Dismissed

Smt. Yashodha v. Smt. Rashmi. J

Karnataka HC27 Nov 2023RFA/2010/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

An appellant nominated by a deceased policyholder filed a regular first appeal challenging a trial court decree that declared her legal heirs entitled to equal shares of insurance proceeds despite her nomination. The High Court upheld the trial court's decision, dismissing the appeal.

What did the court decide?

Appeal dismissed. Impugned order and decree confirmed. Insurance companies directed to disburse amounts equally among all three legal heirs within one month.

Smt. Yashodha Vs Smt. Rashmi. J — Insurance | Karnataka HC (2023)

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1 - NC: 2023:KHC:42955 RFA No. 2010 of 2023

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27^TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2023

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 2010 OF 2023 (DEC/INJ)

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BETWEEN:

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SMT. YASHODHA W/O SEENAPPA K, AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS, R/AT NO 145, 2^ND MAIN, 1^ST CROSS, K K LAYOUT, PAPAREDDYPALYA, NAGHARABHAVI 2^ND STAGE, BENGALURU 560 072.

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…APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. KUMARA K G. AND SRI. SURESH.B., ADVOCATES)

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AND:

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Digitally signed by VANDANA S Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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SMT. RASHMI. J W/O LATE ROHITH S, AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, PRESENTLY R/AT NO. 15/1, 5^TH MAIN, 4^TH A CROSS, J C NAGAR, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM LAYOUT, BENGALURU 560 086.

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BABY LAKSHARA D/O LATE SRI ROHITH S, AGED ABOUT 2 YEARS, PRESENTLY R/AT NO 15/1, 5^TH MAIN, 4^TH A CROSS, J C NAGAR, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM LAYOUT, BENGALURU 560 086. REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN SMT RASHMI J.

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TATA AIA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED REGISTERED AND CORPORATE OFFICE AT 14^TH FLOOR, TOWER A PENINSULA BUSINESS PARK, SENAPATI BAPTAP MARG LOWER PAREL, MUMBAI 400013

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POLICY SERVICE BRANCH OFFICE AT NO 474, 6^TH BLOCK, 80 FT ROAD, KORAMANGALA, BENGALURU 560 094. REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.

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SBI LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD CENTRAL PROCESSING CENTRE 7^TH LEVEL D WING, 8^TH LEVEL SEA WOODS GRAND CENTRE TOWER 2, PLOT NO R-1, SECTOR 40, SEA WOODS NERUL NODE, THANE DISTRICT, MUMBAI 400 706. SERVICE BRANCH OFFICE AT SBI LIFE INSURANCE CO LTD PLOT NO 96/04, 3^RD FLOOR, CHANDRASALES, SOUTH END ROAD BASAVANAGUDI, BANGALORE 560 004. REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR.

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LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA LIC NO 6, ANNAPOORNA COMPLEX 7^TH MAIN, 80FT ROAD III BLOCK KORAMANGALA, BENGALURU 560 034. SERVICING BRANCH OFFICE AT LIC OF INDIA, YESHWANTAPURA, BR OFFICE 12/12, GMN COMPLEX, 1^ST MAIN I PHASE, GOKULA MATIEKERE BENGALURU 560 054 REPRESENTED BY ITS DIVISIONA MANAGER.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI.VIVEK HOLLA AND OTHERS.,ADVOCATES FOR C/R-1 & R-2)

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THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 14.09.2023 PASSED IN OS NO. 1448/2022 ON THE FILE OF THE LXI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU, DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND INJUNCTION.

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THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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JUDGMENT

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Though the appeal is posted for admission, with the consent of both sides, the trial court records were summoned and the matter was taken up for final disposal.

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This appeal by the 1^st defendant in O.S.1448/2022 is directed against the impugned order / judgment and decree dated 14.09.2023 passed by the LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, whereby the application I.A.No.6 filed by respondents 1 and 2 – plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC was allowed by the trial court, which proceeded to decree the suit in favour of the plaintiffs against the defendants.

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Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Senior counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and perused the material on record.

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The material on record discloses that the appellant is the mother of late Rohit.S, who expired / died interstate on 07.12.2021. The respondents 1 and 2 are the wife and minor daughter of the deceased Rohit upon whose demise, the appellant (mother), respondent No.1 (wife) and respondent No.2 (daughter) succeeded to his estate as his Class-I heirs and legal representatives under

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Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The respondents 3 to 5 are Insurance companies, in which the deceased Rohit had made investments and obtained insurance policies.

