“9. That apart, it could be seen from the definition of `Land' in the Act that though it comprehends in the first part land actually cultivated or cultivable, the latter exclusionary part of the definition, "but does not include house site or land used exclusively for nonagricultural purposes" makes it abundantly clear that the actual and exclusive user for non-agricultural purposes, even the land otherwise cultivable or capable of being used for any purposes related to agriculture as enumerated therein, would stand excluded and fall outside the purview of the said definition in Section 2(A)(18) of the Act. When the land in question is itself not 'land' as defined for the purposes of the Act, there is no scope or room for falling back on the so-called object or aim of the legislation to extend the provisions of the Act to areas specifically left outside it against the express legislative mandate and will, policy and intention. In addition thereto, the facts specifically disclosed and categorically found by the High Court on the basis of the materials on record would equally belie the claim of the appellant being a 'tenant' as defined in Section 2(A)(34) of the Act.”
