said Act overrides the provision of Law prior to its commencement. It is clear that for disqualification, the widow should have remarried when the succession opens and the succession would open on the death of the husband and in the present case, the succession opened on 13.4.86, the date on which the husband of the first defendant died and it is not disputed that on 13.4.86, the First defendant was not remarried. Therefore, the finding of the First Appellate Court that in view of the provisions of Section 2 of the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act, 1856, the First defendant is not entitled to succeed to the suit properties is clearly illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 24 of the Hindu succession Act and hence, the same in liable to be set aside and accordingly, I answer the substantial question of law No. 2 in the negative. It is not in dispute that the schedule properties were joint family properties. The share to which Madhavva (the original plaintiff) would be entitled to has been correctly calculated by the First Appellate Court as it is clear from the admitted facts that Bharamappa died on 18.8.63 (i.e, after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act) leaving behind his wife Madhavva, two daughters and a son and therefore, in view of Section 6 of the Hindu Succesion Act , if there was notional partition between Bharamappa on the date of his death, the property has to be divided between Bharamppa and his son Mahaveer and since in a
