Allowed

Dinkar v. the State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary Deptt of Home Jail and Disaster Management

Jharkhand HC8 Apr 2026WPC/4365/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This High Court of Jharkhand quashed orders dismissing a Sub Inspector of Police from service. The petitioner had falsely declared no criminal case, but the FIR listed a pseudonym 'Chhote' with no cognizance taken. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the法院 held that suppression of non-trivial facts, absent cognizance, justified reinstatement without back wages.

What did the court decide?

The impugned orders dated 05.11.2020 and 09.11.2021 were quashed and set aside. The petitioner was directed to be reinstated immediately with all consequential benefits except back wages.

Dinkar Vs the State of Jharkhand through the… — Service and Employment | Jharkhand HC (2026)

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2026:JHHC:10910

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (S) No. 4365 of 2022

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Dinkar, aged about 26 years, son of Arun Kumar, resident of village Mitama, P.O. & P.S. Silao, District Nalanda, Bihar.

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...Petitioner

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-Versus-

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The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Jail & Disaster Management, Govt. of Jharkhand having its office at Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.

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The Director General of Police, Department of Home, Jail & Disaster Management, Govt. of Jharkhand having its office at Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.

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The Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.

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The Inspector General of Police (Training), Jharkhand, Ranchi P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand

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The Deputy Inspector General of Police, South Chotanagpur Range, Ranchi, Jharkhand, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.

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The Superintendent of Police, J.A.P.T.C., Padma-cumEnquiry Officer, Hazaribag, P.O. & P.S.-Padma, District Hazaribag, Jharkhand.

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The Director, Jharkhand Police Academy, Hazaribag, P.O., P.S. & District Hazaribag, Jharkhand.

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The Sr. Superintendent of Police, Ranchi, P.O.G.P.O., Ranchi, P.S.-Kotwali, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.

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...Respondents

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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

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For the Petitioner(s) : M/s. Manoj Tandon, Shivani ` Bhardewaj, Shubham Kumar, Karanjit Singh Chhabra, Advocates For the Respondents : Mr. Saurav Mahto, A.C to G.P.-I

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20/08.04.2026 Heard learned counsel for the parties.

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2. The instant writ application has been preferred

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by the petitioner challenging the order dated 05.11.2020 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition), whereby the petitioner

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has been dismissed from service from the post of Sub Inspector of Police on the ground that this petitioner did

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2026:JHHC:10910

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not furnish correct information at the time of filling the attestation form. The order of appellate authority dated 09.11.2021 is also under challenge, whereby the appeal of the writ petitioner has been rejected on the ground that there is no provision of appeal in such matter. The petitioner has also prayed for his reinstatement in service with full back wages.

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3. Briefly stated, Advertisement No.05/2017 was published for appointment on the post of Sub Inspector of Police in the State of Jharkhand. The petitioner participated in the selection process and after he was declared successful, appointment letter was issued to him on 17.07.2018.

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The petitioner was allowed to join on the post of Sub Inspector of Police on 06.08.2018. On 06.08.2018 itself the petitioner filled up the attestation form, wherein Column No.7 of the Attestation Form refers as to whether the candidate was accused in a criminal or civil matter or not or whether he was remanded in custody and the details were required to be given. As against this, the petitioner mentioned "No".

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It has been alleged that an F.I.R. was lodged on 02.12.2017 under sections 341, 323, 448, 379, 427, 307, 504 and 354(b)/34 of IPC which was registered as Silao PS Case No. 238 of 2017. The name of the petitioner is "Dinkar" but this name does not find place as accused in

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the F.I.R. Though "Chhote" is mentioned in the FIR. The petitioner, therefore, was not knowing that there is an FIR lodged against him. However, he came to know about such F.I.R. at some point of time in the month of December, 2018 and as such he filed Anticipatory Bail Petition which was allowed on 19.12.2018. Bail was granted to the petitioner in A.B.P No. 4224 of 2018. Thereafter, a charge sheet was submitted by the local Police wherein the name of the petitioner also finds place as an accused. This charge sheet was submitted on 31.10.2019.

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Meanwhile, the period of 2 years from the date of appointment of this petitioner expired on 06.08.2020. A show cause notice, however, was issued on 31.08.2020 to the petitioner and another show cause was also issued on 09.09.2020. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 26.09.2020. Thereafter, the impugned order was passed on 05.11.2020; whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service.

