The High Court of Karnataka dismissed a writ petition challenging a dismissal order imposed on a bank employee for issuing gold loans against spurious gold. The Court held that it cannot reappreciate evidence or interfere with the finding of fact unless the punishment shocks the conscience.
Petition stands rejected with no interference in the dismissal order.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2023 BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 107777 OF 2014 (S-DIS)
BETWEEN:
SMT. SANDHYA GURAV, PLOT NO. 6, “YASHSHREE” AGE: 48 YEARS, OCC: NIL, R/NO. 112/2, DWARAKA NAGAR, CHOUGALEWADI, TILAKWADI, BELGAUM.
… PETITIONER
(BY SRI. JAGADISH PATIL, SRI. SANJAY CHANNAL & SRI. S.S. PATIL, ADVOCATES)
AND:
VISHAL NINGAPPA PATTIHAL
Digitally signed by VISHAL NINGAPPA PATTIHAL Date: 2023.10.16 13:52:28 +0530
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… RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SURESH .S. GUNDI, ADVOCATE FOR R2 & R3; R1 & R4 ARE SERVED)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICELS 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 27.03.2014 PASSED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 ENCLOSED WITH A LETTER BEARING NO. DIS/CON/5475 DT.27.03.2014 SENT BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 VIDE ANNEXURE-H AND ETC.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
an order dated 27.3.2014 passed by the disciplinary authority imposing penalty of dismissal of service upon the petitioner. He would further challenge an order dated 12.6.2014 - the order of the appellate authority, affirming the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority.
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The petitioner at the relevant point in time was working
as a special assistant at the State Bank of India, ADB Branch Belagavi. She works in the said capacity between 2006-2011. At the time when she is working as a special assistant was also in-charge of granting of loans, for five years. the petitioner along with others grants several gold loans, which were granted against the deposit of the gold.
Those gold articles pleaded against loans, after the exit of the petitioner from the branch were found to be spurious and therefore, two proceedings were initiated. One a departmental enquiry against the petitioner and the Manage, and the other setting criminal law in motion. The enquiry
officer conducts a departmental enquiry and draw up his report on 25.2.2014 holding the petitioner guilty of the allegations. The petitioner submits her reply to the 2nd show cause notice and the same was found to be unsatisfactory, the disciplinary authority imposes penalty of dismissal from the service upon the petitioner. The petitioner then files an appeal before the appellate authority which comes to be rejected on 12.6.2014, affirming the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority. It is these orders that are called in question in the subject petition.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
would contend with vehemence that the petitioner at all times had taken care of the gold that was deposited in the bank. He would contend that after the petitioner left the branch, the incoming special assistant found that the gold was spurious and has reported the same to the competent authority, after four days. Therefore, he would submit that it is the act of the special assistant/Manager who was working at the relevant point in time, were also to be proceeded against at the time
when the petitioner left the bank. Apart from the said fact, learned counsel would submit that the respondent bank has practiced discrimination in imposition of penalty as penalty against the Manager, who had sanctioned the loan is stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect and penalty against the petitioner is dismissal form service. He would therefore seek parity in penalty in the least, to be imposed upon him, by an order of this Court.
would vehemently refute the submission to contend that the petitioner was a special assistant, so being against the gold articles, she has granted loans to several persons, most of whom were her relatives. All the gold articles received by her, and are deposited with the bank and therefore, at the time of granting of loan, if the petitioner has not verified, whether the gold is genuine or spurious, it is the petitioner, who has to be held responsible and nobody else. The Manager has only sanctioned the loans, who also has not been left off the hook, but is also imposed certain penalty. He would submit that the
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enquiry is conducted in accordance with law and the misconduct of the petitioner is grave that this Court should not interfere in the case at hand.
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
27.9.2012 and later was placed under suspension in contemplation of conduct of a departmental enquiry.
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Madam
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
You have been charge sheeted vide letter DIS CON/1793 dated 14.08.2013 for certain Inpses alleged to have been committed by you while working as Special Assistant at our Agriculture Development Branch, Belgaum.
