Allowed

Sri.C.Boregowda v. Sri.M.Prakash

Karnataka HC28 Nov 2024CRL.A/999/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This High Court allowed a Criminal Appeal against an acquittal in a cheque bouncing case. The Court held that once the accused admitted signing a cheque, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act arose. The accused failed to probabalise his defence of issuing a blank cheque to a third party. The Trial Court's acquittal based on mere doubt was perverse, and the Court ordered convicti

What did the court decide?

The judgment of acquittal was set aside. The accused was convicted and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 8,00,000/-, with compensation ordered to be paid to the complainant.

Sri.C.Boregowda Vs Sri.M.Prakash — Cheque Dishonour | Karnataka HC (2024)

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NC: 2024:KHC:48935 CRL.A No. 999 of 2014

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 28^TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2024

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE M G UMA

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CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 999 OF 2014 (A)

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BETWEEN:

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SRI. C. BOREGOWDA, S/O. LATE CHIKKA BOREGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, R/AT NO.7, 4^TH CROSS, BEHIND VENKATAESHWARA THEATERE, AVALAHALLI G.E.F. POST, BANGALORE - 560 026

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…APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. N. SRIRAM REDDY, ADVOCATE)

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Digitally signed by NANDINI B G Location: high court of karnataka

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AND:

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SRI. M. PRAKASH, S/O. SRI. MUNIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, R/AT NO.381, 17^TH MAIN ROAD, 1^ST CROSS, MUNESHWARA BLOCK, BANGALORE - 560 026

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…RESPONDENT

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(BY SRI. MAHENDRA .N., ADVOCATE)

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THIS CRL.A. IS FILED U/S. 378(4) CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED: 15.10.14 PASSED BY THE XVII ADDL. C.M.M., BANGALORE IN C.C.NO.28917/11 - ACQUITTING THE RESPONDENT/ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 138 OF N.I. ACT.

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THIS CRL.A., COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE M G UMA

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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The complainant in C.C.No.28917/2011, on the file of the learned XVIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Bengaluru is impugning the judgment dated 15.10.2014, acquitting accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (for short 'the NI Act').

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For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their rank and status before the Trial Court.

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Brief facts of the case are that, appellantcomplainant filed the private complaint in PCR No.14102/2011 before the Trial Court against the accused alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act. It is contended that the accused and the complainant were friends since several years. On 20.12.2010, the accused borrowed a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to meet his personal and legal necessities, and agreed to repay the same on or before 05.04.2011. When the complainant requested to repay the loan amount, the accused issued the post-dated cheque bearing No.805154 dated 28.04.2011 for sum of Rs.5,00,000/-. When the cheque was

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presented for encashment, the same was dishonored as there was insufficient funds in the account of the accused. The

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complainant issued the legal notice to the accused informing him regarding dishonor of the cheque and called upon him to pay the cheque amount. The notice was served on the accused. In spite of that, there was no reply. Thereby, he has committed an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. Accordingly, he requested the Trial Court to take cognizance of offence and to initiate legal action.

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The Trial Court took cognizance of the offence and registered C.C.No.28917/2011. The accused appeared before the Trial Court and pleaded not guilty. The complainant examined himself as PW-1 and got marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P6 in support of his contention. The accused denied all the incriminating materials available on record in his statement made under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and examined himself as DW-1. The Trial Court after taking into consideration all these materials on record came to the conclusion that the complainant was not successful in proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused was acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act. Being aggrieved by the same, the complainant is before this Court.

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Heard Sri. Sriram Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri. Mahendra N, learned counsel for the respondent. Perused the materials including the Trial Court records.

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Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that

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the complainant has categorically stated in the private complaint that the accused was his friend and he had borrowed a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- on 20.12.2010. He has not discharged the said loan. Accused had issued the cheque as per Ex.P1 on 28.04.2011 for Rs.5,00,000/-. Admittedly, the cheque in question was dishonored as there was insufficient fund in the account of accused. The legal notice sent to the accused as per Ex.P3 was returned with postal acknowledgment as per Ex.P5. In spite of that, the accused did not repay the cheque amount nor he had replied to the notice. Therefore, it is clear that there is commission of offence under Section 138 of the Act.

