singh vs. Shiv Ram - (2020) 11 SCC 242.

¶362

Citing the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs., vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and Others¹ , he has contended that plaintiffs are clearly found to be dishonest litigants and having lost their land way back in 1946, have made all efforts to reclaim the properties without questioning the sale deeds. Citing the above said

¶363

1 (1994) 1 SCC 1

¶364

¶365

materials, he would point out that plaintiffs have not come with clean hands and the judgment and decree is obtained by the plaintiffs by playing fraud on the Court. This is a clear case of fraud played by the plaintiffs and therefore, he would request this Court to consider the additional evidence cited.

¶366

Similarly, learned counsel appearing for codefendants have argued in the same vein and have cited the following judgments:

¶367

1) Md. Noorul Hoda vs. Bibi Raifunnisa - (1996) 7 SCC

¶368

767;

¶369

Vishwambhar vs. Laxminarayan - AIR 2001 SCC 2607; 3) S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs., vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and Others - (1994) 1 SCC 1.

¶370

Sri Giri K., learned counsel appearing for defendant in RFA.No.1335/2023 has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

¶371

¶372

Md. Noorul Hoda vs. Bibi Raifunnisa² and also judgment rendered in Vishwambhar vs. Laxminarayan³ . Citing these two judgments, learned counsel would point out that immediately after death of plaintiffs father, the properties were sold in 1946 under registered sale deed dated 17.01.1946. Though plaintiffs were minor and the properties were conveyed to third party, they have neither challenged the said alienation within 12 years of the deed or within three years of attaining majority.

¶373

Learned counsel Sri Ravi H.K., has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs., vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and Others (supra). Placing reliance on the said judgment, he would point out that nondisclosure of relevant material documents with a view to obtain advantage amounts to fraud.

¶374

2 (1996) 7 SCC 767

¶375

3 AIR 2001 SCC 2607

¶376

¶377

Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs, however, while supporting the reasons and findings recorded by the trial Court referring to the title deed obtained by propositus S.P.Subbaraya Shetty, he has argued that plaintiffs father Subbaraya Shetty purchased the suit properties under registered sale deed dated 17.06.1937. He would further point out that Subbaraya Shetty died intestate on 02.11.1944 leaving behind the present plaintiffs who were minors at the relevant point of time. He would contend that defendants started interfering with the plaintiffs possession in 1988 and therefore, plaintiffs have rightly filed a suit seeking declaration that they are the absolute owners and consequential declaration sought to declare the documents set up by defendants as sham, colourable and illegal and consequential relief are sought. Referring to the share certificates vide Exs.P-11 and P-12, learned Senior Counsel has vehemently argued and contended that Subbaraya Shetty and his son

¶378

¶379

Hanumatharaya Shetty were financially sound. To

¶380

substantiate this contention, he has placed reliance on the share certificates evidenced at Exs.P-11 and P-12.

¶381

While emphasizing on the conduct of defendants referring to the records, he would point out that except defendant Nos.5 and 18, none of the contesting defendants have filed written statement. He would point out that even after remand by this Court, the defendants have not chosen to contest the proceedings. He would also point out that plaintiffs sought amendment of the plaint and sought relief of possession. Referring to the averments made in the written statement, he would contend that there is evasive denial of plaint averments. He has further submitted that none of the defendants have filed written statement from 1989 till 2023 except defendant Nos.5 and 18. There is a serious contest to the applications filed by the defendants in RFA.Nos.342/2022, 343/2022 and 14/2023. He has contended that application seeking leave to file written

¶382

¶383

statement is sought virtually after 35 years. Therefore, he would persuade this Court to dismiss these applications seeking filing of written statement and also application seeking production of documents. Reliance is placed on the judgment rendered in the case of Shivshankara and Another vs. H.P.Vedavyasa Char⁴ .

¶384

While questioning the alienation made by the plaintiffs maternal uncle, learned Senior Counsel has questioned the validity of alienations under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 and also Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Referring to these two Acts, he would contend that permission to alienate minors properties are mandatory irrespective of natural guardian or defacto guardian. He would point out that nobody can assume the role of guardianship in absence of permission by the Court. He would further contend that no reasons are forthcoming from the alienation made by the maternal uncle and

¶385

4 2023 SCC Online SC 358

¶386

¶387

therefore, he contends that the maternal uncle's alienations of suit schedule properties when plaintiffs were found to be minors also reflects that the guardian did not act prudently. Reliance is also placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tadavarti Bapayya and Four Others vs. Myneni Pundarikakshayya⁵ . Citing the proviso to Section 8 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, he would emphasize that it is only legal guardian to alienate the minors immovable property subject to condition that the alienations are in the interest of the minor.

¶388

While countering the defendants arguments on Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, learned Senior Counsel would contend that Section 31 has no application to the present case on hand. Referring to the words 'Section 31 of Specific Relief Act', he would point out that there is no mandate that relief of declaration as contemplated under

¶389

5 1949 SCC FC 2

¶390

¶391

Section 31 needs to be asked. Referring to the words made, he would contend that it is not imperative in every cases to seek a declaration questioning the instrument.

¶392

While countering the defendants plea of limitation, he would contend that suit filed seeking relief of possession is based on title and the relief of possession sought by way of amendment is well within time. While referring to Article 44 and 59 of Limitation Act, he would contend that the 1946 sale deed was never made known to any party to the suit till 2022 and therefore, plea of limitation is not available to defendants. He would also point out that Section 3 of Limitation Act is not applicable to the present case on hand. While questioning the conduct of defendants, learned Senior Counsel would point out that adverse inference has to be drawn against the defendants who have not produced these documents. Referring to the principles of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, it is vehemently argued and contended that appellants in

¶393

¶394

RFA.No.343/2022 has purchased a portion of the suit schedule property from defendant No.7(a) and therefore, his alienations are hit by principles of lis pendens .

¶395

Learned Senior Counsel referring to the detailed synopsis has also contested the application filed by defendants seeking production of additional evidence. Reliance is placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shivshankar vs. H.P.Vedavyasa Char (supra) . Learned Senior Counsel has seriously objected the prayer of the defendants seeking remand to enable the defendants to contest the suit. He has also serious objections that additional evidence cannot be looked into when exceptional circumstances provide under Section 107(1)(d) read with Rule 27 of Order 41 are not made out in the present case on hand. He would contend that the defendants cannot be allowed to fill the lacuna at this juncture and if entertained, the same would lead to miscarriage of justice. He has further argued and

¶396

¶397

contended that Appellate Court should not permit a party to

¶398

fill up the lacuna who is found to be unsuccessful before the trial Court.

¶399

To buttress his arguments, learned Senior

¶400

Counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments:

¶401

1) Tadavarti Bapayya and Four Others vs. Myneni Pundarikakshayya - 1949 SCC FC;

¶402

2) Palaniyappa Goundan vs. Nallappa Goundan - (1950) SCC Mad 103;

¶403

3) G. Annamalai Pillai vs. District Revenue Officer - (1993) 2 SCC 402;

¶404

4) Panni Lal vs. Rajindar Singh - (1993) 4 SCC 38;

¶405

5) Sirajudheen vs. Zeenath and Others - (2023) SCC OnLine SC 196;

¶406

6) Andiswamychettiar vs. Subburaj Chettiar - (2015) 17 SCC 713;

¶407

7) K.R. Mohan Reddy vs. Net Work INC - (2007) 14 SCC

¶408

257;

¶409

8) Eastern Coal Fields Limited vs. Rabindra Kumar Bharti - (2022) 12 SCC 390;

¶410

9) Saurav Jain and Another vs. A.B.P Design and Another

¶411

2021 SCC OnLine SC 552;

¶412

10) Banarsi and Others vs. Ram Pal - (2003) 9 SCC 606;

¶413

¶414

11) Sirajudheen vs. Zeenath and Others - 2023 SCC OnLine SC 196;

¶415

12) Andiswamychettiar vs. Subburaj Chettiar - (2015) 17 SCC 713;

