Dismissed

Superintendent of Police v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC11 Aug 2023WP/9000/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Lokayukta police officers challenged the State Government's refusal to sanction prosecution of a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court held that the investigating officers are not aggrieved persons and that the sanctioning authority's administrative decision, based on application of mind to the material, is not amenable to judicial review. Petition dismissed.

What the court decided

AI extract

Superintendent of Police Vs State of Karnataka — Corruption | Karnataka HC (2023)

¶1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

¶2

DATED THIS THE 11^TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2023

¶3

BEFORE

¶4

THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA

¶5

WRIT PETITION No.9000/2014 (GM-KLA)

¶6

BETWEEN:

¶7

SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA CITY DIVISION M.S. BUILDING BANGALORE – 560 001 DR. B.A. MAHESH, IPS, S/O. B.R.A. RAO, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS.

¶8

DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE–3 KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA CITY DIVISION M.S. BUILDING BANGALORE – 560 001 M. NARAYANA S/O. DEVAIAH, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS. ... PETITIONERS

¶9

(BY SRI C.H.JADHAV, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI CHETHAN JADHAV, ADVOCATE)

¶10

AND:

¶11

STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS VIDHANA SOUDHA, BANGALORE – 560 001.

¶12

¶13

THE UNDER SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS SERVICES (3) VIDHANA SOUDHA, BANGALORE – 560 001.

¶14

SRI T. BISSE GOWDA S/O. LATE THASSE GOWDA AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, OCC: CHIEF ENGINEER, NATIONAL HIGHWAYS R/O. NO.441, 8^TH CROSS, 4^TH , RMV II STAGE, BANGALORE – 560 094. ... RESPONDENTS

¶15

(BY SMT. ANITHA N., HCGP FOR R-1 & R-2; SRI ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR KUM. SMAMINI GANESH MOHANAMBAL AND SRI ABHIJIT HARANAHALLI, ADVOCATES FOR R-3)

¶16

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY RESPONDENT NOS.1 & 2, DATED 05.10.2012 BEARING NO.C ASU E 07 EMUV 2009 AT VIDE ANNEXURE-F; DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS TO CONSIDER THE REQUEST OF THE PETITIONERS FOR GRANT OF SANCTION VIDE ANNEXURE-E, AGAINST THE 3^RD RESPONDENT AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC.19 OF PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT IN CRIME NO.51/2007 ON THE FILE OF 23^RD ADDL. CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE, BANGALORE.

¶17

THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 20/07/2023 FOR ORDERS AND COMING FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

¶18

¶19

O R D E R

¶20

The Superintendent of Police and the Deputy

¶21

Superintendent of Police of the Karnataka Lokayukta is before this Court assailing the order dated 05.10.2012 passed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 - State Government declining to grant sanction to prosecute respondent No.3.

¶22

Facts of the case are that a disproportionate assets case was registered in Cr.No.51/2007 of Bangalore City Division, Lokayukta Police Station under Section 13(i)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the PC Act” for the sake of convenience) against respondent No.3 herein, formally, the Chief Engineer, National Highways, PWD, Bangalore. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta was handling the investigation of the case and submitted “B” final report to the Special Court.

¶23

¶24

Consequent to his promotion to the cadre of

¶25

Superintendent of Police, he was relieved from the duties of the office of Lokayukta. Subsequently, petitioner No.1 authorized one H.S. Manjunath, Deputy Superintendent of Police to take over the charge of the file and continue the investigation. It is stated that during the course of further investigation, further acts and material concerning the case were unearthed, as such, petitioner No.2 filed application under Section 173(8) of the Criminal Procedure Code (“Cr.P.C”). contending that the “B” report filed by the investigating agency has not been accepted by the Court and some facts, which was not within the knowledge of the agency at the earlier stage and sought to request to return “B” report to enable the investigating agency to file a separate report after conducting further investigation. The Special Court allowed the application and permitted petitioner No.2 to conduct further

¶26

¶27

investigation and file report within three months. The petitioners conducted further investigation and made a request to the appointing authority seeking sanction for prosecution against respondent No.3, on scrutiny of the documents, the State passed an order on 05.10.2012 refusing sanction.

¶28

Heard learned senior counsel Sri C.H.Jadhav for the petitioner; learned senior counsel Sri Ashok Haranahalli for respondent No.3 and learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent Nos.1 and 2.

¶29

Learned senior counsel for the petitioner would address his argument in two folds:

¶30

(i) That the power exercised by the State Government in granting or refusing sanction is purely an administrative action and not a quasi judicial decision/order and hence, the personal hearing of the officer to represent his case before the sanctioning

¶31

¶32

authority is not necessary, as done in the instant case by the respondent – State giving the personal hearing and on considering the objections of the accused, the order refusing sanction has been passed.

¶33

(ii) That the petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of the act, as the Court on the memo filed by respondent No.2 had accorded permission to conduct further investigation and having found sufficient material to proceed against respondent No.3, the petitioner made a request to the appointing authority seeking sanction and having found fresh material by conducting investigation, the sanctioning authority ought to have accorded sanction to prosecute respondent No.3. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied on the following judgments:

¶34

(a) Superintendent of Police (C.B.I.) vs. Deepak Chowdhary & others [(1995) 6 SCC 225] (Deepak Chowdhary);

¶35

¶36

(b) Assistant Commissioner, Assessment-II,

¶37

Bangalore & others vs. Velliappa Textiles Ltd., & another [(2003) 11 SCC 405 (Velliappa Textiles Ltd);

¶38

(c) Subramanian Swamy vs. Manmohan

¶39

Singh & another [(2012) 3 SCC 64] (Subramanian Swamy);

