"It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in Section 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co- accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is bout to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, s the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30. The same jew has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira singh v. State of M.P. [Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., 1952 CR 526: AIR 1952 SC 159: 1952 Cri LJ 839] where the ecision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case [Bhuboni ahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12: (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 55.] has been cited with approval."
