Dismissed

Shivabasappa Jangannavar v. the Special Land Acquisition Officer

Karnataka HC25 Jan 2019MFA/20486/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Landowners' appeals seeking enhancement of compensation awarded by the Reference Court for acquired lands. The State's earlier appeals against the same awards had been dismissed, the judgment attaining finality. The Division Bench held the belated fresh appeals barred by res judicata, cause of action estoppel and finality, and dismissed them without costs.

What the court decided

AI extract

Shivabasappa Jangannavar Vs the Special Land Acquisition… — Land Acquisition | Karnataka HC (2019)

¶1

¶2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH

¶3

DATED THIS THE 25^th DAY OF JANUARY, 2019

¶4

PRESENT

¶5

THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA

¶6

AND

¶7

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BELLUNKE A.S.

¶8

MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL No.20486 OF 2011 C/W MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL No.20182 OF 2013 (LAC)

¶9

IN M.F.A. No.20486 OF 2011

¶10

BETWEEN:

¶11

SHIVABASAPPA JANGANNAVAR BY LR’s.

¶12

1A. SMT. NEELAVVA W/O. SHIVABASAPPA JANGANNAVAR, AGE: 65 YEARS,

¶13

OCC: HOUSEHOLD,

¶14

1B. IRAPPA S/O. SHIVABASAPPA JANGANNAVAR, AGE: 45 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,

¶15

1C. VIRUPAKSHAPPA S/O. SHIVABASAPPA JANGANNAVAR AGE: 42 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,

¶16

1D. PRALHAD S/O. SHIVABASAPPA JANGANNAVAR, AGE: 40 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,

¶17

1E. GOURAVVA D/O. SHIVABASAPPA JANGANNAVAR, AGE: 30 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD,

¶18

1F. GANGAVVA D/O. SHIVABASAPPA JANGANNAVAR, AGE: 28 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD,

¶19

¶20

ALL R/O. SIMIKERI,

¶21

TQ. & DIST. BAGALKOT. ... APPELLANTS

¶22

(BY SRI LINGARAJ MARADI, ADVOCATE)

¶23

AND:

¶24

THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT, BAGALKOT. TQ. AND DIST. BAGALKOT. ... RESPONDENT

¶25

(BY SRI DINESH RAO, ADDL. ADDVOCATE GENERAL)

¶26

THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 54(1) OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 23.11.2002 PASSED IN LAC NO.132 OF 2000 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN.) BAGALKOT, PARTLY ALLOWING THE REFERENCE PETITION FOR COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT OF COMPENSATION.

¶27

IN M.F.A. No.20182 OF 2013

¶28

BETWEEN:

¶29

RUDRAPPA ADIVEPPA ANGADI SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LR’s.

¶30

1A. SMT. RUDRAWWA W/O. RUDRAPPA ANGADI, AGE: 62 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: CHABBI, TQ: BAGALKOT DISTRICT: BAGALKOT.

¶31

1B. DAKSHANIA W/O. KALLAPPA KANNI SHETTY AGE: 48 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: CHABBI, TQ: BAGALKOT, DISTRICT: BAGALKOT.

¶32

1C. SHRI. ADVAPPA S/O. RUDRAPPA ANGADI, AGE: 43 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: CHABBI, TQ: BAGALKOT, DISTRICT: BAGALKOT.

¶33

¶34

1D. SHRI RAMESH S/O. RUDRAPPA ANGADI AGE: 35 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: CHABBI, TQ: BAGALKOT, DISTRICT: BAGALKOT.

¶35

1E. MALLAVVA W/O. ADIAPPA MURANAL AGE: 39 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE, R/O: CHABBI, TQ: BAGALKOT, DISTRICT: BAGALKOT. ... APPELLANTS

¶36

(BY SRI LINGARAJ MARADI, ADVOCATE)

¶37

AND:

¶38

THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT, BAGALKOT TQ: BAGALKOT, DIST: BAGALKOT.