In this connection, an enquiry was ordered vide this office letter DIS/CON/2136 dated 31.08.2013, which has concluded on 06.02.2014. The Enquiry Officer has submitted his report on 23.02.2014 and the same has been sent to you vide our letter No. DIS CON 4374 dated 25.02.2014. I have gone through the Enquiry Officer's Report. I have applied my mind independently on each of the documents and facts and had tentatively decided to impose the punishment on you as under:
“ DISMISSAL" without notice as provided for in para 6(A) of Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.04.2002 between IBA and Workman Union. Further, the period of suspension will be treated as such and not on duty.
The tentative punishment was advised to you vide our letter No.DIS/CON/5096 dated
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19.03.2014 and a personal hearing was accorded to you on 25.03.2014. However, you have not brought out any fresh facts other than those discussed during the enquiry proceedings that would have served to mitigate your punishment. I have, therefore, decided to confirm the tentative punishment and order accordingly.
A copy of my speaking order is enclosed with this letter.
The order comes into effect from the date it is served on you.
In case you desire to make an appeal, you may do so within 45 days from the date of receipt of this letter before the Appellate Authority &
Deputy General Manager(B&O Administrative Office, Hubli.
Please acknowledge receipt of this letter with date on each page of the duplicate copy enclosed.
9. The petitioner prefers an appeal and the appellate
authority affirms the order of the disciplinary authority by the following order:
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ORDER
I have gone through the Appeal made by Smt.Sandhya Gurav, Special Assistant (Dismissed), Belgaum ADB branch in regard to her punishment imposed by Disciplinary Authority & Regional Manager, (R-II) vide DIS/CON/5475 dated 27.03.2014. The Charge Sheet DIS/CON/1793 dated 14.08.2013 specifically alleged that
Charge a
The CSE had availed gold loans against the security of spurious gold in her name and in the names of her relatives in case of 12 loans as detailed in her Charge Sheet.
Charge b
The CSE was instrumental in sanction of gold loans against spurious gold in case of 23 loans as detailed in her Charge Sheet.
Charge c
The CSE had not ensured the genuineness and purity of gold ornaments pledged against the gold loans as detailed in Charge a & b of her Charge Sheet.
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Charge d
The CSE had not obtained the borrowers photos in case of 21 loans as detailed in her Charge Sheet, in accordance
with Bank's laid down instructions.
Charge e
The CSE had not obtained introduction of the borrowers in accordance with Bank's laid down instructions in case of 20 loans as detailed in her Charge Sheet.
I have also gone through the order of the Disciplinary Authority.
In CSE's Appeal I find no new facts or extenuating factors which can contribute to change the punishment order of the Disciplinary Authority.
The punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority "DISMISSAL" as provided for in term of 6(A) of Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.04.2002 between IBA & Workmen Union, just and fair.
During the personal hearing granted to CSE on 09.06.2014 and in her submission thereafter s has not brought out any new facts which would have served to mitigate her punishment.
The charges are multiple and serious in nature. The punishment has been gauged and awarded by the Disciplinary Authority after considering all aspects of the matter.
The CSE has pleaded for leniency on compassionate considerations. However, there is no room for compassion in disciplinary matters and it is my view that the punishment should be appropriate to the crime. In this respect, the Disciplinary Authority has eminently succeeded in his task and I feel that the punishment of "DISMISSAL" as provided for in terms of 6(A) of Memorandum of Settlement dated 10.04.2002 between IBA & Workmen Union, imposed by him is just and fair. Further, the period of suspension will be treated as such and not on duty.
In conclusion, I uphold the orders of the Disciplinary Authority.
enquiry. The petitioner was a Special Assistant was in-charge of grant of loans and it is an admitted fact that the petitioner has granted loans to several, most of whom are the relatives of the petitioner. What is required under the norms for grant of gold loan is the gold being assessed by the official goldsmith of the bank, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner has not got the gold assessed from the hands of an official goldsmith. The other fraud played by the petitioner is the applications for grant of gold loan must have photographs of the applicants on it, it is admitted fact that the petitioner has not taken any of the photographs of any person who has been granted such loan. This is the finding of the enquiry officer which is affirmed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. There is no document that is produced before the Court which would demonstrate otherwise by the petitioner.
sanctioning the gold loan to various accounts has only acted
on the note put by the petitioner and has to sanction loans. Therefore, he is also not left scot-free, two increments of him have also been cut with cumulative effect. Therefore, there is no ground that would warrant interference in the case at hand. Any interference at the hands of this Court would run
foul of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union
of India and others V.s. P.Gunasekaran, reported in
(2015) 2 SCC 610.
