Faridabad to Delhi. But it is not true to say that for the purposes of section 3(a) of the Act it is necessary that the contract of sale must itself provide for and cause the movement of goods or that the movement of goods must be occasioned specifically in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale. The true position in law is as stated in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Bombay v. S.R. Sarkar, wherein Shah, J., speaking for the majority, observed that clauses (a) and (b) of section 3 of the Act are mutually exclusive and that section 3(a) covers sales in which the movement of goods from one State to another “is the result of a covenant or incident of the contract of sale, and property in the goods passes in either State” (page 391) (page 667 of 11 S.T.C.). Sarkar, J., speaking for himself and on behalf of Das Gupta, J., agreed with the majority, that clauses (a) and (b) of section 3 are mutually exclusive but differed from it and held that “a sale can occasion the movement of the goods sold only when the terms of the sale provide that the goods would be moved; in other words, a sale occasions a movement of goods when the contract of sale so provides” (page 407) (page 679 of 11 S.T.C). The view of the majority was approved by this Court in Cement Marketing Co. of India v. State of Mysore, State Trading Corporation of India v. State of Mysore and Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Hyderabad. In K. G. Khosla & Co. v. Deputy Commisssion of Commercial Taxes, counsel for the revenue invited the court to reconsider the question but the court declined to do so. In a