¶39

... RESPONDENT

¶40

(BY SRI DINESH RAO, ADDL. ADVOCATE GENERAL)

¶41

THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 54(1) OF LA ACT AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 23.11.2002 PASSED IN LAC NO.133 OF 2000 ON THE FILE OF II ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE(SR.DN) BAGALKOT PARTLY ALLOWING THE REFERENCE PETITION FOR COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT OF COMPENSATION.

¶42

THESE APPEALS COMING ON FOR HEARING THIS DAY, NAGARATHNA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

¶43

J U D G M E N T

¶44

These appeals have been filed by the land

¶45

owners/claimants assailing the judgment and award

¶46

passed by the II Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bagalkot, in LAC No.132 of 2000 and LAC No.133 of 2000,

¶47

¶48

respectively dated 23.11.2002 by seeking enhancement of compensation.

¶49

Succinctly stated, the facts are that the State

¶50

had sought to acquire, inter alia, lands belonging to the appellants herein for the purpose of establishing a Rehabilitation Centre at Muranal. That the lands belonging to the appellants-claimants in M.F.A. No.20486 of 2011 are R.S.No.49/1(49/2A) totally measuring 5 acres 24 guntas situated at Chabbi village, Bagalkot taluk and district, while the lands belonging to the appellants in M.F.A. No.20182 of 2013 are bearing R.S. No.49/2(49/2B) measuring 3 acres 3 guntas also situated at Chabbi village, Bagalkot taluk and district. The said lands were acquired generally for Upper Krishna Project. Initially an award bearing No.LAQ:SR:33:1997-98 dated 14.09.1998 fixing the market value at Rs.20,500/- per acre insofar as the lands in M.F.A. No.20486 of 2011 are concerned was made. Insofar as M.F.A. No.20182 of 2013 is concerned award made in LAQ:SR:33:1997-98 dated 15.10.1998 was

¶51

¶52

passed fixing the market value at Rs.22,428/- per acre. Not being satisfied with the said compensation, claimants in both the appeals sought reference before the competent Civil Court by filing an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Karnataka Amendment) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘LA Act’, for the sake of brevity). The Reference Court, considered the case of the respective claimants, awarded a sum of Rs.45,000/- per acre and all statutory benefits as against the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer referred to above.

¶53

At this stage, it may be mentioned that aggrieved by the said judgment and award of the Reference Court, the respondent herein namely, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, Baglakot, had filed M.F.A. No.2005 of 2003 and M.F.A. No.2004 of 2003 respectively before this Court. The said appeals were heard along with M.F.A. No.2006 of 2003 which was filed by respondent herein against one Narayan Appanna Dalwai. By judgment and award dated

¶54

¶55

21.06.2005, the learned Single Judge of this Court opined that the award made by the Reference Court was not excessive or exorbitant and confirmed the said awards by dismissing the appeals. It is also stated by the learned Additional Advocate General and learned Government Advocate that, as against the said judgment, no special leave petition was preferred by the State.

¶56

When the matter stood thus, these appeals have been preferred by the claimants assailing the judgment and awards passed by the Reference Court. In M.F.A. No.20486 of 2011, there was a delay of 2888 days in filing the appeal and in M.F.A. No.20182 of 2013, there was a delay of 3604 days delay in filing the appeal. This Court has condoned the delay in both the appeals by observing that for the period of delay, there shall not be any payment of interest.

¶57

We have heard learned counsel for appellants

¶58

and learned Additional Advocate General along with

¶59

¶60

learned Additional Government Advocate for the

¶61

respondent and perused the material on record.

¶62

At the outset, learned Additional Advocate

¶63

General and learned Additional Government Advocate raised a preliminary objection with regard to the very maintainability of these appeals. They submitted that as against the judgment and awards made by the Reference Court, the respondent herein on behalf of the State had filed M.F.A. Nos.2005 and 2004 of 2003 respectively. The said appeals were dismissed by the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge on 21.06.2005 and the award passed by the reference Court, has attained finality. In the said appeals, the appellants-claimants herein were notified. They appeared and justified the said judgment and awards of the Reference Court. After dismissal of the said appeals by this Court, and after a long delay of 2888 and 3604 days, the appellants-claimants have filed these appeals. That, having suppressed the fact that earlier, they were parties to the appeals filed by the respondents

¶64

¶65

which had been dismissed and without disclosing the said fact, these appeals have been filed belatedly. That they did not taken any steps to file independent appeals at the earliest point of time or by filing cross-objections to the appeals filed by the respondents herein. In the absence of having taken steps at an appropriate time, these appeals could not have been filed and that too belatedly.

