Rajeev Ranjan Vs Union of India And Ors.

The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed for quashing of the order of punishment dated 10.02.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority which was upheld by the appellate authority vide order dated 16.04.2010 and the revisional order dated 28.07.2010 by which the punishment of “reduction of pay for three stages of four years which will have effect on postponing his future increment of pay” has been inflicted.

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Factual Matrix

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The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition reads as under:

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(i) The petitioner joined the services of Central Industrial Security Force as Constable in the year 1994 having Personnel No.

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943441535 and at present posted at C.I.S.F. Unit, B.C.C.L., Koyla Nagar, Dhanbad.

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(ii) The petitioner during his service tenure under the respondents have served with best of his ability and to the utmost satisfaction of his superiors.

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(iii) The respondent no.5 on 08.07.2009 gave a charge memo to the petitioner wherein the petitioner has been charged for negligence in duty on 25.04.2009 when he posted for duty in second shift at forfeit of B.C.C.L. Area No.12 from 1300 hours to 2100 hours.

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(iv) The petitioner did not agree with the charges levelled against him and claim to be tried.

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(v) The enquiry officer was appointed and he started the enquiry, examined the witnesses of both the sides and verify the spot and thereafter came into conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner was found not found proved.

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(vi) The respondent No.5, the disciplinary authority did not agree with the findings of the enquiry officer and gave disagreement note to the petitioner and asked for his reply.

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(vii) The petitioner gave reply of the disagreement note of the respondent no.5 stating therein that he has been falsely implicated in this matter and requested him to exonerate him from the charges levelled against him.

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(viii) The respondent no.5 in a most arbitrary manner after receiving the reply of petitioner passed the final order imposing the punishment of reduction of pay by three stages for a period of four years which will have effect on postponing his future increment of pay.

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(ix) The petitioner after receiving the final order preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General (Respondent No.4) and prayed to exonerate him from the punishment levelled against him as the charges has not been proved in Departmental Enquiry, but the appellate authority did not accept the plea of the petitioner and in a most arbitrary manner upheld the punishment.

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(x) The petitioner after receiving the appellate authority order preferred revision petition before the Inspector General (Respondent No.3) and requested to exonerate him from the punishment as the charges against him has not been proved but the revisionist authority did not interfere into the matter and reject the petition of petitioner by order dated 28.07.2010.

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(xi) The petitioner is running from pillar to post for exonerating him from the punishment as the charges levelled against him which has not been proved in Departmental Enquiry but failed.

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Being aggrieved with the order dated 10.02.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority and the order dated 16.04.2010 passed by the appellate authority as well as the order dated 28.07.2010 passed by the revisional authority, the present writ petition has been preferred by the writ petitioner.

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It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner while posted as constable and while assigning with the duty in Santri post has found to be involved in the irregularity in not discharging the duty with sincerity and due to that 12 bags of coal have been found to be recovered and, therefore, the authority of the CISF has decided to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner.

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In addition, thereto, the second charge has also been framed by taking habitual nature of the petitioner found to be involved in not discharging his duty with sincerity for which the punishment has also been imposed on earlier occasion.

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The writ petitioner was asked to participate in the inquiry proceeding. The petitioner has defended himself by denying the allegation levelled against him.

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The respondent-authority have examined altogether four witnesses. The Inquiry Officer while recording the statement of the witnesses and by giving emphasis upon the evidence of PW4, namely, S.C. Tirki, Constable, on whose behest the call was given and other witnesses, i.e. PW1, PW2 and PW3 were rushed to the place of occurrence.

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The Inquiry Officer, on appreciation of the evidence of PW4, who is said to be an eye witness of the occurrence, has found the charge not to be proved.

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The said inquiry report was forwarded before the disciplinary authority, but the disciplinary authority has deferred with the aforesaid findings of difference of opinion assigning the reason. The disciplinary authority thereafter has provided an opportunity to make comment upon the difference of opinion which the petitioner has duly responded.

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10.The disciplinary authority being not satisfied with the response, has inflicted the punishment vide order dated 10.02.2010.

