Dismissed

Sri K Srinivas Murthy v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC17 Aug 2020WA/3348/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appellants challenged the dismissal of their writ petition seeking a declaration that land acquisition under the KIAD Act had lapsed for want of an award and compensation. The Division Bench held that the KIAD Act prescribes no limitation for the award and that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not apply to KIAD Act acquisitions, and dismissed the appeal.

What the court decided

AI extract

Sri K Srinivas Murthy Vs State of Karnataka — Land Acquisition | Karnataka HC (2020)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 17^TH DAY OF AUGUST 2020

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PRESENT

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THE HON’BLE MR. ABHAY S. OKA, CHIEF JUSTICE

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AND

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THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI

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WRIT APPEAL NO.3348 OF 2018 (LA-KIADB)

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BETWEEN:

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SRI. K. SRINIVAS MURTHY AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS S/O LATE. N. KRISHNA IYER RESIDING AT NO.236 “KRISHNAKRUPA” 9^TH CROSS ROAD, 1^ST BLOCK RAJAJINAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 010.

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SMT. S.V. PADMA AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS W/O K. SRINIVAS MURTHY RESIDING AT NO.236 “KRISHNAKRUPA”, 9^TH CROSS ROAD, 1^ST BLOCK RAJAJINAGAR, BENGALURU – 560 010.

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….APPELLANTS

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(BY SRI. L.M. CHIDANANDAYYA, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY ITS UNDER SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES MULTI –STOREYED BUILDING 3^RD FLOOR, DR. AMBEDKER VEEDHI BENGALURU – 560 001.

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THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER KIADB, EAST WING KANIJA BHAVANA RACE COURSE ROAD BENGALURU – 560 001.

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THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER KIADB, KANIJA BHAVANA, RACE COURSE ROAD BENGALURU – 560 001.

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M/S KUNAL ENTERPRISES OFFICE NO.37/9, 4^TH CROSS K.S. GARDEN, LALBAGH ROAD BENGALURU – 560 027 REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORISED PERSON SRI. S. ANANTHRAM.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. ASHOK N NAYAK, ADVOCATE FOR CAVEATOR /RESPONDENT NO.3

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SRI. SHIVAPRASAD SHANTANGOUDAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-4)

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THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 05.11.2018 PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.61041 OF 2016 (LA-KIADB) PASSED BY THE HON’BLE SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE COURT AND ALLOW THE WRIT APPEAL BY ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION.

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THIS WRIT APPEAL COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING THIS DAY, ASHOK S KINAGI J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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JUDGMENT

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The petitioners claim to be the owners of the land bearing Sy.No.59/1 measuring to an extent of 0.04½ guntas situated at Doddathoguru village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as ‘the land in question’ for the sake of convenience).

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According to the petitioners, the land in question along with the surrounding lands were declared as industrial area under Section 3(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act (‘the KIAD Act’ for short). Thereafter, the State Government issued a preliminary notification on 21.12.2000 under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act giving a notice of its intention to acquire such lands as they were required for the purpose of an industrial establishment by the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’). In pursuance of it, a show cause notice was issued under Section 28(2) of the KIAD Act to the petitioners fixing the date of hearing and calling upon them to show cause why the said land should not be acquired. The petitioners filed detailed objection objecting for acquisition on the ground that

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their son is an Ayurvedic Doctor and they want to establish a hospital and requested to drop the acquisition proceedings. After enquiry and appropriate order was passed under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act, a final declaration dated 30.5.2001 was issued under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act stating that the State Government was satisfied that the lands stated therein should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act.

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The petitioners claim that they are in continuous possession of the acquired land. The petitioners claim that no award has been made after final notification and further claim that the acquiring authorities have not followed the provisions of Sections 28(1) to (8), 29 and 30 of the KIAD Act. The petitioners have therefore filed the writ petition in the year 2016 for a declaration that the entire acquisition proceedings relating to the aforesaid land has lapsed on account of no award being passed within two years from the date of final declaration.