¶66

Learned Additional Advocate General and

¶67

learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that these appeals are hit by the doctrine of res judicata , doctrine of finality and hence, this Court may not hear the appeals on merits and dismiss the same in limine . They also submitted that the appellate proceedings having been concluded before this Court, continuation of these appeals by once again assailing the judgment and awards of the reference Court which have been confirmed by this Court would not arise. That the appellants cannot belatedly maintain these appeals and that the doctrine of Estoppel would also apply in the instant case.

¶68

¶69

In response to the said submission, learned

¶70

counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants

¶71

are land losers; they are entitled to a fair and just compensation. That in respect of similar lands, this Court has subsequently enhanced the compensation. In order to secure a higher compensation, the appellants have preferred these appeals and that this Court may hear these appeals on merits and enhance the compensation. That the dismissal of these appeals filed by the respondent herein by the learned Single Judge of this Court would not come in the way of the claimants’ appeal being heard independently by the Division Bench. He submitted that since this Court can entertain and is empowered to hear these appeals despite the dismissal of the appeals filed by the respondent herein earlier, confirming the judgment and award of the Reference Court, it was unnecessary to disclose the fact that earlier the matter had already been determined by this Court. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the doctrine of ‘ res judicata’ or

¶72

¶73

‘finality of judgment’ or any other submission made by the learned Additional Advocate General along with learned Additional Government Advocate would not apply in the instant case. Hence, this Court may hear the appeals on merits as the delay in filing the appeal has already been condoned subject to there being no payment of interest for the period of delay.

¶74

Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, it is unnecessary to reiterate the narration of facts and the contentions. Prior to entertaining these appeals on merits or in order to ascertain as to whether the appellants/claimants are entitled for additional or higher compensation, it would be necessary to consider the question of maintainability of these appeals in the first instance.

¶75

The doctrine of res judicata contains the rule of conclusiveness of the judgment which is based partly on the maxim of Roman jurisprudence interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it concerns the State that there be an end

¶76

¶77

to law suits) and partly on the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in several decisions has also examined the concept of finality of judgment and how the adversarial system in India is being abused by litigants and its adverse impact of the administration of justice.

¶78

In the case of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India and Others reported in (2011) 8 SCC 161, it has been observed that there should apply the maxim, ‘ interest Republicae ut sit finis litium’ which means that for the public good there should be an end of litigation after a long hierarchy of appeals. In a country governed by the rule of law, finality of the judgment is absolutely imperative and great sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgment. Permitting the parties to reopen concluded judgments of the Court by filing repeated applications and appeals is an abuse of the

¶79

¶80

process of law and would have far reaching adverse impact on the administration of justice.

¶81

In Union of India and Another vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by L.Rs . reported in [(1989) 2 SCC 754] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the plea for reconsideration is not to be entertained merely because the party chooses to reagitate the points concluded by the earlier decision. That a party cannot seek review of a Court’s judgment merely for the purpose of rehearing and for a fresh decision of a case by either filing a review petition or by independently filing separate petitions (or appeals as in the instant case). Departure from the normal principle that the court’s judgment is final would be justified only when compelling substantial circumstances make it necessary to do so. Such circumstances may be that a material statutory provision was not drawn to the Court’s attention at the original hearing or a manifest wrong has been done.

¶82

¶83

In Rupa Ashok Hurra vs . Ashok Hurra and

¶84

another reported in [(2002) 4 SCC 388], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that when reconsideration of a judgment is sought, the finality attached both to the law declared as well as to the decisions made in the case, is normally brought under challenge. That the Court will not sit as a court of appeal for its own decisions, nor will it entertain applications to review on the ground only that one of the parties in the case conceives himself to be aggrieved by the decision. That it would be most prejudicial and intolerable to the public interest if the case once decided by the Court is reopened and reheard. That a strict observance of the aforesaid salutary maxim may occasionally entail hardship to individual litigants but the mischief arising from that source is small in comparison with the great mischief which would necessarily result from doubt being thrown upon the finality of the decisions of a Court or Tribunal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also opined that frequent exercise of the power to review earlier decisions on the ground that the view expressed

¶85

¶86

before it later appears to the Court more reasonable may tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. Of course, if a court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should not hesitate to correct the error but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the court must be satisfied that the unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that the concern for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment.

