Allowed

Kadappa Satyappa Terani v. Siddappa Khandappa Terani

Karnataka HC2 Sept 2022RSA/1483/2005

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This court allowed an appeal against an appellate order that rejected an adoption claim. The court held that evidence of an ancient adoption from 1947 was valid despite strict statutory gaps, emphasizing spiritual intent over formal rituals and applying estoppel to the natural siblings questioning the status.

What did the court decide?

The second appeal is allowed; the judgment and decree of the district appellate court setting aside the adoption are set aside; the judgment and decree of the trial court recognizing the adoption are

Kadappa Satyappa Terani Vs Siddappa Khandappa… — Succession and Inheritance | Karnataka HC (2022)

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MOHANKUMARB SHELAR Digitally signed byMOHANKUMAR BSHELARDate: 2022.09.1515:23:03 +0530

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 2^ND DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2022

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BEFORE

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THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

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R.S.A NO. 1483 OF 2005(PAR)

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BETWEEN:

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SRI. KADAPPA SATYAPPA TERANI, AGE: 75 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O NIRVANAHATTI-591309 TALUK HUKERI, DIST: BELGAUM SINCE DEAD BE HIS LRS

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1A. SRI. VIRUPAXI BASAGOUDA MADDGI AGE: 52 YEARS, OCC: AGRI R/O SHIRAGAON – 591309 TAL: HUKERI, DIST: BELGAUM.

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...APPELLANTS

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(BY SRI.B.S.KAMATE, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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SRI.SIDDAPPA KHANDAPPA TERANI, AGE: 65 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O SHIRAGAON-591309, TALUK: HUKERI, DIST: BELGAUM

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SRI.SHIVALINGAPPA KHANDAPPA TERANI, AGE: 60 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O SHIRAGAON-591309, TALUK: HUKERI, DIST: BELGAUM.

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SRI.VIRUPAXI BASAGOUDA MUDALAGI AGE: 55 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O NIRVANAHATTI-591309, TALUK: HUKERI, DIST: BELGAUM.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI.ANAND.R.KOLLI, ADVOCATE FOR R1(NOC OBTAINED); SRI.G.BALAKRISHNA SHASTRY, ADVOCATE FOR R2; SRI.JAGADISH PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R3)

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THIS RSA IS FILED U/S 100, OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 16.04.2005 PASSED IN R.A.NO.14/2000 ON THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN), HUKKERI, ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DT: 31.01.2000 PASSED IN O.S.NO.253/93 ON THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (JR.DN), HUKKERI AND ETC.,

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THIS RSA HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 15.02.2022, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THIS COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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JUDGMENT

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The captioned second appeal in RSA.No.1483/2005 is filed by plaintiff No.1 questioning the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court in modifying the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and granting 1/3^rd share to plaintiff No.1 in the suit schedule property.

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2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are

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referred to as per their rank before the Trial Court.

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3. The family tree of the parties is as under:

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Mallappa (deceased)

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--------------------------------------------------------| | Khandeppa Satteppa | Kadappa (Plff-No.1) | Adopted son | (died on 17/07/2006) ------------------------------------------------------| | | | | | Kadappa Siddappa Shivalingappa Parwatevva | (Adopted to (Def No.1) (Def No.2) | | Satteppa under | | the adoption | | deed dtd:8/8/1947 | | Regd.on 13/8/1947 | | Virupaxi | (Plff No.2) | |

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Virupaxi(LR) (As per High Court Order dtd.28/8/2007 Vide regd. WILL dtd.31/5/2000).

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4. The first plaintiff by claiming to be the adopted son

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of Satteppa instituted a suit for partition and separate

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possession in O.S.No.253/1993 claiming half share in the suit

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schedule property. By asserting that he is an adopted son, first plaintiff claimed that he represents the branch of Satteppa and therefore, he is entitled for half share. While plaintiff No.2 claimed to be the beneficiary under the gift deed executed by plaintiff No.1.

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4(a) Defendants on receipt of summons contested the proceedings and stoutly denied the entire averments made in the plaint. The defendants seriously disputed that first plaintiff is the adopted son of Satteppa. Defendants alleged that first plaintiff was addicted to vices and inspite of repeated warnings, the first plaintiff did not mend his ways. Defendants further contended that first plaintiff left the house way back in 1979 and started residing with his sister Parwatevva. Defendants seriously disputed the adoption as well as the alleged gift deed in favour of second plaintiff.

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4(b) Plaintiffs and defendants let in oral and documentary evidence. The Trial Court on examination of the material on record decreed the suit by holding that first

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plaintiff is the adopted son and accordingly, allotted half share to first plaintiff.

