Dismissed

Sri Hanumanthappa H Siddlingappanavar v. Smt. Leelavathi P Mahale

Karnataka HC30 Jul 2021HRRP/11/2021

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This revision petition challenged an eviction order under Karnataka Rent Acts. The High Court judicial review dismissed the petition, holding the respondent a competent landlord since the sale deed execution in 1993, despite later registration, and finding the petitioner's denial of ownership non-bonafide.

What did the court decide?

Rejection of the revision petition and confirmation of the eviction order passed by the Small Causes Court.

Sri Hanumanthappa H Siddlingappanavar Vs Smt… — Landlord and Tenant | Karnataka HC (2021)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 30^TH DAY OF JULY, 2021

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BEFORE

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THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN

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HRRP NO.11 OF 2021 (EVI)

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BETWEEN :

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SRI. HANUMANTHAPPA H. SIDDALINGAPPANAVAR S/O LATE SRI.HONNAPPA AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS R/AT 148, MATADAHALLI FURTHER EXTENSION R.T.NAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 032 … PETITIONER

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(BY SRI.GANGADHARA R. GURUMATH, SR. COUNSEL FOR SRI. RAVIPRAKASH T., ADV. AND SRI. AVIN TIPPANNA H., ADV.)

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AND :

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SMT. LEELAVATHI P. MAHALE W/O SRI. PADMANABHA MAHALE AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS, 9 SUPREME ENCLAVE MAYUR VIHAR, PHASE I NEW DELHI – 110 091

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SMT. V. SULOCHNA D/O SRINIVASA SHETTY DELETED AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS ORDER NO.835, F CROSS 10.06.2021 22^ND MAIN ROAD 13.07.2021 JAYANAGAR T. BLOCK BENGALURU – 560 041 … RESPONDENT

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RESPONDENT NO.2 DELETED AS PER ORDER DATED 10.06.2021 AND 13.07.2021

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(BY SRI.PADMANABHA P. MAHALE, SR.COUNSEL FOR SRI. JAYARAJ D. S., ADV. AND SRI. SANDESH C. R., FOR C/R-1; VIDE ORDER DATED 14.06.2021 NOTICE TO R-2 IS DISPENSED WITH)

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THIS HRRP IS FILED UNDER SECTION 46 (1) OF THE KARNATAKA RENT ACT, 1999, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 02.01.2021 PASSED IN HRC.NO.1082/1995 ON THE FILE OF THE I ADDITIONAL SMALL CAUSES JUDGE AND ACMM, BANGALORE, ALLOWING THE PETITION FILED UNDER SECTION 27(2)(j) AND (o) OF KARNATAKA RENT ACT.

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THIS HRRP HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 13.07.2021 FOR ORDERS AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

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ORDER

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Aggrieved by the order dated 02.01.2021 passed by I Additional Judge, Court of Small Causes, Bengaluru, in HRC No.1082/1995, respondent no.1 therein has preferred this revision petition.

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The case of the petitioner is that the ground floor of the premises bearing no.148, situated at Matadahalli, R.T.Nagar, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as the property) belonged to one late

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Parappa K.Kalligudda. He inducted the petitioner as a tenant. Since then, the petitioner is in enjoyment of the said property. It is the contention of the petitioner that after the demise of late Parappa K.Kalligudda, there is a dispute as to the ownership of the property and respondent no.1 has perfected her title over the property only on 10.10.2018 when the Bangalore Development Authority executed a sale deed in respect of the property in her favour. However, respondent no.1 contending that she is the owner of the property instituted proceedings before the court below in the year 1995 itself by way of HRC No.1082/1995 and sought for evicting the petitioner herein from the premises. It is the further contention of the petitioner that respondent no.1 claims title to the property by virtue of a sale deed dated 24.12.1993 but the same was not registered by the Sub-Registrar till 27.09.2018. It is also contended

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that the sale deed also was not executed following all the procedures as contemplated in the Registration Act, 1908 and the Rules made thereunder and proper title has not passed as to respondent no.1 herein. As on the date of institution of HRC No.1082/1995, respondent no.1 was not the owner and there was no jural relationship of land lord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent and hence the said petition ought to have been dismissed by the court below and it erred in allowing the same. It is also contended that there was a dispute as to title between respondent nos.1 and 2 and as already stated above, the issue was solved and respondent no.1 has become the owner of the property only on 10.10.2018, and thus, respondent no.2 has been deleted as a party from the proceedings presently. The petitioner also contended that the said petition has been preferred under Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control