¶87

In M. Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka and

¶88

others reported in [(2011) 3 SCC 408] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that “the principle of finality is a high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle, great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and

¶89

¶90

actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating on issues which have become final between the parties.” In the aforesaid case, in order to discourage further litigation in the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court imposed costs of rupees ten lakhs.

¶91

In Bailey vs. Marinoff reported in [(1971) 125 CLR 529] , the High Court of Australia, which is a Apex Court therein, speaking for the Court Justice Gibbs in a dissenting opinion has observed as under:

¶92

“It is a well-settled rule that once an order of a court has been passed and entered or otherwise

¶93

¶94

perfected in a form which correctly expresses the intention with which it was made the court has no jurisdiction to alter it. x x x The rule rests on the obvious principle that it is desirable that there be an end to litigation and on the view that it would be mischievous if there were jurisdiction to rehear a matter decided after a full hearing. However, the rule is not inflexible and there are a number of exceptions to it in addition to those that depend on statutory provisions such as the slip? rule found in most rules of court. Indeed, as the way in which I have already stated the rule implies, the court has the power to vary an order so as to carry out its own meaning or to make plain language which is doubtful, and that power does not depend on rules of court, but is inherent in the court. x x x.”

¶95

Further, in State of Karnataka and another vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation and others reported in [(2006) 4 Supreme Court Cases 683] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the doctrine of res judicata at paragraphs 32 and 38 to 40 and has observed as under:

¶96

¶97

“32. Res judicata is a doctrine based on the larger public interest and is founded on two grounds: one being the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (no one ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause) and second, public policy that there ought to be an end to the same litigation. It is well settled that Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC”) is not the foundation of the principle of res judicata, but merely statutory recognition thereof and hence, the section is not to be considered exhaustive of the general principle of law. The main purpose of the doctrine is that once a matter has been determined in a former proceeding, it should not be open to parties to reagitate the matter again and again. Section 11 CPC recognizes this principle and forbids a Court from trying any suit or issue, which is res judicata, recognizing both “cause of action estoppel” and “issue estoppel”. There are two issues that we need to consider, one, whether the doctrine of res judicata, as a matter of principle, can be applied to public interest litigations and second, whether the issues and findings in Somashekar Reddy constitute res judicata for the present litigation.

¶98

¶99

33 to 37. xxxxx

¶100

38. The spirit behind Explanation IV is brought out in the pithy words of Wigram, V.C. in Henderson v. Henderson as follows (All ER pp.381 I-382 A)

¶101

“The plea of res judicata applies, except in special case (sic), not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.

¶102

39. In Greenhalgh v. Mallard (hereinafter “Greenhalgh”). Somervell, L.J. observed thus:

¶103

“I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.”

¶104

¶105

40. The judgment in Greenhalgh was approvingly referred to by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain. Combining all these principles, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Assn. v. State of Maharashtra expounded on the principle laid down in Forward Construction Co. by holding that:

¶106

An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had (sic) decided as incidental to or essentially connected with (sic) subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus, the principle of constructive res judicata underlying Explanation IV of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.”

¶107

In Ishwar Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector

¶108

and another reported in [(2005) 7 Supreme Court

¶109

¶110

cases 190] , it has been observed that the principle of res judicata would not only apply in different proceedings arising out of the same cause of action but would also apply in different stages of the same proceedings. That the principle of res judicata is a species of a principle of estoppel. When a proceeding based on a particular cause of action has attained finality, the principle of res judicata fully applies. Reference is also made to Wade and Forsyth on Administrative Law, 9^th Edn., P.243 wherein it has been stated as under:

¶111

“one special variety of estoppel is res judicata . This results from the rule which prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again, even though the determination is demonstrably wrong. Except in proceedings by way of appeal, the parties bound by the judgment are estopped from questioning it. As between one another, they may neither pursue the same cause of action again, nor may they again litigate any issue which was an essential element in the decision. These two aspects are

¶112

¶113

sometimes distinguished as ‘cause of action estoppel’ and ‘issue estoppel’.”

