Allowed

Ramesh S/O Chunnilal Parmar, v. Smt.Sudha

Karnataka HC9 Apr 2021RSA/100969/2016

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed second appeals challenging the dismissal of specific performance and refusal of permanent injunction. The Court held the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness due to a cancellation letter sent in 2000, thus not enforcing specific performance but awarding refund of purchase money with interest.

What did the court decide?

Specific performance refused; refund of Rs. 3,00,000 with 18% interest granted; permanent injunction in favor of appellant allowed.

Ramesh S/O Chunnilal Parmar, Vs Smt.Sudha — Specific Performance | Karnataka HC (2021)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH

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DATED THIS THE 9^TH DAY OF APRIL 2021

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BEFORE

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THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N.K.SUDHINDRARAO

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R.S.A.No.100969/2016 c/w R.S.A.No.100970/2016

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IN RSA NO.100969/2016

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BETWEEN

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RAMESH S/O CHUNNILAL PARMAR, AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: C-1, GROUND FLOOR, RAMDATTA APARTMENT, KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI-580023.

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.....APPELLANT

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(BY SRI HANUMANTHAREDDY SAHUKAR, ADV. & SRI S.S. NIRANJAN, ADV.)

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AND

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SMT.SUDHA W/O RAJENDRA HUILGOL, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O: R.K. NAGAR, PLOT NO.60, DHARWAD.-580001

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M/S RAMDATTA BUILDERS (P) LTD., KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI BY RAMESH BINDURAO KULKARNI,

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THE MANAGING DIRECTOR AND G.P.A. HOLDER OF RESPONDENT NO. 2 TO 6.

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2A) RAMESH BINDURAO KULKARNI,

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2B) R.G. KULKARNI, 2C) B.M. BALAGANUR,

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ALL ARE MAJOR, OCC: MANAGING DIRECTOR AND BUSINESS RESPECTIVELY, RO: ENKAY COMPLEX, 3^RD FLOOR, BLDG. NO.III, KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI-580023.

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M/S PRADEEP BROTHERS COTTON MERCHANT & COMMISSION AGENTS A PARTNERSHIP FIRM BY ITS PARTNER S.H. SAPARE, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI-580023.

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S.H. SAPARE, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI-580023.

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PRAKASH S. SAPARE, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI-580023.

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SATISHCHANDRA SAPARE,

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AGE: MAJOR, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI-580023.

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PRADEED S. SAPARE, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI-580023.

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RAMESH S/O KRISHNAMURTHY MUSALE, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: SERVICE, R/O: C/1/B, AIR QUARTERS, UNIVERSITY, POST: GOA-403206.

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DIVAKAR S/O SEETARAM HEGDE, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: RAILWAY EMPLOYEE, R/O: R.G. QUARTERS, RAILWAY STATION, GADAG ROAD, HUBBALLI-580020.

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…..RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI A.R. PATIL, ADV. FOR R-1 R-2(A), R-2(B), R-2(C), R-3 TO R-7 & R-9 HELD SUFFICIENT R-8 SERVED UNREPRESENTED)

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THIS RSA IS FILED U/SEC 100 CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED: 27.07.2016 PASSED IN RA.NO.53/2010 ON THE FILE OF V ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, AT DHARWAD SITTING AT HUBBALLI, DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED:22.12.2009 PASSED IN OS.NO.274/2000 ON THE FILE OF THE III ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE (SRN.DN) AT HUBBALLI, DECREEING THE SUIT FILED FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT AND POSSESSION.

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IN RSA NO.100970/2016

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BETWEEN

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RAMESH S/O CHUNNILAL PARMAR, AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC: BUSINESS, R/O: C-1, GROUND FLOOR, RAMDATTA APARTMENT, KESHWAPUR, HUBBALLI-580023.

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.....APPELLANT

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(BY SRI HANUMANTHAREDDY SAHUKAR, ADV.)