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The respondents 1 and 2 – plaintiffs instituted the aforesaid suit inter alia contending that though they were entitled to 2/3^rd share (1/3 + 1/3) in estate of late Rohit including the schedule insurance policies, which were investments made by him in respondents 3 to 5 – defendants 2 to 4 / Insurance companies, their requests for disbursement / payment of the said amounts were not complied with by the Insurance companies on the ground that the said Rohit had nominated his mother, the appellant – defendant No.1 as his nominee in the Insurance policies. Under these circumstances, the respondents 1 and 2 – plaintiffs instituted the aforesaid suit for declaration that they were entitled to 2/3^rd share (1/3 + 1/3) in the schedule insurance policies and for consequential permanent injunction to not only restrain the defendants 2 to 4 from disbursing the said amounts in favour of defendant No.1 but also for mandatory injunction directing the said Insurance companies from paying / disbursing to the plaintiffs and

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defendant No.1 their respective 1/3^rd share each in the suit schedule properties.

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The said suit was contested by the defendants, who filed their written statement. The defendants 2 to 4 - Insurance companies stated that the said late Rohit had nominated his mother - defendant No.1 as his nominee in relation to the schedule insurance policies and that they would abide by any order / direction to be passed by the trial court regarding payment of the policy amounts in favour of the parties. However, the defendant No.1 opposed the claim of the plaintiffs and contended that by virtue of her nomination by late Rohit and Section 39(7) of the Insurance Act, 1938 as amended vide Central Act No.5 of 2015 w.e.f. 26.12.2014, she alone would be entitled to the entire amounts covered under the schedule insurance policies to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, who would not be entitled to any share in the schedule insurance policies and accordingly, the defendant No.1 sought for dismissal of the suit.

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During the pendency of the suit, the respondent 1 and 2 – plaintiffs filed the instant application I.A.No.6 under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC requesting the trial court to pass the judgment and decree in

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their favour on the basis of the admission made by the defendant No.1 – appellant in her written statement. It was inter alia contended by the plaintiffs that since the appellant had admitted that they were the wife and daughter of late Rohit and in the light of the well settled position / principle of law that mere nomination under Section 39 of the Insurance Act would not create any vested

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/ absolute right in favour of the appellant / nominee, who stood in the position of only an agent / trustee of the other legal heirs, viz., the respondents 1 and 2 – plaintiffs and the appellant would be liable to receive the policy amounts and disburse / distribute the same equally amongst the appellant and respondents 1 and 2, no useful purpose would be served in directing trial to be conducted in the instant case, particularly when no disputed / complicated / complex questions of fact arose for consideration in the suit. It was therefore contended by the plaintiffs that in the light of the admission made by the appellant - defendant No.1, the suit deserved to be decreed in their favour.

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The appellant filed her objections to I.A.No.6 and reiterated the various contentions urged by her in the written statement and contended that in view of her nomination in relation

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to the schedule insurance policies by the aforesaid late Rohit and Section 39(7) of the Insurance Act, she alone would be beneficially entitled to the entire amounts covered under the policies and since the plaintiffs would not be entitled to put forth any claim in relation to the schedule insurance policies, the question of allowing I.A.No.6 and decreeing the suit in their favour would not arise and as such, the said application was liable to be dismissed.

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After hearing the parties, the trial court came to the conclusion that in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sarbati Devi vs. Usha Devi – (1984) 1 SCC 424, which had been followed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Arun Kumar Singh v/s Smt. Jaya Singh and Others – Civil Revision No.38/2021 dated 22.09.2022, mere nomination of the appellant by late Rohit in the schedule insurance policies would not have the effect of conferring upon her absolute right over the policies and the amounts covered thereunder would become part of his estate and governed by the law of succession applicable to him and since both the appellant and respondents 1 and 2 were Class-I heirs, all of them would be entitled to 1/3^rd share each in the suit schedule properties. The trial court also held that the judgment of

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the Delhi High Court in the case of Shweta Singh Huria vs. Santosh Huria – AIR 2021 DEL 121, cannot be relied upon by the appellant, since no ratio was laid down by the Court, which did not decide / adjudicate upon the said issue but remitted the matter back to the trial court for reconsideration afresh in accordance with law. Further, the trial court also noticed that there was a clear admission by the appellant – 1^st defendant regarding not only the relationship between the parties but also that all of them were Class-I heirs of late Rohit and coupled with the admission made by the defendants 2 to 4 – Insurance companies that they would abide by any order / directions to be passed / issued by the trial court as regards payment / disbursement of the policy amounts, it was a fit case to invoke and exercise its powers under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and decree the suit in favour of the plaintiffs on the basis of the said admissions made by the defendants. Aggrieved by the impugned order passed on I.A.No.6 and consequential judgment and decree of the trial court, appellant – 1^st defendant is before this Court by way of the present appeal.