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Act, 1961 and the ingredients of the same have not

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been proved by respondent no.1 and even if it presumed that she is the owner of the property as on the date of filing of the HRC petition, it ought to have been rejected on the ground that the requirements of Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 have not been established by respondent no.1. It is further contended that after coming into force of Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, the petition has been amended to include Section 27 (2) (j) and (o) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. But the ingredients of the said sections are also not proved. It is also contended that there has been no proper attornment of tenancy.

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Per contra, Sri Padmanabha Mahale, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent no.1 contends that after the demise of Parappa K.Kalligudda, his wife Smt. Basavannamma became the owner of the property and that she has sold the

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same in favour of one Sangappa Basappa Ittagi and respondent no.1 herein by virtue of a sale deed dated 24.12.1993 and that she became the owner of the property from that date itself. It is further contended to maintain a HRC petition either under the erstwhile Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 or under the present Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 one has to be a landlord as per the definition mentioned thereunder and not an absolute owner. It is submitted that she was a landlord as per the definition of ‘landlord’ in both the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 from 24.12.1993 itself. It is further contended that the petitioner/tenant has no locus to question as to the manner in which the sale deed dated 24.12.1993 was executed and irrespective of the date of its registration by virtue of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, respondent No.1 becomes the owner on the date of execution of the sale deed

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and not its registration. It is contended that there has been proper attornment of tenancy and there exists a jural relationship of land lord and tenant between respondent and petitioner.

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The trial court, based on the pleadings and the evidence let in, allowed the petition filed by the respondent herein and has directed the petitioner herein to handover the vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the respondent herein. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner herein has preferred this revision petition.

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The issues that arise for consideration in

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this revision petition are as under:

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(i) Whether respondent no.1 is a landlord competent to initiate an eviction petition against the petitioner herein by filing HRC No.1082/1995 and is there a jural

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relationship of land lord and tenant between them?

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(ii) Whether respondent no.1 is entitled for evicting the petitioner herein under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999?

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It is a well settled proposition of law that the

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person who initiates eviction proceedings against another person under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 or the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 has to be a landlord as defined in a said enactments and there should exist a jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and in case where the tenant was inducted by the erstwhile owner of the property attornment of tenancy needs to be established. Further, the landlord has to prove any of the grounds contemplated in the Act based on which he can have the tenant evicted.

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The petitioner and respondent herein have relied

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upon several case laws to prove the above proposition propositions of law. However, as the above propositions are well settled, it is not necessary to discuss the said case laws.

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7. Section 3(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control

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Act, 1961 defines ‘landlord’ as follows:

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3(h) “landlord” means any person who is for the time being receiving or entitled to receive, rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account, or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant; and includes any person not being a tenant who from time to time derives title under a landlord; and further includes in respect of his sub-tenant a tenant who has sub-let any premises;

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Section 3(e) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999

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defines ‘landlord’ as follows:

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“Landlord” means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or to be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant;”

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From the above definitions, it is clear that a landlord to initiate eviction proceedings under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 or the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 need not be an absolute owner of the property in question but should qualify as a landlord as per the aforementioned definitions.

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In a landlord tenant suit, the landlord is not required to prove his title in the subject property as in a title suit. But, when the landlord’s derivative title is challenged, the same has to be established in some form. In the instant case, the original owner of the property was one late Parappa K. Kalligudda. After his

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demise, his wife being the sole legal heir has sold the property to the respondent and another person jointly herein. The petitioner has challenged the respondent’s derivative title to the property in question. So the burden is on the respondent to prove that she has ownership over the property in some form and that she is landlord as per the terms of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 and there was attornment of tenancy and is entitled to receive the rents from the petitioner herein and further, she is entitled to have the petitioner evicted as per the relevant provisions.

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The respondent contends that she became

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the owner of the suit schedule property by virtue of a sale deed dated 24.12.1993. But it is noticed that though the said sale deed was presented for registration on 24.12.1993, it was registered as document No.1063/1996-1997 on 31.05.1997 in the

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office of Sub-Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bengaluru. The HRC petition was initiated in the year 1995. For the said reasons, the petitioner contends that the trial Court ought to have dismissed the same because the respondent had not yet become the owner of the suit schedule property.