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4(c) Feeling aggrieved, defendants 1 and 2 preferred an appeal in R.A.No.14/2000 questioning the finding of the Trial Court on the question of adoption. The Appellate Court having independently assessed the oral and documentary evidence, however, reversed the finding of the Trial Court recorded on adoption. While examining the issue relating to adoption, the Appellate Court was of the view that there is no evidence indicating the act of giving and receiving which is essential for valid adoption. Referring to the material on record, the Appellate Court came to the conclusion that requisite formalities relating to adoption are not pleaded in the plaint and there is no evidence to that effect. On these set of reasoning, the Appellate Court reversed the finding of the Trial Court. The Appellate Court modified the decree and granted 1/3^rd share to plaintiff No.2 who was asserting right through plaintiff No.1.

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4(d) The first plaintiff feeling aggrieved by the finding on

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adoption rendered by the Appellate Court has preferred the captioned second appeal.

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This Court vide order dated 30.1.2006 has

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formulated the following substantial questions of law:

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“Whether the lower appellate court was justified in reversing the findings of the trial court by holding that the plaint does not disclose the ingredient of adoption?”

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The learned counsel appearing for first plaintiff questioning the findings recorded by the Appellate Court vehemently argued and contended that there are pleadings at para 2 of the plaint relating to the customs prevailing in the community. He would further contend that the ceremony relating to giving and taking is also narrated in para 2 of the plaint. Referring to Ex.P9 he would further contend that the document itself speaks and briefly states about the ceremony relating to adoption and also reasons to take adoption. He would further point out that the Appellate Court being the final

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fact finding authority has misread the entire evidence on record and has also not examined the adoption deed which is marked at Ex.P9. He further points out that the adoption deed is dated 8.8.1947, registered on 13.9.1947 and the same is acted upon. The learned counsel appearing for first plaintiff would contend that the defendants who are the genitive brothers of first plaintiff have no locus standi to question the status of deceased first plaintiff. He would further contend that the dispute started only when first plaintiff resolved to bequeath his share in favour of second plaintiff who is none other his nephew. Adoption was never disputed. To buttress

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his arguments, he has placed reliance on following judgments:

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“1. AIR 1991 SC 1180 – Kondiba Rama Papal Alias Shirke (dead) by his heirs and LRs and another Vs. Narayan Kondiba Papal.

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2. ILR 2010 KAR 5694 – Ramu Baddu Lamani Vs. Revanasiddayya Channaveerayya Muddabihalmath (deceased) by his LRs and others.

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3. LAWS (SC) 2012(2) 65 – Param Pal Singh Through father Vs. National Insurance Co.”

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He has also placed reliance on commentary on adoption by Mulla. Referring to Note 447, he would contend that the objects of adoption are two fold: the first is religious, to secure spiritual benefit to the adopted and his ancestors by having a son for the purpose of offering funeral cakes and libations of water to the manes of the adopted and his ancestors. The second is secular, to secure an heir and perpetuate the adopter’s name. The Supreme Court, agreeing with earlier decisions of the Privy Council, has expressed the view that the validity of an adoption is to be determined by spiritual rather than temporal considerations and that devolution of property is only of secondary importance.

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Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for defendants has seriously disputed the status of first plaintiff. Referring to the document vide Ex.P9, he would vehemently argue and contend that genitive parents have not signed the adoption deed and there is absolutely no evidence indicating giving and taking of child under adoption. Therefore, he would

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contend that absence of ceremonies of adoption would invalidate the adoption. He would further contend that mere presence of genitive father when the ceremony of adoption took place would not be sufficient to meet the statutory requirements. Referring to the material on record, he would contend that first plaintiff was living with genitive brothers and therefore, he would counter the claim made by plaintiffs in regard to adoption. He would also submit that absence of signature of genitive parents on the adoption deed would invalidate the adoption. He would contend that if genitive father was present at the time of registering the deed, then genitive father ought to have signed the adoption deed. Therefore, he would contend that presence of father is quite doubtful. He would also contend that plaintiff No.1 has not laid any foundation before placing reliance on certified copy of the adoption deed. To buttress his arguments, he has relied on following judgments:

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“1. Vidyadhar Vs. Mankikrao – LAWS(SC)-19993-34.

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2. Ram Awadh (dead) by LRs. And Others Vs. Achhaibar Dubey and Anr – LAWS(SC)-2000-2-104”

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Heard the learned counsel appearing for first

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plaintiffand the learned counsel appearing for defendants.

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Plaintiffs to substantiate that plaintiff No.1 is the adopted son of Satteppa, first plaintiff has examined himself as P.W.1 and plaintiff No.2 is examined as P.W.2 and an independent witness is examined as P.W.3. Certified copy of the adoption deed is produced at Ex.P9. Plaintiff No.1Kadappa is the elder son of Khandappa which is evident from the family tree which is culled out supra. The adoption is dated 8.8.1947.

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P.W.3 is an independent witness aged about 79 years. He has stated in his evidence that first plaintiff was taken in adoption by Satteppa. He has stated that first plaintiff was adopted on Friday and all formalities of Datta Home ceremony were performed during the course of

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adoption. He has also stated that one Basayya Swamiji was also present. He has also stated that residents of surrounding houses and relatives were also invited and the genitive father of first plaintiff expressed his willingness to give first plaintiff in adoption. He has further stated that after performance of Datta Home ceremony, sweets were exchanged and Swamiji had uttered all requisite mantras. After three to four days of Dattaka ceremony, the adoption deed was executed and the same was registered. He has also stated that deceased Khandappa and Satteppa requested P.W.3 to act as a witness and he has signed the adoption deed. This witness has withstood the test of cross-examination and nothing substantial is elicited in his cross-examination.