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The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the same has preferred an appeal before the appellate authority who declined to interfere with the finding so recorded by the disciplinary authority vide its order dated 16.04.2010. Thereafter, the writ petitioner moved to the revisional authority for redressal of his grievance who has also declined to

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interfere with the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority vide its order dated 28.07.2010.

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The aforesaid orders are under challenge in the present writ petition.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner:

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Mr. Manindra Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in support of his contention has taken the following grounds:

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(i) Although the difference of opinion has been shown by the disciplinary authority, but the said difference of opinion cannot be said to be based upon the material available on record, particularly, the evidence of PW4.

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(ii) It has been submitted that the evidence of PW4 recorded in course of the inquiry proceeding, the same has totally been discarded by the disciplinary authority as if he is taking the evidence of PW4 afresh.

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(iii) The learned counsel, therefore, has submitted that the issue of second charge which is habitual in nature of misconduct for which the petitioner has already been punished that cannot be taken as a charge.

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The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned orders are, therefore, not sustainable in the eyes of law and, as such, the same are liable to be quashed and set aside.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-CISF:

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Per contra, Mr. H.K. Mahto, the learned counsel for the respondentUOI has taken the following grounds in support of the orders impugned:

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(i) That there is no error in the order of the disciplinary authority and in the situation where the charge has not been found to be

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proved the disciplinary authority has differ with the opinion and thereafter opportunity was given to the petitioner to make comment upon the same.

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(ii) It has been contended that the comment was made by the writ petitioner not found to be satisfactory and the disciplinary authority on consideration of the nature of allegation, particularly, the charge of not discharging duty properly has inflicted the punishment of “reduction of pay for three stages of four years which will have effect on postponing his future increment of pay”.

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(iii) It has been contended that the said stand of the disciplinary authority also finds support from the habitual misconduct of the writ petitioner for which the writ petitioner, on earlier occasion, has already been punished with the punishment said to be minor in nature.

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The learned counsel for the respondent-UOI, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the impugned orders need no interference.

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Analysis:

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This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents and the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer as has been taken note by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate and revisional authority.

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The issue which fell for consideration in this writ petition is:

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(i) As to whether is it available for the disciplinary authority while differing with the opinion recorded by the Inquiry Officer of the charge not proved?

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(ii) Is it available for the disciplinary authority till the evidence which was recorded in the inquiry proceeding by the witnesses which was the second charge for which the punishment was already inflicted can be said to be a fresh charge for the purpose of initiating departmental proceeding in the present case?

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19.Both the issues are being taken up separately.

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Re-Issue No.(i):

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The law is well settled that in a case where the charge has not been found to be proved by the Inquiry Officer then the disciplinary authority is not helpless.

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Law with respect to a situation where the Inquiry Officer has not found the charge proved has already been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra reported in 1998 (7) SCC 84 wherein the disciplinary authority has remedy. The disciplinary authority, in such situation, should differ with the opinion of the Inquiry Officer by assigning the reason which shall be communicated to the delinquent employee for the purpose of defending himself based upon the difference of opinion shown by the disciplinary authority upon the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being referred hereunder :-

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“19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to

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represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.”

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The issue no.1 is solely based upon the fact that in the inquiry the charge as levelled against the petitioner has not been found to be proved particularly the charge no.1.

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This Court in order to consider the aforesaid issue has gone through the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer wherein altogether four witnesses have been examined, i.e., PW1 PW2, PW3 and PW4.

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It is evident from the reference of the content of the evidence of all the witnesses that PW4 has been accepted to be an eye witness by the Inquiry Officer.

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PW4 has stated that he had seen the occurrence while on duty. Thereafter he had given telephonic call to other witnesses upon which PW1 to PW3 were rushed to the place of occurrence, meaning thereby, PW4 is the sole eye witness and on his information the other witnesses, i.e., PW1 to PW3 all of them have rushed to the place of occurrence.

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The Inquiry Officer has specifically recorded in the inquiry proceeding by discarding the evidence of PW4 for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the charge has not been proved as has been alleged against the writ petitioner.