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Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908

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reads as under:-

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“47. Time from which registered document operates .— A registered document shall operate from the time which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration.”

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Thus, by virtue of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, though the registration takes place at a much latter date, it dates back to the date on which the sale deed was executed. Thus, by reading of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, in the instant

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case, the respondent has become the owner of the property in question on 24.12.1993. However, the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2010 (13) SCC 128 between Har Narain (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Mam Chand (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors., paragraphs 13, 14,16 and 23 of the judgment reads as under:-

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“13. Section 54 of the Act, 1882, mandatorily requires that the sale of any immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upward can be made only by a registered instrument. Section 47 of the 1908 Act provides that registration of the document shall relate back to the date of the execution of the document. Thus, the aforesaid two provisions make it crystal clear that the sale deed in question requires registration. Even if registration had been done subsequent to the filing of Suit, it related back to the date of execution of the sale deed, which was prior to institution of the Suit.

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14. A similar issue though in a case of right of pre-emption was considered by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ram Saran Lall v. Domini

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Kuer by the majority of 3:2, the Court came to the conclusion that as the mere execution of the sale deed could not make the same effective and registration thereof was necessary, it was of no consequence unless the registration was made. Thus, in spite of the fact that the 1908 Act (sic registration) could relate back to the date of execution in view of provisions of Section 47 of the 1908 Act, the sale could not be given effect to prior to registration. However, as the sale was not complete until the registration of instrument of sale is complete, it was not completed prior to the date of its registration. The court held: (AIR p.1749, para 8)

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"8. … Section 47 of the Registration Act does not, however, say when sale would be deemed to be complete. It only permits a document when registered, to operate from a certain date which may be earlier than the date when it was registered. The object of this section is to decide which of two or more registered instruments in respect of the same property is to have effect. The section applies to a document only after it has been registered. It has nothing to do with the completion of the registration and therefore, nothing to do with the completion of a sale when the

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instrument is one of sale. A sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of Section 47 the instrument by which it is effected , after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date. Therefore, we do not think that the sale in this case can be said, in view of Section 47 to have been completed on 31.01.1946" (Emphasis added).

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16. However, all these cases are related to right to pre-emption though the legal issue involved therein remained the same. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that in spite of the fact that the registration of the sale deed would relate back to the date of execution, the sale can not be termed as complete until its registration and it becomes effective only once it stands registered. Thus, the fiction created by Section 47 of the 1908 Act does not come into play before the actual registration of the document takes place.

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23. In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the sale executed by respondent No.1 in favour of respondents 2 to 6 on 2.8.1971 could not be termed as a complete sale

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until the document got registered on 3.9.1971. In view of the provisions of Section 47 of the 1908 Act the effect of registration would be that registration would relate back to the date of execution but it does not mean that sale would be complete in favour of respondents 2 to 6 prior to 3.9.1971 i.e. the date of registration of the sale deed. In view of the above, as sale stood completed during the pendency of the suit, doctrine of lis pendens is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The courts below failed to appreciate that the fiction created by Section 47 of the 1908 Act itself is a consequence of registration of the sale deed. More so, as the appellant had been in possession of the suit land being a mortgagee since 1970 and this fact had also been mentioned by the respondent No.1 in the sale deed dated 2.8.1971 in favour of respondents 2 to 6, the question of respondent Nos. 2 to 6 being bonafide purchasers for value and paid money in good faith without notice does not arise, simply for the reason that the said respondents were fully aware that the suit land was in possession of the appellant. Thus, the respondents 2 to 6 cannot take the benefit of the provisions of Section 19(b) of the Act, 1963.”

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He has also relied upon the decision of the Delhi

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High Court reported in 2018 SCC Online Del 6730

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between Prem Prakash Gupta vs. Sanjay

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Aggarwal, in CS (OS) 272/2017, paragraphs 34

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and 35 reads as under:-

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“34. My research shows that in Ram Saran Lall Vs. Mst. Domini Kuer AIR 1961 SC 1747, it was held that Section 47 of the Registration Act does not say when a sale would be deemed to be complete; it only permits a document, when registered, to operate from a certain date which may be earlier than the date when it was registered. It was further held, that Section 47 applies to a document only after it has been registered and has nothing to do with the completion of the sale, when the instrument is one of sale; a sale which is admittedly not completed until the registration of the instrument of sale is completed, cannot be said to have been completed earlier because by virtue of Section 47, the instrument by which it is effected, after it has been registered, commences to operate from an earlier date. The same view was reiterated in Hiralal Agrawal Vs. Rampadarath Singh AIR 1969 SC 244 and in Har Narain Vs. Mam Chand (2010) 13 SCC 128.