¶114

In Hope Plantations Ltd. vs. Taluk Land Board

¶115

reported in [(1999) 5 SCC 590] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has delineated on res judicata and estoppel and has observed that the plea of res judicata , though technical, is based on public policy in order to put an end to litigation. An explanation has also been stated by observing that the doctrine of res judicata would not apply if there is fresh cause of action.

¶116

Writing on the doctrine of res judicata , George Spencer Bower and Turner have stated that, “a judicial decision is deemed final, when it leaves nothing to be judicially determined or ascertained thereafter, in order to render it effective and capable of execution, and is absolute, complete and certain, and when it is not lawfully subject to subsequent rescission, review, or modification by the tribunal which pronounced it….”

¶117

¶118

In Swamy Atmananda vs. Sri Ramakrisna

¶119

Tapovanam reported in [(2005) 10 SCC 51] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the object and purport of the principle of res judicata is to uphold the rule of conclusiveness of judgment as to the points decided earlier of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in every subsequent suit between the same parties. Once the matter which was the subject-matter of lis stood determined by a competent court, no party thereafter can be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. Such a rule was brought into the statute book with a view to bring the litigation to an end so that the other side may not be put to harassment.

¶120

In Ishwardas vs. State of MP reported in [(1979)

¶121

4 SCC 163] it has been observed that in order to sustain the plea of res judicata, it is not necessary that all the parties to the two litigations must be common. All that is necessary is that the issue should be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of

¶122

¶123

them claim. The doctrine of cause of action estoppel would also apply where cause of action in latter proceedings is identical to that of the earlier proceedings, the latter having been litigated between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subjectmatter. In such a case, the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged, such as to justify setting aside the earlier judgment. The discovery of new factual matter which could not have been found out by reasonable diligence for use in the earlier proceedings does not permit the latter to be reopened.

¶124

It is also now well settled that principle of res judicata applies in different stages of the same proceedings vide ( Satyadhyan Ghosal vs. Deorajin Debi reported in [(1960) 3 SCR 590] and Prahlad Singh vs. Col. Sukhdev Singh reported in [(1987) 1 SCC 727] , it has been held that the principles of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to the extent that a Court, whether the trial Court

¶125

¶126

or a higher Court, having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way, will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. But it does not mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a Court has decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher Court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again.

¶127

Recently, in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy

¶128

vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in [(2014) 5 Supreme Court Cases 75], it has been observed that even an erroneous decision on a question of law attracts the doctrine of res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not, it operates as res judicata . (Vide Mohanlal Goenka vs. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee reported in [AIR 1953 SC

¶129

65] .

¶130

¶131

Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, the question that needs to be answered is as to whether the appellants/claimants were entitled to maintain these appeals seeking enhancement of compensation subsequent to the dismissal of the appeals filed by the State by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 21.06.2005 as against the very same judgment and awards passed in LAC No.132 of 2000 and 133 of 2000 by the Reference Court.

¶132

As already noted, the Reference Court awarded

¶133

a sum of Rs.45,000/- per acre along with all statutory benefits. Contending that the said amount awarded was on the higher side, the State, through the Special Land Acquisition Officer, UKP, had preferred M.F.A. No.2005 of 2003 and M.F.A. No.2004 of 2003 respectively before this Court. As already noted, the said appeals were heard along with M.F.A. No.2006 of 2003. Appellants herein were notified. They were represented through their counsel, they were heard in the matter. The learned

¶134

¶135

Single Judge at paragraphs 3, 4 an 5 has reasoned as under:

¶136

“3. I have heard the learned Government Pleader appearing for the common appellant in all the three appeals and learned counsel appearing for respondents. After careful perusal of the impugned judgment and award passed by the Reference Court, it is manifest on the face of the judgment and award passed by the Reference Court that, the Reference Court has not committed any error in determining the market value of the acquired lands at the rate of Rs.45,000/- per acre for the reason that the Reference Court, after thorough evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence such as Ex.D1 in all the three cases, and Exhibits P1 to P4, which disclose that, the lands are also situate at Chabbi village, Murnal, acquired under the same notification and after careful perusal of Exs.P1 to P4, has fixed the market value. The appellant has not disputed the said documentary evidence at Exs.P1 to P4 which is produced before the Court by respondents-claimants to substantiate their claim for enhancement. The lands involved in the said exhibits, wherein the market value is fixed at Rs.45,000/- per acre and the lands in question are similar in nature, fertility and potentiality of the soil. Further, the Reference Court has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court wherein it is held that if the land acquisition cases which have become final, and if it

¶137

¶138

relates to similar land, the same will be very valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of fixing the market value in respect of cases that arise subsequently. Therefore, the Reference Court, relying on the judgments of this Court (supra), taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence and after critical evaluation of the evidence, has determined the market value of the acquired land in question.

¶139

4. Further, it is significant to note here itself that, in respect of lands belonging to the same village which were acquired under the same notification and for the same purpose, the Reference Court had enhanced the market value at the rate of Rs.56,000/- per acre and this Court, on an appeal by the appellant herein by its judgment dated 1^st September 1998 in MFA No.2551 of 1998(LAC No.46/1997) modified the judgment and award passed by the Reference Court and redetermined the market value at the rate of Rs.45,000/per acre. If the ratio of law laid down by this Court in MFA No.2551 of 1998 disposed of o 1^st September 1998 (The Special Land Acquisition Officer, UKP, Bagalkot vs. Ningappa Kudlapa Talawar) and the specific finding and reasoning given by the Reference Court at paragraph 8 of its judgment in arriving at the market value of Rs.45,000/- per acre are taken into consideration, I do not find any error much less material irregularity committed by Reference Court in determination of the market value at the rate of

¶140

¶141

Rs.45,000/- per acre. The said amount fixed by the Reference Court is just and reasonable. The appellant has not produced any authenticated document to establish its claim that the amount awarded by the Reference Court is excessive.

¶142

5. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, these three appeals filed by the common appellant are dismissed, confirming the judgment and award passed by the Reference Court. Ordered accordingly.”

¶143

The learned Single Judge who heard the appeals was of the opinion that the award of compensation of Rs.45,000/- per acre was just and reasonable and that the judgment and awards of the Reference Court did not call for any interference. As already noted, the judgment of the learned Single Judge was passed on 21.06.2005. The appellants/claimants who were respondents in the said appeals did not file any cross-objections nor had filed any independent appeals seeking enhancement of compensation. The claimants were satisfied with the dismissal of the appeals filed by the Special Land Acquisition officer, UKP Project, Bagalkot, by this Court,

¶144

¶145

which implies that they were satisfied with the award of Rs.45,000/- per acre along with statutory benefits as compensation to the land loser/appellants herein. It is also noted that the Special Land Acquisition Officer, UKP, Bagalkot, for the State did not file any appeal against the said judgment dated 21.06.2005 before the Apex Court. The said judgment, therefore, has attained finality.

¶146

It may be that, the said judgment has been passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court having regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Single Judge to consider any appeal which is up to Rs.15,00,000/-. Respondents in those appeals disposed of by the learned

¶147

Single Judge, who are claimants, have now filed these appeals which have been posted before the Division Bench on account of the compensation that they have claimed and having regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Division Bench of this Court which is above Rs.15,00,000/-. What is important to note is that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court

¶148

¶149

in M.F.A. No.2005 of 2003 and M.F.A. No.2004 of 2003, respectively, is the judgment of this Court between the parties herein which has attained finality, as there has been no appeal as against the said judgment. It is conclusive and binding between the parties to the said judgment. Ignoring the said fact, the claimants cannot now seek to file separate or independent appeals which are now posted before the Division Bench and that too by not disclosing the fact that earlier this Court had already dealt with the matter.