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27.PW4 has stated that on 25.04.2009 at about 1400 hrs. near the fore pit duty post, he had seen five-six thieves carrying out the coal towards the road side but he could not able to catch hold of the thieves, rather while observing them he informed over his mobile phone to the post commander (PW1) and chased them. Thereafter, all the thieves had fled away towards road side. He has further stated that thereafter he has followed the thieves and while doing so he had reached at the place near by a bush wherein four bicycles and 12 bags of coal were found lying.

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PW1, PW2 and PW3 had also reached there and on inquiry they have called upon the delinquent employee for the purpose of interrogation. PW1 has seized the said coal and thereafter the FIR was instituted for the alleged theft and the coal was sent to the police outpost.

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In the cross-examination, PW4 has stated that the guard ( santri ) was not being seen from the place where he had shown the thieves. He has further stated that the guard ( santri) was at the distance where any person reaches within minutes but he had not seen any other person save and except the thieves from the place from where the coal was recovered and seized. The aforesaid places are not in the fore pit area and it is not visible from there but the guard was in a position to put vigilance. He has stated that he has got no opportunity to give information to guard ( santri) about the theft.

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On question being asked by the Inquiry Officer that the place from where the coal was stolen whether there was any private coal mine or not, then he has stated that at some distance there was a private mine. From that place the recovered coal was being seen but at that place no one can go.

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31.The Inquiry Officer based upon the statement recorded in the examination-in-chief and cross examination has come out with the conclusive finding that it is evident that 12 bags of coal and four bicycles were found outside the fore fit coal dump area, meaning thereby, the place was beyond the territory of the duty place of the delinquent employee.

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The Inquiry Officer, therefore, has not trusted the evidence of PW4 being contradictory in nature. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer coming to the conclusion that the coal was not stolen from the fore pit area and, as such, the allegation against the petitioner was not found to be proved.

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33.The said inquiry report was forwarded to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has decided to differ with the inquiry report. The difference of opinion is the part of the record. This Court has gone through the aforesaid report of difference of opinion and found that the evidence of PW4 has totally been discarded as would be evident from the recording so made by interpreting the evidence of PW4.

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34.The disciplinary authority has come to the finding on consideration of evidence of PW4 wherein he has clarified that he had seen 5-6 thieves carrying out the coal from coal depot while standing in the hill area.

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It has also been recorded in the difference note that the delinquent employee has accepted the same that at about 1300 hrs. while he was standing on his duty, he had seen no person, but after some time he had seen that three boys after throwing away the coal had fled away.

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36.The disciplinary authority, based upon the aforesaid reference of the evidence, has come to the conclusion that the coal was lifted from the fore pit area which was the duty place of the petitioner. The reference of the evidence of PW4 has also been taken note, particularly, the cross

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examination wherein the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that he had rushed on to the place and had seen the thieves at the distance of 100 yards.

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He has also stated that the thieves were inside the mining area but bicycle was not there. He has also taken note that the statement of PW4 wherein he has stated that he had not seen anybody nearby the mining area. The disciplinary authority has further stated that at the time when the force was deputed and all of a sudden 4-5 persons had reached to the place of occurrence which itself is the subject matter of surprise was the same in order to know what has happened everybody will be vigilant. But PW1 has not shown any reaction while as per the statement he was in four number dump yards in between 12.30 to 15.00 hrs.

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38.PW2 has also supported the version of PW4 by replying that in between 14:00 to 14.30 hrs. he had shown ignorance about the presence of any member of CISF and has disclosed about the recovery of the coal.

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39.When the delinquent employee has not disclosed about the same then only PW1 and PW2 had come for the purpose of rescuing the delinquent employee.

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40.The disciplinary authority, therefore, has come to the conclusion that some unsocial elements were stealing the coal but the delinquent employee could not be in a position to prohibit them.

