Dismissed

Manjunath R v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC10 Nov 2020WP/7968/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court of Karnataka dismissed a writ petition challenging a departmental order permanently withholding 50% of the petitioner's pension. The Court held that criminal acquittal on benefit of doubt does not bar departmental action, penalty for grave misconduct was lawful under Karnataka Civil Services Rules, and the authority exercised independent discretion.

What did the court decide?

Writ petition dismissed; Impugned order withholding 50% pension of petitioner maintained.

Manjunath R Vs State of Karnataka — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Karnataka HC (2020)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 10^TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2020

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BEFORE

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THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA WRIT PETITION NO.7968 OF 2020(S-RES)

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BETWEEN:

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MANJUNATH R S/O LATE RAMALINGAIAH AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS REVENUE INSPECTOR BBMP OFFICE, WARD NO.119 JC ROAD BENGALURU-560006

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...PETITIONER

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(BY SRI: T PRAKASH, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA REP BY ITS SECRETARY, URBAN DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, (BBMP) VIKASA SOUDHA BENGALURU-560001

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2 . THE COMMISSIONER OFFICE OF THE BBMP CORPORATION BUILDINGS N R SQUARE BANGALORE-560002

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3 . THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER (ADMINISTRATION) OFFICE OF THE BRUHAT MAHANAGARA PALIKE CORPORATION BUILDINGS N R SQUARE BANGALORE-560002

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4 . ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR ENQUIRIES -II KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA M S BUILDING DR B R AMBEDKAR VEEDHI BENGALURU-560001

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...RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI:R.SRINIVASA GOWDA, AGA FOR R1-ABSENT; SRI: K.N. PUTTEGOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R2 & R3 SRI: VENKATESH.S. ARBATTI, SPL.PP FOR R4)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE RECORDS LEADING TO THE ISSUE OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 26.06.2019 VIDE ANNEXURE-A PASSED BY THE R-2 COMMISSINER, REGARDING IMPOSING OF PENALTY OF PERMANANTLY WITHHOLDING OF 50 PERCENT OF THE PENISON AMOUNT PAYABLE TO THE PETITIONER, PERUSE THE SAME AND QUASH THE SAME AND CONSEQUENTLY TO SET ASIDE THE ENQUIRY REPORT DATED 16.3.19 SUBMITTED BY R-4 ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR ENQUIRIES-II KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA BENGALURU VIDE ANNEXUR-C AND ETC.

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THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 05.11.2020 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCMENT OF ORDER, THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCE, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

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O R D E R

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Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 and learned Spl. Public Prosecutor for respondent No.4.

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Learned Addl. Government Advocate for respondent No.1 has not addressed any arguments.

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Petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to set-aside the enquiry report dated 16.03.2019 submitted by respondent No.4Additional Registrar Enquiries-11, Karnataka Lokayukta(Annexure-C), Bengaluru and the order passed by the second respondent –The Commissioner, Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Pallike(for short ‘BBMP’), Bengaluru imposing penalty of permanently withholding 50% of the pension amount payable to the petitioner vide Annexure-A.

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The brief facts of the case are as follows:-

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Petitioner joined the services of BBMP on 12.02.1976 as a

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class-IV employee. In the year 1995, he was promoted as a Tax

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Inspector and thereafter in the year 2007, he was promoted as Revenue Inspector. He retired from service on 31.05.2014. While he was working as Revenue Inspector, he was caught redhanded while receiving Rs.3,000/- as illegal gratification from the complainant for making joint khatha in the name of the complainant and his son. Criminal prosecution was launched against the petitioner/DGO in Spl.C.C.No.33/2012 under sections 7, 13(1) (d) r/w section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After trial, the petitioner was acquitted of those charges by judgment and order dated 06.10.2017.

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Simultaneously, departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by The Commissioner, BBMP by issue of Articles of Charges on 26.12.2012. The petitioner denied the charges. Hence, Disciplinary action was ordered and the enquiry was entrusted to Karnataka Lokayuktha. Lokayuktha nominated the Additional Registrar, Enquiries-II as the Inquiry officer to enquire into the Articles of Charges and Imputations of misconduct against the DGO. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 16.03.2019 in enquiry No.LOK/INQ/14-A/188/2013

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holding the petitioner guilty of misconduct within the purview of Rules 3(1) (i) to (iii) of The Karnataka Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966.

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On reconsideration of the enquiry report, the Upalokayukta by its order dated 19.03.2019 recommended the Government to accept the report of the Enquiry Officer and having regard to the nature of the charges (demand and acceptance of bribe) proved against the petitioner, recommended imposition of penalty of permanently withholding 50% of pension payable to the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority viz., the second respondent by the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 imposed penalty on the petitioner withholding 50% of the pension payable to the petitioner.