¶416

13) Shivshankara and Another vs. H.P. Vedavyasa Char - (2023) SCC OnLine SC 358;

¶417

14) G.T. Girish vs. Y. Subbaraju - (2022) 12 SCC 321;

¶418

15) S.K. Golam Lalchand vs. Nandu Lal Shaw - (2024) SCC OnLine SC 2456;

¶419

16) R. Dhanasundari vs. Umakanth and Others - (2020) 14 SCC 1;

¶420

15) Sayeda Akhtar vs. Abdul Ahad - (2003) 7 SCC 52;

¶421

16) Nedunuri Kameswaramma vs. Sampati Subba Rao - 1962 SCC OnLine SC 41;

¶422

17) Kunju Kesavan vs. M.M. Philip - (1963) SCC OnLine SC 136 Para 17;

¶423

Heard learned counsel for the defendants and learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs. This Court has independently examined the pleadings and oral and documentary evidence let in by the plaintiffs. This Court has also given anxious consideration to the written

¶424

¶425

statement filed by defendant Nos.5(a), 5(c) and 18. The following points would arise for consideration:

¶426

1) Whether the finding of the trial Court that the documents obtained by the defendants are collusive, fraudulent, colourable and nominal documents is perverse, palpably erroneous and contrary to the requirement of Order 6 Rule 2 which mandates that pleading shall contain a concise format of all material facts on which plaintiff relies for his claim and also falls short of the mandate contemplated under Rule 4 of Order 6 wherein in a suit based on fraud, allegation of fraud must be clear, definite and specific before plaintiff is entitled to succeed on the basis of fraud alleged in the plaint?

¶427

2) Whether the trial Court erred in declaring the document obtained by the defendants as collusive, fraudulent, colourable and nominal documents in absence of there being a specific challenge to the sale deeds obtained by the defendants as mandated under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act?

¶428

3) Whether the trial Court erred in granting perpetual injunction without examining the

¶429

¶430

documents relied by the plaintiff which not only reveals that the petition lands have changed hands but third party rights are created and the RTC's on which plaintiff is placing reliance also prima facie demonstrates that third parties are in possession of the suit lands?

¶431

4) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to seek recovery of possession?

¶432

5) Whether additional evidence produced by the defendants before this Court can be looked into?

¶433

6) Whether the suit is ex-facie barred under Section 3 of the Limitation Act?

¶434

Findings on point Nos.1 and 2:

¶435

Before this Court delves into asserting as to whether plaintiffs claim is bonafide, this Court deems it necessary to examine the pleadings more particularly at paras 5 and 6 which reads as under:

¶436

"5. After the death of late S.P.Subbaraya Setty, the plaintiffs were cultivating the suit schedule properties for few years and for the past several

¶437

¶438

years, the suit schedule lands have been left follow due to the circumstances which prevented the plaintiff from cultivating the suit schedule lands. The Defendants have not manner of right, title or interest over the suit schedule properties tried to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs learn that the defendants have managed to fabricate documents in their favour and have managed to get their names entered in the revenue records and on the strength of the concocted spurious documents, the defendants have been threatening and trying to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs with the intervention and advice of the local elder people tried to settle the matter by a suitably advising the defendants to desist their illegal acts. But it was not fruitful. Hence, the suit.

¶439

6. The plaintiffs submit that the documents fabricated by the defendants do not in right, title and interest any way affect the of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule properties. The plaintiffs are also taking necessary action for correction of the revenue records."

¶440

¶441

The cause of action is also crucial in the case on hand since from the pleadings and the evidence recorded during trial points out that plaintiffs on account of death of their father were compelled to leave Bengaluru City and started residing with their maternal uncle at Malur. The cause of action which is at para 8 of the plaint would be relevant and the same is culled out which reads as under:

¶442

"8. The cause of action for the suit arose in September, 1988, when the Defendant tried to interfere with the plaintiffs possession of the suit schedule properties and subsequently when the defendants failed to mend their illegal act even after the advice of the elders and in the third week of October 1989, when the defendants again tried to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs at Karihobanahalli Bangalore North Taluk, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. No other suit has been filed on the same cause of action before this Hon'ble Court or before any other Court earlier."

¶443

¶444

Based on the pleadings where a foundation is laid indicating that defendants have obtained documents fraudulently, the prayer sought in the plaint are extracted which reads as under:

¶445

"(a) declaring that the documents are the absolute owners of the suit schedule properties;

¶446

(b) declaring that the documents that the defendants have obtained are all collusive, fraudulent, colorable and nominal documents and they do not affect the rights, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule properties; and do not where bind the right and do not in any way bind the rights title and interest of the plaintiffs over the suit schedule properties.

¶447

(c) restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs, by granting a decree for permanent injunction against the defendants; and

¶448

¶449

(cc) in the alternative, direct the defendants handed over the possession of the portion of schedule properties if any or more possession is event of the court coming to the conclusion that

¶450

¶451

some portion are in possession of few of the defendants herein.

¶452

(d) for costs and such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity."

¶453

On bare perusal of paras 5 and 6 of the pleadings of the plaint which are culled out supra, the relief sought by the plaintiffs in the instant suit is clearly on the ground of fraud. Time and again, the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court have consistently held that fraud is a material fact and must be specifically pleaded. Though in the above said paragraphs, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants have fabricated the documents and based on these fabricated documents are asserting title, but these fabricated documents will not affect plaintiffs' right, title and interest over the suit schedule properties.

¶454

There is a thin line distinction between omission of material facts and omission to give full particulars.

¶455

¶456

Though plaintiffs refer to the documents on which defendants are asserting right and title, there is absolutely no narration and no particulars are furnished in the plaint. That facts which establish pleas must be stated specifically in the plaint. The words "material facts" means all facts upon which the plaintiffs' cause of auction on which plaintiffs' case depends has to be necessarily pleaded. In the case on hand, the material facts are consciously and deliberately omitted. Further, plaintiffs are also found to be guilty for not furnishing full particulars. In absence of disclosure of material facts, this Court is called upon to examine as to whether plaintiffs are guilty of omitting said material facts. In absence of any foundation in the pleading relating to a particular plea, this Court is called upon to decide whether plaintiff can be permitted to raise a plea on fraud and also plead that the documents obtained by the defendants are fabricated and are sham documents.

¶457

¶458

The provisions of Rules 2 and 4 of Order 6 are mandatory. The statement of material facts must appear in the pleading and the particulars must be full so as to enable the opposite party to know the case he is required to meet. On reading the entire plaint and more particularly the culled out paragraphs, there is clear absence of material facts and particulars which ought to have been raised by the plaintiffs while instituting the suit.

¶459

The pleadings at para 5 and 6 which are culled out supra also do not meet the mandate of Rule 4 of Order 6. In a suit alleging fraud, the allegation of fraud must be clear, definite and specific. Time and again, the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court have consistently held that general allegations of fraud, however, strong the words in which they are stated may be, if unaccompanied by particulars are insufficient to amount to an averment of fraud, but the Court is bound to take notice.

¶460

¶461

To address the issue of omission of material

¶462

facts and failure to provide full particulars, it is crucial to adhere to the well-established principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Apex Court has consistently held that all material facts, which form the foundation of the plaintiff's cause of action, must be specifically pleaded in the plaint. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable

¶463

v. Assistant Charity Commissioner⁶ , the Supreme Court emphasized that "material facts" are those essential facts that constitute the right to seek relief. The omission of such facts would render the plaint legally defective, and a mere reference to documents without narrating the factual background does not suffice.

¶464

Further, as held in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin⁷ (2012) 8 SCC 148, the Court stated that Rule 2 of Order 6 CPC mandates that the pleadings must contain material facts, and Rule 4 further imposes an obligation to

¶465

6 (2004) 3 SCC 137

¶466

7 (2012) 8 SCC 148

¶467

¶468

specifically plead particulars in cases involving allegations of fraud. In fraud cases, the allegations must not be vague or general. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bishundeo Narain

¶469

v. Seogeni Rai⁸ , categorically held that "general allegations, however strong, cannot amount to proof of fraud." The Court further reiterated that specific and definite particulars are essential for a claim of fraud, without which the opposite party would be unable to adequately respond.

