Partly allowed

Sri.Susheelkumar @ Prashant S/O Shankar Puranthar v. the State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC18 Aug 2020WP/108825/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Compensation claims concerned land taken for road widening and land submerged by a tank. Both petitions were partly allowed. The court directed consideration of a fresh representation in the road matter and quashed the rejection endorsement in the submergence matter, directing reconsideration within four months.

What did the court decide?

Fresh representation directed for the road claim; rejection endorsement quashed in the submergence claim, with reconsideration within four months.

Sri.Susheelkumar @ Prashant S/O Shankar Puranthar Vs the… — Land Acquisition | Karnataka HC (2020)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH

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DATED THIS THE 18^TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2020

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

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WRIT PETITION No.108825/2018 (GM – RES)

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C/W

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WRIT PETITION No.108763/2018 (LA – RES)

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IN WRIT PETITION No.108825/2018 (GM – RES)

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BETWEEN

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SRI SUSHEELKUMAR @ PRASHANT S/O SHANKAR PURANTHAR, OCC.: PRIVATE SERVICE, R/O BETAGARI – GADAG, DIST.:GADAG.

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... PETITIONER

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(BY SRI SUNIL S.DESAI, ADVOCATE (VIDEO CONFERENCING))

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AND

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THE STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION, M.S.BUILDING, BENGALURU.

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THE DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION, DR.AMBEDKAR ROAD,

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VISHWESHWARAYA TOWER, BENGALURU.

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THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER D.C.OFFICER, GADAG, DISTRICT – GADAG – 582 101.

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THE MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER GADAG – BETAGERI CITY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, GADAG, DIST.:GADAG – 582 101.

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... RESPONDENTS

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(BY MS.SEEMA SHIVA NAIK, HCGP FOR R1 TO R3; SRI HARSH DESAI, ADVOCATE FOR R4)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS TO PAY THE COMPENSATION TO THE PETITIONERS FOR THE ENCROACHMENT OF HIS PROPERTY.

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IN WRIT PETITION No.108763/2018 (LA – RES)

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BETWEEN

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M.K.SHRIKANTH @ SHRIKANTHAGOUDA, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, S/O KHAJANAGOUDA, WARD NO.15, PINJAR STREET, KHAJANAGOUDA COMPOUND, GANGAVATHI – 583 227 KOPPAL DISTRICT.

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... PETITIONER

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(BY SRI HARSH DESAI, ADVOCATE)

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AND

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THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

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BY ITS SECRETARY TO THE REVENUE DEPARTMENT, VIKASA SOUDHA, DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU – 560 001.

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THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER KOPPAL DISTRICT, KOPPAL – 591 121.

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THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KOPPAL DISTRICT, KOPPAL – 591 121.

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THE TAHSILDAR GANGAVATHI TALUK, GANGAVATHI – 583 227, KOPPAL DISTRICT.

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THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER SMALL IRRIGATION DIVISION, KUSHTAGI – 584 131 KOPPAL DISTRICT.

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THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER SMALL IRRIGATION DIVISION, KOPPAL DISTRICT, KOPPAL – 591 121.

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KARNATAKA NEERAVARI NIGAMA NIYAMITA, No.2, CANAL DIVISION, VADDARHATTI CAMP, GANGAVATHI 583 227, KOPPAL DISTRICT BY ITS EXECUTIVE ENGINEER.

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... RESPONDENTS

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(BY MS. SEEMA SHIVA NAIK, HCGP FOR R1 – R6; SRI UMESH C.AIMAPURE, ADVOCATE FOR R7)

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENDORSEMENT BEARING NO.Kandaya:BhuSwaha:20:2017-

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18:kUM.nUM:15349 DATED 19.02.2018 ISSUED BY RESPONDENT NO.2 AS PER ANNEXURE – L ETC.

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THESE WRIT PETITIONS COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

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ORDER

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IN W.P.NO.108825/2018

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The petitioner in this writ petition is one of the legal representatives of one Sri Vasudeva, owner of the property who died in the year 1995 and the petitioner claims that he has succeeded to the property on such succession. The CTS extracts of the property are in his name.

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Heard Sri Sunil S.Desai, learned counsel for the petitioner, Miss Seema Shiva Naik, learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Sri Harsh Desai, learned counsel for respondent No.4.