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AND

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SMT.SUDHA W/O RAJENDRA HUILGOL, AGE: MAJOR, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK, R/O: R.K. NAGAR, PLOT NO.60, DHARWAD.-580001

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…..RESPONDENT

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(BY SRI A.R. PATIL, ADV. FOR R-1)

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THIS RSA IS FILED U/SEC 100 CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED: 27.07.2016 PASSED IN RA.NO.52/2010 ON THE FILE OF V ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, AT DHARWAD SITTING AT HUBBALLI, DISMISSING THE APPEAL AND CONFIRMING THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED:22.12.2009 PASSED IN OS.NO.1/2004 ON THE FILE OF THE III ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) AT HUBBALLI, DISMISSING THE SUIT FILED FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION.

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THESE APPEALS COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING THIS DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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JUDGMENT

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These two second appeals under Section 100 of C.P.C. are directed against the judgment and decree

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passed in two regular appeals filed under Section 96 of C.P.C. which were directed against the judgment and decree in two original suits. They are represented

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as under:

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Sl. No.	R.S.A.	R.A.	O.S.	Preferred by
1)	100969/2016	53/2010	274/2000	Sudha W/o. Rajendra Huilgol
2)	100970/2016	52/2010	1/2004	Ramesh Chunnilal Parmar

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Two suits are interconnected to each other. One

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suit is filed for specific performance and another for permanent injunction. On conclusion of the trial, learned trial Judge dismissed the suit in O.S.No.1/2004 filed for permanent injunction and

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decreed the suit in O.S.No.274/2000. Thereafter the plaintiff in O.S.No.1/2004 filed preferred two appeals in R.A.Nos.52/2010 & 53/2010 however the said appeals also came to be dismissed. Against which he has filed these second appeals.

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In order to avoid confusion and overlapping, parties are hereinafter referred in accordance with the rakings in the original suit.

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The appellant in both the appeals is the plaintiff in injunction suit and defendant No.9 in the suit for specific performance of contract. The suit in O.S.No.274/2000 was filed by one Smt. Sudha against the defendant No.9 for the relief of specific performance of contract dated 25.03.1998 and also for the relief of possession and alternatively for the relief of recovery of Rs.3,75,000/- with interest at the rate of 24% per annum. The suit for permanent

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injunction is filed by one Ramesh S/o. Chunnilal Parmar, who is defendant No.9 in O.S.No.274/2000 for the relief of permanent injunction against Smt. Sudha (plaintiff in O.S.No.274/2000). However, the suit for specific performance came to be decreed and the suit for permanent injunction came to be dismissed.

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The prime claim of the plaintiff/Smt. Sudha in O.S.No.274/2000 is that she entered into an agreement to purchase Flat No.2, Ground Floor, ‘C’ Block apartment with 830 sq.ft bearing CTS No.404 and 405 of Ward No.1, Keshwapur, Hubli. Defendants 2 to 6 were represented by Power of Attorney, defendant No.1, in executing the sale deed.

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The total sale consideration was

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Rs.3,00,000/- and on the date of agreement of sale, Rs.2,00,000/- was given to the defendant No.1 as

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earnest money. Defendant No.2 has passed on the receipt. Out of the balance consideration amount of Rs.1,00,000/-, on 06.11.1998 she paid an amount of Rs.80,000/- but the defendant did not execute registered sale deed. It is also claimed by the plaintiff that defendants 2 to 7 executed final sale deed in favour of defendant No.9 who in turn filed suit for permanent injunction against the plaintiff/Smt. Sudha. It is also stated that defendant No.9 has purchased the schedule property from defendant No.8 through registered sale deed dated 22.07.2003 and has been in actual possession and enjoyment of the property. Defendant No.9 who has purchased the property on 22.07.2003 continued in possession of the schedule property. The suit in O.S.No.274/2000 came to be decreed and suit for injunction came to be dismissed. Now the suit consists various facts and incidents, in

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the sense several proceedings have taken place and several documents were entered into.

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The learned trial Judge considering the

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oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit filed for specific performance and dismissed the

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suit filed for permanent injunction. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court, Ramesh has preferred regular appeals before the first appellate court which came to be dismissed. Against which, Ramesh has filed these second appeals as stated above.