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The respondents filed statement of objections stating

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that the writ petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable

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either under law and facts and further pleaded that the respondents-KIADB has acquired the land after following the procedure prescribed under the KIAD Act and it is also further pleaded therein that since the acquired land are required for public purpose for the formation of industrial layout, the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) has passed an order under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act on 18.4.2001 and forwarded a copy of the same to the State Government. The State Government by its Commerce and Industry Department issued a final notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act on 30.5.2001 and the acquired land vests with the State Government under Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act. A notice was issued under Section 28(6) of the KIAD Act to the land owners on 24.12.2001 to hand over the possession. The land owner Smt. Muniyamma handed over the possession to the SLAO on 11.1.2002. Thereafter, SLAO has handed over the possession of the acquired land to the Board. A notice was issued to the land owner under Section 29(2) of the KIAD Act to receive the consent compensation fixed by the Board. The General Award came to be passed on 31.12.2014.

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The final notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act was issued on 30.5.2001 and the writ petition was filed in the year 2016. Thus, there is an inordinate delay in filing the writ petition. Hence prayed to dismiss the petition.

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The learned Single Judge after hearing the arguments on both sides and after considering the material on record dismissed the writ petition on the ground that no material particulars as to how the grounds on which the alleged denotification of the said land has been made are furnished in the writ petition to seek parity of treatment and held that no ground has been urged and consequently dismissed the writ petition.

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The petitioners aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 5.11.2018, has filed this writ appeal.

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Heard Sri.LM.Chidanandaya, learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners, Sri. Ashok N Nayak, learned counsel for the caveator/respondent No.3- KIADB and the Sri.Shivaprasad Shanthanagoudar, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.4.

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The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners submits that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in dismissing the writ petition without considering the material placed on record. He further submits that the acquisition proceedings had been lapsed on the ground that neither an award has been passed nor the award amount has been paid and he further contends that the appellants/petitioners are in physical possession and enjoyment of the land in question. Respondents have not completed the acquisition proceedings in accordance with law.

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He further submits that he has filed an application for production of additional documents along with the list of documents showing that award has been passed on 18.6.2019. Hence, on this ground he seeks to allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and consequently prays to allow the writ petition.

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The learned counsel appearing for the respondents supports the impugned order.

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The appellants/petitioners do not dispute that after publication of the preliminary notification dated 21.12.2000, show cause notice was issued as required under Section 28(2) of the KIAD Act and the same was served on them. The date of hearing was fixed on 21.12.2000 and they were called upon to show cause why the land in question should not be acquired. In response to the said notice, the appellants/petitioners have filed objections. The order sheet relating to the acquisition proceedings, produced by the appellants vide Annexure-F, shows that the case was called before the SLAO on 21.12.2000. The appellants/petitioners appeared before the SLAO and the SLAO heard the appellants/petitioners and the brief note of the submissions made by the appellants/petitioners was recorded in the order sheet and thereafter the SLAO, as a delegate of the State Government in exercise of the power under sub section (3) of Section 28 of the KIAD Act, passed an order that the land of the appellants be acquired.

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From a perusal of the records it is seen that the SLAO has followed the procedure prescribed under Section 28

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of the KIAD Act. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has not pointed out which is the provision that has not been complied. Hence, the contention of the appellants/petitioners that the respondents have not followed the provisions under Section 28 of the KIAD Act is not well founded and hence rejected.

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Further, the contention of the appellants/petitioners is that the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the LA Act 1894’ for brevity) is applicable to the acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of KIAD Act and he further submits that Section 11A of the LA Act 1894 and Section 24(2) of the New Act, 2013 i.e. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 are applicable to the acquisition proceedings initiated under the KIAD Act.

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In order to examine the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners, it is necessary to notice the provisions of KIAD Act. The preamble of the Act reads as under :

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“An act to make a special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein, and for that purpose to establish an industrial areas development Board and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid”

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Some of the provisions of the KIAD Act which are relevant for the decision of the issues involved, are as under :

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Section 3. Declaration of industrial areas – (1) The State Government may, by notification, declare any area in the State to be an industrial area for the purpose of this Act. 2) Every such notification shall define the limits of the area to which it relates

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“ Section 28. Acquisition of land.- (1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land.