¶40

(d) State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nishant Sareen [(2010) 14 SCC 527] (Nishant Sareen); (e) State of Punjab & another vs. Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti [(2009) 17 SCC 92] (Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti) and

¶41

(f) Vijay Rajmohan vs. Central Bureau of

¶42

Investigation (Anti-Corruption Branch) [(2023) 1 SCC 329](Vijay Rajmohan)

¶43

5. Per contra, learned senior counsel for respondent No.3 would contend that it is well settled proposition of law as held by the Apex Court that the

¶44

¶45

sanctioning authority need not hear the accused at the time of considering the grant or refusal of sanction, however, the Apex Court or the provisions of the Act does not prohibit the discretionary power of the sanctioning authority to provide an opportunity of hearing to the public servant concerned. The order impugned is not on the basis of the submissions or the hearing of the concerned public servant, on the other hand, the State Government has passed the impugned order on taking into consideration the material placed before it and by exercising the discretionary powers.

¶46

Since the matter was related to the issue of

¶47

disproportionate asset, the sanctioning authority had to apply its mind as regards the calculations concerning the items of income, expenditure and assets of the public servant. Therefore, would contend that the impugned order cannot be held to be invalid only on the count of having considered the explanation given by the

¶48

¶49

public servant. It is contended that the petitioner cannot be termed as an aggrieved person by the act of the State Government refusing to grant sanction to prosecute respondent No.3.

¶50

Learned senior counsel for the respondent

¶51

would submit that the present petitions are squarely covered by the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Karnataka Lokayukta Police vs.

¶52

State Rep. by Secretary Department of Personnel & others (W.P.No.48249/2018 dated 13.12.2021) and the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra through Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Mahesh G.Jain [(2013) 8 SCC 119] (Mahesh G.Jain) .

¶53

Learned HCGP for the State would contend

¶54

that after judicially examining the materials placed before the Sanctioning authority, the Government

¶55

10 -

¶56

found that the public servant/officer did not possess more assets as made by the Investigation Agency. Learned HCGP would contend that the State Government in exercise of its discretionary power has judicially examined the report of the Lokayukta, Investigating Officer and final decision refusing to sanction for prosecution has been ordered and the said order is in accordance with law and is a speaking order.

¶57

This Court has carefully considered the rival

¶58

contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record.

¶59

The issues that fall for consideration of this Court are,

¶60

"(i) Whether the petitioner can be termed as an aggrieved person by the act of the State Government declining to grant sanction to prosecute respondent No.3?

¶61

11 -

¶62

(ii) Whether the sanctioning authority was justified in considering the objections of the public servant and whether the sanctioning authority has exercised the administrative function while declining to grant sanction to prosecute respondent No.3?"

¶63

POINT NO.1:

¶64

The facts are not in dispute. The issue revolves around the sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, which reads as under:

¶65

“ 19. Previous sanction necessary for

¶66

prosecution.— (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013—

¶67

(a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his

¶68

12 -

¶69

office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government;

¶70

(b) in the case of a person who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;

¶71

(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.

¶72

Provided that no request can be made, by a person other than a police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other law enforcement authority, to the appropriate Government or competent authority, as the case may be, for the previous sanction of such Government or authority for taking cognizance by the court of any of the offences specified in this sub-section, unless—

¶73

(i) such person has filed a complaint in a competent court about the alleged offences for which the public servant is sought to be prosecuted; and

¶74

13 -

¶75

(ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and directed the complainant to obtain the sanction for prosecution against the public servant for further proceeding:

¶76

Provided further that in the case of request from the person other than a police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other law enforcement authority, the appropriate Government or competent authority shall not accord sanction to prosecute a public servant without providing an opportunity of being heard to the concerned public servant:

¶77

Provided also that the appropriate Government or any competent authority shall, after the receipt of the proposal requiring sanction for prosecution of a public servant under this sub-section, endeavour to convey the decision on such proposal within a period of three months from the date of its receipt:

¶78

14 -

¶79

Provided also that in case where, for the purpose of grant of sanction for prosecution, legal consultation is required, such period may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended by a further period of one month:

¶80

Provided also that the Central Government may, for the purpose of sanction for prosecution of a public servant, prescribe such guidelines as it considers necessary.

¶81

Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression “public servant” includes such person—

¶82

(a) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed; or

¶83

(b) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed and is holding an office other than the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

¶84

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous

¶85

15 -

¶86

sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed.

¶87

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained

¶88

in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

¶89

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby;

¶90

(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or

¶91

16 -

¶92

irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;

¶93

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.

¶94

(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.

¶95

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—

¶96

(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction;

¶97

(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction

¶98

17 -

¶99

of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.”

¶100

Section 19 of the Act envisages that no court

¶101

shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 against the public servant, except with the previous sanction. Therefore, the sanction is an imperative requisite for the concerned authority taking cognizance of the offence against the public servant. The sanctioning authority in exercise of its discretion has power to grant sanction or refuse to grant sanction for prosecution.

¶102

The aggrieved person would be the State, as its the State’s order granting sanction or refusal was called in question and the petitioner is neither a complainant nor an employee of respondent No.3. The sanctioning authority after a considerable analyzation of the material before it, has refused to grant sanction to prosecute respondent No.3. The petitioner cannot seek

¶103

18 -

¶104

to call in question such refusal for grant, wherein, the role of investigating officer is to the limited purpose only more so, when the sanctioning authority having found that no material is placed before it, to grant sanction for prosecution. The Government has applied its mind and then passed the order refusing to grant sanction in exercise of its discretion looking into the entire material. Merely because the investigating officer, the Lokayukta has conducted investigation, it cannot be concluded that the Government is bound by the request seeking sanction and sanction has to be accorded.

