A-2 and A-3 were not acting pursuant to a conspiracy and, therefore, acquitted them of that charge. Such being the position, before recording a conviction, the court should have insisted on evidence which would have proved that A-1 to A-3 passed the vouchers with knowledge that the vouchers were forged and fabricated, it appears that no such evidence is available on record. So far as the offence under Section 409 IPC is concerned it must be proved that a person entrusted with property or with any dominion over property, in his capacity as public servant commits criminal breach of trust in respect of such property, as defined in Section 405 IPC, meaning thereby that he dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do. The crucial word used in Section 405 IPC is "dishonestly" and, therefore, it implies the existence of mens rea, that is to say a guilty mind. If there is no evidence to show that the appellants had knowledge that the vouchers were fabricated by A-3, it cannot be said that they acted with a criminal intent. It may be, and as rightly observed by the courts below, that they acted in a negligent manner and if they had taken due care they would have detected the fraud, but they failed to do so. However, that by itself would not constitute an offence under Section 409 IPC though it may expose the appellants to disciplinary action under the relevant rules. Learned counsel also brought to our notice the fact that in respect of the same Sub-Post Office some vouchers prepared and counter-signed by