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(2) On publication of a notification under sub-section (1), the State Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner is not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the land should not be acquired.

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(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.

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(4) After orders are passed under subsection (3), where the State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect.

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(5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4),

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the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.

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(6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.

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(7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under subsection (5), the State Government or any officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.

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(8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired.

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“ 29. Compensation.- (1) Where any land is acquired by the State Government under this Chapter, the State Government shall pay for

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such acquisition compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

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(2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement.

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(3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid.

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(4) On receipt of a reference under subsection (3), the Deputy Commissioner shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land.

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30. Application of Central Act 1 of 1894.- The provisions of the Land Acquisition

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Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respect of lands acquired under this Chapter.”

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Section 29 of the KIAD Act provides that where the land is acquired by the State Government under Chapter VII (Section 27 to 31), the compensation for acquisition shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 30 of the KIAD Act provides that the provisions of the LA Act 1894 shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of compensation and payment of compensation in respect of lands acquired under this Chapter. It is important to note that LA Act is not applicable at the stage of acquisition of land but becomes applicable only in the matter of payment of compensation on the account of Section 30 of the KIAD Act. Therefore, the provisions of LA Act 1894 and the 2013 Act

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have no application here and the acquisition of land has to be done in accordance with the provision of the KIAD Act.

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The preamble of the KIAD Act shows that it has to be

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enacted to make a special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of the industries in such industrial areas. Section 2 (7-a) defines industrial infrastructural facilities.

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The provisions for acquisition of land under the KIAD Act is contained in Section 28 of the said Act. It is somewhat different from the provisions contained in Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the LA Act 1894. The Legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to make a specific provision for acquisition of land in the KIAD Act itself rather than to take recourse to Sections 4 and 6 of the LA Act 1894. A plain reading of sub section (1) of Section 28 of the KIAD Act would show that the land can be acquired for the purpose of i) Development by the Board or ii) for any other purpose in furtherance of the object of the Act. Sub section (3) of Section 28 of the KIAD Act is similar to

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Section 5A of the LA Act 1894 and the final notification is issued under sub section (4) of Section 28 of the KIAD Act. The necessary pre-conditions for a valid notification under sub section (4) of Section 28 of the KIAD Act is that the State Government should be satisfied that the land is required for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub section (1) viz. for the purpose of - i) development by the Board or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. Therefore, in order to judge the validity of the notification what is to be seen is whether the acquisition of land is been made for securing the establishment of industrial areas or to promote the establishment or orderly development of industries in such area.

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In the present case, the land in question and the surrounding lands are acquired for the purpose of establishment of industrial area and accordingly a notification under Section 3(1) of the KIAD Act was issued and thereafter a preliminary notification was issued, show cause notice was also issued to the appellants/petitioners to show cause why their land should not be acquired. The appellants/petitioners

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have filed objections to the preliminary notification. The SLAO after providing an opportunity to the appellants/petitioners passed an order under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act and a final notification dated 30.5.2001 was issued in the official gazette stating that the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government under sub section (5) of Section 28 of the KIAD Act. As observed above, the acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government is in accordance with Sections 28(1) to (8), 29 and 30 of the KIAD Act.

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The learned counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners submits that no award has been passed and further the appellants/petitioners are in continuous possession of the land in question and compensation is neither paid nor deposited before the Court on or before 1.1.2009 as stipulated under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Hence, the acquisition proceedings deemed to have been lapsed.

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Before considering this point, it would be relevant to extract Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Section 24 of the 2013 Act reads as under:-

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“ 24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894-

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(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

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(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.

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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical

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possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

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Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

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The title or preamble to Section 24 reads as “Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894” shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. It is explicit, restricted in its scope and not expansive in nature. It is only where the acquisition process has been initiated under LA Act, 1894 that the acquisition would lapse, on the existence of conditions as stated in sub-section (2) of Section 24. Same is the case with regard to Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 24.

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Sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) applies only when acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. Therefore, on that short ground alone, it could be held that Section 24 of the 2013 Act is not applicable to an acquisition initiated under the KIAD Act.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, Mysore & another v. Anasuya Bai (dead) by Legal Representatives & others reported in (2017) 3 SCC 313 has held as under :

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“28. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment however, has quashed the acquisition proceedings itself holding that they have lapsed. For this purpose, the High Court has taken aid of Section 24 of the new LA Act in the following manner: (Anasuya Bai case, SCC OnLine Kar paras 13-14)

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’13. It is also noted that the acquisition proceedings including preliminary and final declaration have been passed under the provisions of the KIAD Act. But there is no provision under the KIAD Act to pass an award and award has to be passed only under the provisions of the

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LA Act, 1894. If the award has to be passed under the LA Act, whether the new Act can be pressed into service to hold the acquisition proceedings are lapsed on account of non-passing of award within a period of 5 years under Section 11. If the award is passed under the LA Act, the enquiry has to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before passing the award. Section 11A contemplates that if the award is not passed within 2 years from the date of publication of the final declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall automatically stands lapsed. It is no doubt true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka has held that Section 11-A of the Act is no application in respect of the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act. We have to consider in this appeal as to whether Section 24(2) of the new Act is applicable in order to hold that the acquisition proceedings deemed to be lapsed due to non-payment of

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compensation and non-passing of the award within a period of five years from the date of declaration and with effect from non-payment of compensation to the landowners.

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The new Act does not say whether the Act is applicable to the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act, 1894. What Section 24 says that if the award is not passed under Section 11 of the Act and the compensation is not paid within 5 years or more prior to new Act, if the physical possession of the land is taken or not especially the compensation is not paid or deposited in Court such proceedings deem to have been lapsed. In the instant case, it is not the case of the respondent that award is not required to be passed under the provisions of the LA Act. When the award is required to be passed under the LA Act, the respondents cannot contend that the provisions of the new Act cannot be made applicable on account of non-

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payment of compensation within a period of five years.’

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Further in paragraphs 29 and 30 it is held as under :

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This approach of the High Court, we find, to be totally erroneous. In the first instance, the matter is not properly appreciated by ignoring the important aspects mentioned in para 28 above. Secondly, effect of non-applicability of Section 11A of the old LA Act is not rightly understood. The High Court was not oblivious of the judgment of this Court in M. Nagabhushana case which is referred by it in the aforesaid discussion itself. This judgment categorically holds that once the proceedings are initiated under the KIAD Act, Section 11-A of the old LA Act would not be applicable. Such an opinion of the Court is based on the following rationale: ( M. Nagabhushana case , SCC pp. 420-22, paras 29-36)

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“29. The appellant has not challenged the validity of the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the publication of the Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act i.e. from 30-3-2004, the land in

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question vested in the State free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act, whereas the land acquired under the said Act vests only under Section 16 thereof, which runs as under:

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‘16. Power to take possession. – When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.’

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30. On a comparison of the aforesaid provisions, namely, Section 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 of the said Act, it is clear that the land which is subject to acquisition proceeding under the said Act gets vested with the Government only when the Collector makes an award under Section 11, and the Government takes possession. Under Section 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, such vesting takes place by operation of law and it has nothing to do with the making of any award. This is where Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act are vitally different from Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act.

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In considering the judgment of Anasuya Bai supra, the same principle applies to the present case in hand. In the present case, there is a comparison between the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the KIAD Act. These two Acts were enacted to achieve different purposes. The KIAD Act is enacted for establishment and development of industries in suitable areas in the State and the acquisition of the land under the KIAD Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of planned development of any City whereas, Land Acquisition Act has been enacted to acquire the lands for public purpose for different purposes including the acquisition for establishment of companies. Therefore, considering the judgment referred to above (Anasuya), Section 24 of the New Act of 2013 does not apply to the acquisitions initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act.