¶470

In the present case, as is evident from the plaint, there is a clear absence of such material facts and particulars. The omission appears deliberate and conscious, thus falling short of the mandatory requirements under Rules 2 and 4 of Order 6 CPC.

¶471

In the matter concerning the omission of material facts and failure to provide full particulars in the pleadings, the jurisprudence laid down by the Hon'ble 8 AIR 1951 SC 280

¶472

¶473

Supreme Court of India is well-settled. Material facts are the foundational elements of a cause of action, and their omission can fundamentally undermine the integrity of the plaint. As emphasized in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner (supra) , "material facts" are not merely incidental but are essential to establish the right of the plaintiff to claim relief. The Court in this judgment underscored that these facts must be explicitly stated in the plaint, and failure to do so renders the plaint liable to challenge for not disclosing a cause of action.

¶474

In the present case, while the plaintiffs have referred to certain documents on which the defendants are asserting their right and title, there is a conspicuous absence of any narrative that explains the factual circumstances surrounding those documents. The mere reference to documents without disclosing the essential facts underpinning the plaintiffs' case is insufficient to meet the legal standard required by law. The Hon'ble Supreme

¶475

¶476

Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal⁹ clarified that a plaint that fails to disclose material facts is not maintainable. The requirement is to present the full factual scenario so that the defendants can fully understand the case they are required to meet.

¶477

Moreover, the provisions of Order 6 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, mandate that the statement of facts in a pleading must include all material facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action. This provision ensures that the defendant is not caught by surprise and is aware of the full extent of the allegations. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin¹⁰ further elaborated on the importance of this rule, holding that the omission of material facts or failure to provide sufficient particulars can severely prejudice the opposite party and is fatal to the plaint.

¶478

9 (1977) 4 SCC 467

¶479

10 (2012) 8 SCC 148

¶480

¶481

Now let me examine the prayer sought in the plaint which is culled out supra. The plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that they are the absolute owners of the suit schedule properties and they have succeeded by way of inheritance after the death of their father S.P.Subbaraya Setty. The prayer (b) is not only misconceived but this is a clear case of deliberate mischief by the plaintiffs. This Court needs to examine as to whether such a declaration can be sought. The declaration sought at prayer (b) is as vague as it could be.

¶482

On reading of the prayer at (b) coupled with the documentary evidence placed by plaintiffs themselves, clearly gives an indication that plaintiffs are in fact aware of all the transactions. Plaintiffs' father purchased this suit land under registered sale deed dated 17.06.1937. Plaintiffs have filed the present suit on 05.11.1989. Ex.P-3 is the RTC pertaining to Sy.No.45. In column No.9 of RTC, the following names viz., S.P.Subbaraya Shetty, C.Srinivas,

¶483

¶484

C.Ramakrishna, Lakshmaiah S/o Nanjappa, K.N.Chowdappa S/o Nanjappa and Munirathna S/o Nanjappa are reflected. The mutation is also reflected in Exs.P-3 to P-8. In column No.12(2), possession of aforesaid owners is also reflected. This Court deems it fit to prepare a table of Exs.P-3 to P-8 for better understanding and the same reads as under:

¶485

Exhibits	Sy.No.	M.R.No.	Purchasers names
Ex.P-3	Sy.No.45	M.R.No.32/6263 M.R.No.5013/81- 82 M.R.No.18/70-71 R.R.No.667 R.R.No.643 M.R.No.21/5859	S.P.Subbaraya Sheety, C.Srinivas, C.Ramakrishna, Lakshmaiah S/o Nanjappa, K.N.Chowdappa S/o Nanjappa, Lakshmaiah S/o Nanjappa, Munirathna W/o Nanjappa
Ex.P-4	Sy.No.45	M.R.No.16/86-87 MPR.No.200/86- 87	Lakshmaiah S/o Dodda Nanjappa
Ex.P-5	Sy.No.45	M.R.No.16/86-87 MPR.No.200/86- 87	K.N.Chowdappa S/o Dodda Nanjappa
Ex.P-6	Sy.No.45	M.R.No.8/68-89 M.R.No.10/68 2HC 1/83-84 M.R.No.11/79-80	S.P.Subbaraya Shetty, K.M.Seethappa, Munishama, Chennayya Gittappa, Nagarathnamma, Yellamma, Sadashivaiah, Govidaraju S/o Chinnappanna Pai, Magalayya
Ex.P-7	Sy.No.45	M.R.No.11/79-80	S.P.Subbaraya Shetty, K.M.Seethappa, Lakshmaiah, Muniyabhovi Chikkamariswami, Gurura Bhovi, Muswa Bhovi, Siddaramaiah S/o Byrappa, C.Govindappa S/o Chinnappanna Malai Masali, C.Srinivas Ramakrishna

¶486

¶487

Ex.P-8	Sy.No.45	M.R.No.5/79-80	S.P.Subbaraya Shetty, L.R.Shettaru,
			Chikkasiddaramaiah, Peddakka
			D/o Siddaramaiah, D.Siddappa

¶488

Now coming to Exs.P-21 to P-29, Ex.P-21 is the school leaving certificate of plaintiff No.6/Narayana Shetty. The said document clearly reveals that plaintiff No.6 who is the son of S.P.Subbaraya Shetty has done his schooling at Bangarapete/Malur. Ex.P-22 is the character certificate issued by the Block Development Officer, Malur. Therefore, on examining these documents, it can be inferred that plaintiffs having lost their father, left Bengaluru City and they started residing with their maternal uncle till 1980.

¶489

Plaintiffs have produced encumbrance certificate which is marked at Ex.P-42. This document clearly reveals the conduct of plaintiffs. They have deliberately secured encumbrance certificate from 01.04.1937 to 31.03.1945. While in the plaint, they have specifically pleaded that defendants have created sham documents. The RTCs'

¶490

¶491

which are produced and marked at Exs.P-3 to P-8 also disclose several alienations. This RTC clearly discloses the third party rights created post 1946. There is no whisper in the plaint relating to these transactions. Though plaintiffs having produced these RTCs' have to be presumed that they had clear knowledge of these transactions.

¶492

The plaintiffs' conduct in this case has been far from satisfactory. Their selective production of documents, deliberate omission of material facts, and failure to challenge alienations raise serious questions about their bona fides. The plaint is clearly defective, both procedurally and substantively. The suppression of material facts, coupled with the time-barred nature of the suit and the plaintiffs' acquiescence to third-party rights, render the suit untenable. Therefore, in light of the above provisions and judgments, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for failure to disclose a cause of action and being barred by limitation.

¶493

¶494

The prayer sought by the plaintiffs, declaring that the documents obtained by the defendants are collusive, fraudulent, and nominal, without specifically challenging the sales themselves on the ground of fraud, is inherently defective. This type of pleading amounts to a clear attempt to bypass the requirement of directly contesting the validity of the sales, thereby causing mischief and creating ambiguity in the adjudication process. It is well established that when the plaintiffs acknowledge the formation of a layout and sale of portions of the suit property during the trial, they cannot simultaneously seek to nullify these transactions without challenging the sales directly. In Prem Singh v. Birbal¹¹ , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that any plea seeking to invalidate a transaction on the ground of fraud must specifically challenge the impugned transaction and provide clear and detailed particulars of the fraud alleged. General and vague

¶495

11 (2006) 5 SCC 353

¶496

¶497

allegations, as seen in the present case, are insufficient and do not amount to a valid cause of action. Moreover, the failure to explicitly challenge the alienations or sales demonstrates bad faith and an intention to misuse the process of law, which renders the prayer legally unsustainable. The Court, in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (supra) , emphasized that a party must approach the Court with clean hands, and any suppression or mischief intended to mislead the Court would disentitle the plaintiffs from obtaining any relief. In this context, the prayer in its current form is defective, as it fails to meet the legal requirements for setting aside transactions based on fraud.

