Dismissed

Smt. Nanki Bai v. the Deputy Commissioner

Karnataka HC22 May 2023WP/64733/2016

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

High Court of Karnataka dismissed a writ petition filed by legal heirs seeking restoration of tribal land granted in 1963. The Court held that a delay of 37 years rendered the application untimely, creating third-party rights and barring relief under the PTCL Act.

What did the court decide?

The Writ Petition was dismissed as devoid of merits; pending interlocutory applications are also dismissed.

Smt. Nanki Bai Vs the Deputy Commissioner — Property and Title | Karnataka HC (2023)

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1 - WP No. 64733 of 2016

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 22^ND DAY OF MAY, 2023

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM WRIT PETITION NO. 64733 OF 2016 (SC-ST)

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BETWEEN:

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SMT. NANKI BAI D/O LATE DEVALA NAIK AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS

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SMT. SEETHA BAI D/O LATE DEVALA NAIK AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS

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BOTH RESIDENTS OF GODIKOPPA THANDA SHIVAMOGGA

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…PETITIONERS

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Digitally signed by CHAITHRA A Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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(BY SRI. SANGAMESH G PATIL, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER SHIVAMOGGA DISTRICT SHIVAMOGGA

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THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER SHIVAMOGGA SUB-DIVISION SHIVAMOGGA

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SRI. APPA RAO S/O PAMPANNA PEDDALA VENKANNA MAJOR

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WP No. 64733 of 2016

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RESIDENT OF GOREBALLU CAMP SIDDANUR TALUK RAICHUR DISTRICT

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K.P.NARAYANASWAMY

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DEAD BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE SRI.METALDA MARY @ METALDA SANJEEVINI W/O LATE NARAYANASWAMY ASHOK NAGAR MAIN ROAD SHIVAMOGGA

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. BHARGAV P.G, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. S V PRAKASH, ADVOCATE FOR C/R4, NOTICE TO R.3 IS H/S V/O/D 26.09.2022)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDERS DTD 23.06.2009 PASSED IN CASE NO. PTCL CER-15/04-05 PASSED BY THE ASST COMMISSIONER, R-2 VIDE ANNX-G AND ALSO TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DT 3.11.2016 PASSED IN CASE NO.SC:ST4/14-15 BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SHIVAMOGGA, R-1 VIDE ANNX-H AND FOR FURTHER, DIRECT THE R-2 TO ALLOW THE APPLICATION FILED BY THE FATHER OF THE PETITIONERS AND TO ORDER FOR RESTORATION AND RESUMPTION OF THE LAND BEARING SY.NO.84/32, NEW SY.NO.142, MEASURING 3 ACRES, SITUATED AT MALLINGENAHALLI VILLAGE, SHIVAMOGGA TALUK IN FAVOUR OF THE PETITIONERS HEREIN AND ETC.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING - B GROUP, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

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WP No. 64733 of 2016

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ORDER

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This captioned writ petition is filed by the legal heirs of the original grantee feeling aggrieved by the order dated 23.06.2009 passed by respondent No.2 - Assistant Commissioner and order dated 03.11.2016 passed by respondent No.1 - Deputy Commissioner.

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Before I advert to the facts of the present case, it would be useful to refer to the judgments rendered by the Apex Court on this issue in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi .vs.

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State of Karnataka and another¹ and Vivek M. Hinduja .vs. M. Aswatha² . It would be also useful to refer to the judgment rendered by a Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.50446 of 2012, which was confirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.16/2021 disposed of on 05.04.2021.

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1 (2020) 14 SCC 232

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2 (2019) 1 Kant LJ 819 SC

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WP No. 64733 of 2016

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

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Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, while interpreting Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, (for short "PTCL Act") had an occasion to examine the point of limitation wherein interested person can file appropriate application seeking annulment of sale as void under Section 4 of the PTCL Act. The Apex Court by reiterating the principles laid down in Chhedi Lal Yadav .vs. Hari Kishore Yadav³ and also in the case of Ningappa .vs. Deputy Commissioner and others⁴ has held that where Statute did not prescribe the period of limitation, the provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. The Apex Court was of the view that the authorities have to give due regard to the period of time within which action has to be taken by the interested person. The Apex Court was of the view that it is well within the discretion of the competent authorities not to

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3 (2018) 12 SCC 527

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4 (2020) 14 SCC 236

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annul the alienations where there is inordinate delay in initiating action by the interested persons under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.50446/2012 disposed of on 24.1.2020 declined to entertain the application filed by the original grantee where there was a delay of ten years. This Court

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was of the view that the application itself was not maintainable since the same was not filed within a reasonable time. While recording the finding, this Court relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Ningappa vs.