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Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the following points arise for consideration in the present appeal;

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(i) Whether the trial court was justified in allowing the application I.A.No.6 filed by the plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC and consequently, decreeing the suit in their favour against

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the appellant – 1^st defendant and defendants 2 to 4?

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(ii) Whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial court warrants interference in the present appeal?

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Re-Point Nos.1 and 2:-

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The material on record discloses that it is an undisputed fact that late Rohit son of appellant – 1^st defendant and husband and father of respondents 1 and 2 – plaintiffs died intestate on 07.12.2021 leaving behind all of them to succeed equally to his estate as his Class-I heirs and legal representatives. The issue, as to whether a nominee of an insurance policy would be entitled to claim the entire amount covered under the policy is no longer res integra in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in Sarbati Devi’s case supra, wherein it is held as under:-

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“ 5. We shall now proceed to analyse the provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The said section provides that a holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the

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policy shall be paid in the event of his death. If the nominee is a minor, the policy-holder may appoint any person to receive the money in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. That means that if the policy-holder is alive when the policy matures for payment he alone will receive payment of the money due under the policy and not the nominee. Any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed, but before such cancellation or change is notified to the insurer if he makes the payment bona fide to the nominee already registered with him, the insurer gets a valid discharge. Such power of cancellation of or effecting a change in the nomination implies that the nominee has no right to the amount during the lifetime of the assured. If the policy is transferred or assigned under Section 38 of the Act, the nomination automatically lapses. If the nominee or where there are nominees more than one all the nominees die before the policy matures for payment the money due under the policy is payable to the heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate. It is not necessary to refer to sub-section (7) of Section 39 of the Act here. But the summary of the relevant provisions of Section 39 given above establishes clearly that the policy-holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy-holder. If that is so, on the death of the policy-holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by

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the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a ‘statutory testament’ in para 16 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] . If Section 39 of the Act is contrasted with Section 38 of the Act which provides for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenuous character of the right of a nominee would become more pronounced. It is difficult to hold that Section 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in sub-section (6) of Section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered.

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8. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] . In this case the High Court of Delhi clearly came to the conclusion that the nominee had no right in the lifetime of the assured to the amount payable under the policy and that his rights

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would spring up only on the death of the assured. The Delhi High Court having reached that conclusion did not proceed to examine the possibility of an existence of a conflict between the law of succession and the right of the nominee under Section 39 of the Act arising on the death of the assured and in that event which would prevail. We are of the view that the language of Section 39 of the Act is not capable of altering the course of succession under law. The second error committed by the Delhi High Court in this case is the reliance placed by it on the effect of the amendment of Section 60(1)(kb) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 providing that all moneys payable under a policy of insurance on the life of the judgment debtor shall be exempt from attachment by his creditors. The High Court equated a nominee to the heirs and legatees of the assured and proceeded to hold that the nominee succeeded to the estate with all ‘plus and minus points’. We find it difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to an heir or legatee having regard to the clear provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The exemption of the moneys payable under a life insurance policy under the amended Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure instead of ‘devaluing’ the earlier decisions which upheld the right of a creditor of the estate of the assured to attach the amount payable under the life insurance policy recognises such a right in such creditor which he could have exercised but for the amendment. It is because it was attached the Code of Civil Procedure exempted it from attachment in furtherance of the policy of

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Parliament in making the amendment. The Delhi High Court has committed another error in appreciating the two decisions of the Madras High Court in Karuppa Gounder v. Palaniamma [AIR 1963 Mad 245 at para 13 : (1963) 1 MLJ 86 : ILR (1963) Mad 434] and in B.M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation of India [AIR 1977 Mad 72 : 47 Com Cas 19 : (1977) 1 MLJ 59 : ILR (1975) 3 Mad 336] . The relevant part of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] reads thus: (AIR p. 40, paras 10, 11)

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“10. In Karuppa Gounder v. Palaniamma [AIR 1963 Mad 245 at para 13 : (1963) 1 MLJ 86 : ILR (1963) Mad 434] , K had nominated his wife in the insurance policy. K died. It was held that in virtue of the nomination, the mother of K was not entitled to any portion of the insurance amount.