¶498

The plaintiffs' prayer to declare that the documents obtained by the defendants are collusive, fraudulent, and nominal, without directly challenging the sales themselves, is legally defective and strategically flawed. The plaintiffs have admitted during the trial that a

¶499

¶500

layout was formed over portions of the suit land and that sales had occurred. Despite these admissions, they have sought a declaration that these documents do not affect their rights, title, and interest over the suit schedule properties. However, this approach is nothing more than an attempt to nullify the sales indirectly, without following the proper legal procedure for challenging such transactions.

¶501

In cases where fraud is alleged, the law is clear: the specific transactions in question must be directly challenged, and detailed particulars of the alleged fraud must be pleaded. Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) mandates that when fraud is alleged, the party making the claim must provide precise details about the fraud, including the circumstances under which it occurred. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal (supra) unequivocally held that general allegations of fraud, no matter how strongly they are worded, cannot be the basis for invalidating a transaction unless those

¶502

¶503

allegations are substantiated with specific and clear particulars. The prayer made by the plaintiffs in the present case is a general assertion of fraud without sufficient specifics or a direct challenge to the transactions themselves, which makes the claim legally unsustainable.

¶504

Furthermore, by admitting that sales and layout formations had taken place, the plaintiffs are estopped from indirectly challenging these transactions through a vague prayer. The doctrine of estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position contradictory to one it has already accepted during the course of legal proceedings. In the case of Krishna Mohan Kul alias Nani Charan Kul v. Pratima Maity¹² , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that a plaintiff cannot approbate and reprobate—meaning, they cannot admit to certain facts and then later deny or attempt to nullify the legal effects of those same facts without directly challenging the transactions in a proper manner.

¶505

12 (2004) 9 SCC 468

¶506

¶507

Moreover, the plaintiffs’ prayer appears to be a calculated mischief designed to nullify the sales without filing a proper challenge against them. Such a course of action is impermissible, as it circumvents the legal process required to contest the alienations of property. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (supra) , held that a litigant must come to Court with clean hands, and any attempt to suppress material facts or manipulate the legal process to achieve an outcome without following the proper legal procedures is tantamount to fraud on the Court. In this case, by failing to challenge the sales explicitly and instead seeking a general declaration to invalidate them, the plaintiffs have adopted a disingenuous approach, which the Courts have consistently disapproved.

¶508

The defective nature of the prayer also undermines the rights of third-party purchasers who may have bought portions of the suit land in good faith. By not

¶509

¶510

challenging these sales directly on the grounds of fraud or otherwise, the plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that would affect the legal rights of these third parties without giving them a fair opportunity to defend their titles. The Courts have consistently held that when third-party rights are involved, particularly in cases where purchasers have acted in good faith and have taken possession of the property, any challenge to the sale must be specific, timely, and supported by cogent evidence of fraud or illegality. In Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand¹³ , the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down that a suit seeking to set aside a sale transaction affecting third-party rights must clearly articulate the grounds for such a challenge and give notice to the affected parties, failing which the suit would be deficient.

¶511

The plaintiffs' conduct, therefore, raises serious concerns about their bona fides. By selectively admitting

¶512

13 (1954) SCR 360

¶513

¶514

certain facts while attempting to nullify the legal consequences of those facts through an indirect and defective prayer, the plaintiffs are abusing the judicial process. Their failure to directly challenge the sales and to provide specific particulars of fraud, coupled with the indirect approach taken in the prayer, suggests an intention to manipulate the outcome of the case without following the due process of law. The Courts have repeatedly condemned such conduct, as seen in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal¹⁴ , where the Supreme Court held that Courts must guard against allowing frivolous or vexatious suits that are designed to harass or mislead the parties or the Court itself.

¶515

In the light of these significant details, which is evidenced from Exs.P-3 to P-8 and Exs.P-21 to P-29, let me examine the evidence of plaintiffs in the case on hand.

¶516

14 (1977) 4 SCC 467

¶517

¶518

Cross-examination of PW.3 would be relevant. The relevant

¶519

portion is culled out which reads as under:

¶520

" 23. The Subbarayashetty has purchased the suit schedule properties on 17.06.1937 from Kumarashastry (Ex.P.1). The original sale deed Ex.P.1 is missed but it is not handed over to the defendants. I have not produced Encumbrance certificates from the year 1939 to 1989 or till this date. I have produced the RTCs from the year 1935 to 1989 and also some RTC extracts pertaining to subsequent years. It is right to suggest that, I have not produced RTC extracts in continuous from 1935 to till the date of filing of this suit and till this date and so also Encumbrance certificates. It is not right to suggest that, the plaintiffs are not sons and grandchildren of Subbarayashetty. It is not right to suggest that, I have not produced family tree.

¶521

24. Subbarayashetty was having 2 sons namely Hanumantharayashetty, P.S.Narayana shetty and 1 daughter by name Shanthamma. It is right to suggest that, said the Shanthamma is not party to the case. Witness volunteers she is died prior to filing of this suit. I have not produced death certificate of Shanthamma d/o Subbarayashetty but, I have produced death certificate of Subbarayashetty and Hanumantharayashetty. It is not right to suggest that, I have not produced any document in proof that the plaintiffs are LRs of Subbarayashetty.

¶522

¶523

25. The documents in respect of schedule property are created in the names of all the defendants i.e., Pani, Khatha & sale deeds. I have taken certified copies of RTC extracts created by the defendants. I have not obtained certified copies of sale deeds. I have not taken any action by challenging the created RTC extracts etc., and also of mutations.

¶524

26. It is not right to suggest that, the plaintiffs No.1 to 7 are not joint family members and LRs of Subbarayashetty. The suit properties are not sold by the Subbarayashetty or his children or his grandchildren. The defendants are formed layout illegally and by force and in possession of the suit properties. I don't know whether they have sold the sites to the respective purchasers. The constructions on some of the sites are made. I did not obtained created sale deeds and Khathas and I have not challenged the same. On asking the purchasers they told that we have records you can file a case. I don't know whether said purchasers have taken phone connections, electricity connections, water connections and drainage.

¶525

27. I have visited the suit properties 8 to 10 days back. I know what are all the things are there in the suit properties.

¶526

28. I don't know how many sale deeds are executive in respect of entire schedule properties (51 acres 37 guntas).

¶527

¶528

I don't know the amount of considerations paid by respective purchasers."

¶529

Para 26 which is culled out supra clearly clinches the factual matrix on the ground. Plaintiffs have admitted in unequivocal terms that defendants have illegally formed a layout by force and coercion and that they are in possession of the suit schedule properties. PW.3 has further acknowledged and admitted in unequivocal terms that residential houses are constructed on the sites formed in the layout. PW.3 further admits that he has not obtained the sale deeds and kathas and there is no challenge. He has also admitted in unequivocal terms at para 25 of the cross-examination that no steps are taken to change the katha in favour of defendants.

¶530

In the light of several admissions elicited in cross-examination of plaintiffs, this Court has to examine as to whether prayer (b) in the present form can be

¶531

¶532

entertained in the context of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. On reading relief of declaration sought at prayer (b), the plaintiffs are alleging that defendants have obtained forged documents. It is trite law that forged documents so long as the forgery has not been judicially determined clearly creates a cloud over the plaintiffs title and therefore, plaintiffs who are intending to impeach these sale deeds obtained by the defendants ought to have atleast sought relief of declaration furnishing the details of the sale deeds and then further ought to have claimed and declared that these sale deeds are forged one. Once plaintiffs pleads that the documents obtained by defendants are fraudulent and forged, the burden is on the plaintiffs to substantiate the same by producing cogent and clinching evidence. A sham transaction can be treated as voidable and if a party is not signatory to the said document, the plaintiffs need not seek cancellation of the sale deeds but is bound to seek a declaration that these sale deeds are not

¶533

¶534

binding on the relief of declaration in that regard aimed at avoiding a vexatious or injuries used by the defendants against the plaintiffs of an instrument which is voidable. Said sale deeds remaining with documents will definitely cast a cloud upon title of plaintiffs and the plaintiffs will be subjected to litigation. Therefore, the test is reasonable apprehension of serious injury and whether such injury exists depends upon the circumstances of a particular case.