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The learned Court concerned took cognizance of the offence on 20.02.2021, but no cognizance was taken against this petitioner. The departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner came to be dismissed on 09.11.2021.

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4. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though an F.I.R. is said to have been lodged on 02.12.2017, but this petitioner "Dinkar" was not named therein. However, the name Chhote, was

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mentioned in the F.I.R. He submits that no notice under section 41A Cr.P.C. was ever issued to the petitioner and hence the petitioner was not at all aware about the lodging of F.I.R.

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Ld. Counsel further submits that though the charge sheet was submitted on 31.10.2019 but the learned Magistrate concerned did not take cognizance against the petitioner, which is evident from order dated 20.02.2021 (Annexure-9 Series).

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5. Ld. Counsel further submits that the petitioner completed the probation period on 06.08.2020 itself and therefore, the services of the petitioner could not have been dispensed with without a departmental proceeding initiated against him.

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Ld. Counsel further submits that from perusal of F.I.R, it is apparent that it was a minor dispute of family members in which the petitioner had no role to play because there was a case and counter case between the parties for trivial offences, being Silao P.S. Case No.237 of 2017 and Silao P.S. Case No.238 of 2017 in which the petitioner was in no way concerned and, therefore, the learned Magistrate did not take cognizance as against this petitioner. The F.I.Rs. lodged are between the sole brothers and the petitioner was falsely implicated. The offence was absolutely trivial in nature.

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Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgements in the case of Umesh Chandra Yadav Vs. Inspector General & Chief Security Commissioner, RPF,¹ and Pawan Kumar Vs. Union of India² .

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6. Learned Counsel refers to Annexures-10, 11 and 12 of the rejoinder to submit that for same set of allegations Pawan Kumar, Sandeep Gupta and Amrit Kumar Ojha were proceeded. It was alleged against these persons that they did not furnish correct information against Column No.7 of the Attestation Form; however, these persons have been retained in service. It is submitted that Amrit Kumar Ojha was imposed the penalty of stoppage of increment for six months which was equivalent to one black mark, but without cumulative effect. Another person namely, Pawan Kumar was also proceeded for the same allegation that there was an F.I.R against him and he did not furnish correct information against Column No.7 of Attestation Form, but he was let off. Similarly, one Sandeep Gupta was also proceeded in Departmental Proceeding No.04/20 for the same set of allegation of furnishing wrong information in Column No.7, but he was imposed the penalty of stoppage of increment for twelve months, equivalent to two black marks. He, therefore, submits that the impugned

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1 (2022) 14 SCC 244

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2 (2023) 12 SCC 317

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order is discriminatory; as for same set of charges, other persons have been retained in service.

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7. Per Contra , Ld. Counsel appearing for the respondents have defended the impugned order. It has been submitted by learned Counsel for the State that since the petitioner did not furnish correct information as against Column No.7, the impugned penalty order of dismissal from service has been passed against him, which is in accordance with law.

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8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record, it appears that though the F.I.R was lodged on 02.12.2017, but the petitioner had no information at all. The moment he came to know in the month of December, 2018, he preferred Anticipatory Bail Petition and the same was allowed on 19.12.2018, which is marked after the Attestation Form, which was filled up on 06.08.2018 itself.

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From perusal of the F.I.R it appears that the offences alleged are under Sections 341, 323, 448, 379, 427, 307, 504 and 354(b)/34 of the Indian Penal Code. Though the charge sheet was submitted, but the learned Magistrate did not take cognizance against this petitioner and, therefore, it is an admitted fact from the records that no offence was made out against this petitioner. Further, the F.I.R. does not mention the name of this petitioner (Dinkar).

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2026:JHHC:10910

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9. It is further evident that the petitioner worked successfully for next two years, which is the probation period. After completion of two years he has been dismissed from service without any departmental proceeding which is not permissible in the eye of the law.

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10. Similar issue fell for consideration before the

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Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Umesh Chandra Yadav (Supra). Paragraphs 15, 17 and 18 are profitable to refer

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here, which are extracted herein below:-

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“ 15. Earlier there has been conflict of opinion in the various decisions of the Division Bench of this Court, the three-Judge Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in Avtar Singh, after noticing various decisions of this Court and after detailed discussions, summarised the conclusions in para 38, the relevant part is reproduced as under: (SCC pp. 507-508)

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“38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our conclusion thus:

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38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.