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It transpires that the 4^th respondent/Gadag-

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Betgeri City Municipal Council took up the task of widening the Municipal Road and encroached the land of

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the petitioner to an extent of 1925 sq.ft. and laid the road in the year 1987. The grandfather of the petitioner after noticing the same, immediately wrote to the 4^th respondent for payment of compensation as the property was acquired without any proceedings for acquisition.

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It further transpires that the General Body of the 4^th respondent met and resolved in resolution No.288 on 31-12-1988 to call for the report from the Sub-Registrar with regard to market value of the land and to consider lowest amount in the market value for payment of compensation. The 4^th respondent upon the aforesaid decision communicated to the Sub-Registrar, Gadag on 14-05-1999 to submit a report with regard to the market value of the property. It appears that the Sub-Registrar submitted a report of determination of market value of the property by fixing a rate at Rs.153/- per sq.ft. and sought approval of the 2^nd respondent by his communication dated 19-02-2000 (Annexure-B).

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On receipt of the above communication, the 2^nd

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respondent by his communication dated 17-11-2000, sought approval of the 1^st respondent/State as required under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976. The State looking into the nature of the claim sought one more report from the 4^th respondent regarding encroachment, by its communication dated 15-12-2000. The petitioner claims that the 2^nd respondent after receipt of communication from the 1^st respondent directed the Assistant Commissioner, Gadag Sub-Division to submit an Inspection Report with regard to the aforesaid subject matter. The Assistant Commissioner held an inspection after which he submitted a report on 17-10-2003, confirming encroachment of land and fixation of price for the encroached property at Rs.153/per sq.ft., which according to the Assistant Commissioner was the reasonable amount. A copy of the Inspection Report is placed as Annexure ‘E’ to the writ petition.

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Thereafter, the petitioner learnt that there were several internal communications between the parties and the respondents have not taken any decision to pay compensation amount to him. On the contrary, the 4^th respondent had collected tax for the entire extent of land. During the life time of the grandmother of the petitioner, she has once again requested the 4^th respondent to pay compensation for the encroached property of the petitioner. The 4^th respondent after taking note of its earlier decision in Resolution dated 24-02-2004, decided to seek approval of the Government for payment of compensation amount. The resolution dated 24-02-2004 reads as follows:

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“ «µÀAiÀÄ: ¹.¸À.£ÀA.6677:9£ÉÃzÀÝgÀ°è gÀ¸ÉÛ ªÀiÁqÀÄªÀ PÁ®PÉÌ CwÃPÀæªÀÄt ªÀiÁrzÀÝgÀ ¥ÀjºÁgÀ zsÀ£À PÉÆqÀ®Ä ²æÃªÀÄw ¥ÁªÀðvÉªÀé ªÁ¸ÀÄzÉÃªÀ ¥ÀÄgÀAvÀgÀ EªÀgÀÄ «£ÀAw¹PÉÆArgÀÄªÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ «ZÁgÀ. xÀgÁªÀÅ £ÀA.167 ¢£ÁAPÀ:24-2-04

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PÁAiÀiÁð®AiÀÄ n¥ÀàtÂ ºÁUÀÆ PÁUÀzÀ ¥ÀvÀæ ¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ FUÁUÀ¯ÉÃ eÁUÉ CwÃPÀæªÀÄt gÀ¸ÉÛ ªÀiÁrzÀÝgÀ §UÉÎ d.PÀ.xÀgÁªÀÅ £ÀA.56 ¢£ÁAPÀ:16-6-87£ÉÃzÀÝgÀ°è ¥Àæw ZÀzÀgÀ CrUÉ gÀÆ.38.72 gÀAvÉ PÉÆqÀ®Ä xÀgÁ¬Ä¹zÀÄÝ EgÀÄªÀzÀÄ. ¸ÀzsÀåzÀ £ÀUÀgÀ¸À¨sÉ DyðPÀ ¥Àj¹Üw ¸Àj E®èzÀ PÁgÀt ªÀÄvÀÄÛ gÀ¸ÉÛAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¸À£ï 1907 ªÀÄÄAZÉAiÀÄ gÀ¸ÉÛ ªÀiÁrgÀÄªÀzÀjAzÀ

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CA¢£À zÀgÀzÀ°è ¨sÀÆªÀiÁ°ÃPÀjUÉ ¨sÀÆ ¥ÀjºÁgÀ zsÀ£À ªÀÄAdÆgÀ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä ¸ÀgÀPÁgÀPÉÌ ¥Àæ¸ÁÛªÀ£É ¸À°è¸À®Ä ¸ÀÆZÀ£É.

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¸ÀÆZÀPÀgÀÄ: ²æÃ J¸ï.©.ºÀÄ¬Ä®UÉÆÃ¼À C£ÀÄªÉÆÃzÀPÀgÀÄ: ²æÃ Dgï.«.AiÀÄ¼ÀªÀÄ°

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¸ÀÆZÀ£É M¥Àà¯Á¬ÄvÀÄ CAvÁ xÀgÁªÀÅ ¸ÀªÁð£ÀÄªÀÄvÀ¢AzÁ ¥Á¸Á¬ÄvÀÄ.

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The petitioner again approached the 1^st respondent

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for necessary action in terms of the aforesaid facts and correspondences of the authorities. The said request of the petitioner was referred back to the 2^nd respondent by the 1^st respondent/State on 29-03-2004. Thereafter, it appears that there was no order passed either granting compensation in terms of the aforesaid communication or turning it down. The petitioner, therefore, preferred the present petition seeking a direction to issue a writ of mandamus to the respondents herein to pay compensation for the land of the petitioner acquired for formation of road in the year 1987.

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IN WRIT PETITION NO.108763 OF 2018

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The petitioner in this writ petition claims to be

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the owner of several agricultural lands in (a) Sy.No.272 measuring 11 acres; (b) Sy.No.273 measuring 09 acres 33 guntas; (c) Sy.No.274 measuring 20 acres 03 guntas; (d) Sy.No.287/2 measuring 03 acres 37 guntas and (e) Sy.No.288/1 measuring 05 acres 23 guntas, all situated in Yardona Village now called as Karatagi in Gangavathi Taluk, Koppal District. The petitioner claims that several decades ago Yardona Tank was used as a balancing reservoir by the Government for construction of Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal System. Owing to this, the lands of the petitioner gradually submerged underwater and became unusable, upon which the petitioner requested the respondents to acquire the lands and compensate him for the loss along with other agriculturists.

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Pursuant to the request of the petitioner, the 3^rd respondent/Assistant Commissioner sent a proposal on 28-08-2001 to the office of the 2^nd respondent

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suggesting that lands of the petitioner be acquired in the light of the aforesaid fact of it becoming not usable by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner alleges that there was no further action taken by the respondents despite the petitioner requesting several times for grant of compensation on acquisition. When nothing was moving, the petitioner also caused a legal notice on 09-08-2017 to initiate proceedings to acquire the submerged lands and pay compensation thereto. On receipt of notice, the 3^rd respondent forwarded the same to the office of the 7^th respondent/Karnataka Neeravari Nigama Niyamita, which is the competent authority to entertain any claims towards grant of compensation for lands submerged, requesting to take further action. The allegation of the petitioner in this writ petition is that,

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despite the aforesaid communications nothing had happened. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner had approached this Court in Writ Petition No.109634 of 2017 and connected matters and after hearing, this Court by its order dated 21-11-2017 directed the 2^nd respondent to consider the case of the petitioner. The order passed by this Court reads as follows:-

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“7. In M.V.Subba Rao’s case referred to supra, this Court observed that there is a tendency of some persons making such applications for compulsory acquisition of the lands and some of the Government officials in collusion with such claimants, making recommendations for acquisition, which leads to fraudulent award, etc. The Deputy Commissioner has to appreciate all those facts.

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8. Therefore, the writ petitions are disposed of directing the 2^nd respondent to consider annexure-D the representation of the petitioner in the light of the observations of this Court in M.V.Subba Rao’s case referred to supra and in accordance with law within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.”

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Pursuant to the aforesaid order passed by this Court, the petitioner represented to the 2^nd respondent on 16-122017. The 2^nd respondent purported to be complying with the order of this Court issued an endorsement dated 19-02-2018 stating that the lands were submerged about 50 to 60 years ago and no proceedings can be initiated on this day and accordingly, no compensation can be paid/payable. The endorsement rejecting the claim of the petitioner reads:-

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“ vÀºÀ²Ã¯ÁÝgÀ, UÀAUÁªÀw EªÀgÀÄ AiÀÄgÀqÉÆÃt UÁæªÀzÀ ¸À.£ÀA:272 «: 09-32 JPÀgÉ, 274 «:20-03 JPÀgÉ, 287/2 «: 03-27 JPÀgÉ ºÁUÀÆ 288/1 «: 05-23 JPÀgÉ d«ÄÃ£ÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¸ÀA¥ÀÆtðªÁV PÉgÉAiÀÄ°è ªÀÄÄ¼ÀUÀqÉAiÀiÁVgÀÄvÀÛªÉ. ¸ÀzÀj PÉgÉAiÀÄÄ ¸ÀÄªÀiÁgÀÄ 50 jAzÀ 60 ªÀµÀðUÀ¼À ºÀ¼ÉAiÀÄzÁVzÀÄÝ, CA¢¤AzÀ EA¢£ÀªÀgÉUÉ UÁæªÀÄ¸ÀÜgÀÄ PÉgÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß G¥ÀAiÉÆÃV¸ÀÄvÁÛ §A¢zÀÄÝ, FUÁUÀ¯ÉÃ PÉgÉAiÀÄÄ C¹ÛvÀézÀ°è EgÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ ºÉÆ¸ÀzÁV ¨sÀÆ¸Áé¢üÃ£À ¥Àr¹PÉÆ¼ÀÄîªÀÅzÀÄ CªÀ±ÀåPÀvÉ EgÀzÉÃ EgÀÄªÀÅzÀÄ PÀAqÀÄ§gÀÄvÀÛzÉ JAzÀÄ ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¸À°è¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.”

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The circular dated 15-11-2001 issued by the Divisional Commissioner, Kalaburagi under which shelter

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is taken by the 2^nd respondent for his decision, directs

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that compensation cannot be granted to the petitioner for submergence of his lands. The said circular dated 15-11-2001 is also produced by the petitioner, a perusal of which clearly indicates that it has nothing to do with the cause brought out by the petitioner. The circular is indicative of apprehension of the Divisional Commissioner about antisocial elements claiming higher compensation by producing false documents. Therefore, the issue with regard to the compensation payable to the petitioner in this writ petition will have to be re-considered by the 2^nd respondent by taking into consideration the circular issued by the Divisional Commissioner also.

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Both the writ petitions thus concern grant of

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compensation for acquisition of the respective properties of the petitioners for formation of a road and the other, for the submerging of the lands of the petitioner by

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formation of a tank. To these facts obtaining in each of the cases, it is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of VIDYA DEVI v. STAE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AND OTHERS reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569 , wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:

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“2. The respondent State took over the land of the appellant in 1967-68 for the construction of a major district road being the Nadaun — Sujanpur Road, a major district road without taking recourse to acquisition proceedings, or following due process of law. The construction of the road was completed by 1975.

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3. The appellant, being an illiterate widow, coming from a rural background, was wholly unaware of her rights and entitlement in law, and did not file any proceedings for compensation of the land compulsorily taken over by the State.

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4. In 2004, some similarly situated persons whose lands had also been

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taken over by the respondent State for the same public purpose, filed CWP No. 1192 of 2004 titled Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., claiming compensation before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The High Court vide order dated 23-4-2007 [Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC OnLine HP 220] , allowed CWP No. 1192 of 2004, and directed the respondent State to acquire the lands of the writ petitioners under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

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5. Pursuant to the order of the High Court in 2008, the respondent State initiated acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 only with respect to the lands of the writ petitioners, and not the other landowners whose lands had also been taken over.

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6. The appellant submits that she learnt of these proceedings in 2010, when she along with her two daughters filed CWP No. 1736 of 2010 before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, praying that the State be directed to pay compensation for the land acquired in 1967-1968; or, in the alternative, direct the State to initiate acquisition

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proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

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8. The State has further admitted that a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act had been issued in 2008 with respect to the land of Anakh Singh a neighbouring landowner, whose land was similarly taken over for the same purpose. Furthermore, the writ petition was barred by laches, since the road was constructed in 1967-1968, and metalled since 1975. The land was utilised by the respondent State after the appellant and her predecessors-ininterest had verbally consented to the land being taken over without any objection.

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10. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a review petition against the judgment and order dated 11-9-2013 [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., 2013 SCC OnLine HP 5384] which was dismissed vide order dated 13-5-2014 [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., 2014 SCC OnLine HP 5941] .