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The first limb of challenge is directed against the validity

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of the enquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer. It is contended that the said report is perverse and illegal; the evidence of the parties and the documents are not properly appreciated; the acquittal judgment passed by the Sessions Court has been ignored; serious contradictions appearing in the

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evidence of the witnesses before the Sessions Court and before the Lokayukta has not been taken note of; Enquiry Officer failed to note that the petitioner was not in a position to do official favour demanded by the complainant.

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The second limb of challenge is based on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in THE KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LIMITED V. JAVARAI GOWDA AND ORS., ILR 2015 KAR 1615 and it is contended that the recommendation made by Upalokayuktha to impose penalty is bad in law. The Disciplinary Authority has imposed punishment solely relying on the recommendations made by the Upalokayuktha without independently considering the material on record. Further, placing reliance on another decision on this Court in the case of UMESH VITTAL BIRADAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS., ILR 2018 KAR 4403, it is submitted that the Disciplinary Authority is not statutorily bound either by the finding given by the Enquiry Officer or recommendation of the Lokayukta. The Disciplinary Authority having failed to apply its

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mind independently to the enquiry materials, the impugned order imposing penalty on the petitioner is liable to be set-aside.

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Further, placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of HIRA LAL v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS., AIR 2020 SC 1027, it is submitted that the pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer. It is a measure of socio-economic justice to those who in the hey-day of their life ceaselessly toiled for the employer on an assurance that in their old age they would not be left in lurch and therefore, the order passed by the second respondent withholding 50% of the pension being contrary to the ratio laid down in the above decision cannot be sustained.

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Relying on another decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in NAZRUL ISLAM v. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS, (2018) 3 SCC 190, it is argued that the recovery of pension is permissible only if the pensioner is found, in a departmental proceeding, to have been guilty of grave misconduct or to have caused pecuniary loss to the Central or State Government. It is

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contended that, in the instant case, the petitioner having been honorably acquitted of the criminal charges foisted against him, there was no justification to impose penalty of withholding the pension. Learned counsel for petitioner has also placed reliance on yet another recent Division Bench decision of this Court in AEJAZ HUSSAIN v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA in W.P.No.203239/2019 dated 29.05.2020 and would submit that the petitioner having been acquitted by the criminal court on the same set of charges levelled against him in the departmental proceedings and based on the same set of facts and evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the consequential order withholding 50% of the pension is liable to be set-aside.

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Sri. Venkatesh S. Arbatti, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.4 countered the above submissions and by placing reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in D. G. MANJUNATH v. KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA AND OTHERS in W.P.No.36761/2014 disposed of on 11.01.2017 would submit that the termination of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner does not ipso-facto absolve

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him from the liability arising under the disciplinary jurisdiction as per the service rules. Further, referring to the judgment rendered by the criminal court, learned Spl. Public Prosecutor submitted that the acquittal recorded by the learned Special Judge, Bengaluru in Spl.C.C.No.33/2012 is not an honourable acquittal. In the said proceedings, the petitioner has been acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt, whereas in the disciplinary proceedings, the Enquiring Authority on appreciation of evidence adduced by the Disciplinary Authority having held that the charges against the petitioner as duly proved and the said findings having been affirmed by the Lokayuktha, this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot interfere with the factual finding recorded by the Enquiring Authority and the Lokayuktha.

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Learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 has argued in support of the impugned action contending that the Enquiring Authority as well as Lokayuktha have duly followed the procedure contemplated under the law. The charges against the petitioner having been duly proved in departmental enquiry, the

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punishment imposed against the petitioner is proportionate to the charge proved against him and therefore there is no reason to interfere in the impugned orders.

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I have bestowed my careful thought to the submissions made at the Bar and have carefully scrutinized the material on record.

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12. The points that arise for consideration are;

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1) Whether enquiry report submitted by respondent No.4 suffers from any error of law, fact and procedure?

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2) Whether acquittal of the DGO in the criminal case on the same set of evidence and on the same charges in the criminal case ipso facto would lead to exoneration of the petitioner in the departmental enquiry?

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3) Whether respondent No.2 had no power and authority to withhold pension for the misconduct proved against the petitioner?

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Reg. Point No.1;

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Even though serious contentions are urged in the

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petition challenging the correctness of the report submitted by the enquiry officer, but the learned counsel for the petitioner has not pointed out any such error of law and procedure vitiating the enquiry report submitted by respondent No.4. A perusal of the report indicates that the enquiry officer has followed the principles of natural justice and has afforded adequate opportunity to the petitioner to adduce his evidence and to produce the documents and has considered all the material produced before him and has arrived at a conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the charges framed against him. The report indicates that the Disciplinary Authority has considered the acquittal recorded by the criminal court. Further, relying on the direct evidence produced by the complainant which is duly corroborated by the testimony of the shadow witnesses and other circumstances as deposed by the witnesses which are fully supported by the copies of the trap proceedings and the statement of the witnesses as well as the explanation offered by

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the DGO has recorded the finding to the effect that the petitioner as Revenue Inspector attached to Ward No.119, BBMP, demanded illegal gratification of Rs.10,000/from the complainant on 27.7.2011 in order to attend the application of the complainant for change of katha and accepted a sum of Rs.7,000/- from the complainant towards part of the illegal demand and was caught red-handed while receiving illegal gratification of Rs.3,000/- from the complainant on 18.10.2011. This finding having been rendered on consideration of the legal evidence, I do not find any error of law and fact in the said report warranting interference by this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As a result, point No.1 is answered against the petitioner.

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Reg. Point No.2:

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Basic facts are not in dispute. While the petitioner being in service, departmental enquiry was initiated against him on the specific charge that the petitioner demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.3,000/from the complainant on 18.10.2011 for change of khatha in the joint names of the

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complainant and his son and was caught red-handed while receiving the aforesaid illegal gratification. On the same charge, the petitioner has been prosecuted for the alleged offences under sections 7, 13(1) (d) r/w 13(2) of P.C. Act. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has not produced either the Articles of charge or the charges framed by the criminal court in Spl.C.C.No.33/2012 to ascertain as to whether the petitioner has been prosecuted on the very same charge based on the very same material, yet a perusal of the copy of the order produced by the petitioner in Spl.C.C.No.33/2012 would indicate that the petitioner has been prosecuted on the very same charge and the criminal court as well and Enquiring Authority have relied on the very same witnesses in proof of the charges levelled against the petitioner.

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It is seen from the proceedings conducted by the criminal court as well as by the Enquiring Authority that the complainant has stood by the allegations made by him in the complaint and has reiterated that the petitioner demanded and received Rs.3,000/- from him for the purpose of changing katha

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in the joint names of himself and his son. But the learned Special Judge while appreciating the evidence of the complainant and the shadow witness in Spl.C.C.No.33/2012 has held that the shadow witness did not accompany the complainant when he approached the accused and that he was standing at a distance of 60 feet away from the complainant and he did not overhear the conversation between the complainant and the accused, as a result, there in no independent corroboration to prove the theory of demand and acceptance of bribe. Secondly, the trial judge has held that the petitioner was not in a position to do official act of effecting the change of khatha and with this reasoning the trial Judge has acquitted the petitioner of the alleged offences.

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The Enquiry Officer on appreciating the evidence adduced before him by the complainant and the shadow witnesses has categorically held that PW-2 the shadow witness has specifically stated during his evidence that he was at a distance of 50ft and he could not hear the conversation of the delinquent official with the complainant, yet in his evidence, he has specifically stated that he saw the complainant giving cash

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to the delinquent official and the delinquent official receiving the cash and placing the same in the right side pant pocket. Further, while being questioned by the Investigating Officer, the shadow witness has confirmed that the delinquent official received cash and kept it in the right side of his pant pocket. This evidence has been accepted by the Enquiry Officer holding that the respondent was in a position to do official favour demanded by the complainant and has held the charge as proved.

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Law relating to the scope of Departmental Proceedings is well exposited by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SHASHI BHUSHAN PRASAD v. INSPECTOR GENERAL,CISF, (2019) 7 SCC 797. In para 17 of the judgment, it is held as under:-

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17. “The scope of departmental enquiry and judicial proceedings and the effect of acquittal by a criminal Court has been examined by a three Judge Bench of this Court in A.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mohd. Yousuf Miya [A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, (1997) 2 SCC 699: 1997 SCC (L&S) 548]. The relevant paragraph is as under: (SCC pp. 704-05, para 8)

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“8…The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So

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crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of

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the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304A and 338, IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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In para 18, it is further held:-

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“18. The exposition has been further affirmed by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited [Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764: 2005 SCC (L&S) 1020] This Court held as under: (SCC p. 776, para 11)

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“As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is

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totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order [Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2004 SCC Online cal 59: (2004) 4 LLN 512] dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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Thus, the principle that emerges from the above

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decision is that an acquittal in a criminal proceedings is not binding on the Enquiry Officer, who conducts the disciplinary proceedings and it does not take away the right of the employer to initiate or continue departmental proceedings against the employee in regard to the same charges faced by the delinquent employee in a criminal proceedings. But as held by the Division

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Bench of this Court in MEHIBOOBSAB vs. UPALOKAYUKTA, ILR 2002 KAR 2535, where the employee is honourably acquitted, then normally it would not be expedient or appropriate to initiate or continue the departmental enquiry, on the same charges.” In para 18 of the above judgment, the Division Bench has enumerated the circumstances, wherein the delinquent could be exonerated in the departmental enquiry proceedings namely; “ Where the Criminal Court acquits an accused on a technical ground [for example on the ground of failure to obtain requisite sanction for prosecution or on the ground of limitation] or where the accused is acquitted for want of sufficient evidence or nonexamination of material witnesses or on account of material witnesses turning hostile or on account of conflict in evidence or where the accused is acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, then such acquittal is not an exoneration of the accused by an honourable acquittal.”