¶150

This is not an intra-Court appeal where the Division Bench would consider the legality and correctness of a judgment of a learned Single Judge. These appeals are listed before the Division Bench having regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Division Bench having the said pecuniary jurisdiction to consider the appeals which is above Rs.15,00,000/-. They are the appeals filed separately and independently challenging the very judgment and awards passed by the Reference Court after

¶151

¶152

a challenge made to the same by the Special Land Acquisition Officer before this Court has been negatived and the judgment of this Court has attained finality, particularly when no liberty was sought nor granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court to the appellants herein to file their appeals independently. Therefore, in our view, filing of these appeals in the absence of disclosing that earlier, this Court had already dealt with the legality and correctness of the judgment and awards of the Reference Court is an instance of abuse of the process of this Court. These appeals seeking enhancement of compensation, on the basis of compensation being enhanced in certain other appeals subsequent to the disposal of the appeals between the parties herein by the learned Single Judge, would not in any way give any cause of action to reagitate the case before the Division Bench. The Division Bench cannot sit in judgment over the judgment or order of the learned Single Judge of this Court dated 21.06.2005 which is a judgment between the very same parties and in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. There cannot be a duplication in

¶153

¶154

the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, once by the Single Bench and thereafter, by a Division Bench, against the very same judgment and award of the Reference Court.

¶155

In the circumstances we hold that these appeals are hit by principles of res judicata , doctrine of finality and by cause of action estoppel. Further, these appeals are filed after a delay of 2880 ad 3604 days. Only because in some other appeals this Court has enhanced the compensation, and merely because in subsequent decision there has been enhancement in compensation would not give a fresh cause of action to the appellants/claimants to file these appeals. There could be no review of the judgment passed by this Court by the Division Bench, merely because there is change in law or basis of which a higher compensation based on another judgment could be claimed. It is reiterated that judgment dated 21.06.2005 passed in M.F.A. No.2005 of 2003 and 2004 of 2003 being a judgment of this Court and having attained finality, the same cannot be reopened by this

¶156

¶157

Court even though these appeals are listed before the Division Bench. The Division Bench has no jurisdiction to re-hear a challenge to the judgment and award of a Reference Court after the same have been confirmed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. In the circumstances, we find that these appeals are not maintainable and are liable to be dismissed and we accordingly dismiss the same.

¶158

Before parting with this matter, we wish to indicate to the respondent and also to the State which is represented by learned Additional Advocate General and learned Government Advocate that, in this era of digitalization and computerization, steps must be taken to develop a software whereby for each notification of acquisition issued in respect of each village, town or city, data is collected in respect of survey numbers of the lands; names of Khatedars or owners; the date on which the award is passed, the compensation awarded; details of reference sought by the land owners, date of possession of

¶159

¶160

landed property being taken, date of award passed by the concerned Reference Court, any further appeal being filed either as a Miscellaneous First Appeal before the District Court or this Court, miscellaneous second appeal being filed before this Court and further any special leave petitions or civil appeal being filed thereon. Such collection of data would enable the concerned officer or official dealing with acquisition of lands to instruct the law officer appearing in the case to effectively assist the courts so as to avoid there being duplication of claims and reagitation of matters which may some time result in awarding compensation twice over in respect of the very same land/landed property.

¶161

We hope and trust that the State would consider the aforesaid observations with all seriousness as the same have been made not to deprive the land owners of their legitimate right but to ensure that illegality and duplication claims are avoided, as it is, ultimately, the public exchequer which would be releasing the

¶162

¶163

compensation to the land owners which must be protected. In the absence of having such a data, there is every possibility of duplication of references being made by land owners and double claims being sought resulting in multiple execution petitions being filed and the acquiring authorities being forced to deposit the amounts on the threat of attachment, arrest, etc. Such a data must also be made available to the concerned Reference Courts and to the public in general.

¶164

Learned Additional Advocate General at the end submitted that these appeals, not being maintainable, may be dismissed with heavy costs as there is suppression of the fact of adjudication of these matters earlier by this Court.

¶165

In response, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that Court fee of Rs.1,41,876/- and Rs.90,032/respectively, has been paid in these appeals and the appeals have been dismissed on maintainability, without

¶166

¶167

considering the appeals on merits, hence, this Court may

¶168

not impose costs.

¶169