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41.It is, thus, evident from the record that upon comparing the testimony of P.W.4, as noted in the inquiry report, the disciplinary authority proceeded to arrive at its own conclusion by distorting the factual position. The reason being that, although P.W.4 claimed to be an eyewitness, his testimony/statement was found contradictory by the inquiry officer. In such circumstances, the reliance placed by the

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disciplinary authority upon the testimony of P.W.4, and its corroboration with the statements of P.W.1, P.W.2, and P.W.3, amounts only to a misinterpretation of the evidence, thereby leading to a difference of opinion with the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer.

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42.The fact is admitted that PW4 is the only eye witness on his saying PW1, PW2 and PW3 had reached to the place of occurrence, therefore, there is no question of corroboration of testimony of PW4 with the corroboration of testimony of PW1, PW2 and PW3, since, PW1, PW2 and PW3 are not the eye witness, rather they had reached to the place of occurrence after giving telephonic call from PW4 about the occurrence.

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43.The testimony of PW4 which has been taken note by Inquiry Officer is itself in contradictory since he had stated and taken note that the statement of the accused himself proved that on 25.04.2009, the accused force member, Constable- the Petitioner herein was posted at the fore pit duty station for the security of the coal dump from 1300 hrs to 2100 hrs. Near the said duty station, PW-04 saw 05-06 thieves lifting coal at about 14:10 hrs. After which he immediately informed the Post Commander (PW.-01) about the incident on mobile and requested him to reach the fore pit duty station as soon as possible. On information, PW-01, PW-02 and PW-03 reached the said duty place and searched for PW-04 and the accused was also asked about PW-4. The accused replied that he did not know about PW-04. After this, PW-01, PW-02 and PW-03 with the accused searched the entire area and found PW-04 in the bushes across the road outside the four-pit duty area.

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After this, on the information of PW-4, 12 sacks of coal and four bicycles were found kept inside the bushes across the road away from

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the fore-pit. This means that PW-4 did not come to the fore pit duty station.

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45.According to statement of PW-4, he saw the thieves taking the stolen coal from the Fore pit duty station and, while observing, informed PW1, the Camp Commander over his mobile phone. If PW-4 saw the thieves taking the coal from the fore pit area, why did he not attempt to apprehend the thieves on the spot with the help of the santri (i.e., the petitioner herein) whereas the santri's area, i.e., the fore pit was very close to him in the coal dump and instead he informed over the phone to call PW-1 (Camp Commander) to the camp located far away from there.

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If PW-4 saw the thieves lifting coal from the fore pit and later shown the same coal bags and bicycle recovered from the bushes on the other side of the road, then how in his presence of PW4 (surveillance) the thieves were able to take away 12 sacks of coal from the fore pit to the bushes and hide them there.

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Apart from this, if PW-4 had wanted, he could have made noise or shouted or called the santri on the spot (i.e. at the fore-pit coal dump) when he saw the thieves lifting coal, then in that case the coal thieves would have fled away leaving the coal bags at the same place or both the force members (i.e. the petitioner and PW-4) would have caught the thieves red-handed on the spot.

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In this situation, it would have been proved that the coal was being lifted from the fore-pit coal dump and it belonged to the BCCL fore-pit dump. However, PW-4 did not do so and kept a watch and informed PW-1 over the phone and allowed the coal thieves to take the coal from the fore-pit coal dump to the bushes. Therefore, it is proved that the

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statements given by the accuse (petitioner herein) and his defence appear to be absolutely correct and the statement of PW-4 is inconsistent.

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49.. During examination, PW 1, PW2, and PW 3 all stated that they had no knowledge of the source of the coal, which contradicts statement of PW4. His only knowledge was that the sack of coal and the bicycle were recovered from bushes across the road. This area was not within the jurisdiction of the duty station, as confirmed by eyewitnesses PWs 1, 2, and 3 as well as DW 1.

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The Inquiry Office has found that this area does not fall within the jurisdiction of the place of duty, which has also been confirmed by eyewitnesses i.e. PW-01, PW-02, and PW-03 (all force members of CISF) and DW-01 and DW-02 (both employees of BCCL). Thus, during the investigation, it has come to light that some stolen coal was indeed recovered from the area outside the BCCL area, but it was not proved that the coal was stolen from the fore pit area of BCCL Dhanbad (Area No. 12) where the accused (petitioner herein) was posted for duty.