¶105

The judgment relied by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in case of Nishant Sareen, wherein, the Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti's case was referred and at paragraph Nos.13 and 14 has held as under:

¶106

19 -

¶107

13. In our opinion, a change of opinion per se on the same materials cannot be a ground for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. However, in a case where fresh materials have been collected by the investigating agency subsequent to the earlier order and placed before the sanctioning authority and on that basis, the matter is reconsidered by the sanctioning authority and in light of the fresh materials an opinion is formed that sanction to prosecute the public servant may be granted, there may not be any impediment to adopt such course.

¶108

14. Insofar as the present case is concerned, it is not even the case of the appellant that fresh materials were collected by the investigating agency and placed before the sanctioning authority for reconsideration and/or for review of the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. As a matter of fact, from the perusal of the subsequent order dated March 15-3-2008 it is clear that on the same materials, the sanctioning authority has changed its opinion and ordered sanction to

¶109

20 -

¶110

prosecute the respondent which, in our opinion, is clearly impermissible."

¶111

The judgment relied by the learned counsel

¶112

for the petitioner in Nishant Sareen's case stated supra, was a case where the Apex Court held that, if there are no fresh materials placed by the investigating agency for reconsideration or for review of the earlier order before the sanctioning authority, the change in the opinion of the sanctioning authority from the earlier view and granting sanction later without there being any fresh materials was clearly impermissible is what the Apex Court held.

¶113

In the present scenario of facts, though the investigating officer by re-enquiry sought to contend that further materials were unearthed, and the fact also reveals that the DSP, City Division, Karnataka Lokayukta had submitted 'B' final report to the Special Court on 22.07.2009 itself and the same agency has

¶114

21 -

¶115

reopened the case for further investigation in the matter, which itself shows the conduct of investigating agency. In the present circumstances, it is not the case of the investigating officer that the sanctioning authority had earlier refused to grant sanction and on placing fresh materials, the sanctioning authority needs to reconsider. The said judgment relied is in applicable to the facts of the case.

¶116

The issue in the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Nishant Sareen and Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti to contend that the investigating officer is an aggrieved person, it is relevant to mention that in the said judgments, there was a passing reference made by the Apex Court at paragraph No.15 in Nishanth Sareen's case, which reads as under:

¶117

"15. By way of foot-note, we may observe that the investigating agency might have had

¶118

22 -

¶119

legitimate grievance about the order dated November 27-11-2007 refusing to grant sanction, and if that were so and no fresh materials were necessary, it ought to have challenged the order of the sanctioning authority but that was not done. The power of the sanctioning authority being not of continuing character could have been exercised only once on the same materials."

¶120

The said observations of the Apex Court in the above mentioned paragraph in the considered view of this Court would not empower the police wing of the Lokayukta to file a writ petition calling in question the refusal of grant of sanction by the sanctioning authority to prosecute respondent No.3. The Apex Court in Nishant Sareen's case has held that the Investigating Agency might have legitimate grievance about the order refusing to grant sanction and if they were so, no fresh material is necessary, it ought to have challenged the order of the sanctioning authority, but that was not

¶121

23 -

¶122

done. The sanctioning authority being not of continuing nature could not have been exercised only once on the same material. Even assuming that the petitioner can assail the order of the sanctioning authority, the authority has exercised its discretion and in exercising its discretion, it has to act as a Judge and has to examine and evaluate every witness and documents brought before it taking judicious decision and though it is an administrative function. Thus, point No.1 framed for consideration is answered accordingly.

¶123

Point No.2:

¶124

The other contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the according of personal hearing to the public servant is vitiated and is contrary to the law declared by the Apex Court. It is relevant to state that the grant or refusal of sanction is an administrative action and not a quasi judicial

¶125

24 -

¶126

decision and hence, personal hearing need not be given to the delinquent accused, however, even assuming that it is an administrative action in the discretionary power of the sanctioning authority, and in the absence of any statutory prohibition, the administrative action cannot be faulted following the principles of natural justice. The impugned order cannot be invalidated only on account of having considered the explanation by answering delinquent public servant. The discretionary power has been exercised by the sanctioning authority and the same cannot be interfered or replaced with the view of this Court.

¶127

The Apex Court, in the case of Mahesh G.Jain has held that grant of sanction is a sacro santum act and is intended to provide safeguard to a public servant against frivolous and fictitious litigation. Grant of sanction is only an administrative function and sanctioning authority is required to prima facie reach

¶128

25 -

¶129

the satisfaction, that the relevant fact would constitute the offence. Satisfaction of the sanctioning authority is essential to validate and order granting sanction. The adequacy of the material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the Court as it does not sit in an appeal over the sanction order. Ordinarily, the sanctioning authority is the best person to judge as to whether the public servant concerned should received the protection under the Act by refusing to accord sanction for his prosecution or not.

¶130

When there is an order of refusal of sanction by the sanctioning authority indicating application of mind, on examination of the material on record, it can safely be concluded that the sanctioning authority has duly recorded its satisfaction and refused to accord sanction. The Apex Court in para No.6 of the said case has held as under:

¶131

26 -

¶132

“6. Grant of sanction is irrefragably a sacrosanct act and is intended to provide safeguard to public servant against frivolous and vexatious litigations. Satisfaction of the sanctioning authority is essential to validate an order granting sanction."

¶133

The grant of sanction is irrefragably a sacrosanct act and is intended to provide safeguard to the public servant against frivolous and vexatious litigation. Satisfaction of the sanctioning authority is essential to validate an order granting sanction.

