Dismissed

Smt. Kamalamma v. the State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC15 Feb 2021WA/126/2021

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The State of Karnataka appealed against the Single Judge's dismissal of a writ petition filed by a Scheduled Caste woman challenging the restoration of land to her predecessor's heirs. The High Court upheld the dismissal, finding the appeal barred by laches due to an 11-year delay and affirming that the land falls under the Prohibition of Transfer Act.

What did the court decide?

Given liberty to the appellant to seek recovery of the sum of `85,000/- paid under compromise if not returned.

Smt. Kamalamma Vs the State of Karnataka — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Karnataka HC (2021)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15^TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2021

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PRESENT

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THE HON’BLE MRS.JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA

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AND

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THE HON’BLE MRS.JUSTICE M.G.UMA

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W.A.No.126/2021 (SC –ST)

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BETWEEN:

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Smt. Kamalamma, W/o Gopalappa, Aged about 64 years, R/at Health Quarters, Lakkavalli Hobli, Tarikere Taluk, Chikkamagalur District.

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And also at: Opp: Kuvempu University, Shankaragatta Post, Badravathi Taluk, Shivamogga District. … Appellant

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(By Sri. Shankara Narayana Bhat, Advocate)

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AND:

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The State of Karnataka, Rep. by its Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Karnataka, Vidhana Soudha, Bangalore – 560 001.

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The Deputy Commissioner, Chikkamagalor District, Chikkamagalore – 577 101.

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The Assistant Commissioner, Tharikere Sub-Division, Tharikere – 577 228. Chickkamagalur District.

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Thasildar, Tharikere Taluk – 577 228. Chickkamagalore District.

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Sri. Srinivas, S/o late Papanna @ Papabhovi, Aged about 56 years, Mandravalli Village, Lakkavalli Hobli, Tharikere Taluk, Chikkmagaluru District – 577 228. And also at: Mallapura Village, Mydolalu Post, Holehonnor Hobli, Badravathi Taluk, Shivamogga District – 577 301. … Respondents

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(By Sri. Ajay Kumar.M., Advocate for Sri. M.Rudraiah For C/R-5)

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This appeal is filed under Section 4 of Karnataka High Court Act praying to issue an appropriate order or direction, set-aside the order passed in WP.No.39368/2014 dated 14/12/2020 (SC-ST) and allow the Writ Petition as prayed for.

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This appeal coming on for Preliminary Hearing this day, NAGARATHNA, J., delivered the following:

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JUDGMENT

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The legality and correctness of the order dated 14.12.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.39368/2014 is called in question in this appeal.

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Briefly stated, the facts are that, in Sy.No.2P measuring 4 acres of land situated in Doddakundur Village, Lakkavalli Hobli, Tarikere Taluk, was granted in favour of Papanna on 21.01.1962. Papanna, the original grantee, sold the said land on 13.07.1989. The legal heirs of the original grantee initiated proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner alleging violation of the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PTCL Act’, for the sake of brevity). The Assistant Commissioner, by his order dated 22.08.2002, allowed the application and ordered restoration of land in question in favour of the legal heirs of the original

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grantee. The purchaser/appellant herein, being aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Commissioner, filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, who, by his order dated 28.10.2003 dismissed the appeal while affirming the order of the Assistant Commissioner, directing restoration of land. Thereafter, according to learned counsel for the appellant, there was compromise arrived at between the parties on 12.07.2003 as per Annexure-J to the writ petition, which was during the pendency of the appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, under which, a sum of `85,000/- is said to have been paid by the appellant to the 5^th respondent herein, son of the original grantee. Subsequent to the dismissal of the appeal by the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 28.10.2003, no other proceeding was initiated by the appellant herein. According to the appellant, there was one more compromise entered into between the parties on 12.05.2009 as per Annexure-K to the writ petition. However, on 30.07.2014, notice as per

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Annexure-A to the writ petition was issued by the 3^rd respondent - Assistant Commissioner seeking resumption of land by eviction of the appellant from the land. The said notice along with the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 22.08.2002 and the order

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of the Deputy Commissioner dated 28.10.2003 were assailed by the appellant herein in W.P.No.39368/2014.

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The learned Single Judge, by the impugned order, has dismissed the writ petition both on the ground of delay as well as on merits. Hence, this appeal.

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We have heard learned counsel, Sri Shankara

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Narayana Bhat for the appellant, Sri Ajay Kumar M., learned counsel for Sri M.Rudraiah, learned counsel for

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the caveator respondent No.5 and learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondents 1 to 4 on advance notice and perused the material on record.

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Learned counsel for the appellant made a two

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fold submissions: firstly, he submitted that there was no

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delay in approaching this Court in filing the writ petition as there was a compromise entered into between the appellant and respondent No.5 on 12.07.2003 and subsequently on 12.05.2009, under which, a sum of `85,000/- was paid by the appellant to respondent No.5 in order to save the land in question from being restored to respondent No.5 pursuant to the order of the Assistant Commissioner and thereafter by the order of the Deputy Commissioner. That the appellant was under a bonafide belief that respondent No.5 would not initiate any further action pursuant to the orders of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. However, all of a sudden, notice dated 30.07.2014 was issued by the Assistant Commissioner for the purpose of resumption of land by eviction of appellant, so as to restore the same to respondent No.5. The same was the catalyst for approaching this Court in the year 2014 itself and there was no delay as such in approaching this Court. That the learned Single Judge ought not to have

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dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches.