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35. In Commissioner of Gift-Tax Vs. Aloka Lata Sett (1991) 190 ITR 556, a Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta, applying the aforesaid

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judgments, held (i) that Sections 122 & 123 of the Transfer of property Act leave no room for doubt that a transaction of transfer of immovable property will be complete only by executing a registered document; (ii) it cannot be said that the transaction was complete and a gift in the eyes of law came to be made by the donor to the donee, prior to the registration of the document by which the gift was made; (iii) that under Section 47 of the Registration Act, a registered document operates from the date of its execution and not from the date of its registration; (iv) that registration of a document relates back to the date of its execution, between the parties thereto, but as regards third parties, it is effective from the date of registration; (v) that where an instrument, which purports to transfer title to property is required to be registered, the title does not pass until registration has been effected; no new title is created by registration-it only affirms a title which has been created by the deed; (vi) that a gift of immovable property cannot be completed, without a registered instrument.”

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Based on the ratio laid down in the above judgments, the petitioner contends that as on the date of institution of H.R.C.No.1082/1995, the

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respondent was not an owner of the property and the trial Court ought to have dismissed the petition. He further relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in (1981) 3 Supreme Court Cases 36 (Civil Appeal No.758/1978) between M.M.Quasim vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors., paragraph 14 of the judgment reads as under:-

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“14. The expression 'landlord' has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the Rent Act which reads as under:

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"landlord" includes the persons who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf or for the benefit, or himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant.

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The inclusive definition is couched in very wide language. However this wide amplitude of the

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expression has been cut down by the explanation appended to clause (c) of sub- section (1) of Section 11 which reads as under:

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11. Eviction of tenants.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and to those of section 12, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction there-from except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds:

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(c) Where the building is reasonably

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and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord:

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Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion

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in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall thenceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (aa) of section 2, and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under section 5;

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Explanation.- In this clause the word "landlord" shall not include an agent referred to in clause (d) of section 2.

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Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in Section 11 (1) (c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude, cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of Section 11 (1) (c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the clause. By restricting the meaning of expression ‘landlord’ for the purpose of section 11(1)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner

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and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right, can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the buildings for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The second clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti que trust but when the case is governed by the first part of clause (c) of subsection (1) of Section 11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of Section 11(1)(c) the expression ‘landlord’ could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own

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right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of clause (c) of Section 11(1) which reads: "Where building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation.. ". Assuming that the expression 'landlord' has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rent collector or a receiver of the property appointed by the Court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that he wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to clause (c) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression 'landlord' would unmistakably show that for the purposes of clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word 'owner' is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation.”

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He also relies upon the decision of this Court reported in 2000 SCC Online Kar 192 in H.R.R.P.No.372/1993 between Ganapati Marthu Pai

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_vs. The Chairman, Consumers Co-operative Limited, Gokarn_* , paragraph 27 of the judgment reads as under:-

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“27. Sri Vinod Prasad, however submitted on the basis on the decision of the Supreme Court in MM. Quasim vs. Manoharlal Sharma and others "that in order to obtain an eviction order, the eviction petitioner must be the owner of the property", Learned Counsel read to me extensively the said decision to emphasize his point: In M.M. Quasim's case: Two brothers Manoharlal Sharma, Motilal Sharma and his uncle Kishorilal Sharma filed an eviction petition against the tenant M.M. Quasim seeking the shop in his occupation for opening a clinic, and also on the ground that the tenant defaulted in paying the rents, under Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947: Trial Court had ordered eviction which was appealed before the Additional Subordinate Judge: During hearing of the appeal tenant filed an application under Order 41, Rule 27 stating that the suit