¶535

In the case on hand, it is not a mere speculation or vague complication that would arise in future. Exs.P-3 to P-8 clearly demonstrates that third party rights are created and plaintiffs admittedly is not found to be in possession of the suit properties. Interestingly, on reading the relief of declaration at prayer (b), the plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that they are the absolute owners of the suit schedule property. By seeking such a declaration, plaintiffs are just seeking declaration of their previous rights which is obviously not in dispute.

¶536

¶537

In the case on hand, the plaintiffs have consciously not sought relief of declaration questioning the transactions of the defendants and plaintiffs also are not found to be in possession. Same is evidenced from the cross appeal filed by the plaintiffs in RFA.Crob.No.21/2024. Though relief of cancellation may not arise for consideration in the case on hand as plaintiffs have consciously suppressed all material facts as to who meddled with the property in 1946, they are definitely affected by the sale transaction and therefore, plaintiffs cannot ignore these sale deeds and therefore, they were required to file suit seeking substantial relief which were available to them. Plaintiffs have filed the present suit without seeking any declaration challenging the sale deeds as either void or voidable.

¶538

This Court has also noticed that though a declaration is sought that sale deeds obtained by defendants are forged or fictitious, these documents are not

¶539

¶540

referred to and no declaration is sought by furnishing details of the sale deeds obtained by the defendants. Unless the sale deeds are declared to be void or voidable on the ground that these were obtained by fraud, the plaintiffs could not have maintained the suit in the present form.

¶541

The plaintiffs who assert that the properties were originally owned by their father and have purchased the property in 1936 have deliberately furnished encumbrance only till 1946, while suit is filed in 1990. The plaintiffs who assert that they have got interest in the suit properties and reasonably apprehend that defendants have set up an adverse title based on registered sale deeds, ought to have sought relief of declaration. These sale deeds if left outstanding, they will definitely affect and prejudice plaintiffs right. Unless the sale deeds are subjected to adjudication and either declaration is void or voidable, the present suit seeking declaration that plaintiffs are absolute owners of the suit schedule properties will not suffice.

¶542

¶543

Therefore, unless the sale deeds are declared as voidable as distinguished from void, the plaintiffs who have alternatively sought for possession of the property are not entitled to seek recovery of possession unless these sale deeds are declared to be fraudulent documents. The plaintiffs have miserably failed to substantiate the date of discovery of fraud. Though the burden of proving that plaintiffs had the knowledge of these transactions is always on the defendants, the facts of these case are on a different footing. Having examined Exs.P-3 to P-8, coupled with admissions elicited in cross-examination of PW.3 who has acknowledged and admitted that some portion of the land is converted, sites are formed and they are sold to various persons, it is clearly evident that plaintiffs had the knowledge about the sale transactions. Therefore, in the case on hand, the burden was never on the defendants.

¶544

The right to seek declaration that these sale deeds are not binding on plaintiffs is a right to a

¶545

¶546

consequential relief sufficient to sustain a declaratory decree. But when such a relief is granted in pursuance of that right, it is the substantive relief independent of declaration. Even if plaintiffs were to assert that they were not parties to the sale deeds, but they have right in the property is threatened in terms of sale deeds obtained by third parties, he has to seek a declaration that these instruments are not binding on them. Therefore, when an instrument is not binding upon the plaintiff and he seeks to establish his title over the property, which is the subject matter of instrument, he cannot do so without having that deed declared to be not binding. Either plaintiffs must get it cancelled or seek a declaration that it is not binding on them before they succeed to seek declaration of their title over the properties covered under the instrument.

¶547

It is bit concerning that plaintiffs have consciously sought a declaration seeking to declare that these sale deeds are invalid and not binding on them.

¶548

¶549

Therefore, the contention of plaintiffs that Section 31 does not obligate plaintiffs to seek cancellation of sale deeds is misconceived and therefore, cannot be acceded to.

¶550

On over all assessment of the oral and documentary evidence, this Court is of the view that the suit in the present form is not at all maintainable. To enable the order of declaration, plaintiffs have to establish as to how they are entitled to a declaration of a right to a property. They have to also substantiate and demonstrate the infringement i.e., defendants denying their title over the property in question and then a declaration i.e., declaration sought indicating that plaintiffs are entitled to such legal character or right and then consequential relief as contemplated under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

¶551

Section 31 clearly contemplates that any person against whom a written instrument is void and voidable and has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument if left

¶552

¶553

outstanding may cause him serious injury has to file a suit and seek a declaration and seek adjudication that the document is void or voidable as the case may be.

¶554

Relief as to cancellation of instrument is founded upon administration of protective justice for fear that instrument may be vexatiously or injuriously used by defendant against plaintiff. There is a difference between the suit for cancellation of instrument and one for declaration that instrument is not binding on the plaintiff. When a plaintiff seeks to establish his title in himself and cannot establish that title without removing the said disputed document, provided he is a party to such document, plaintiff has to seek cancellation of the said document. But when he is seeking to establish title and finds himself threatened by a registered document and since he is not a party to the said document, though he may not be in a position to get that document cancelled, his

¶555

¶556

proper remedy is to seek a declaration that such a document is invalid and not binding on him.

¶557

Section 31 refers to both void and voidable documents. It provides for discretionary relief. A person who is not a party to the document is required to ask for a declaration so as to see it does not affect his property rights.

¶558

Principle that solemnly executed and registered deed must stand until set aside by a competent Court is squarely applicable to the present case on hand. The relevant cross-examination and the documents produced by the plaintiffs themselves clearly gives an impression that plaintiffs are clearly aware of all the transactions. The present suit seeking a declaration that they are the absolute owners is not maintainable as there is no specific prayer to declare the sale deeds obtained by the defendants as null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs.

¶559

¶560

In the light of discussion made supra, point

¶561

Nos.1 and 2 formulated by this Court are answered in the affirmative .

¶562

Findings on Point Nos.3 and 4:

¶563

In the present case, the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction, as they have failed to establish their possession of the suit property. An injunction, being an equitable remedy, requires the plaintiffs to demonstrate not only a prima facie case but also possession of the property. The exhibits relied upon by the plaintiffs, such as Ex.P-3 to Ex.P-8, clearly show that multiple sale transactions have taken place, and third-party rights have been created over the property. Individuals such as S.P. Subbaraya Shetty, C. Srinivas, K.N. Chowdappa, and others have been involved in these transactions, and several revenue records, including M.R. Nos. 32/6263, 16/86-87, 18/70-71, and others, further confirm the transfers of interest in the

¶564

¶565

property. In the light of this evidence, the plaintiffs are clearly not in possession.

¶566

The trial court, in failing to critically examine these documents, has overlooked the creation of third-party rights, which is a significant factor in determining the plaintiffs’ entitlement to an injunction. As held by the Supreme Court in Rame Gowda vs. M. Varadappa Naidu¹⁵ , a plaintiff seeking an injunction must prove not only their title but also possession. Since the plaintiffs are not in possession of the suit property, they are not entitled to the equitable relief of an injunction. Furthermore, the mere fact of owning the title does not automatically entitle the plaintiffs to an injunction, especially when the property has passed into the hands of bona fide purchasers.