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In the instant case, the records clearly indicate that the petitioner has been proceeded in the departmental enquiry and criminal trial on the same set of charge; but as already discussed above, the petitioner has been acquitted of the charges in criminal proceedings solely on the ground that the prosecution failed to provide adequate corroboration to the testimony of PW-1. But, standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as criminal trial. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act. Under the said circumstances, merely because the evidence adduced by the prosecution did not meet the requirements of absolute proof and on that ground, if the criminal prosecution resulted in acquittal, the same cannot be said as honourable acquittal of the accused. Secondly, the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal prosecution on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner/accused was in a position to do the official favour, but, in this regard, law is well settled that if the act is done by a public servant in his official capacity as distinguished from his purely private capacity, it amounts to official act as held by the

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Hon’ble Supreme Court in DR.V.SEBASTIAN vs. THE STATE, 1988 CRI.L.J. 1150, “A public servant may have power to do certain official acts by virtue of the rank he holds as a public servant. He may get other powers by virtue of the office which he holds. When he exercises either of the powers, his act is official. No line of distinction need be made as between the acts in exercise of a particular office and acts in exercise of his position as a public servant. If the act is done in his official capacity, as distinguished from his purely private capacity, it amounts to official act. Even if it does not come within the scope of the functions of his office, the act does not cease to become official act.” In that view of the matter, the acquittal of the petitioner being not an honourable acquittal, in my view, the contention of the petitioner that on account of acquittal of the petitioner in criminal proceedings, the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiring Authority and the subsequent order passed by the Disciplinary Authority suffers from illegalities cannot be accepted.

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Even though, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the pension is not a bounty and the same cannot be withheld by the Government or by the disciplinary authority by way of punishment, yet, law on the point is crystal clear that if the service rules governing the public servant permits withholding of pension, such power could always be exercised by the Government or the Disciplinary Authority. In the instant case, the petitioner is governed by the provisions of The Karnataka Civil Services Rules. Rule 213 of Karnataka Civil Services Rules clearly empowers the Government or Disciplinary Authority to withhold the pension. Rule 213 read as under:-

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213(1) “Further good conduct shall be an implied condition of every grant of pension. The pension sanctioning authority may, by order in writing withhold or withdraw a pension or part thereof whether permanently or for a specified period, if the pensioner is convicted of a serious crime or is found guilty of grave misconduct.

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xxxxx

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(2) Where a pensioner is convicted of a serious crime by a Court of law, action under clause (1) shall be taken in the light of the judgment of the Court relating to such conviction.

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Rule 214 which is relevant for our purpose read as under:-

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214(1)(a) “ Withholding or withdrawing pension for misconduct of negligence -The Government reserve to themselves the right of either withholding or withdrawing a pension or part thereof, either permanently or for a specified period, if in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service including the service under a foreign employer and the service rendered upon reemployment after retirement.

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(b) xxxx

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Undeniably the charge proved against the petitioner is a grave misconduct, which even entails the punishment of dismissal. Under the said circumstances, the Disciplinary Authority having ordered withholding of 50% of the pension, in my view, is proportionate to the misconduct proved against the petitioner and it does not call for any interference by this Court.

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Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently disputed the validity of the order passed by respondent No.2 – Disciplinary Authority on the ground that the impugned order at Annexure-A has been passed solely based on the recommendation made by Upa Lokayuktha and in violation of

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the discretion conferred on him under the Statute to independently consider the enquiry materials placed before him yet, a perusal of the order indicates that respondent No.2 has examined all the material placed before him referred in the preamble namely, the entrustment of the enquiry to the enquiry officer, the report of the enquiring officer as well as the recommendation made by the Upa Lokayuktha. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order at Annexure-A has been passed solely on the basis of the recommendation made by the Lokayuktha without considering the enquiry material and without exercising the discretion vested in him. Therefore, I do not find any justifiable ground to interfere with the impugned order. Having regard to the gravity of the charge proved against the petitioner and the nature of the misconduct committed by the petitioner, in my view, respondent No.2 was justified in directing withholding of 50% of the pension amount. The said penalty in my view is in commensurate with the delinquency proved against the petitioner.

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In view of the above reasons, I do not find any reason to

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interfere with the impugned order.

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Petition dismissed.

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Sd/- JUDGE

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*mn/ nd/-