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Learned counsel contended that the accused categorically admitted that cheque-Ex.P1 belongs to his bank account and it bears his signatures. He has taken defence that he had issued 8 to 10 blank cheques in favour of his friend one

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Zelan Pasha, about 10 years back after obtaining loan from him and one such cheque was misused by the complainant. Secondly, it is the defence taken by the accused that the legal notice was not served on him and therefore, he is not liable for conviction. Both these defence taken by the accused were disbelieved by the Trial Court. It is also noticed that the accused admitted issuance of the cheque and his signatures. But, in spite of that the legal presumption under Section 139 of NI Act is not drawn. On the other hand, the burden was again shifted on the complainant to prove the actual lending of the money and therefore, the impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court is illegal, perverse and the same is to be set aside. Accordingly, prays for allowing the appeal and to convict the accused in the interest of justice.

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Per contra , learned counsel for respondent-accused

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opposing the appeal submitted that lending of the amount by the complainant is not proved and under such circumstances, the Trial Court was right in acquitting the accused. The Trial Court on proper appreciation of the materials on record held that the complainant was not having capacity to lend and therefore, acquitted the accused. There are no reasons to

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interfere with the impugned judgment and accordingly, prays for dismissal of the appeal.

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In view of the rival contentions urged by learned counsel for both the parties, the point that would arise for my consideration is:

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"Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court suffers from perversity or illegality and calls for interference by this Court?"

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My answer to the above point is in the 'Affirmative' and pass the following:

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REASONS

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It is the specific contention of the complainant that

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the accused was his friend since many years. On 20.12.2010, the accused had borrowed an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- to meet his personal requirement. He agreed to repay the same on or before 05.04.2011. The accused issued post dated cheque bearing No.805154 dated 28.04.2011 for Rs.5,00,000/-. When the cheque was presented for encashment, the same was dishonored as funds insufficient in the account of the accused. Legal notice was issued to the accused calling upon him to repay

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the cheque amount. Inspite of service of notice, neither he replied nor he repaid the cheque amount. Thereby, he has committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act.

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The complainant examined himself as PW-1 and got marked Ex.P1 to P6 in support of his contention. The cheque in question marked as Ex.P1. The endorsement of bank is produced as per Ex.P2 which discloses that the cheque was presented for encashment and the same was dishonored as funds insufficient in the account of the accused. Ex.P3 is the legal notice addressed to the accused and Ex.P5 is the postal acknowledgement which suggests service of notice on the accused. Admittedly, the accused has not issued any reply nor he has repaid the cheque amount. Therefore, it is the contention of the complainant that the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act.

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During cross examination of PW-1, it is specifically suggested to PW-1 that Ex.P1 was not issued by the accused towards legally enforceable debt. The said suggestion is denied by the complainant. The accused had not issued any reply to the notice nor there is any specific suggestion regarding defence

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taken by the accused regarding the cheque Ex.P1, except saying that the same was not issued towards discharge of legally enforceable debt.

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The accused examined himself as DW-1. In his chief examination, he admits that, Ex.P1 belongs to his bank account and it bears his signature. Once the accused admits issuance of cheque with his signature, the burden shifts on the accused and the initial burden on the complainant gets discharged as the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act would arise.

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It is the contention of the accused who is examined as DW-1 that Ex.P1 cheque was issued by him to one Zelan Pasha, about 10 years back as he had availed loan of Rs.2,00,000/-from him. He contends that he had issued as many as 8 cheques, 2 promissory notes, and two signed blank papers to Zelan Pasha. He contends that he has not written the contents in Ex.P1, but had issued only blank cheque in favour of said Zelan Pasha.

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During cross examination of DW1, initially he pleaded his ignorance regarding avocation of complainant. However, subsequently, stated that he was doing news paper

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agency business along with the complainant in Gandhi Bazar and he knows him since 5 to 6 years. The witness also stated that the complainant is his friend. He came in contact with Zaleen pasha through the complainant but states that he knows Zaleen pasha through the complainant since 10 years. Therefore, the accused must be knowing the complainant much prior to he coming in contact with Zaleen pasha.

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The witness states that he had issued 8 blank cheques with his signature to Zaleen pasha and he is having document to show that the cheque was given to Zaleen pasha on such date. He admits that he has not produced any document to show that 8 blank cheques were issued in favour of Zaleen pasha. The witness goes to the extent of saying that his cheque book is lost. 8 cheques were issued to Zaleen pasha. 6 Cheques were issued to the dealer of motor cycle while purchasing the same and about 5 to 6 cheque leaves were lost about 3 to 4 years back. He had not complained about the same nor did he informed it to the bank. The accused stated that the pass book pertaining to National Cooperative Bank is with him and it evidences regarding the various cheques issued by him.