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Deputy Commissioner and others, where the Apex Court had declined to entertain the application which was submitted after nine years seeking restoration of land under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act. The judgment rendered by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.50446/2012 is affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.16/2021.

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In the present case on hand, the grant was made on 19.07.1963. The original grantee sold the

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petition land in favour of respondent No.3 under registered sale deed dated 24.04.1967, who, in turn, sold it to respondent No.4 under registered sale deed dated 16.03.1987. In the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments cited supra, the only question that requires consideration at the hands of this Court is;

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As to whether after the death of original grantee, the legal heirs of original grantee are entitled to seek resumption of petition lands?

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments cited

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supra has categorically stated that where statute does not provide for limitation, the authorities-State must act consciously and if the process of invoking the provisions of statute is delayed and is initiated after long lapse of time, the delay by itself would act as an impediment. Thus, without exception and coming across various rules of law, the Apex Court has categorically stated the law in respect of exercise of power/jurisdiction under statute where no

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limitation is stipulated. The law in this regard is no more res-integra . Apart from embargo placed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in exercise of jurisdiction by the Authorities under the statute, where no limitation is specified, the law is well settled in respect of delay on the part of the litigants in seeking redressal of grievances.

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In the present case on hand, there is an inordinate delay of 37 years. In the instant case, diligence is woefully lacking. In the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments cited supra, the action is not initiated within reasonable time. There is a gross delay, which has let to creation of third party rights. The first sale is of the year 1967 in favour of respondent No.3. Respondent No.3, in turn, has sold to respondent No.4 on 16.03.1987.

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In the instant case, respondent No.2 - Assistant Commissioner has rejected the petition on the premise that petitioners, who claimed to be the legal heirs of

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original grantee, have not produced any documents to substantiate their claim that the petition land was granted

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to their ancestor Devala Naik. Respondent No.2 - Assistant Commissioner rejected the petition in the year 2009. The petitioners have not immediately preferred an appeal thereby questioning the order or respondent No.2 - Assistant Commissioner. The appeal is preferred only in the year 2016. Respondent No.1 - Deputy Commissioner has rejected the appeal only on the ground of delay. Respondent No.1 - Deputy Commissioner was dismissing the appeal found that no sufficient records are assigned to condone the delay. The appeal was preferred before respondent No.1 - Deputy Commissioner in the year 2009, while the appeal is preferred in the year 2016. Be that as it may, though both the Authorities have not examined the inordinate delay in seeking restoration in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgments cited supra. The restoration petition filed by the grantees family is not at all maintainable. In the

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preceding paragraphs, I have also recorded that there is a delay of 37 years.

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The principles laid down by the Apex Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav .vs. Hari Kishore Yadav⁵ [(2018) 12 SCC 527] is also squarely applicable to the present case on hand as there are series of transactions. The materials on record clearly reveals that the grant was made on 19.07.1963 and the original grantee sold the petition land in favour of respondent No.3 under registered sale deed dated 24.04.1967, who in turn sold to respondent No.4 under registered sale deed dated 16.03.1987. The Apex Court was of the view that if there is inordinate, unexplained and unjustified delay on the part of the applicant in seeking restoration of the land, such inaction would create a right in favour of other party. Therefore, the Apex Court was of the view that time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to preserve the rights and advantages which party possesses but equally

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5 (2018) 12 SCC 527

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10 -

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to protect each party from losses he ought not to suffer. The registered sale deeds are public documents and if after verifying the public documents, if citizens enter into further transaction believing such public documents to be genuine, the subsequent alienations cannot be set at naught by showing leniency to aggrieved party who has slept over his rights. If rights are crystallized on account of inaction on the part of the original grantee, the said application has to be rejected on this count also.

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For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the petitioners, who are legal heirs of original grantee, are not entitled to seek restoration of lands. The inaction on the part of the grantee has created third party rights. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to grant any reliefs to the petitioners. Hence, I pass the following;

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ORDER

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The Writ Petition is devoid of merits

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and accordingly, the same is dismissed.

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