the period during which circumstances were beyond anybody’s control, the same should flow from a statutory provision. Since we have already concluded, that Sections 99 and 100 of the Municipal Corporations Act are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case, and since, no other provision, which can be stated to be applicable has been brought to our notice, we are satisfied, that reference made to Section 509 of the Municipal Corporations Act, has to be accepted as the only source of refuge in the facts of the present case. We therefore, hereby, accept the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel representing respondents 2 to 4. In the aforesaid view of the matter it is not necessary to examine the remaining contentions advanced on behalf of the learned Counsel for the rival parties. (insofar as the first contention is concerned). For the reasons recorded herein above, we find no merit in the first contention submitted at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioners.