entitled to argue that, on the evidence, the sound and disposing state of mind of Lakshmamma is proved. Mr. Iyengar, for the appellant, has strongly urged before us that, since these facts are established, the Court must presume the valid execution of the will and in support of his contention he has invited our attention to the relevant statements on the point in the text books dealing with the subject. Jarman on “Wills” (Jarman on “Wills” – Vol. I, 8th Ed., p. 50) says that “the general rule is ‘that the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party propounding a will and he must satisfy the conscience of the court that the instrument so propounded is the last will of a free and capable testator’.” He adds that, “if a will is rational on the face of it, and appears to be duly executed, it is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be valid.” Similarly, Williams on “Executors and Administrators” (Williams on “Executors and Administrators” – Vol. I, 13th Ed., p. 92) has observed that, “generally speaking, where there is proof of signature, everything else is implied till the contrary is proved ; and evidence of the will having been read over to the testator or of instructions having been given is not necessary.” On the other hand, Mr.Viswanatha Sastri, for respondent No.1, contends that the statements on which the appellant has relied refer to wills which are free from any suspicions and they cannot be invoked where the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstance. In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that, in the same text books, we find another rule of specifically mentioned. “A1-though the rule of Roman Law”, it is observed in Williams, “that ‘Qui se scripsit