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properties were allotted to the share of one Pyarelal Vishwakarma in a partition suit filed by the uncle Kishorilal, therefore the personal need to occupy ceased, which contention was rejected by both the Appellate Court and High Court, on the matter being taken up before the Supreme Court, it was held after quoting Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Rent Act which provides for eviction when the landlord requires for his personal use that the meaning of the word 'landlord' in the context used under Section 11 gets a restricted meaning then what the definition provides for: Under Section 11(1)(c) of the Act the eviction petitioner must have a "Right to occupy in his own Right". After referring to the definition of the word 'landlord' which is in the same terms as under Karnataka Act and also the explanation to Section 11(1)(c) to the following effect:

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Explanation.-“In this clause landlord shall not include an agent referred to in clause (d) of Section 2, the Court held:

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"Therefore the explanation to clause (c) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression "Landlord" would unmistakably show that for the purpose of clause (c) which landlord who in the sense in which the word 'owner' is understood can claim as of right to

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the exclusion of every one, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation". Ultimately the matter was remanded to the file of the Appellate Court to enquire about the effect of partition on the proceedings: As the facts in this case itself suggest, the eviction petition was not filed by the 'Manager' of the Hindu Joint Family, and the 'Theory of Representation' was not the subject-matter of consideration. Secondly, whether the same restricted meaning of 'landlord' excluding all others than the 'owners' found in definition clause for consideration of eviction of the tenant when he defaults to pay rent under Section 21(1)(a) of the Karnataka Act was also not the subjectmatter: Quasim's case, is distinguishable on facts, particularly, when eviction is sought under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, the expression 'landlord' takes the meaning to suit the context of the different clauses. When eviction is sought on the ground of 'personal requirement' under Section 21(1)(h), the expression 'landlord' becomes personalised, inasmuch as, the requirement is relatable to the 'personal need' but the same word gets a wider meaning when used in the context of

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seeking eviction on the ground that tenant has defaulted in paying the rents, a Rent Collector, a trustee etc., are also included. There is nothing in the definition of the word 'landlord' or under the scheme of the Rent Act to exclude the application of the Doctrine of Representation of Manager of the Hindu Joint Family to continue the proceedings, even after partition; and in my view he will be the landlord for purposes of eviction under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, and the benefit of eviction order obtained by him is available to the divided member also".

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Based on the aforementioned two judgments,

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the petitioner contends that the landlord has to be an owner when he seeks eviction of a tenant on the ground of own use and occupation. Merely satisfying the definition of ‘landlord’ as per the Rent Control Act, 1961 or the Rent Act, 1999 does not suffice.

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The aforementioned decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in M.M.Quasim’s case and the decision of this Court in Ganapati Marthu Pai’s

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case holds that when a landlord initiates eviction proceedings under the Rent Act, 1999, he cannot be merely an agent or a rent collector but he should be entitled to occupy the house in his own right to the exclusion of others, then he is considered as an owner and he can initiate proceedings to have the tenant evicted.

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In the instant case, the sale deed is executed in favour of the respondent on 24.12.1993 and the same was presented for registration on the same day. However, as certain formalities were not completed, there was delay in registration. The respondent is not merely an agent or a rent collector. It is not the case of her predecessor in title to the property or any person claiming under her that the respondent is not the owner of the property in question. According to them she has become the owner of the property in question as on the date of

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execution of sale deed i.e., on 24.12.1993 and the respondent had all the right over the property since then. It is not open for the petitioner herein who is a tenant to question it. Thus, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in AIR 1990

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Supreme Court 636 between Subhash Chandra vs. Mohammad Sharif and Ors. and the decision of High Court of Delhi in 2018 SCC Online Del 6730 between Prem Prakash Gupta vs. Sanjay Aggarwal does not come to the rescue of the petitioner.