¶134

The Apex Court in the year 1958 in the case of Jaswant Singh vs. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC

¶135

124] while considering the validity and effect of the sanction given under Section 6(1) of the PC Act and held that from the order of the sanctioning authority it should be clear that the authority has considered the evidence before it and after consideration of all the circumstances of the case sanctioned the prosecution.

¶136

27 -

¶137

Later, the Apex Court in the case of Deepak Chowdhary stated supra held that the grant of sanction is only an administrative function, though it is true that the accused may be saddled with the liability to be prosecuted in a Court of law. What is material at that time is that the necessary facts collected during investigation constituting the offence have to be placed before the sanctioning authority and it has to consider the material. Prima facie, the authority is required to reach the satisfaction that the relevant facts would constitute the offence and then either grant or refuse to grant sanction.

¶138

Subsequently, in the other judgment, in the case of R.Sundararajan vs. State [(2006) 12 SCC 749] , wherein a similar view was taken by the Apex Court holding that the order granting or refusing sanction should be with considering of the material

¶139

28 -

¶140

before the sanctioning authority and the Court should not sit in an appeal over the sanction order.

¶141

The Apex Court in the case of State of

¶142

Karnataka vs. Ameerjan [(2007) 11 SCC 273] has taken the following view stating that the sanctioning authority is the best person to judge as to whether the public servant concerned should receive the protection under the Act by refusing to accord sanction for the prosecution or not.

¶143

The Apex Court in the case of Mahesh G.

¶144

Jain has considered the aforesaid judgments and summarize the principles at paragraph No.14, which reads as under:

¶145

14. From the aforesaid authorities the following principles can be culled out:

¶146

14.1. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the valid sanction has been granted

¶147

29 -

¶148

by the sanctioning authority after being satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out.

¶149

14.2. The sanction order may expressly show that the sanctioning authority has perused the material placed before it and, after consideration of the circumstances, has granted sanction for prosecution.

¶150

14.3. The prosecution may prove by adducing the evidence that the material was placed before the sanctioning authority and its satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before it.

¶151

14.4. Grant of sanction is only an administrative function and the sanctioning authority is required to prima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts would constitute the offence.

¶152

14.5. The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order.

¶153

14.6. If the sanctioning authority has perused all the materials placed before it and

¶154

30 -

¶155

some of them have not been proved that would not vitiate the order of sanction.

¶156

14.7. The order of sanction is a prerequisite as it is intended to provide a safeguard to a public servant against frivolous and vexatious litigants, but simultaneously an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner and there should not be a hypertechnical approach to test its validity.”

¶157

The Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court under

¶158

similar circumstances in the case of Karnataka Lokayukta Police vs. State Rep. by Secretary Department of Personnel & others at paragraph No.18 has held as under:

¶159

" 18. The State performing the act of considering grant of sanction or otherwise, is required to look at the entire material or the whole material. The usage of the words ‘whole’ or ‘entire’ material by the Apex Court in the case of ASHOK KUMAR AGGARWAL (supra), clearly mandates that the competent authority is required to look into everything placed

¶160

31 -

¶161

before it and other material, if available, at the time of considering the request for grant of sanction, as it is trite that it is not an acrimonious 31 exercise but a solemn or sacrosanct act, which affords protection to the Government servant or releases him to face prosecution. It is the discretion of the competent authority either to accord sanction or refuse sanction. What material has to be looked into while granting or refusing sanction has been the subject matter of interpretation by the Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgments. In my considered view, no fault can be found with the exercise of discretion of the competent authority in looking into the whole or entire material, while refusing to accord sanction, failing which, the act of the competent authority would have fallen foul of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgments."

¶162

Keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid

¶163

down by the Apex Court in Mahesh G. Jain in mind, it is relevant to consider whether the order of the

¶164

32 -

¶165

sanctioning authority in refusing to grant sanction is justifiable. The relevant order is extracted hereunder:

¶166

"DPëÃ¦¹gÉ ÄªÀ DzÁAiÀ ÄzÀ «ªÀ gÀ À

¶167

(1) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (8) gÀAvÉ J¯ï.L.¹ ¥Á°¹ £ÀA.360106411, PÉÆÃ¯ÁgÀ ¸ÀªÉÊðªÀ¯ï ¨É¤¦ümï - F ¥Á°¹AiÀÄ£ÀÄß DgÉÆÃ¦vÀgÀÄ ªÉÊAiÀÄQÛPÀªÁV ºÉÆA¢zÀÄÝ, EzÀgÀ ªÀAwPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß CªÀgÀ ¸ÀA§¼À¢AzÀ £ÉÃgÀªÁV MlÄÖ gÀÆ.1,24,768/¥ÁªÀw¹zÀÄÝ, ¸ÀzÀj ¥Á°¹UÉ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ gÀÆ 40,000/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸ÀªÉÊðªÀ¯ï ¨É¤¦ümï ºÀt JAzÀÄ ¸ÀAzÁAiÀÄªÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ gÀÆ 40,000/-

¶168

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃµÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀÄµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹ ¥Á°¹¬ÄAzÀ CªÀjUÉ ªÉÆzÀ®£É PÀAw£À°è CAzÀgÉ 199899£ÉÃ ¸Á°£À°è §A¢gÀÄªÀ ¸ÀgÉéöÊªÀ¯ï ¨É¤¦ümï ºÀtªÁzÀ gÀÆ.20,000/UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀÆgÀPÀ zÁR¯ÉUÀ¼À DzÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆArgÀÄªÀ gÀÆ 20,000/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß DzÁAiÀÄPÉÌ vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆ¼Àî®Ä ¤zsÀðj¸À¯ÁVzÉ. gÀÆ 40,000-00(+) 20,000-00 = gÀÆ.60,0000/-