“ 12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
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(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
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14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] , many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao [(1975) 2 SCC 557 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 349 : AIR 1975 SC 2151] , the principles have been further discussed at paras 21-24, which read as follows: (SCC pp. 561-63)
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723] . First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence
and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548] said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case [(1969) 1 SCC 502 : (1969) 3 SCR 548] this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shutdown of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on 31-5-1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be
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accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477] .)
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24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do.”
16. These principles have been succinctly summed up by the living legend and centenarian V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 298] . To quote the unparalleled and inimitable expressions: (SCC p. 493, para 4)
“4. … in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor textbooks, although we have been taken through
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case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.”
17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up to the latest in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38] , these principles have been consistently followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything.
18. On Article I, the disciplinary authority, while imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement in the impugned order dated 28-2-2000, had arrived at the following findings:
“Article I was held as proved by the inquiring authority after evaluating the evidence adduced in the case. Under the circumstances of the case, the evidence relied on viz. letter dated 11-12-1992 written by Shri P. Gunasekaran, provides a reasonable nexus to the charge framed against him and he did not controvert the contents of the said letter dated 11-121992 during the time of inquiry. Nor did he produce any defence witness during the inquiry to support his claims including that on 23-11-1992 he left the office on permission. There is nothing to indicate that he was handicapped in producing his defence witness. …”
19. The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to reappreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford Dictionary is “moral uprightness; honesty”. It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence, etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values.
21. The impugned conduct of the respondent working as Deputy Office Superintendent in a sensitive department of Central Excise, according to the disciplinary authority, reflected lack of integrity warranting discontinuance in service. That view has been endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal also. Thereafter, it is not open to the High Court to go into the proportionality of punishment or substitute the same
with a lesser or different punishment. These aspects have been discussed at quite length by this Court in several decisions including B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] , Om Kumar v. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039] , Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn. [(2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68] , Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri [(2009) 15 SCC 620 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 499] and the recent one in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply.
The Hon’ble Apex Court holds that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be loathe to interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer, which are affirmed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, unless it finds the procedural aberration or violation of the principles of natural justice. None of these facts are projected in the case at hand. The loans that are granted, even if they are recovered, the acts of the petitioner in granting loans on spurious gold to her relatives left, right and center, cannot be seen to be knocking at the door of this court seeking its indulgence or interference under Article 226 of the
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Constitution of India, finding no merit in the petition, petition stands rejected.
Sd/JUDGE
vb/ct:bck List No.: 1 Sl No.: 44
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the disciplinary order dismissing the petitioner for granting gold loans against spurious gold.
Whether the High Court erred in reappreciating evidence affirmed by competent authorities under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Whether the punishment of dismissal shocks the conscience of this Court warranting interference.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Union of India and others V.s. P.GunasekaranFollowed¶101
(2015) 2 SCC 610 · Who else cites this
State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama RaoFollowed¶129
AIR 1963 SC 1723 · Who else cites this
State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata RaoFollowed¶134
[(1975) 2 SCC 557] · Who else cites this
Railway Board v. Niranjan SinghFollowed¶137
[(1969) 1 SCC 502] · Who else cites this
Syed Yakoob v. K.S. RadhakrishnanReferred¶141
AIR 1964 SC 477 · Who else cites this
State of Haryana v. Rattan SinghFollowed¶145
(1977) 2 SCC 491 · Who else cites this
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali BabuFollowed¶149
(2014) 4 SCC 108 · Who else cites this
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of IndiaReferred¶158
B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749] · Who else cites this
Union of India v. G. GanayuthamReferred¶158
Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463] · Who else cites this
Om Kumar v. Union of IndiaReferred¶158
Om Kumar v. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC 386] · Who else cites this
Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn.Referred¶158
Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn. [(2007) 4 SCC 669] · Who else cites this
Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar ChoudhuriReferred¶158
Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri [(2009) 15 SCC 620] · Who else cites this
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Smt. Sandhya Gurav
Vishal Ningappa Pattihal
The Chairman, State Bank Bhavan, Mumbai
The Disciplinary Authority and Regional Manager (R-II), S.B.I., Belgaum
The Appellate Authority and Deputy General Manager (B & O), SBI, Hubli
The Regional Manager (R-II), State Bank of India, Belgaum
M. Nagaprashanna
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