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Secondly, learned counsel for the appellant

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contended that the land in question does not come within the meaning of “granted land” under Section 3(b) of the PTCL Act. That the land in question was granted to the father of respondent No.5 by way of compensation pursuant to submergence of some other extent of land belonging to the father of respondent No.5 and the said grant was made by the Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, the said grant would not come within the scope and ambit of the expression “granted land” under Section 3(b) of the PTCL Act. If that is so, the provisions of the said Act would not apply to the land in question. The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant and instead, has held that there is no merit in the petition. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the writ petition may be admitted and heard finally.

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Per contra, learned counsel for the caveator – respondent No.5 supported the order of the learned Single Judge and contended that any land granted to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe would come within the scope of the expression “granted land” under Section 3(b) of the PTCL Act. It is not in dispute that the father of respondent No.5, the original grantee, belonged to the scheduled caste community. Therefore, the initiation of the proceedings under the provisions of the PTCL Act was justified as there was violation of Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the PTCL Act, inasmuch as no permission was taken from the State Government prior to alienation being made by the original grantee to the appellant herein. Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner as well as the Deputy Commissioner were justified in accepting the application filed by respondent No.5 herein. That the appellant herein did not file the writ petition in time, instead, it was filed only when notice dated 30.07.2014 was issued, whereas, the order of the Deputy

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Commissioner was passed in the year 2003 and there was a long delay and laches of eleven years on the part of the appellant herein. He contended that there is no merit in the appeal and the same may be dismissed.

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Learned Additional Government Advocate

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appearing for respondents 1 to 4 also endorsed the submissions of learned counsel for respondent No.5 and submitted that there is no merit in the appeal.

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The detailed narration of facts and contentions would not call for reiteration except highlighting the fact that the original grantee, father of respondent No.5 herein was granted land in the year 1962. There is no dispute that the original grantee as well as respondent No.5 herein belonged to scheduled caste community. There is also no dispute that on initiation of proceedings by respondent No.5 before the Assistant Commissioner, the order of resumption and restoration was made and thereafter, the appeal was

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also dismissed on 28.10.2003 by the Deputy Commissioner. Thereafter, no writ petition was filed assailing the orders of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner before this Court for a period of eleven years. It is only when the said orders was sought to be implemented by issuance of notice dated 30.07.2014 by the Assistant Commissioner seeking eviction of the appellant from the land in question and resumption and restoration of the same to respondent No.5, the appellant has approached this Court.

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The long delay of eleven years in approaching this Court is sought to be explained by the appellant by placing reliance on two documents dated 12.07.2003 and 12.05.2009 being Annexures-J & K respectively to contend that there was compromise entered into between the appellant and respondent No.5, under which, a sum of `85,000/- was paid by the appellant to respondent No.5. Therefore, the appellant thought it unnecessary to approach this Court in view of the said

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compromise and the appellant approached this Court in the year 2014, when, despite compromise entered into between the appellant and respondent No.5, on 30.07.2014, the Assistant Commissioner issued a notice of eviction, resumption and restoration against the appellant herein.

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We have considered this contention and we hold that any compromise entered into between the appellant and respondent No.5 did not efface or denude the efficacy of the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. Those orders were not assailed for over a decade. It was only for the purpose of giving effect to those orders that the notice for eviction was issued by the Assistant Commissioner on 30.07.2014. Irrespective of any compromise entered into between the appellant and respondent No.5, the appellant ought to have taken steps to approach this Court in time to ensure that the orders of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner which were

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against her were considered and set aside. The same not having been done in time, the alleged compromise entered into between the parties cannot be considered to be sufficient reason to condone the delay and laches in approaching this Court. Therefore, learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches.

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The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is with regard to the land in question not coming within the scope and ambit of the expression “granted land” under the provisions of the PTCL Act. The expression “granted land” under Section 3(b) of the PTCL Act reads as under:

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“3. Definitions: (1) In this Act, unless the

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context otherwise requires.-

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(a)….

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(b) “Granted Land” means any land granted by the Government to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and includes land allotted or granted to

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such person under the relevant law for the time being in force relating to agrarian reforms or land ceilings or abolition of imams, other than that relating to hereditary offices or rights and the word “Granted” shall be construed accordingly;”

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On reading of said expression, it becomes clear that any land granted by the Government to a person belonging to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe would come within the scope of the expression “Granted Land”. What is exempted from the said expression is only the land relating to hereditary offices. What is significant is a grant being made to a person belonging to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. The circumstances or the reasons for the said grant does not have any importance when any land is granted to a scheduled caste or schedule tribe. If in violation of the provisions of the PTCL Act, if it is transferred, then the provisions of the said Act would apply. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention of appellant’s counsel that the land in question in the instant case was

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not ‘granted land’ as the Land Acquisition Officer has granted the said land in view of submergence of other extent of land belonging to the father of respondent No.5. The fact that the original grantee belonged to scheduled caste and that the land in question was a granted land, is sufficient for application of the definition of Section 3(b) of the PTCL Act (Grante Land) to the instant case. Hence, we do not find any merit in the writ petition and we find that the order of the learned Single Judge on merits is also just and proper. Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

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At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that pursuant to the compromise entered into between the parties, a sum of `85,000/was paid by the appellant to respondent No.5, at least that amount may be returned by respondent No.5 to the appellant.

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Learned counsel for respondent No.5 submits that if really respondent No.5 has received a sum of `85,000/- from the appellant under compromise entered into on 12.07.2003 and 12.05.2009, he would advise them to return it and not otherwise.

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