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11. The appellant has filed the present appeals before this Court, to challenge the judgment dated 11-9-

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2013 [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., 2013 SCC OnLine HP 5384] passed in the writ petition and order dated 13-5-2014 [Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., 2014 SCC OnLine HP 5941] passed in the review petition.

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12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92] , which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.

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12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property

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except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414]

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12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius ShapurChenai [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius ShapurChenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627] , wherein this Court held that: (SCC p. 634, para 6)

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“6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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Padmamma V. S. Reddy [N.

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12.4. In N. Padmamma V. S. Ramakrishna Reddy [N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517] , this Court held that: (SCC p. 526, para 21)

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“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. [ Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. , (2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673] , this Court recognised the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: (SCC p. 379, para 30)

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“ 30 . It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government . Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed-bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists .”

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(emphasis supplied)

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12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.

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12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State.

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12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.

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12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a

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constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.

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12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.

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12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial

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conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.

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12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]

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12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana

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Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] , this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows: (SCC p. 359, para 11)

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“11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities

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pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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13. In the present case, the appellant being an illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been deprived of her private property by

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the State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The appellant has been divested of her right to property without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a continuing one, since the appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law. The present case is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since the State has admitted that the land was taken over without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to the appellant.

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14. The State has submitted that in 2008 it had initiated acquisition proceedings in the case of an adjoining landowner viz. Shri Anakh Singh pursuant to a direction given by the High Court in Anakh Singh v. State of H.P. [Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC OnLine HP 220] The State initiated acquisition only in the case where directions were issued by the High

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Court, and not in the case of other landowners whose lands were compulsorily taken over, for the same purpose, and at the same time. As a consequence, the present landowner has been driven to move the Court in their individual cases for redressal.

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15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondent State is directed to pay the compensation on the same terms as awarded by the Reference Court vide order dated 7-7-2015 in AnakhSinghcase [Anakh Singh v. State of H.P., 2007 SCC OnLine HP 220] (i.e. Land Reference No. 1 of 2011 RBT No. 01/13) along with all statutory benefits including solatium, interest, etc. within a period of 8 weeks, treating it as a case of deemed acquisition. An affidavit of compliance is directed to be filed by the State before this Court within 10 weeks.

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16. It is informed that an appeal has been preferred by Ravinder Singh s/o Anakh Singh &Ors. being RFA No. 35 of 2016 which is pending before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla.

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17. Taking note thereof, if an appeal is filed by the present appellant within 8 weeks from the date of compensation being paid to her by the State, the appeal will be treated to be within limitation, and would be decided on its own merits in accordance with law.”

¶147

The facts obtaining before the Apex Court was a claim of 80 years old appellant whose land was acquired for construction of road completed in the year 1975 had approached the High Court in the year 2004 claiming compensation for the acquisition of 1975, which had observed importance of right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Hence, the authorities are required to re-consider the case of the petitioner in this petition in the light of the aforesaid law declared the by the Apex Court.

¶148

In the light of the law declared by the Apex

¶149

Court in the aforesaid case, the reasons given in the order of rejection in the writ petitions will lose its legs to

¶150

¶151

stand and the respondents will have to reconsider the claim of the petitioners in both the writ petitions keeping in mind the facts narrated hereinabove and the law declared by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. Wherefore, the following:

¶152

O R D E R

¶153

W.P.No.108825 of 2018 is allowed in part. Petitioner is directed to give a fresh representation within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the respondents herein are directed to consider the same in accordance with law.

¶154

W.P.No.108763 of 2018 is allowed in part. Impugned endorsement bearing No.Kandaya: BhuSwaha: 20:2017-18:Kum:Num:15349 dated 19-02-2018 (Annexure-L-) is quashed and the respondents herein are directed to re-consider the case of the petitioner within four months keeping in mind the

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¶156

observations made hereinabove and consider grant of compensation of amount to the petitioner for his lands submerged in Yardona Tank, now known as Karatagi, Gangavathi Taluk, in accordance with law.

¶157

Sd/JUDGE

¶158

nvj CT:MJ

Sri.Susheelkumar @ Prashant S/O Shankar Puranthar v. the State of Karnataka

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Sri.Susheelkumar @ Prashant S/O Shankar Puranthar v. the State of Karnataka

Case brief

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