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Witness also denies his signature found on vakalathnama marked as Ex.C1 and in the summons marked as Ex.C2.

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The evidence on record discloses that even though accused admits his signature found on Ex.C1, he takes specific defence that he issued blank cheque in favour of Zaleen pasha not in favour of the complainant. He contends that he is having document to show that, which are all the cheques he issued to Zaleen pasha on which date. But he has not produced any such document. Zaleen pasha is not examined by the accused. It is not made clear as to how cheques issued in favour of Zaleen pasha came in possession of the complainant. The accused has not filed complaint either against Zaleen pasha or against complainant for misusing his cheques. It is also pertinent to note that the accused had not issued stop payment instructions to the bank after he had issued blank cheques in favour of Zaleen pasha about 10 years back. Under such circumstances, merely by saying that he had issued blank cheque in favour of one Zaleen pasha, who is not before the Court, will not probabalise the defence taken by the accused. When the accused fails to probabalise defence, he is liable for conviction.

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The contention taken by the learned counsel for the accused that he had issued blank cheque with his signature and writings found on cheque was not that of the accused will not come to the rescue of the accused. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bir Singh Vs. Mukesh Kumar¹ where Hon'ble Apex Court categorically held in paragraph Nos.34 and 36 as under:

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"34. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.

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36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt".

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It is the contention of the accused that, he had never borrowed any amount from the accused but admits that Ex.P1 cheque belongs to his bank account and it bears his

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1 (2019) 4 SCC 197

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signature. Under such circumstances, the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that the complainant has not proved actual lending of the amount cannot be accepted. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Rangappa v/s Sri Mohan² categorically held existence of legally enforceable debt is also a matter of presumption under Section 139 of NI Act, while disagreeing with its own judgment in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v/s Dattatraya G. Hegde³ case as it is not a good law and held in paragraph Nos.26 and 27 as under.

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"26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there

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2 (2010) 11 SCC 441

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3 (2008) 4 SCC 54

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is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.

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27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof.’"

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Hon'ble Apex Court again in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel V. State of Gujarat and another⁴ discussed extensively about the position of law by referring to its earlier decision, including Rangappa(supra) held in paragraph Nos.15 to 18 as under:

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4 (2019) 18 SCC 106

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"15. So far the question of existence of basic ingredients for drawing of presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act is concerned, apparent it is that the appellant-accused could not deny his signatures on the cheques in question that had been drawn in favour of the complainant on a bank account maintained by the accused for a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs each. The said cheques were presented to the bank concerned within the period of their validity and were returned unpaid for the reason of either the balance being insufficient or the account being closed. All the basic ingredients of Section 138 as also of Sections 118 and 139 are apparent on the face of the record. The trial court had also consciously taken note of these facts and had drawn the requisite presumption. Therefore, it is required to be presumed that the cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheques i.e. the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the appellant-accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption.

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16. In Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, this Court has reiterated and summarised the principles relating to presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act and rebuttal thereof in the following : (SCC pp. 453-54, paras 26-28)

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“26. In the light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of

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the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna JanardhanBhat may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it is based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.

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confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof.

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28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of “preponderance of probabilities”. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.”

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17. On the aspects relating to preponderance of probabilities, the accused has to bring on record such facts and such circumstances which may lead the Court to conclude either that the consideration did not exist or

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that its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that the consideration did not exist. This Court has, time and again, emphasised that though there may not be sufficient negative evidence which could be brought on record by the accused to discharge his burden, yet mere denial would not fulfil the requirements of rebuttal as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act. This Court stated the principles in Kumar Exports as follows : (SCC pp. 52021, paras 20-21)

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“20. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence

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of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.

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21. The accused has also an option to prove the non-existence of consideration and debt or

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liability either by letting in evidence or in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, therefore, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue.”

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18. In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused. This approach of the trial court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the appellant-accused. The

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aspect relevant for consideration had been as to whether the appellant-accused has brought on record such facts/material/circumstances which could be of a reasonably probable defence."