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While admitting the appeals, this court has framed the following substantial questions of law:

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i) Whether the orders passed by the Courts below are justified in law in view of Ex.D3 which is a latter said to have been written by the plaintiff/respondent No.1?

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ii) Whether the plaintiff/respondent No.1 was unwilling and unprepared to perform her part of obligation under agreement of sale by writing a letter under Ex.D3?

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iii) Any other substantial question of law that arises for consideration at the time of final hearing?

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I find that the following additional substantial

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question of law would arise for consideration:

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Whether non-consideration of Ex.D-3 proves fatal to the case of the plaintiff?

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The learned counsel Sri. Hanumanth Reddy

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Sahukar submits that he appears for the contesting defendants in the suit and any meddling with the schedule property would only hurt their interest. Further, he submits that the sale deed no doubt was executed by defendant No.7 in favour of the appellant with a valid right, title, interest and possession on 22.07.2008. It is also submitted that the plaintiff/Smt.

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Sudha who had entered into an agreement to purchase the schedule property from the defendant sent a letter of cancellation of the contract.

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Learned counsel for respondent No.1

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submits that the trial Court has clearly forgone rights of agreement and did not cancel through Ex.D-3. But in the judgment of the appellate Court Ex.D-3 is not discussed anywhere there is no document which is being discussed in the appellate Court.

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The letter by Smt. Sudha the plaintiff in the suit for specific performance is marked as Ex.D.3

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and the contents of the same are as under:

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“From. Smt.Sudha K. Huilgol, Basappa Painter house, Saranaika road, Extension, Bagalkot. 2.3.2000

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To. M/s. Ramadatt Builders Pvt. Ltd., Enkay Complex, 3^rd Floor Building, Keshwapur, Hubli-580023

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Dear Sir,

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Sub: Cancellation of Flat No.1/G-Floor/C block.

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I the undersigned, Smt. Sudha R. Huilgol, owner of Flat No-1, G-Floor/C Block, due to some domestic problems thinking of canceling my flat. Hence I request you to

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kindly cancel the same and sell it and credit the same to my S.B.A/c.No.22824/17 of Vijay Bank, Bagalkot. I am herewith enclosing the copy of my sale deed for your reference.

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Thanking you,

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(Sudha R Huilgol) Yours faithfully.”

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This cancellation endorsement is as per Ex.D12. It is seen that it is also marked in other cases. It is written on 03.03.2000. Thus, the learned counsel for appellant would submit that the plaintiff had no subsisting interest over the schedule property and he has purchased the schedule property for valuable consideration from defendant No.8. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would further submit that the agreement which the plaintiff had entered into, if any, stood redundant.

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There is no dispute regarding the property being constructed by Vidya Builders. Smt. Sudha had retained the sale agreement. But she was missed.

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It was also submitted that the plaintiff was

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not entitled for the relief of specific performance in O.S.No.274/2000. Even as per Section 14(2) of the

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Specific Relief Act and there was no cause of action to the suit and on the date of the sale deed, the plaintiff

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had no locus-standi to buy the property nor the sellers were entitled to do so.

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In the facts and circumstances, the following

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points are amply clear:

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The sale agreement in favour of defendant No.9.

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*Defendants 1 to 6 together filed a suit and executed sale deed in favour of L. Narasimha.

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*The property was purchased by defendant No.9 from defendant No.8 under Ex.D1/Agreement.

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The phase-I of the proceedings is that defendants claimed to have executed sale agreement dated 14.05.1998 and in pursuance, of the samem, the sale deed was executed. Here the learned counsel

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for the defendants submits that the agreement was cancelled through Ex.P3, but in the judgment of the Appellate Court, defendant No.3 is not discussed anywhere. There is no document, which is being discussed in the Appellate Court.

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Under this stage, one of the proceedings is

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that defendants No.1 to 6 is said to have executed an agreement on 25.03.1998 to defendant No.9.

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Before coming to the point it is necessary to state that the plaintiff was put in possession. Meanwhile, several cases for recovery of land against defendant were stated to have been filed. Such as O.S.No.63/2002 and 1/2004.