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11. I am in respectful agreement with these views, because they accord with the law and reason. They are supported by Section 44(2) of the Act. It provides that the commission payable to an insurance agent shall after his death, continue to be payable to his heirs, but if the agent had nominated any person the commission shall be paid to the person so nominated. It cannot be contended that the nominee under Section 44 will receive the money not as owner but as an agent on behalf of someone else, vide B.M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation [AIR 1977 Mad 72 : 47 Com Cas 19 : (1977) 1 MLJ 59 : ILR (1975) 3 Mad 336] . Thus, the nominee excludes the legal heirs.”

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12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere

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nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case [AIR 1978 Del 276] and in Uma Sehgal case [AIR 1982 Del 36 : ILR (1981) 2 Del 315] do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.

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13. In view of the above conclusion, the judgments and decrees of the High Court, the first appellate court and the trial court are liable to be set aside. They are accordingly set aside. Since it is not disputed that the plaintiffs are under the law of

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succession governing them each entitled to one-third share in the estate of the deceased, it is hereby declared that each of the plaintiffs is entitled to one-third share in the amount received under the insurance policies in question and the interest which may have been earned by its investment. The suit stands decreed accordingly.”

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11.1 The aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court has been followed subsequently in several judgments by the Apex Court including the case of Challamma vs. Tilaga & others – (2009) 9 SCC 299, as well as this Court, wherein it is held that mere nomination of the appellant by late Rohit in the schedule insurance policies would not have the effect of conferring upon her absolute right over the policies and the amounts covered thereunder would become part of his estate and governed by the law of succession applicable to him and since both the appellant and respondents 1 and 2 were Class-I heirs, all of them would be entitled to 1/3^rd share each in the suit schedule properties. In this context, it is relevant to state that the entire claim of the appellant is based upon the amendment to Section 39(7) and (8) of the Insurance Act, 1938 vide Central Act No.5 of 2015 w.e.f. 26.12.2014. It is contended that by virtue of the said amendment and since the deceased Rohit

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expired subsequently on 07.12.2021, the appellant – nominee shall be beneficiary entitled to the amount payable by the Insurance companies exclusively to herself and the respondents 1 and 2 would not be entitled to any share in the schedule insurance policies.

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11.2 Before adverting to the said contentions, it is necessary to point out that even prior to the aforesaid amendment to Section 39, in Vishin N.Khanchandani vs. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani – (2000) 6 SCC 724 and Ram Chander Talwar vs. Devender Kumar Talwar – (2010) 10 SCC 671, the Apex Court while dealing with provisions of Section 6 of the Government Savings Certificate Act, 1959 and Section 45-ZA of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, both of which provided a non-obstante clause, which contemplated that a nominee would have the right to receive payment and become entitled to be paid the amounts covered under insurance policies to the exclusion of all other persons, categorically held that despite the existence of the nonobstante clause and the other expressions referred to supra, a nominee would be entitled to only receive the amounts as a trustee / agent and cannot be treated as being equivalent to a legal heir or a legatee, since nomination would not create an independent kind

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of succession which can be termed as “statutory testament” in favour of the nominee, as a result of which, he / she would be liable to disburse the amounts in favour of all heirs in accordance with the

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law of succession applicable to the said person.

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11.3 In the instant case, since reliance is placed upon Section 39(7) and (8) of the Insurance Act, 1938 the same are hereby reproduced for ease of reference:-

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“ 39. Nomination by policyholder. —

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(7) Subject to the other provisions of this section, where the holder of a policy of insurance on his own life nominates his parents, or his spouse, or his children, or his spouse and children, or any of them, the nominee or nominees shall be beneficially entitled to the amount payable by the insurer to him or them under sub-section (6) unless it is proved that the holder of the policy, having regard to the nature of his title to the policy, could not have conferred any such beneficial title on the nominee.

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(8) Subject as aforesaid, where the nominee, or if there are more nominees than one, a nominee or nominees, to whom sub-section (7) applies, die after the person whose life is insured but before the amount secured by the policy is paid, the amount secured by the policy, or so much of the amount secured by the policy as represents the share of the nominee or nominees so dying (as the case may be), shall be payable to the heirs or legal representatives of the nominee or nominees or the holder

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of a succession certificate, as the case may be, and they shall be beneficially entitled to such amount.”