¶567

Additionally, the plaintiffs’ alternate relief of possession after the remand by this Court cannot be considered, as they have failed to challenge the sale deeds

¶568

15 AIR 2004 SC 4609

¶569

¶570

in the manner known to law. The exhibits show that several sale deeds have been executed, transferring rights to third parties. Under the law, if a plaintiff wishes to seek possession in a scenario where there are subsequent purchasers, they must challenge the validity of those sale deeds through appropriate legal proceedings, such as seeking cancellation or declaration of the sale deeds as void. In this case, the plaintiffs have not undertaken such a challenge. Without setting aside the sale deeds, the plaintiffs cannot claim possession, as the third-party purchasers would have acquired valid legal rights through those transactions.

¶571

This principle was reinforced in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy¹⁶ , where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a person who has been dispossessed and seeks recovery of possession must challenge the transfer deeds or other instruments that have

¶572

16 AIR 2008 SC 2033

¶573

¶574

affected their title or possession. The failure to challenge the sale deeds in a legally recognized manner, such as through a suit for cancellation, bars the plaintiffs from claiming possession. Since they have neither challenged these deeds nor proven that the purchasers are not bona fide, their alternate relief of possession cannot be granted.

¶575

Therefore, based on the lack of possession, the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction, and their alternate relief of possession, after remand, also fails due to their failure to challenge the sale deeds in accordance with the law. Without addressing the legal transfers of title through valid sale deeds, the plaintiffs' claim for possession is legally unsustainable.

¶576

In the present case, it is evident from the exhibits relied upon by the plaintiffs themselves that they are not in possession of the suit property. The trial court has erred in failing to properly scrutinize the documents,

¶577

¶578

which clearly indicate the creation of third-party rights. For instance, the documents marked as Ex.P-3 to Ex.P-8, including M.R. Nos. 32/6263, 16/86-87, and others, reveal multiple transactions involving various individuals such as S.P. Subbaraya Shetty, C. Srinivas, K.N. Chowdappa, Lakshmaiah, and others, demonstrating the transfer of interests over the suit property. The trial court's oversight in neglecting to assess these records has resulted in an incomplete and flawed decision-making process. Furthermore, the fact that close to 450 appeals have been filed by subsequent purchasers underscores the gravity of third-party claims over the property, which should have been a critical consideration during the trial.

¶579

In light of these facts, the plaintiffs’ challenge to the finding on possession in their cross-appeal appears contradictory to their own reliance on these documents. In Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court highlighted the principle that a

¶580

¶581

plaintiff must not only establish a superior title but also prove that they were in possession of the property in order to seek its restoration. In the absence of clear evidence of possession, the plaintiffs cannot succeed in claiming possession through their cross-appeal.

¶582

Similarly, in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (supra) , the Court held that possession follows title, but in cases where third-party rights have been created, mere title without possession is insufficient to claim recovery of possession. The trial court’s failure to examine whether subsequent purchasers hold legitimate third-party rights further weakens the plaintiffs' case. Therefore, based on the precedents and evidence, the plaintiffs' attempt to claim possession is unjustified without addressing the thirdparty rights that have been created over time.

¶583

Given these circumstances, the plaintiffs' crossappeal challenging the finding on possession should be

¶584

¶585

dismissed, as it lacks substantive legal standing when examined against the backdrop of the judgments cited above. The failure to properly examine the documents that establish third-party interests severely undermines the plaintiffs' case for possession.

¶586

Therefore, based on the lack of possession, the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction, and their alternate relief of possession, after remand, also fails due to their failure to challenge the sale deeds in accordance with the law. Without addressing the legal transfers of title through valid sale deeds, the plaintiffs' claim for possession is legally unsustainable. Accordingly, point No.3 is answered in the Affirmative and point No.4 is answered in the Negative.

¶587

Findings on Point No.5:

¶588

The defendants , and subsequent transferees, by way of additional evidence, have attempted to demonstrate

¶589

¶590

that the suit properties are no longer in possession of the plaintiffs but are instead in the hands of several third-party purchasers. This revelation according to defendants is significant, as it highlights the extensive alienation of the properties over the years, which further weakens the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs before this court disclosed for the first time that the alienation of the suit properties was carried out by their maternal uncle, a fact that was conspicuously absent from the original pleadings. This disclosure raises several critical legal issues, particularly regarding the authority of the maternal uncle to alienate the properties and the plaintiffs' failure to challenge this alienation in a legally appropriate manner.

¶591

Interestingly, despite this disclosure in these appeals, the plaintiffs have not made any allegations against their maternal uncle, who was responsible for alienating the properties. This omission is crucial because, under law, if the plaintiffs believed that the alienation by

¶592

¶593

their maternal uncle was unauthorized or illegal, they were obligated to specifically plead this in their plaint and seek relief accordingly. However, in the absence of any pleadings challenging the authority of their maternal uncle to execute the sale transactions, the validity of these transactions cannot be called into question by the Court. The wellsettled principle of law is that parties must plead all material facts and cannot introduce new claims or allegations during the trial without having properly pleaded them in the plaint. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Afsar Sheikh v. Soleman Bibi¹⁷ has consistently held that allegations of fraud or unauthorized actions must be specifically pleaded with full particulars, failing which the Court cannot entertain such claims.

¶594

Given that the plaintiffs have failed to make any

¶595

allegations against their maternal uncle and have not challenged the sale transactions through proper legal

¶596

17 AIR 1976 SC 163

¶597

¶598

channels, the alienations made by the uncle must be presumed to be valid. The plaintiffs' silence on this issue in their original pleadings strongly suggests that they were either aware of or had consented to these transactions. Therefore, their subsequent attempt to raise this issue during the trial, without having included it in their original claims, cannot be entertained by the Court. As a result, the authority of the maternal uncle's alienations cannot be questioned in the absence of specific pleadings to that effect.

¶599

Moreover, the evidence led by the plaintiffs themselves confirms that they are not in possession of the suit properties and that the properties have been alienated to third parties over time. This evidence effectively undermines their own case, as they have not provided any legal basis for challenging the authority of these alienations. The plaintiffs, having failed to plead or prove any irregularity in the alienation by their maternal uncle,

¶600

¶601

deserve to be non-suited based on the evidence presented by them. The defendants, through the submission of additional evidence, have sought to demonstrate that following the alienation of the suit schedule properties, the land has been extensively subdivided and now consists of over 2,000 residential sites, including numerous residential houses. This development according to defendants highlights the significant passage of time and the number of subsequent transactions that have taken place, further complicating the plaintiffs' claims. A key piece of additional evidence presented is a sale deed executed by the plaintiffs’ maternal uncle on 17.01.1946, which according to defendants further reinforces the timeline of alienations. The defendants therefore have contended that these documents along with other evidence provided by the defendants, establishes that the properties have passed through multiple hands and are now owned by several subsequent purchasers who have acquired these rights in

¶602

¶603

good faith. This court while dealing with point 1 &2 has taken cognizance of plaintiffs’ own admissions during proceedings, unequivocally demonstrate that the suit properties are no longer under the control of the original parties, but have been lawfully transferred to numerous third parties who are bona fide purchasers. The chain of transactions and the current state of ownership make it clear that the plaintiffs' failure to challenge these alienations at an earlier stage, along with the multitude of new interests created in the properties, renders their claims legally unsustainable and inequitable to enforce against the subsequent purchasers.

¶604

Therefore, there is no need for the Court to delve further into the additional evidence submitted by the defendants , even though these documents shed considerable light on the current status of the properties. The additional evidence may reinforce what the plaintiffs' own evidence has already revealed that the properties have

¶605

¶606

passed into the hands of third-party purchasers, and the plaintiffs are no longer in possession. This additional evidence, while illuminating, is not necessary for the Court to reach a conclusion, as the plaintiffs’ case has already collapsed under the weight of their own admissions and the lack of proper pleadings.

¶607

In conclusion, the plaintiffs' failure to challenge the alienations made by their maternal uncle in the manner prescribed by law, coupled with their own evidence confirming that the suit properties are no longer in their possession, is fatal to their case. The Court need not rely on the additional evidence, as the plaintiffs have effectively undermined their own claims. The plaintiffs' case, lacking both legal and factual support, should be dismissed, and the defendants and subsequent transferees should be protected from further legal action arising out of this flawed litigation. The absence of proper pleadings and the plaintiffs’ failure to prove their case make it clear that they

¶608

100

¶609

are not entitled to any relief, and there is no need to admit additional evidence.. Accordingly, point No.5 does not survive for consideration in the light of findings recorded on point Nos.1 and 2.