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The trial Court also observes that before any other particulars it was sufficient for going into the pleadings of the evidence of the plaintiff of O.S.No.274/2000 which is clear that respondent No.1

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was made to come to the Court of law on receipt of summons and alleged dispossession based on the sale deed on the other.

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The appellant acquired the property on 14.02.2000 wherein the defendant No.1 has

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registered agreement of conveying on possession of the schedule property from 25.03.1998. This is nothing but the sale agreement on which the plaintiff Sudha is claiming relief according to her sale consideration i.e., Rs.3,00,000/- advance given was Rs.2,00,000/- and subsequently Rs.95,000/- was paid. It is also stated that the defendants requested plaintiff that they sought time. On approaching them, several times plaintiff had no other alternative except to file suit for specific performance and that specific performance is the suit under this appeal.

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Defendant No.1 is the company of the

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defendants, No.2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. One example of their syndicate type of company is, defendant No.1 executed a sale agreement in favour of plaintiff on behalf of defendants No.2 to 6. It is in the further circumstances what has happened is the further site holder or others filed suits such as O.S.Nos.66/2002 and 428/2002 and gathering facts and circumstances of this cases are not worth mentioning here. Defendant No.1 was authorized to be represented on behalf of the defendants No.2 to 6. The appellate Court observes that no doubt trial Court in its discretion has granted not only the costs and damages also mesne profits to the extent of RS.3,000/- per month available to the relief to the plaintiff and these were tricks to deny the sale agreement. Meanwhile, there are also instances of the defendants availing

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loan from the bank. The fact remains that they are builders.

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The plaintiff-Sudha was represented by

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her husband who was examined as PW-1 and PW-2 is

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her father in law. In his evidence it is elicited from him that completion certificate is not issued to the schedule property. He admits that defendant No.7 being in Goa has not locked the house. It is also elicited that the order of injunction in a suit for injunction filed by Divakar in O.S.No.428/2000. Above all, the next question that come up is Ex.D-3 is dated 02.03.2000. Meanwhile, it is necessary to note that registered sale deed had not been executed in favour of the plaintiff even till the filing of the suit and hence suit for specific performance was filed. Meanwhile, defendants No.1 to 6 executed sale agreement in favour of defendant No.7 on 04.01.2000. Later the defendant No.7 coming to

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know about these facts, executed the registered sale deed of the schedule property in favour of defendant No.8 on 14.02.2000. It is defendant No.8 who sells the schedule property to defendant No.9 on 22.07.2003. Here it is necessary to mention the nature of the estate business and how certain builders and developers make use of law to their favour by keeping the customers in complete darkness and equally who transact with them did not verify the veracity of the representation and later in order to get part relief they also spoil their cases and also start representing helter and skelter.

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It is necessary to note that plaintiff-Sudha

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examined her husband as PW-1. Ex.D-3 is stated to be a letter dated 02.03.2000 written by plaintiff and it is addressed to the syndicate of defendants builders seeking for cancellation of agreement. Last 3 lines read as under:

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“Hence, I request you to kindly cancel the same and sell it and credit the same to my S.B. A/c NO.22824/17 of Vijaya Bank Bagalkot. I am herewith enclosing a copy of my sale deed for your reference”

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24. Section 9 of the Transfer of Property Act,

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1882 is relied upon by the plaintiff which is as under:

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“9. Oral transfer.— A transfer of property may be made without writing in every case in which a writing is not expressly required by law.”

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But they cannot nullify the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Specific Performance Act or Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Limitation Act.

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The evidence of PW-2 father-in-law of plaintiff-Sudha is regarding Ex.D-3. The last portion of cross-examination is worth to be extracted which is as under:

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“It is true that construction was not completed when the agreement of sale was executed. I can identify the signature of my daughter- in- law Sudha and now I see the cancellation letter which bears the signature of my daughter- in- law. It is marked as Ex.D-3. Signature is at Ex.D-3A. It is true that Ex.D3 was produced in the earlier suit No.420/2000. It is true that my daughter- in- law intended to withdraw the amount by canceling the transaction.”