¶169

(2) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (17) gÀAvÉ, ªÀiÁªÀÅ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ EvÀgÉ vÉÆÃlUÁjPÉ ¨É¼ÉUÀ½AzÀ §AzÀ DzÁAiÀÄ -gÀÆ 10,20,555/-

¶170

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀgÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄÄ vÀªÀÄä D¹Û ªÀÄvÀÄÛ zÁAiÀÄvÀé ºÉÃ½PÉAiÀÄ°èAiÀÄÆ

¶171

33 -

¶172

ªÀÄvÀÄÛ C«¨sÀPÀÛ PÀÄlÄA§zÀ DzÁAiÀÄ vÉjUÉ jl£ÀìðUÀ¼À°ègÀÆ DAiÀiÁ ªÀµÀðUÀ¼À°è ¨ÉÃ¸ÁAiÀÄzÀ DzÁAiÀÄªÀ£ÀÄß WÉÆÃ¹PÉÆArgÀÄªÀÅzÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹zÉ. CªÀgÀÄ 1994-95 jAzÀ 2006-07 gÀªÀgÉV£À D¹Û ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ºÉÆuÉUÁjPÉ ¥ÀnÖUÀ¼À°è F PÉ¼ÀPÀAqÀAvÉ WÉÆÃ¶¹PÉÆArgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.

¶173

1994-95- 4.5 ®PÀë (¥ÀÄl-757) 1995-96-4.80 ®PÀë, 1996-97-5.00 ®PÀë 1997-98-5.00 ®PÀë 1998-99-5.00 ®PÀë 19992000 6.00 ®PÀë. 2000-2001 ®PÀë, 2000-2001 3.60 ®PÀë, 20012002-3.5 ®PÀë, 2002-03-3.5 ®PÀë, 2003-04-3.50 ®PÀë (DzÁAiÀÄ vÉjUÉ jl£Àìð£À°è) 2004-05 3.85 ®PÀë, 2005-06-6.25 ®PÀë 200607 6.00 ®PÀë, MlÄÖ gÀÆ60.50 ®PÀëUÀ¼ÀÄ gÀÆ.60,50,000/-

¶174

ªÉÄÃ®ÌAqÀAvÉ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀgÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ D¹Û ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ºÉÆuÉUÁjPÉ ¥ÀnÖAiÀÄ°è ºÁUÀÆ DzÁAiÀÄ vÉjUÉ jl£ïì£À°è £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀÄªÀÅzÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹ gÀÆ 60,50,000/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß DzÁAiÀÄPÉÌ ªÉÄÃ¯É ºÉÃ½zÀAvÉ vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆ¼Àî®Ä ¤zsÀðj¸À¯ÁVzÉ.

¶175

¯ÆÃPÁAiÉ ÄÄPÀ Û vÀ ¤SÀ AiÉ Ä ¥À æPÁgÀ DzÁAiÀ ÄUÀ ¼À MlÄÖ ªÀ iÀ Ë®å- gÆ.1,02,63,259À -70 ªÄÃ¯É ºÉ Ã½zÉ AvÀ DzÁAiÉ ÄPÀ Ì ¥É jUÀ tÀ ¹zÂ ªÀ ÆvÉ Û À ¸Ãj MlÄÖ DzÁAiÉ Ä ªÀ iÀ Ë®å - gÆ 1,53,12,704.70. À

¶176

III. ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è Rað£À ¥ÀæªÀUÀðzÀ°è MlÄÖ 50 CA±ÀUÀ½ªÉ. CªÀÅUÀ¼À°è PÉ¼ÀPÀAqÀ 11 CA±ÀUÀ½UÉ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄÄ DPÉëÃ¥À ªÀåPÀÛ¥Àr¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. DPÉëÃµÀ ªÀåPÀÛ¥Àr¹gÀÄªÀ CA±ÀUÀ¼À°è ¸ÀPÁðgÀ 3 CA±ÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß wgÀ¸ÀÌj¹zÉ. G½zÀ 8 DPÉëÃµÀuÉUÀ¼ÀÄ PÉ¼ÀPÀAqÀAwªÉ.

¶177

- 34 -

¶178

DPëÃ¦¹zÉ Rað£À «ªÀ gÀ :À-

¶179

(1) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (2) gÀAvÉ, ªÀÄ£É £ÀA.441gÀ £ÉÆÃAzÀtÂ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄÄzÁæAPÀ ±ÀÄ®ÌzÀ CzsÀð¨sÁUÀªÀ£ÀÄß ¥ÀÄ£Àgï vÀ¤SÉUÉÆ¼À¥Àr¹ ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹zÉ- gÀÆ 2,79,315/-

¶180

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀgÀ ªÀÄ£É £ÉÆÃAzÀtÂ ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°è PÀæ.¸ÀA.12 gÀ°è ªÀÄÄzÁæAPÀ ±ÀÄ®Ì, PÀæªÀÄªÁV PÀæAiÀÄ ªÀiÁrPÉÆnÖgÀÄªÀªÀgÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ RjÃ¢zÁgÀgÀÄ ¨sÀj¹¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ «ªÀj¹zÀ DzÀÝjAzÀ PÀæAiÀÄ ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°è ªÀÄÄzÁæAPÀ ±ÀÄ®ÌzÀ ªÉZÀÑªÀ£ÀÄß RjÃ¢zÁgÀgÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀiÁgÁlUÁgÀgÀÄ ¸ÀªÀÄªÁV ¨sÀj¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉAzÀÄ ¸ÀàµÀÖªÁV £ÀªÀÄÆ¢¹gÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ F ªÉÆvÀÛªÀ£ÀÄß PÉÊ©qÀ®Ä ¤zsÀðj¸À¯ÁVzÉ. gÀÆ.2,79,315-00 gÀÆ.2,79,315-00 = gÆ.0À -00/-