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The Court has also held regarding reasonable doubt in paragraph No. 21 as under:

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"21. On perusing the order of the trial court, it is noticed that the trial court proceeded to pass the order of acquittal on the mere ground of “creation of doubt”. We are of the considered view that the trial court appears to have proceeded on a misplaced assumption that by mere denial or mere creation of doubt, the appellant had successfully rebutted the presumption as envisaged by Section 139 of the NI Act. In the scheme of the NI Act, mere creation of doubt is not sufficient."

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent decision in Kalamani Tex and another V. P.Balasubramanian⁵ by referring to its earlier decision including Basalingappa ( supra), Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel (supra), Bir Singh (supra), reiterated the position of law in paragraph Nos. 13, 15 and 17 as under:

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5 (2021)5 SCC 283

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"13. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the trial court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. The statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these “reverse onus” clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. This point of law has been crystallised by this Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat in the following words : (SCC pp. 120-21, para 18)

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“18. In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused. This approach of the trial court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance

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of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the appellant-accused.”

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15. No doubt, and as correctly argued by Senior Counsel for the appellants, the presumptions raised under Sections 118 and Section 139 are rebuttable in nature. As held in M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, which was relied upon in Basalingappa, a probable defence needs to be raised, which must meet the standard of “preponderance of probability”, and not mere possibility. These principles were also affirmed in Kumar Exports, wherein it was further held that a bare denial of passing of consideration would not aid the case of accused.

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17. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated.

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(emphasis supplied)

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Thus, the position of law is very well settled. Once the accused admits issuance of the cheque with his signature,

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the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act would arise and burden shifts on the accused to rebut the presumption. The accused in order to rebut the presumption has to raise probabale defence. Mere contending that he had issued blank cheque in favour of Zaleen pasha without probabalising the same, cannot be stated that accused has discharged his burden. Under such circumstances, he is liable for conviction.

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I have gone through the impugned judgment of the Trial Court. The Trial Court in paragraph 9 has categorically held that the version of the accused is unbelievable. It is also held that since the accused has taken a specific contention that he had issued Ex.P.1 blank signed cheque to Zaleen pasha, burden to prove this contention is on the accused. It is further observed that even the accused has not suggested any explanation or reason as to why Zaleen pasha had handed over the blank cheque to the complainant, and filed the present complaint. It also inferred that the accused had taken a false defence disputing service of notice only with an intention to avoid his liability. Even after making such observations, the Trial Court concluded that the complainant has failed to prove

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advancing of amount of Rs.5,00,000/- as hand loan and in discharge of said debt accused issued Ex.P1 cheque and therefore, accused was acquitted. The approach of the Trial Court in this regard is perverse and illegal. The same is against the settled position of law as highlighted above. Therefore impugned judgment of acquittal calls for interference by this Court. Accordingly, I answer point No.1 in the Affirmative.

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REGARDING SENTENCE

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Heard learned counsel for the appellant regarding sentence. Learned counsel submits that cheque in question was issued by the accused on 28.04.2011. 13 years have already lapsed. Under such circumstance, the accused is liable for conviction by sentencing him to pay double the cheque amount which would meet the ends of justice.

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Learned counsel for the respondent submits that he has nothing to say about the sentence.

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On consideration of the facts of the case, it is the contention of the complainant that he had lent an amount on 20.12.2010, towards repayment of the same, cheque Ex.P1 dated 28.04.2011 was issued, which was later came to be

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dishonored. Admittedly, complainant has not filed any suit for recovery of the amount. However, it is to be noticed that the Trial Court has acquitted the accused upon which, present appeal came to be filed.

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Considering all these facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that the accused is not liable for maximum sentence or for imposition of substantive sentence. However, reasonable amount is to be imposed as fine which would be proportionate to the offence in question and sufficient to compensate the complainant. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following;

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ORDER

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(i) The Criminal Appeal is allowed.

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(ii) The judgment dated 15.10.2014 passed in C.C.No.28917/2011, on the file of the learned XVIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Bengaluru, is hereby set aside.

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(iii) Consequently, the accused/respondent is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.8,00,000/- within 8 weeks from today. In default to pay fine, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a one year.

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Out of the fine amount, Rs.7,90,000/- is ordered to be paid to the complainant as compensation.

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Send back TCR along with copy of this judgment for information and necessary action i.e., to issue conviction warrant.

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Sd/(M G UMA) JUDGE

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SPV/BH List No.: 2 Sl No.: 58

Sri.C.Boregowda v. Sri.M.Prakash

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Sri.C.Boregowda v. Sri.M.Prakash

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