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What this Court has to bear in mind is that adoption is of the year 1947. Therefore, it is in this background, the validity of adoption has to be determined not on the anvil of statutory requirements set out under the Act but by assessing entire material on record and conduct of parties. The

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conclusion whether there was an adoption is essentially one of fact merely depending upon pure appreciation of evidence on record. From the genealogical tree what can be gathered is adoption is within the family. The first plaintiff is the genitive brother of defendants 1 and 2. In the present case on hand, it is not the adoptive parents or genitive parents of plaintiff No.1 who are questioning the adoption deed. On the contrary, the genitive brothers of first plaintiff after almost lapse of 47 years of adoption, are disputing the status of first plaintiff. Their denial is obviously with a specific motive. All these litigations are on account of bequeath made by first plaintiff in favour of second plaintiff and also on account of gift deed executed by first plaintiff in favour of second plaintiff.

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All was well till first plaintiff was residing with defendants 1 and 2. Had first plaintiff not created any testamentary arrangement, the defendants 1 and 2 in all probability were anticipating that the property held by Satteppa’s branch would revert back and their share would

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stand enhanced. Therefore, this Court has to examine the present lis through the prism of the inter se arrangement within the family on account of adoption and subsequent testamentary arrangement made by plaintiff No.1.

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If the adoption is found to be ancient and if direct evidence is lacking due to long lapse of time, every allowance for absence of evidence shall be favourably entertained by the Courts and therefore, there has to be relaxation in appraisal of evidence. There also has to be relaxation while examining the pleadings in regard to ‘giving and taking’ of the child. Though there is some vagueness in the pleadings, however, at para 2 of the plaint there is a reference in regard to ‘giving and taking’.

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Therefore, by producing the certified copy of adoption deed coupled with evidence of P.W.3, plaintiffs have discharged their initial burden. Therefore, the burden would shift on defendants to disprove the adoption even though

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there is no direct evidence indicating ‘giving and taking’ which is essential for valid adoption. Method of appreciation of evidence of old adoption cannot be strictly assessed. It is also a trite law that the requirement of adoptive father asking natural father for adoption of a boy is immaterial when delivery of adoptee is proved. It is also a trite law that if factum of adoption is proved by sufficient evidence, then it is not necessary for the party to prove every part of the ceremonies or formalities for completing the adoption. In the present case on hand, the situation would not arise where the adoption of plaintiff would dislocate the natural succession to the branch of Satteppa.

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This Court also has to take note of the judgment rendered by the Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in Veerabhadrayya R. Hiremath vs. Irayya A.F. Basayya Hiremath¹ . This Court was of the view that except genitive parents, adoptive parents and the adopted son, others have

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1 ILR 2006 K 1740

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no locus to question the validity of adoption. The principles laid down by the Co-ordinate Bench are squarely applicable to the present case on hand.

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The clinching evidence on record clearly

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demonstrates that first plaintiff on adoption was transplanted in adoptive family and therefore, there was severance of all ties of first plaintiff with his natural family. The documents placed on record by both the parties clearly indicates that first plaintiff is shown as Satteppa Terani. In several documents, it is forthcoming that his name is shown as Kadappa adopted son of Satteppa Terani. Therefore, it is clearly evident that defendants were well aware of first plaintiff’s adoption and therefore, I am of the view that defendants are estopped from disputing the adoption. It is more than trite that a correct Rule of Estoppel applicable in case of adoption is that it does not confer status. It shuts out the mouth of certain persons if they try to deny the adoption. The evidence on record clearly reveals that adoption is of the year 1947 and the present suit

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is filed in 1993, almost after 46 years. The evidence clearly indicates that the adoption is acted upon and therefore, the status of adoption of first plaintiff cannot be negated and set at naught at the instance of genitive siblings of first plaintiff i.e. defendants. The object of adoption are two fold: the first is religious, to secure spiritual benefit to the adopted and his ancestors by having a son for the purpose of offering funeral cakes and libations of water to the manes of the adopted and his ancestors. The second is secular, to secure an heir and perpetuate the adopter’s name. The Supreme Court, agreeing with earlier decisions of the Privy Council, has expressed the view that the validity of an adoption is to be determined by spiritual rather than temporal considerations and that devolution of property is only of secondary importance.

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For the foregoing reasons, the substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered in negative. The Appellate Court has totally misread the evidence on record and therefore, erred in holding that first plaintiff has failed to prove

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the requisite ceremonies of adoption. The finding of the Appellate Court that plaintiffs have failed to prove the validity of adoption of first plaintiff is perverse, palpably erroneous and contrary to evidence on record.

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