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Further, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. MANOHARLAL AND OTHERS (S.L.P.(C)Nos.9036-9038 of 2016 dt.6.3.2020), has considered Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 and has observed in paragraphs 398, 401 and 402 as under :

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398. We are of the considered opinion that Section 24 cannot be used to revive dead and stale claims and concluded cases. They cannot be inquired into within the purview of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. The provisions of Section 24 do not invalidate the judgments and orders of the Court, where rights and claims have been lost and negatived. There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus, stale and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment of Section 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment has not been made, but possession has been taken, the remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by the proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

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401. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Shree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra) cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v.

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Shailendra (Dead) through L.Rs., (supra), the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether ‘or’ has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment

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“402. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:

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1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013.

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2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 under the Act of 1894 as if it has not been repealed.

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3. The word ‘or’ used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 takes place where due to

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inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.

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4. The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of nondeposit with respect to the majority of holdings

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for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the Act of 1894.

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5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or nondeposit of compensation in court. The obligations to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. 6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is to be treated as part of Section 24(2) not part of Section 24(1)(b).

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7. The mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894 and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report / memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the Act of 1894, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the

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Act of 2013, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).

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8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the Act of 2013 came into force, in a proceedings for land acquisition pending with concerned authority as on 1.1.2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.

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Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013, i.e., 1.1.2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.”

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Thus considering the aforesaid judgments, Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 cannot be used to revive dead and stale claims and concluded cases. In the present case, the acquisition proceedings as per Section 28 of the KIAD Act was concluded in the year 2001 by issuing final notification dated 30.5.2001 under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act. The writ petition is filed in the year 2016. The same cannot be revived under Section 24 of the Act of 2013. There is no time limit prescribed under the KIAD Act for passing the award. In the present case, the respondents have passed a General Award on 31.12.2014.

¶142

Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, the appellants/petitioners are not entitled to any declaration on the premise that the award has not been passed, no compensation is paid and that possession is not delivered under sub section (2) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act.

¶143

The appellants are also not entitled to the relief claimed in the writ petition on the ground of delay and latches as they have filed the writ petition after more than 15 years

¶144

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¶145

from the date of publication of final notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act. In view of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act, on publication of a declaration dated 30.5.2001 under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act, the land vested absolutely in the State Government with effect from 30.5.2001. Much water has already flown from the date of final declaration till the filing of the writ petition. The Board has already created interest in favour of the third parties.

¶146

As discussed above, General Award was passed on 31.12.2014. There is no time limit prescribed under the KIAD Act for passing the award separately. Further, there is no provision under the KIAD Act that if award is not passed, acquisition proceedings shall automatically lapse. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners cannot be accepted that mere non passing of the award in respect of the acquisition proceedings initiated under the KIAD Act, the acquisition proceedings would lapse.

¶147

Further, that the adjacent land owners of the land in question filed Writ Petition Nos.47274 of 2002 challenging the

¶148

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¶149

impugned notification, which came to be dismissed on 28.7.2005. In view of the discussion made above, this Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention of the appellants that the acquisition under the KIAD Act lapsed for alleged non compliance with the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

¶150

The learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners submits that the appellants have filed an application-I.A.1/2020 for production of additional documents.

¶151

The appellants have produced a copy of the award dated 18.6.2019 passed in respect of the land in question. From a perusal of the said award, the same was passed during the pendency of the present appeal. Hence, accepting the reasons assigned in the application for production of additional documents, the application-I.A.1/2020 is allowed. The additional documents are taken on record.

¶152

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¶153

For the reasons aforesaid, all the contentions of the appellants, being without any substance, fail and accordingly, we proceed to pass the following order.

¶154

ORDER

¶155

Writ appeal is dismissed.

¶156

In view of the dismissal of the Writ Appeal, all pending

¶157

applications are also disposed of.

¶158

Sd/CHIEF JUSTICE

¶159

Sd/-