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11.4 Section 39(7) states that a nominee shall be beneficially entitled to the amount payable by the insurer; however, the usage of the expression “ subject to the other provisions of this section” in Section 39(7) and absence of any other provision which has the effect of vesting / creating / conferring absolute right in favour of the nominee by divesting his / her heirs from claiming any right in the insurance policy amounts is a clear pointer / indicator to the fact that even after Section 39(7) was amended vide Act No.5 of 2015 w.e.f. 26.12.2014, the legal position / principles enunciated by the Apex Court in Sarbati Devi’s case supra and Challamma’s

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case supra, had not undergone any material / substantial change or alteration so as to enable / entitle the nominee to claim an indefeasible / absolute / exclusive right over the policy amounts to the exclusion of his / her legal heirs, who would otherwise be entitled to the same in terms of the law of succession governing them; in other words, even after amendment to Section 39(7), a nominee remains only a trustee / agent and cannot be treated as a legatee and the amount received under the insurance policy would become part of the estate of the deceased and liable to be

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distributed among all his legal heirs in accordance with the law of succession. Under these circumstances, no reliance can be placed upon the amendment to Section 39(7) of the Insurance Act by the appellant to contend that she alone would be entitled to claim the entire policy amounts without distributing the same amongst herself and the plaintiffs.

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11.5 In Kohinur Sikder vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India – 2022 SCC Online GAU 2330 , and Arun Kumar Singh v/s Smt. Jaya Singh and Others – Civil Revision No.38/2021 dated 22.09.2022, while dealing with the amended provisions of Section 39(7) supra, the High Courts of Gauhati and Madhya Pradesh respectively, also considered the earlier judgment of the Delhi High Court in Shweta Singh’s case supra , and came to the conclusion that even after amendment, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Sarbati Devi’s case supra, continues to hold the field and a nominee could not claim absolute right over any amounts covered by insurance policies which were liable to be distributed among all the legal heirs. As rightly held by the trial court in the impugned order, the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Shweta Singh’s case supra , was not applicable, since the matter was remitted back to the trial court and no law / ratio was laid down by the Delhi

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High Court. Under these circumstances, the contention urged on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted.

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11.6 A perusal of Section 39(8) supra will also indicate that

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the same applies to a situation where after the expiry of the policy holder and before payment is made, the nominee also expires; the usage of the words “or so much of the amount secured by the policy as represents the share of the nominee or nominees so dying (as the case may be)” is also an indicator / pointer of the fact that the nominee / nominees would be entitled to only to their legal share in the policy amount, which would be payable to their heirs and legal representatives and not the entire amount covered under the policy; to put it differently, in the event, the policy holder dies, making a nomination and leaving behind legal heirs to succeed to his estate including the policy amounts and if the nominee also dies before the amounts are paid / disbursed, the heirs of the nominee would be entitled to the limited extent of the share of the nominee / nominees and cannot claim the entire policy amount, which would have to be distributed equally among all the legal heirs of the deceased policy holder. Viewed from this angle also, the intention of the legislature not to confer any absolute / exclusive right upon the nominee can be discerned and consequently, the legal position

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/ principles enunciated in Sarbati Devi’s case supra and reiterated subsequently stands confirmed and affirmed even after the amendment to Section 39 of the Insurance Act and the contention of the appellant is liable to be rejected on this ground also.

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11.7 As stated supra, despite the existence of a nonobstante clause and usage of specific words in other enactments referred to supra, the Apex Court has categorically held that the basic principle underlying the right of a nominee is not dependent on the language employed in the provisions but is based on the premise that the insurance policy amounts become part of the estate of the deceased and the nominee would not be entitled to claim exclusive right over the same, which would necessarily have to be distributed among all his legal heirs. Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the trial court was fully justified in passing the impugned order allowing I.A.No.6 and consequently, decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs.

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11.8 Upon re-appreciation, re-evaluation and reconsideration of the entire material on record, the impugned judgment and decree cannot be said to be suffered from any illegality or infirmity nor can the same be said to be capricious or

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perverse warranting interference by this Court in the present appeal.

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Point Nos. 1 and 2 are accordingly answered against the appellant.

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In the result, I pass the following:-

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ORDER

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(i) Appeal is hereby dismissed.

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(ii) The impugned order passed on I.A.No.6 as well as the impugned judgment and decree both dated 14.09.2023 passed in O.S.No.1448/2022 by the trial court is hereby confirmed.

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(iii) The respondents 3 to 5 – defendants 2 to 4 / Insurance companies are directed to disburse the subject policy amounts equally in favour of the appellant and respondents 1 and 2 in the ratio of 1/3^rd each in favour of each of them as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

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SV/SRL

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Sd/JUDGE

Smt. Yashodha v. Smt. Rashmi. J

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Smt. Yashodha v. Smt. Rashmi. J

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