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Learned counsel for plaintiff submitted that

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when once the agreement is executed no other document can be executed and there shall not be any document against the terms of sale agreement which is registered.

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In this connection, it is necessary to mention Section 9 of the Karnataka Apartment Ownership Act, 1972, which is as under:

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9. Encumbrances against apartments; removal from encumbrances, effect of part payment.—(1) Subsequent to recording the Declaration as provided in this Act, and while the property remains subject to this Act, no encumbrance of any nature shall thereafter arise or be created only against each apartment and

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the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to such apartment, in the same manner and under the same conditions inevery respect as encumbrances may arise or be created upon or against any other separate parcel of property subject to individual ownership:

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Provided that if during the period any encumbrance has arisen or been created against such apartment and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to such apartment, no apartment and such percentage of undivided interest shall be partitioned or sub-divided in interest:

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Provided further that, no labour performed or materials furnished with the consent or at the request of an apartment owner or his agent or his contractor or sub-contractor shall be the basis for a charge or any encumbrance under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, against the apartment or any other property of any other apartment owner not expressly consenting to or requesting the same, except that such express consent shall be deemed to be given by the owner of any apartment in the case of emergency repairs thereto. Labour performed and material furnished for the common areas and facilities if duly authorized by the Association of Apartment Owners, the Manager or Board of Managers in accordance with this Act, the Declaration or byelaws shall be deemed to be performed or furnished with the express consent of each apartment owner and shall be the basis for a charge or encumbrance under the Act aforesaid against each of the apartments and shall be subject to the provisions of sub-section (2).

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(2) In the event of a charge or any encumbrance against two or more apartments

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becoming effective, the apartment owners of the separate apartments may remove their apartments and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant to such apartments from the charge or encumbrance by payment of the fractional or proportional amounts attributable to each of the apartments affected. Such individual payment shall be computed by reference to the percentages appearing in the Declaration. Subsequent to any such payment, discharge or other satisfaction, the apartmet and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant thereto shall thereafter be free and clear of the charge or encumbrance so paid, satisfied or discharged. Such partial payment, satisfaction or discharge shall not prevent the person having a charge or any other encumbrance from proceeding to enforce his rights against any apartment and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurtenant thereto not so paid, satisfied or discharged.”

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Sale agreement claimed by plaintiff Smt. Sudha represented by her husband who was examined as PW-1 and the sale consideration was for Rs.3,00,000/- date of sale agreement is 25.03.1998. Time and certain particulars are not mentioned therein.

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She claims the additional amount of

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Rs.95,000/- and Rs.75,000/- being paid to the defendants. Then there is a transaction between defendants No.1 to 6 in favour of defendant No.7 in the form of agreement dated 04.01.2000. After consulting some purchasers he came to know about the misdeeds of defendants No.1 to 6. Then he applied for encumbrance certificate on 05.08.2000 and he came to know that Diwakar has also entered into an agreement of sale.

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The present case when read along with attitude and modus operandi of defendants No.1 to 6 who claimed themselves as Developers and Builders, the harassment on purchasers who enter into an agreement with the builders stands exposed and they take things for a ride and have no regard to law. For example, Ex.P-2 in O.S.No.274/2000 is copy of sale deed in favour of Diwakar S Hegde wherein he

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purchases property from defendants No.1 to 7 for consideration of Rs.4,21,000/-. But at the same time, he sells the property to defendant No.9 for Rs.2,50,000/-. It is stated that the market value of the schedule property is Rs.4,35,000/- but that being sold for Rs.2,50,000/-.

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The trial Court decreed the suit, never discussed about the details and intricacies with the thread bare bifurcation. The first appellate Court partly discussed the transactions and forgotten to discuss Ex.D-3, which is the cancellation letter and her own father-in-law, who is PW-2, has identified the signature and state that Ex.D-3 is by his daughter-inlaw and also that she wanted to cancel agreement at once. The parties are no more liable by the rights and obligations when the contract comes into an end which we call it as by discharge of a contract happens through notation, recession, alteration and merger. In

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this connection, she not only wrote letter but also

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forwarded to defendant in this case, which is filed by defendant No.9 and it was given to him by the builder.