¶181

(2) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (14) gÀAvÉ, rAiÉÆ ªÉÆÃmÁgï ¸ÉÊPÀ¯ï £ÀA. PÉJ-EJ£ï-1363 EzÀÄ ¸ÀºÁAiÀÄPÀ ¥ÁæzÉÃ²PÀ ¸ÁjUÉ C¢üPÁjUÀ¼À ¥ÀvÀæzÀ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ ²æÃ ±ÀAPÀgï gÀªÀgÀ ºÉ¸Àj£À°èzÀÄÝ, EzÀgÀ «ªÉÄ, vÉjUÉ, EAzsÀ£À, zÀÄgÀ¹Û ªÀÄvÀÄÛ EvÀgÉ Rað£À ªÉÆvÀÛ - gÀÆ 20,452/-

¶182

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀgÀ C¢üPÁAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄÄ F ªÉÆzÀ®Ä ¤ÃrgÀÄªÀ «ªÀgÀuÉ M¦à ¨ÉÃ£Á«Ä JAzÀÄ ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹gÀÄªÀÅzÀ£ÀÄß M¦àPÉÆArgÀÄªÀÅ¢®è. EzÀgÀ DzsÁgÀzÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄ ªÁºÀªÁVgÀzÀ ªÁºÀ£À EAzsÀ£À RZÀÄðUÀ¼ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ EvÀgÉ RZÀÄðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄ ¯ÉPÀÌzÀ RZÀÄðUÀ¼À°è ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¸ÀÄªÀÅzÀÄ DgÉÆÃ¦UÉ C£ÁåAiÀÄ ªÀiÁrzÀAvÉ DUÀÄvÀÛzÉ JA§ ºÉÃ½PÉ ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹ -

¶183

35 -

¶184

¶185

(3) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (19) gÀAvÉ, J¸ï.©.SÁvÉ ¸ÀASÉå (22564) 20040, PÁ¥ÉÆðgÉÃµÀ£ï ¨ÁåªÀÄPï, £ÀÈ¥ÀvÀÄAUÀ gÀ¸ÉÛ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ F SÁvÉ¬ÄAzÀ «vï qÁæ ªÀiÁqÀÄªÀ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ««zsÀ GzÉÝÃ±ÀUÀ½UÁV ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀ RZÀÄðUÀ¼ÀÄ ªÉÆvÀÛ-gÀÆ 6,34,945/-

¶186

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄÄ vÀ£Àß D¹Û ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ºÉÆuÉUÁjPÉ ¥ÀnÖAiÀÄ°è ¥Àæw ªÀµÀðªÀÅ vÀªÀÄä J®è RZÀÄð ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ºÉÆ¸ÀzÁV Cfð¹gÀÄªÀ D¹ÛUÀ¼À «ªÀgÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀÅ¢AzÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ vÀ¤SÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ DgÉÆÃ¦¬ÄAzÀ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉÃ «ªÀgÀuÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆ¼ÀîzÉÃ, CªÀgÀÄ ¸ÀévÀAvÀæªÁV, ¨ÉÃgÉ jÃwAiÀÄ°è ¸ÁQëUÀ¼À£ÁßUÀ°Ã, zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÁßUÀ°, vÀ¤SÉUÉ M¼À¥Àr¸ÀzÉ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉÃ DzsÁgÀUÀ½®èzÉÃ ¥ÀÄ£ÀB ¥ÀÄ£ÀB MAzÉÃ RZÀÄðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß JgÀqÉgÀqÀÄ ¨Áj ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹gÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ ºÁUÀÆ J¯Áè ¨ÁåAPï SÁvÉUÀ¼À°è ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀ oÉÃªÀtÂ, dªÀiÁ ºÁUÀÆ ¨ÁåAPï SÁvÉUÀ½AzÀ ºÁUÀÆ ªÁ¥À¸ï ¥ÀqÉzÀÄ ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀ RZÀÄðUÀ¼À «ªÀgÀUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¤ÃrgÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ gÀÆ. 2,50,000-00 UÀ¼À ªÉÆvÀÛªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀiÁvÀæ RZÉðAzÀÄ vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆ¼Àî®Ä ¤zsÀðj¸À¯ÁVzÉ. gÀÆ. 6,34,945-00 (-) gÀÆ. 3,84,945-00 gÀÆ. 2,50,000/-

¶187

(4) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (20) gÀAvÉ, J¸ï.©.SÁvÉ ¸ÀASÉå.17624, L.N.©., UÁA¢üÃ£ÀUÀgÀ ±ÁSÉ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ. F SÁvÉ¬ÄAzÀ «vï qÁæ ªÀiÁqÀÄªÀ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ²æÃ.¸ÉÆÃªÉÄÃUËqÀ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ

