The High Court of Karnataka refused to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court held that mere breach of promise does not establish false promise. It found a case for trial to determine if the accused had no intention of marrying from the beginning.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.1924 OF 2020
BETWEEN:
Sri M.V.L Manoj Kumar, S/o T.M.Lokanathan, Aged about 30 years, R/at No.806, 3rd Cross, 8th Main Road, HRBR Layout, 1st Block, Kalyan Nagar, Bengaluru-560043.
…Petitioner
(By Sri Amar Correa, Advocate)
AND
…Respondents
(By Sri K.S.Abhijith, HCGP for R1)
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This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying to set-aside the ode dated 05.08.2019 in Crime No.12/2019 now registered as C.C.No.55066/2019 passed by the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru and thereby taking cognizance against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 417 and 376 of IPC and to quash the entire proceedings in C.C.No.55066/2019 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 417 and 376 of IPC which is pending on the file of the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru vide Annexure-A.
This Criminal Petition coming on for admission this day, the Court made the following:
ORDER
This is a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., for quashing the charge sheet registered as C.C.No.55066/2019 on the file of the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru. The petitioner has been implicated of committing offences punishable under Sections 417 and 376 of IPC.
The second respondent who is the first informant to police, posted her profile on a
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matrimonial website called “Bharat Matrimony”,
which paved way for her coming in contact with the petitioner. They agreed to get married. The second respondent introduced the petitioner to her mother who also agreed for marriage. The petitioner was from a place called ‘Thiruchi’, Tamilnadu and was working in Bengaluru. The petitioner promised of marrying the second respondent in the month of June-2017. But the parents of the petitioner postponed the marriage giving some reasons. Since the second respondent’s mother insisted on arranging engagement ceremony, it was held in the month of October-2018, and at that time, the parents of the petitioner said that they would be ready for arranging marriage in January or February, 2019. In this background, it is alleged that the petitioner brought the respondent to his residential apartment and had sexual intercourse against her will. It is stated that when she did not agree, the
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petitioner told her that they would be going to marry; and this made her oblige. Thereafter the petitioner shifted his residence to another rented house at Kalyan Nagar, Bengaluru. And in this house also, the petitioner contintued to have intercourse with her. In the FIR, there is a specific allegation that the petitioner forced the second respondent for intercourse with him by telling her that he had video recordings of their intimate moments and thus, blackmailed her. A few days later, the petitioner’s parents and sister came to Bengaluru to live with him. The second respondent asked the petitioner as to when his parents and sister would go back, and this question furiated the petitioner and stopped meeting her. The petitioner’s sister made a call to the second respondent and asked her to forget the petitioner. These events consequently led to registration of FIR and the charge sheet against the petitioner.
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petitioner argued that in any event, assuming the allegations against the petitioner are true, yet, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted. His submission was that the second respondent is a major and according to the second respondent, the engagement ceremony had also been held. That means the second respondent knew the consequences of indulging in sexual activity with the petitioner. It is not her case that the petitioner had no intention to marry actually and that he made a false promise to marry her. The marriage broke for some other reason. The consent for sexual intercourse given under misconception of marriage amounts to an offence only when the promise to marry appears to be false at the inception. This not being the case of the second respondent, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted and therefore, subjecting him to trial is abuse of process of Court. The proceedings
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against the petitioner can therefore be quashed. He has placed reliance on two judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of PRAMOD SURYABHAN PAWAR V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. [(2019)9 SCC 608] and SONU ALIAS SUBHASH KUMAR V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER [2021 SCC ONLINE SC 181] .
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establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed: (SCC pp.382-84 Paras 21 & 24)
“21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused , or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have
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foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently.
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fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (Emphasis supplied)
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FIR was sought. There is a clear observation in para 21 of the judgment that FIR did not disclose
the allegation that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. In the case on hand, charge sheet has been filed and it is alleged here that the petitioner induced the belief in the second respondent that he would marry her. For this, I find a case for trial. There cannot be interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., in a position like this. There are no merits to admit this petition, hence it is dismissed .
IA No.1/2020 does not survive for
consideration. It stands disposed of accordingly.
Sd/JUDGE
Kmv/-
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the High Court can quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. alleging rape based on a false promise of marriage.
Whether consent obtained under a misconception of marrying is vitiated when the promise was not false at inception.
Whether there is sufficient material to establish false intention to marry at the initial stage to quash the charge sheet.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Versus State of Maharashtra and Anr.Referred¶31
PRAMOD SURYABHAN PAWAR V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR. [(2019)9 SCC 608] · Who else cites this
Sonu Alias Subhash Kumar Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and AnotherReferred¶31
SONU ALIAS SUBHASH KUMAR V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER [2021 SCC ONLINE SC 181] · Who else cites this
Deepak GulatiExplained¶35
3 provisions across 2 enactments
M.V.L Manoj Kumar
State of Karnataka
Usha P.
Sreenivas Harish Kumar
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