¶610

Findings on Point No.6:

¶611

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, imposes a mandatory duty on Courts to dismiss a suit, appeal, or application if it is barred by limitation, irrespective of whether the defense of limitation has been raised by the parties. This provision ensures that legal proceedings are initiated within a statutorily prescribed time frame, and prevents the revival of stale claims that could lead to uncertainty and hardship for parties. Courts must strictly adhere to the principle of limitation as it promotes justice by ensuring that claims are brought to the Courts in a timely manner, preserving the integrity of evidence and protecting parties from being dragged into litigation over long-forgotten disputes.

¶612

101

¶613

The Courts have an obligatory role under Section 3 to consider the issue of limitation suo motu (on their own motion), even if the parties have not raised it. The language of Section 3 is imperative: it states that a suit filed after the prescribed period "shall be dismissed"— making it non-negotiable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India¹⁸ emphasized that Courts are under a bounden duty to dismiss suits that are barred by limitation, irrespective of whether limitation is raised as a defense by the parties. This principle prevents the reopening of old and settled matters, ensuring that the legal process is not abused for reviving stale claims, which would otherwise disturb public tranquility and create a backlog of cases.

¶614

In cases where there has been a significant delay in initiating litigation, Courts must be particularly vigilant. Limitation laws exist to ensure that justice is

¶615

18 AIR 2011 SC 3590

¶616

102

¶617

administered efficiently and fairly. The longer a party waits to file a suit, the more likely it is that evidence, witnesses, and documents will become unavailable, thus impairing the ability to conduct a fair trial. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Noharlal Verma v. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd.¹⁹ (2008) reiterated that Courts must not ignore the mandate of the Limitation Act, and any case that is clearly timebarred should be dismissed at the earliest. The Limitation Act is not merely procedural but substantive in nature, as it affects the right to bring a claim.

¶618

Further, in Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan²⁰ , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the object of limitation laws is to provide certainty and finality to litigation. Delays in initiating claims deprive the opposing party of the peace of mind that comes with the final

¶619

19 2008 AIR SCW 7850

¶620

20 AIR 1959 SC 798

¶621

103

¶622

settlement of disputes, often leaving them in an unjust state of perpetual uncertainty.

¶623

In the present case, the suit is ex-facie barred by limitation as it involves transactions that took place several decades ago, including alienations made by the plaintiffs' maternal uncle in 1946. The suit, however, was filed in 1989 more than 40 years after the cause of action arose. As per the Limitation Act, the statutory period for challenging property transactions, including the execution of sale deeds, is generally 12 years under Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiffs were required to file their suit within 12 years from the date of dispossession or from the date the sale transactions came to their knowledge, but they failed to do so.

¶624

Despite the clear bar of limitation, the Trial Court failed to advert to Section 3 of the Limitation Act, thereby allowing the suit to proceed in violation of mandatory legal

¶625

104

¶626

provisions. This oversight by the Trial Court is a serious procedural and legal lapse, as the Court had a duty to dismiss the suit as being time-barred, even if the defendants did not raise the issue. The Supreme Court in Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) made it clear that Courts cannot overlook the issue of limitation merely because it was not raised by the defendants. This failure by the Trial Court has resulted in an unjust situation, where a stale claim has been wrongfully entertained, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

¶627

Moreover, in S.S. Gadgil v. Lal and Co.²¹ , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that Courts must interpret limitation statutes strictly to prevent belated and dilatory claims from being heard. The objective is to ensure that Courts do not allow claims to resurface after they have become legally extinct due to the lapse of time. The trial Court, in this case, not only overlooked the limitation aspect

¶628

21 1964 SCR (8) 72

¶629

105

¶630

but also failed to recognize that the plaintiffs, who admitted to the alienations by their maternal uncle, delayed their challenge for several decades, making the suit untenable in law. The plaintiffs, for the first time, are attempting to contend that the alienation of the suit schedule properties by their maternal uncle in 1946 is void, citing judgments related to the alienation of minor’s property. However, the records clearly reveal that plaintiff No.1 attained majority in 1955, while plaintiff No.6 attained majority in 1957. According to Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit to set aside a transfer of property made by a guardian on behalf of a minor must be filed within three years from the date on which the minor attains majority. Therefore, the limitation period for plaintiff No.1 to challenge the alienation expired in 1958, and for plaintiff No.6, in 1960. Since the present suit was filed only in 1989, more than three decades after the limitation period had lapsed, the plaintiffs' claims are clearly barred by limitation. In T.V. Seshagiri

¶631

106

¶632

Rao vs. T.V. Shanthamma²² , the Court reiterated that a claim to set aside a transfer made during minority must strictly comply with the limitation period prescribed under the Limitation Act. In light of these judgments, and considering the long delay in filing the suit without challenging the alienation at the appropriate time, the plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the void nature of the alienation are legally unsustainable and barred by the statute of limitation. Accordingly, point No.6 is answered in the affirmative.

¶633

In the light of the discussion made supra, this Court arrives at the following conclusions:

¶634

(i) Upon a thorough examination of the findings, this Court concludes that the Trial Court's judgment, declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the suit schedule properties, is legally flawed and unsupported by the evidence. The plaintiffs, who sought a declaration without

¶635

22 (2004) 11 SCC 430

¶636

107

¶637

challenging the validity of sale deeds executed in favor of the defendants, failed to meet the statutory requirements under Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well as Sections 31 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Afsar Sheikh v. Soleman Bibi (supra) , allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded with full particulars. In this case, the plaintiffs made generalized claims of fraud, which the Trial Court erroneously accepted without demanding adequate particulars of alienations or proof. Therefore, the finding that the sale deeds executed by the defendants were fraudulent and collusive is legally unsustainable and must be set aside. Exs.P-3 to P-8 reveal that the suit properties were sold, and the names of subsequent transferees were reflected based on sale deeds. The plaintiffs were aware of these transactions, as successfully elicited during crossexamination. As such, the plaintiffs were required to seek further declaration and challenge the alienation. The relief

¶638

108

¶639

sought for declaration in the prayer (b) is defective and does not satisfy the requirements under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act..

¶640

(ii) The Trial Court's conclusion that the plaintiffs are in lawful possession of the suit properties is equally erroneous. The plaintiffs themselves admitted, both in cross-examination and through their cross-appeal, that they are not in possession of the properties. This admission directly contradicts the Trial Court's finding that they hold possession.

¶641

(iii) Furthermore, the procedure adopted by the Trial Court in arriving at its conclusion is fundamentally flawed. In a suit for declaration of title, the burden of proof lies squarely on the plaintiffs to prove their ownership, and they must rely on the strength of their own case rather than the weakness of the defendant’s defense. In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy²³ , the Hon'ble Supreme

¶642

23 (2008) 4 SCC 594

¶643

109

¶644

Court reiterated that in a declaratory suit, the plaintiff must stand on their own legs and prove their title independently of any flaws in the defendant’s case. In the present matter, the plaintiffs failed to provide a detailed explanation as to how the sale deeds executed in 1946 by their maternal uncle do not bind them. The absence of this crucial evidence undermines their claim of ownership and exposes a significant gap in their case. The Trial Court failed to require the plaintiffs to furnish these essential details, which led to a legally unsound judgment.

¶645

(iv) The Trial Court’s handling of the evidence is also a matter of serious concern. While the Court reproduced the exhibits presented by the plaintiffs, it did not critically engage with the contents of those documents. The mere listing of exhibits without a thorough analysis is insufficient for drawing conclusions about title. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh²⁴ held

¶646

24 (2000) 5 SCC 652

¶647

110

¶648

that Courts must engage in a substantive analysis of documentary evidence to reach a well-founded conclusion. In this case, the Trial Court’s superficial treatment of the evidence has resulted in a capricious and arbitrary finding, particularly with respect to issue Nos. 1 to 3, which relate directly to the question of title.