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In view of the aforesaid, it is established that the incident was of the coal sack being stolen from the BCCL fore pit area. Only PW-04 has stated that the stolen coal was stolen from the BCCL fore pit duty station, whereas PW-04 is posted in the intelligence wing and should have prevented the theft with the help of the santri present there. In fact, PW-04 should have called the santri present there and, with the help of BCCL employees, caught the thieves red-handed. However, he did not do so, and according to his statement, the stolen coal was taken out, which clearly demonstrates that the statement of PW4 is far from the truth.

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The Inquiry Officer has found that apart from statement of PW4, no evidence has emerged regarding the theft of coal from BCCL's fore-pit area during the operation.

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Thus, ultimately, based on statements of witnesses and evidence, it is established that the theft did not occur in BCCL's coalpit area. If coal was not stolen from the coal pit, who could the accused have stopped? Therefore, it is not entirely proved that some antisocial elements were stealing coal while the accused (petitioner herein) was on duty, but the accused did not attempt to stop them.

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In view of the discussion made above, the Inquiry Office has arrived at a conclusion that Charge No. 1 levelled against Constable Rajeev Ranjan, Force No. 943441535, under Rule 36 of the CITU Rules, 2001, vide Memorandum No. V-15014/ CITU/BCCL/ANU/CITU36/RR/2009/3917 dated 08.07.2009 of the Senior Commandant CITU, BCCL, Dhanbad, is not proved to the fullest extent.

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The law as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra (Supra) although confer power upon the disciplinary authority for the purpose to come to the conclusive finding to deal with the erring official/employees by inflicting punishment so that even in case of the charge has not been found to be proved by the Inquiry Officer, the erring officer may not be allowed to be escaped but that does not mean that whatever has been stated in the testimony will totally be reverted back by the disciplinary authority as has been done in the present case.

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56.Showing difference of opinion means that on the basis of the material which has come before the Inquiry Officer and as has been interpreted by the Inquiry Officer the difference of opinion is to be sought for from

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the same and not by interpreting the same for the purpose of giving difference of opinion.

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57.The writ petitioner has tried to demonstrate by substantiating the finding so recorded by the Inquiry Officer and has also stated in the response that whatever has been shown by showing the difference of opinion by the disciplinary authority that is contrary to the testimony which has been recorded before the Inquiry Officer in the inquiry proceeding.

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58.This Court, therefore, is of the view that while the case is totally dependent upon the evidence of PW4 and if the evidence of PW4 has been considered to be contradictory with each other, then it is bounden duty of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence of PW4 from his evidence only but instead of doing so he has got corroboration from evidence of PW1, PW 2 and PW3 who are not the eye witness, rather they are only hearsay witnesses and they have stated their evidence on the basis of the evidence given by PW4.

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One another thing which cannot be ignored is that when the specific version of PW4 was that he had seen the thieves while stealing the coal, then why any inquiry has not been conducted on the conduct of PW4 in neglecting discharge of his duty while his saying that when he was moved on duty, he had seen the thieves were stealing the coal.

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60.The further important thing is that PW4 although was not in duty, then what was the occasion for PW4 to rush to the place of occurrence and that fact has also not been considered by the disciplinary authority.

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61.This Court, therefore, is of the view that the law which has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank

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and Others Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra (Supra) has not strictly been adhered to.

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62.This Court is conscious with the settled position of law that in a departmental proceeding the preponderance of probability is applicable but even for the purpose of applicability of the principle of preponderance of probability cogent evidence is required to prove the charge, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bombay Vs. Uday Singh and others, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 129 . For ready reference, the same is being referred as under:-

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"-------- the doctrine of proof beyond doubt has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record would be necessary to reach a conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct-------."

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63.On the basis of discussion made hereinabove this Court is of the view that the difference of opinion which has been shown by the disciplinary authority from the fact-finding report of the Inquiry Officer finding that the charges have not been proved appears to be erroneous.