¶188

36 -

¶189

²æÃ.¹.PÀÈµÀÚ¥Àà JA§ÄªÀªÀjUÉ ¤ÃrgÀÄªÀ ºÀtzÀ ªÉÆvÀÛ – gÀÆ. 3,94,384/-

¶190

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀÄµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ J¸ï.©.SÁvÉ £ÀA.17624 gÀ°è ¢B 30-05-2002 jAzÀ 28-03-2008 gÀªÀgÉUÉ qÁæ ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀ J¯Áè ªÉÆvÀÛªÀ£ÀÄß ªÀÄvÀÄÛ AiÀiÁªÀÅzÉÃ jÃwAiÀÄ°è ²æÃ ¸ÉÆÃªÉÄÃUËqÀgÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ²æÃ PÀÈµÀÚ¥Àà£ÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß 2£ÉÃ vÀ¤SÁ¢üPÁjUÀ¼ÀÄ vÀ¤SÉUÉ M¼À¥Àr¸ÀzÉ CªÀgÀ ºÉÃ½PÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉAiÀÄzÉÃ ZÉPï ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ªÀÄgÀÄ¥ÁªÀw ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀ PÉÊ¸Á®zÀ ºÀtªÀ£ÀÄß DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄ RZÀÄðUÀ¼ÉAzÀÄ ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹gÀÄªÀÅzÀÄ ºÁUÉAiÉÄÃ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄÄ ¨ÁåAPï SÁvÉUÀ½AzÀ ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀ J¯Áè «vïqÁæUÀ¼À£ÀÄß JgÀqÉgÀqÀÄ ¨Áj RZÀÄð SÁvÉUÉ ¸ÉÃj¹gÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ gÀÆ. 3,30,000/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß Rað¤AzÀ PÉÊ©qÀ®Ä ¸ÀPÁðgÀ ¤zsÀðj¹zÉ. gÀÆ. 3,94,384-00 (-) 3,30,000-00 = gÀÆ. 64,384/-

¶191

(5) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (24) gÀAvÉ, ªÀÄ£É RjÃ¢UÉ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄ£É ªÀiÁ¥ÁðrUÉ ¥ÀqÉzÀ ¸Á® gÀÆ.13,36,000 ¸ÉÖÃmï ¨ÁåAPï D¥üï ªÉÄÈ¸ÀÆgÀÄ, UÁA¢üÃ£ÀUÀgÀ, ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ. EzÀgÀ ªÀÄgÀÄ¥ÁªÀw ªÉÆvÀÛ gÀÆ. 10,29,538.80

¶192

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÀÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀÄµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ ¸ÉÖÃmï ¨ÁåAPï D¥üï ªÉÄÊ¸ÀÆgÀÄ gÀªÀgÀÄ ¤ÃrgÀÄªÀ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀgÀ CPËAmï SÁvÉAiÀÄ ¥ÀæwAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã°¹ gÀÆ. 7,05,000-00 UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ªÀiÁvÀæ RZÉðAzÀÄ ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹ gÀÆ. 3,24,538/-

¶193

37 -

¶194

¶195

(6) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (25) gÀAvÉ, J¸ï©L PÉærmï PÁqïð 4006-6761-3401-1736, ªÁ¶ðPÀ ±ÀÄ®Ì ªÀÄvÀÄÛ EvÀgÉ ±ÀÄ®ÌUÀ¼ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ «vï qÁæ ªÀiÁqÀÄªÀÅzÀgÀ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ªÀå¬Ä¹gÀÄªÀ ºÀtzÀ ªÉÆvÀÛ – gÀÆ. 2,57,582-69

¶196

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀÄµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄÄ ZÉPï CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è PÉærmï PÁqïð ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀ J¯Áè RZÀÄðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß FUÁUÀ¯ÉÃ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄ MlÄÖ RZÀÄðUÀ¼À°è ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹gÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ ªÀÄvÉÆÛªÉÄä F RZÀð£ÀÄß ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¸ÀÄªÀÅzÀÄ £ÁåAiÀÄ ¸ÀªÀÄävÀªÀ®èªÉA§ÄzÀ£ÀÄß M¦à gÀÆ. 2,57,582.69 UÀ¼À£ÀÄß Rað¤AzÀ PÉÊ©qÀ®Ä ¤zsÀðj¸À¯ÁVzÉ. gÀÆ. 2,57,582-69 (-) gÀÆ. 2,57,582-69 = 0-00

¶197

(7) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (29) gÀAvÉ, PÉÆÃ¯ÁgÀ UÁæ«ÄÃt ¨ÁåAPï ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ®àvÀgÀÄ UÁæ«ÄÃt ¨ÁåAPÀÄUÀ¼À°è oÉÃªÀtÂUÀ¼À£ÀÄß RjÃ¢¸À®Ä ªÀå¬Ä¹zÀÝ oÉÃªÀtÂUÀ¼À ªÉÆvÀÛ – gÀÆ. 5,87,676/-

¶198

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀÄµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄÄ vÀªÀÄä ªÀÄPÀÌ¼À ºÉ¸Àj£À°è ªÀÄÆ® oÉÃªÀtÂAiÀiÁV gÀÆ. 10,000,/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß vÉÆqÀV¹ CzÀjAzÀ §rØ ¨Á§ÄÛ gÀÆ. 26,920/- UÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆArgÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ ¸ÀzÀj ªÉÆvÀÛªÀ£ÀÄß

¶199

38 -

¶200

¶201

(8) ¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ°è£À PÀæªÀÄ ¸ÀASÉå (30) gÀAvÉ, J¸ï.©.L. SÁvÉ ¸ÀASÉå.849, PÀ.PÀAmÁæåPÀÖ¸ïð ¸ÀºÀPÁj ¨ÁåAPï ¤, aPÀÌ§¼Áî¥ÀÅgÀ F SÁvÉ¬ÄAzÀ ««zsÀ GzÉÝÃ±ÀUÀ½UÁV «vïqÁæ ªÀiÁqÀÄªÀ ªÀÄÆ®PÀ ªÀå¬Ä¹gÀÄªÀ RZÀÄðUÀ¼À ªÉÆvÀÛ – gÀÆ. 5,23,59890

