not establish that the death was the result of a rash or negligent act or that any such act was the proximate and efficient cause of the death. If that were so, the acquittal of the appellant for contravention of the provisions of the Act and the Rules would itself have been an answer and we would have then examined to what extent additional evidence of his acquittal would have to be allowed, but since that is not the criteria, we have to determine whether the appellant's act in giving only one batch number to all the four lots manufactured on November 12, 1962, in preparing Batch No. 211105, was the cause of deaths and whether those deaths were a direct consequence of the appellants' act, that is, whether the appellants' act is the direct result of a rash and negligent act and that act was the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another's negligence. As observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap, the act causing the deaths “must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the cause sine qua non”. This view has been adopted by this Court in several decisions. In Kurban Hussein Mohammedali Rangwala v. State of Maharashtra, the accused who had manufactured wet paints without a licence was acquitted of the charge under Section 304-A because it was held that the mere fact that he allowed the burners to be used in the same room in which varnish and turpentine were stored, even