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Admittedly, Sri.Parappa K. Kalligudda was the owner of the property in question. He inducted the petitioner as a tenant in the property in question. It is not the case of the petitioner that he is the landlord. He admits that he is a tenant. On the demise of Parappa K. Kalligudda, his wife Smt.Basavannavva was his only class one legal heir and became the sole

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owner of the property. She executed the sale deed in favor of the respondent herein and one Sri.Sangappa Basappa Ittagi on 24.12.1993. There is no dispute between Sri.Sangappa Basappa Ittagi and the respondent herein. The respondent herein was always authorized to initiate necessary proceedings in respect of the property on behalf of herself and Sri.Sangappa Basappa Ittagi. Unfortunately, Smt.Basvannavva, the vendor of the property in question expired before the registration was completed. Upon her expiry, the next kith and kin of Sri.Parappa K. Kalligudda has issued an attornment notice to the petitioner herein intimating that the respondent and Sri.Sangappa Basappa Ittagi have become the owner of the property in question. Thereafter, one Smt.S.V.Sulochana claimed right on the property on the basis of an alleged will purported to have been executed by late Parappa K. Kalligudda which resulted in litigation. As there was litigation,

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the petitioner herein preferred H.R.R.P.No.1561/1998, wherein, he admitted that he is a tenant and a HRC petition is filed to have him evicted and as there was dispute with regard to title of the property, he intends to deposit the rent before the Court. This Court in the said H.R.R.P. has ordered accordingly:-

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“2. I do not find any reasonableness in the order of the trial Court in rejecting the prayer. The parties are litigating in the Civil Court regarding title and they have also filed eviction petitions before the HRC Court. Since the title is involved, till the parties get a decree from the competent Court, it is just and reasonable to direct the tenant to deposit the rents under Section 19 of the Act and the successful party will receive it. This order will bind the parties litigating in the suits and also on HRC side. The tenant shall continue to deposit the rents as and when fall due.”

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Thus, from the above attornment notice and the

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proceedings in the HRRP proceedings it is not open for the petitioner to now turn around and say there is no

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proper attornment. Further, in H.R.R.P.No.1561/1998, this Court has permitted the petitioner to deposit the rents and has held that the successful party will be entitled to receive it and the order passed in H.R.R.P. will bind the parties litigating in the suits and also on HRC side. The same has attained finality. Subsequently, the respondent herein and Sri.Sangappa Basappa Ittagi has also got sale deed executed in favour of them in respect of the property from the BDA. Thus, the respondent has been a landlord for the purpose of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 from 24.12.1993 itself and there has been a valid attornment of tenancy and are entitled to initiate eviction proceedings against the petitioner herein.

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The eviction petition has been filed under the grounds that the respondent herein requires the same for her bonafide use and occupation that the tenant

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through his son has an alternative residence and that the tenant having denied the ownership of landlord over the property has failed to prove it and the denial was not made in a bonafide manner.

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In respect of requirement of a residential or

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business premise, the land lord is a best judge of his own requirement and he has complete freedom in that matter. The respondent is married and having a son and daughter, who are married and she has stated that she requires the said premises for her own use. The petitioner has not denied the suggestion in his evidence that his son owns a different property. Further, though the petitioner himself presently admits that the respondent has become the owner of the property has denied even in the evidence conducted in the year 2020 about the ownership of the respondent over the property concerned. Even in the course of argument, he has denied existence of a

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jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and himself in the petition. He challenges the ownership of the respondent over the property though in the course of argument states that upon execution of sale deed by BDA on 10.10.2018 she has become the owner.

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From the evidence adduced, wherein, the respondent has in detail lead evidence as to her requirement regarding the suit schedule property, she cannot be denied of the same. Further, as per Section 27 (2) (o) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 when the tenant in his reply denies the ownership of the landlord and fails to prove it or when such denial is not made in a bonafide manner, the landlord is entitled to have the tenant evicted. In the instant case, admittedly, petitioner is a tenant. Thereafter, respondent has become the owner of the property in the year 1993. Subsequently, there was a litigation

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on the property as one Smt.S.V.Sulochana made a claim on the property. By virtue of the orders of this Hon’ble Court in M.F.A.No.3884/2001 dated 08.12.2006 and R.F.A.No.1448/2003 dated 08.12.2006, the said Smt.S.V.Sulochana lost whatever rights she claimed on the suit schedule property and that was laid to rest completely in the SLP preferred by the said Smt.S.V.Sulochana in Civil Appeal (S.5751/2009) when the same was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 16.08.2017. Even thereafter, the petitioner herein denied the ownership of the respondent over the property in question. The said contention of the petitioner cannot be considered bonafide and was only taken to drag on the proceedings. Hence, the respondent is entitled to have the petitioner evicted from the premises.

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For the aforementioned reasons, the revision

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petition being devoid of any merits is hereby dismissed.

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No order as to costs.

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Sd/JUDGE

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hkh./MH