¶649

(v) Additionally, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court suffer from significant procedural and legal infirmities. The plaintiffs’ plaint is tainted with mala fides and is based on the suppression of material facts, a circumstance that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (supra) , litigants who approach the Court with unclean hands or suppress material facts cannot claim any equitable relief. In this case, the plaintiffs failed to disclose key facts regarding the sale transactions, and the Trial Court erred in not dismissing the suit for want of proper pleading. The

¶650

111

¶651

plaintiffs, having admitted in various stages of the trial that they were not in possession and that sales had taken place, sought to suppress these admissions and pursue a misleading narrative of ownership, which the Trial Court wrongly accepted.

¶652

(vi) The plaintiffs have intentionally produced an encumbrance certificate covering the period from 01.04.1937 to 31.03.1945 evidenced at Ex.P-42, despite the fact that the suit was filed much later, on 09.11.1989. This selective production of documents raises serious concerns, particularly in light of the fact that numerous transactions involving the suit properties took place after this period. Exs.P-3 to P-8 provide clear evidence of a series of alienations, reflecting the transfer of the suit properties through various sale deeds. Given these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the plaintiffs were aware of these alienations and chose not to disclose them fully in their pleadings. The relief sought by the plaintiffs to declare all

¶653

112

¶654

sale deeds obtained by the defendants as invalid without specifically challenging the individual alienations, is legally defective. By failing to challenge the alienations directly and by omitting relevant and material documents from the Court’s consideration, the plaintiffs have engaged in a lack of full disclosure. This non-disclosure of critical documents appears to be an intentional act aimed at gaining an unfair advantage in the case. Such conduct, as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) , amounts to fraud. The plaintiffs, by not challenging the alienations specifically and by concealing relevant documents, have acted in bad faith, rendering their claims unsustainable in law

¶655

(vii) The question of limitation is another significant issue that the Trial Court ignored. The plaintiffs sought to challenge transactions dating back to 1946, yet the suit was filed in 1989 more than 40 years after the alleged sales. This delay makes the suit clearly barred by limitation under

¶656

113

¶657

Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is well-settled that even if limitation is not raised as a defense, the court must consider it suo motu . The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India²⁵ emphasized that it is the duty of the court to dismiss suits barred by limitation, irrespective of whether limitation is raised as an objection. The Trial Court’s failure to apply the law of limitation further vitiates its judgment. In light of Section 3 of the Limitation Act and the authoritative judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the suit in the present case is ex-facie barred by limitation. The Trial Court's failure to apply Section 3 of the Limitation Act resulted in an erroneous decision to proceed with a time-barred suit, leading to further litigation and legal complications. Courts are bound by law to dismiss such suits at the threshold to prevent the revival of stale claims and ensure that legal proceedings are conducted in a timely and fair manner.

¶658

25 (2011) 9 SCC 126

¶659

114

¶660

Therefore, in the current case, the plaintiffs' suit should have been dismissed for being time-barred under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, and the Trial Court's failure to recognize this has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

¶661

(viii) In urban centers like Bangalore, where real estate disputes are highly contentious and often involve significant financial stakes, trial Courts must exercise heightened caution when handling such suits. The case at hand exemplifies the potential for misuse of judicial processes, where plaintiffs, despite not being in possession of the suit property and having failed to challenge crucial sale deeds in the manner known to law, sought to obtain relief through misleading claims. Courts in such jurisdictions must meticulously investigate the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, and ensure that litigants are not abusing the system to settle personal scores or claim properties they are not legally entitled to. The procedural lapses in this case, where the Trial Court failed to scrutinize

¶662

115

¶663

key evidence, did not apply the relevant legal provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure and Specific Relief Act, and overlooked the crucial issue of limitation, underscore the necessity for judicial diligence.

¶664

(ix) In cities like Bangalore, where rapid urbanization leads to complex property disputes involving multiple parties and long-standing transactions, Courts must ensure that plaintiffs are required to provide a clear and unambiguous pleading, as well as substantiate their claims with cogent evidence. Fraud claims must be specifically pleaded with full particulars, as mandated under Order 6 Rule 4 of the CPC, and Courts must not accept generalized allegations. Further, Courts must be vigilant in protecting bonafide third party purchasers and ensuring that declaratory suits are not used as tools to unsettle legally executed transactions. This case is a classic example of how the judicial process can be misused when proper scrutiny is not applied, and it highlights the need for trial Courts to

¶665

116

¶666

adopt a rigorous approach in verifying the facts, analyzing the evidence, and applying the law meticulously to prevent the manipulation of legal processes in property disputes.

¶667

(x) The palpably erroneous findings of the Trial Court in this case have resulted in a significant miscarriage of justice, particularly impacting bonafide third party purchasers. By erroneously declaring the plaintiffs as absolute owners of the suit properties, despite clear evidence of third-party rights and transactions evidenced at Exs.P-3 to P-8, the Court has indirectly enabled the plaintiffs to create further third-party interests. Purchasers who acquired rights through the plaintiffs are now at serious risk, as the judgment opens the door to further litigation between them and those who legitimately acquired title through the defendants. This situation is compounded by the fact that the defendants, who were grossly negligent in defending the suit at an early stage, failed to challenge the plaintiffs' claims with due diligence.

¶668

117

¶669

As a result, the subsequent purchasers, who bought properties in good faith, are the ones bearing the brunt of this judicial oversight. These innocent purchasers are now entangled in a complex legal web, facing the prospect of protracted litigation and the potential loss of their legitimate rights. The Trial Court's failure to critically examine the plaintiffs' claims, coupled with the defendants' lack of timely defense, has led to a grave miscarriage of justice, with farreaching consequences for innocent third parties. This case serves as a stark reminder of the judicial responsibility to safeguard the rights of bonafide purchasers and prevent the manipulation of the legal process in property disputes.

¶670

(xi) The situation is further aggravated by the gross negligence of the defendants, who failed to mount a proper defense at the earliest stages of the litigation. Their inaction has contributed to the current complex situation, where the true victims are not the parties to the original dispute, but rather the subsequent purchasers who had no involvement

¶671

118

¶672

in the initial conflict. These purchasers, having acted in reliance on what they believed were legitimate transactions, now find themselves embroiled in a legal quagmire. The defendants’ failure to defend the suit diligently has thus caused grave harm to third parties who had no means of protecting themselves against the legal wrangling that has ensued. The real injustice lies in the fact that those who are most affected had no part in the original dispute and are now forced to bear the heavy cost of the court's erroneous findings.

¶673

(xii) The consequences of such flawed judicial findings are far-reaching. When Courts do not thoroughly investigate the cause of action and the evidence before them, they open the door to prolonged legal battles that impact innocent third parties. This case demonstrates how the judicial process, if not handled with care and precision, can be misused by litigants to create further complications in property disputes. In this instance, the plaintiffs have

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succeeded in creating third-party rights based on a fundamentally flawed judgment, leaving bonafide purchasers to pay the heavy price of legal uncertainty and potential loss of their property rights. Courts, therefore, must be vigilant in ensuring that their judgments do not inadvertently harm innocent third parties who act in reliance on those decisions.

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(xiii) In conclusion, this case stands as a stark reminder of the need for judicial prudence, especially in property disputes where third-party rights are involved. The Trial Court’s failure to properly analyze the evidence and apply the correct legal standards has resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice, affecting innocent purchasers who were unaware of the underlying disputes. The negligent defense by the defendants has further compounded this problem, leaving subsequent purchasers in a vulnerable position. To prevent such situations, Courts must meticulously investigate the facts, scrutinize the cause of

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action, and consider the potential impact of their judgments

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on all parties involved, particularly third-party purchasers who rely on the integrity of the judicial process to secure their property rights.

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