¶202

¯ÉÆÃPÁAiÀÄÄPÀÛ ¥ÉÆ°Ã¸ÀgÀ vÀ¤SÁ ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀÄªÀ DPÉëÃ¥ÀuÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÀÆ®APÀÄµÀªÁV ¥Àj²Ã°¹zÀ ¸ÀPÁðgÀ DgÉÆÃ¦AiÀÄÄ, ¸ÀzÀj SÁvÉAiÀÄ°è ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀ dªÀiÁ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ RZÀÄðUÀ¼À£ÀÄß SÁvÉ¬ÄAzÀ qÁæ ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀ ªÉÆvÀÛªÀ£ÀÄß zÁR¯ÁwUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÀgÁªÀÄ²ð¸ÀzÉ ¥ÀjUÀtÂ¹gÀÄªÀÅzÉAzÀÄ ¸ÀàµÀÖªÁUÀÄªÀ PÁgÀt gÀÆ. 2,50,000-00 UÀ¼À£ÀÄß MlÄÖ RZÀÄðUÀ¼À°è PÉÊ©qÀ®Ä ¤zsÀðj¸À¯ÁVzÉ. gÀÆ. 5,23,598-90 (-) gÀiÁ. 2,50,000-00-00 = 2,73,598/-.

¶203

¯ÆÃPÁAiÉ ÄÄPÀ Û vÀ ¤PÀ AiÉ Ä ¥À æPÁgÀ J¯Áè RZÀ ÄðUÀ ¼À MlÄÖ ªÀ iÀ Ë®å gÆ. À 1,01,57,804-45 ªÄÃ¯É ºÉ Ã½zÉ AvÀ jAiÉ iÁ¬Äw ¤ÃrzÀ £À AvÀ gÀ MlÄÖ À RZÄð ªÀ iÀ Ë®å gÆ. 82,84,130À -00.

¶204

¸ÀPÁðgÀzÀ ¤zsÁðgÀzÀ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ ºÉÆA¢gÀÄªÀ D¹ÛAiÀÄ «ªÀgÀUÀ¼ÀÄ ±ÉÃPÀqÀªÁgÀÄ PÉ¼ÀPÀAqÀAwzÉ.

¶205

«ªÀgÀUÀ¼ÀÄ	ªÉÄÃ®ÌAqÀ «µÉèÃµÀuÉAiÀÄAvÉ
D¹ÛUÀ¼À ªÀiË®å	gÀÆ. 64,99,299-57

¶206

- 39 -

¶207

RZÀÄðUÀ¼À MlÄÖ ªÀiË®å	gÀÆ. 82,84,130-06
D¹ÛUÀ¼À ªÀÄvÀÄÛRZÀÄðUÀ¼À ªÉÆvÀÛ	gÀÆ. 1,47,83,429-63
DzÁAiÀÄUÀ¼À MlÄÖ ªÉÆvÀÛ	gÀÆ. 1,53,12,704-70
DzÁAiÀÄQÌAvÀ ºÉaÑ£À D¹ÛUÀ¼À ªÉÆvÀÛ	(-) 5,29,275-07

¶208

ªÉÄÃ®ÌAqÀ «±ÉèÃµÀuÉAiÀÄAvÉ DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÀÄ gÀÆ.

¶209

5,29,275-07 ºÉaÑ£À DzÁAiÀÄ ºÉÆA¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ªÀiÁ£Àå ¸ÀªÉÇÃðZÀÒ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ DzÉÃ±ÀzÀAvÉ §®èªÀÄÆ®UÀ½VAvÀ ±ÉÃPÀqÁ 10gÀªÀgÉUÉ ºÉZÀÄÑªÀj D¹Û EgÀÄªÀ C¢üPÁjUÀ¼À£ÀÄß C©üAiÉÆÃf¸À®Ä ªÀÄAdÆgÁw ¤ÃqÀ¨ÉÃPÁVgÀÄªÀÅ¢®è. ¥Àæ¸ÀÄÛvÀ ¥ÀæPÀgÀtzÀ°è DgÉÆÃ¦vÀ C¢üPÁjAiÀÄªÀgÉÃ ºÉaÑ£À DzÁAiÀÄ ºÉÆA¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ªÉÄÃ®ÌAqÀ »£Éß¯ÉAiÀÄ°è ¸ÀzÀj C¢üPÁjAiÀÄ£ÀÄß C©üAiÉÆÃf¸À®Ä ªÀÄAdÆgÁw ¤ÃqÀÄªÀ ¸À¤ßªÉÃ±À EgÀÄªÀÅ¢®èªÁzÀÝjAzÀ C©üAiÉÆÃf¸À®Ä ªÀÄAdÆgÁw ¤ÃqÀÄªÀAvÉ vÁªÀÅ PÉÆÃjgÀÄªÀÅzÀ£ÀÄß ¸ÀPÁðgÀªÀÅ wgÀ¸ÀÌj¹zÉ JAzÀÄ vÀªÀÄUÉ w½¸À®Ä ¤zÉÃð²vÀ£ÁVzÉÝÃ£É.

¶210

The sanctioning authority applying its mind

¶211

and considering the entire material available on record

¶212

refused to grant sanction to prosecute respondent No.3 and the order of the sanctioning authority cannot be

¶213

40 -

¶214

amenable to judicial review. The sanctioning authority has referred and considered the entire aspect by considering all the circumstances and applied its mind to the facts of the case and rejected the application for sanction, which this Court is of the considered view that the same does not call for any interference. The second point framed for consideration is answered accordingly.

¶215