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The issue no.1 is, accordingly, answered against the respondentauthority and in favour of the writ petitioner.

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Re-Issue No.(ii):

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So far as the second charge is concerned, the question is that once in the earlier charge the writ petitioner has already been punished, then how can it be a second charge for the purpose of passing the order of punishment again on the earlier charge upon which punishment has already been inflicted upon the writ petitioner.

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The law is well settled that for the same charge there cannot be two punishments on the principle of double jeopardy, and if two

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punishments will be inflicted the same will be in violation of Article 22 of the Constitution of India which is also applicable in the disciplinary proceeding.

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67.A constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.A.Venkataraman Vs. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1954 SC 375 explained the scope of doctrine of double jeopardy, observing that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words ''prosecuted' and ''punished' are to be taken not distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors must co-exist in order that the operation of the clause may be attractive. While deciding the said case, the Apex Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment of the Constitution Bench in Maqbool Hussain Vs.

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State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325, wherein, it had been observed that the provision is based on a well established rule, embodied in the maxim "nemo debet bis vexari"- a man must not be put twice in peril for the same offence.

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Thus, once the writ petitioner has already been visited with punishment on the earlier charge, the same cannot be made the foundation for a second order of punishment, for that would amount to inflicting penalty twice over on the very charge upon which punishment has already been imposed. That can be a ground to be taken while passing the order of punishment and not by framing a separate charge for the same. The reason is that once the charge has been framed and the punishment has been imposed whether it is major or minor, the charge will be communicated in the order of punishment and once the termination is

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there by way of order of punishment the same cannot be a charge. The aforesaid aspect of the matter has also not been taken into consideration.

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69.Being conscious with the fact about the jurisdiction conferred to this Court which is to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of following judgments which is being referred hereunder as:

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SSC 610 has held at paragraphs-12 and 13 thereof that the following guidelines have been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads as under:

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“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

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a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

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b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

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c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

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d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

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e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

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f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

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g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

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h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

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i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

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13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

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(i). re-appreciate the evidence;

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(ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

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(iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence;

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(iv). go into the reliability of the evidence;

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(v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

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(vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

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Further, in Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali,

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[(2017) 4 SCC 507], following guidelines have been laid down by the Apex Court for interference by the High Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that Court will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental inquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding. The extract of relevant passages, i.e., para 13 and 14, are referred

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hereinbelow:

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“13. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to reappreciation of evidence. It is settled law that reappreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

¶184

14. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, [(2011) 4 SCC 584], this Court held as follows:

¶185

"7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts

¶186

20

¶187

2026:JHHC:15058

¶188

will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations."

¶189

It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power which is to be exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited one. However, the parameter has been fixed, as to in which case, the interference is to be made by the High Court in exercise of the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in which case, such power is not to be exercised.

¶190

It has also been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of “ Union of India & Others vs. P. Gunasekaran” (supra) and “Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali” (supra) that the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so far as it relates to interfering with the decision taken by the disciplinary authority, the same is very limited and to be exercised only in the following situations:

¶191

(i) if there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

¶192

(ii) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

¶193

(iii) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; and the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

¶194

(iii) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; and if the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

¶195

21

¶196

2026:JHHC:15058

¶197

This Court has considered the issue of perversity by the disciplinary authority while showing the difference of opinion and, as such, on that ground also the guideline as has been formulated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments referred hereinabove will be applicable in the present case.

¶198

This Court considering the aforesaid fact is of the view that the impugned orders need to be interfered with.

¶199

Accordingly, the orders impugned, i.e., order dated 10.02.2010 passed by the disciplinary authority, order dated 16.04.2010 passed by the appellate authority and the order dated 28.07.2010 passed by the revisional authority are hereby quashed and set aside.

¶200

Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands allowed and disposed of as such.

¶201

The matter is remitted to the authority concerned for taking a decision afresh within a period of two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.

¶202

Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.

¶203

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

¶204

Dated:13.05.2026. Sudhir AFR

¶205

22

Rajeev Ranjan v. Union of India And Ors.

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Rajeev Ranjan v. Union of India And Ors.

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