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As such, in order to grant the relief of specific performance, due consideration has to be given to Sections 14 and 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which reads as under:

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“ 14. Contracts not specifically enforceable .— The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely:—

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(a) where a party to the contract has obtained substituted performance of contract in accordance with the provisions of section 20;

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(b) a contract, the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise;

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(c) a contract which is so dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties that the court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms; and

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(d) a contract which is in its nature determinable.

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16. Personal bars to relief.— Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person—

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[(a) who has obtained substituted performance of contract under section 20; or

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(b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or

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(c) who fails to prove] that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms of the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.

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However, defendant No.9 is stated to be in possession of the property and now the real victim of entering into agreement is the plaintiff. Her agreement is registered which is established and it is dated 22.12.1998 moreover, it is established in context of the proceedings, documents and circumstances, she is the earliest right holder as defined under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act. However, it is agreement regarding priority of interest. Section 48 of Transfer of Property Act, reads as under:

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48. Priority of rights created by transfer:- Where a person purports to create by transfer at different times rights in or over the same immoveable property and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created.

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But Ex.D-3 comes in the way for the rights for specific performance of the plaintiff. By looking at the tenor, though she has not come before the Court for evidence but she has sent her father-in-law who admits and tells about the contents of agreement, and he cannot be said that as a 3^rd party he is telling about identification. He is the father-in-law more like a father. He is expected to have acquaintance with the signature and daily affairs of the family.

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He had knowledge of this document as it is a family affairs and the content and the answers in his

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cross-examination goes to show that Ex.D-3 is a last nail on the coffin.

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In the circumstances by virtue of priority of interest till 02.03.2000 sale deed was not executed in favour of the plaintiff but for the reasons best known to her, she cancels the agreement and sends a copy of the sale deed by requesting the builders to sell it to other purchaser and credit the amount to her SB Account at Vijaya Bank, Bagalkot. Now the same was purchased by defendant No.9 from defendant No.8 on 22.07.2003. Defendant No.8 had purchased from defendant Nos.1 to 6 on 14.02.2000 as per Ex.P-2.

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The execution of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff is proved beyond doubt but the proof of the agreement cannot entail the rights of specific performance to her because of the negative net work

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and unwholly groupism by the defendant.

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Unfortunately, the efficacy is absolute along with cancellation of the agreement for specific perform. When the defendants have sold the property to others, it amounts to acceptance of cancellation only. In the circumstances, the court does not know about any transaction in respect of others with respect to the schedule property. I find that the plaintiff-Sudha

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has failed to establish that she is entitled for the relief of specific performance of the agreement. Still, she cannot go bare handed as Rs.2,00,000/- was given by her at the time of the agreement and further amount of Rs.80,000/and 90,000/and Rs.1,00,000/-on 6-11-1998. However, there are no substantive materials to conclude the payment of Rs.80,000/- andRs.90,000/- as contended in the plaint.

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The date of sale agreement is 25.03.1998

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and the balance amount of Rs.1,00,000/- is agreed to be paid at the time of possession.

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The Court has to consider the attitude and conduct of the defendants and loss sustained by the plaintiff. When she is not entitled for specific performance it does not mean that her entire suit cannot be dislodged. She is entitled for refund of the amount of Rs.3,00,000/- together with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 22.12.1998 till payment. The liability shall be jointly and severally on defendant Nos.1 to 6 and 8 and 9.

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In the circumstances, the aforesaid amount of Rs.3,00,000/- with interest as stated above shall be paid to her within two months from today. There shall be a charge on the schedule property in this connection. When the plaintiff has lost right of

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specific performance, the suit filed by the defendant for permanent injunction, invariably succeeds and defendant No.9 is in possession of the property. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court is incomplete and invalid to the said extent. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. Hence both the appeals are disposed off.

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Sd/JUDGE

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Naa, Yan & kmv

Ramesh S/O Chunnilal Parmar, v. Smt.Sudha

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Ramesh S/O Chunnilal Parmar, v. Smt.Sudha

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

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Case details

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