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38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information,

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38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision.

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38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted:

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38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered and Incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information.by condoning the lapse.

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38.4.2 Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee.

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38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.

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38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

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38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.

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38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper.

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38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.

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38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form.

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38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/ verification from has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for.

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38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppression veri or suggestion falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him

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(emphases as original)

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17. The Division Bench, in the impugned judgment, has proceeded mechanically without taking note of the fact that a juvenile could not have been entangled in a criminal complaint instituted against him as October 1997 and this fact remained unnoticed by the Division Bench that he was a juvenile when the order of discharge was passed on 15.12.2001 and almost a decade thereafter, the process of selection came to be initiated by the respondents pursuant to an advertisement dated 23.2.2011, the seriatim of facts cumulatively indicates that the nature of information which was not disclosed by the appellant, in any manner, could be considered to be a suppression of material information not being bona fide disclosed in Clause 12 of attestation form filled by him. In this regard, the finding which has been recorded by the Division Bench in holding that there was a suppression of material information is unsustainable and deserves to be set aside.

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18. At the first blush, we were not inclined to grant the appellant consequential benefits as he had not worked after his services came to be terminated on account of cancellation of appointment dated 19.2.2015, but in the present facts and circumstances when the appellant was never at fault and no one has afforded him a reasonable opportunity to justify and, at the same time, the authorities have also failed to consider that the appellant was a juvenile on the date when the complaint was made and the date when he was discharged by the learned trail Judge by an order dated 15.12.2001, these peculiar facts were not noticed by the authority while exercising its judicious discretion as to whether the so called alleged suppression at all disentitle the appellant from continuation of service.

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(emphasis supplied)

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11 . Again, the same issue fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of

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Pawan Kumar (Supra), and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraphs no. 18, 19 and 20 held as follows:-

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“18. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, at the time of attestation form filled by the appellant, the criminal case was already registered against him but it may be noticed that at the very threshold, the complainant filed his affidavit that the complaint on which FIR came to be registered was due to misunderstanding and he did not want to pursue his case any further, but still charge-sheet came to be filed and on the first date of hearing, the alleged victim PW I did not support case of the prosecution and thus the order of clean acquittal came to be passed by the learned Judge of competent jurisdiction by judgment dated 12.08.2011.

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19. The criminal case indeed was of trivial nature and the nature of post and nature of duties to be discharged by the recruit has never been looked into by the competent authority while examining the overall suitability of the incumbent keeping in view Rule 52 of the 1987 RPF Rules to become a member of the force. Taking into consideration the exposition expressed by this Court in Avtar Singh, in our considered view the order of discharge passed by the competent authority dated 24.04.2015 is not sustainable and in sequel thereto the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi does not hold good and deserves to be set aside.

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20. Consequently, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 17.11.2015 and the order of discharge dated 24.4.2015 and dated 23.12.2021 are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the appellant in service on the post of Constable on which he was selected pursuant to his participation in reference to Employment Notice No.1/2011 dated 27.02.2011. We make it clear that the appellant will not be entitled for the arrears of salary for the period during which he has not served the force and at the same time he will be entitled for all notional benefits, including pay, seniority and other consequential benefits, etc. Necessary orders shall be passed within a period of one month from today. No costs.”

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Emphasis Supplied

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12. In the case at hand, admittedly, the issue for which the FIR was lodged was for an offence of trivial nature

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and further the name of the Petitioner was also indicated as “CHHOTE” & not “DINKAR” . Further, even the cognizance was not taken.

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13. Having regard to the above, and looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case and also the cases referred to hereinabove; the impugned orders dated

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05.11.2020 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) and also the appellate order dated 09.11.2021 (page-77 of the writ petition), are hereby, quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith, with all consequential benefits except back wages.

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14. The writ petition stands allowed. Pending I.A(s),

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if any, stands closed.

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8^th April, 2026 Jk Uploaded on 21/04/2026 AFR

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Dinkar v. the State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary Deptt of Home Jail and Disaster Management

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Dinkar v. the State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary Deptt of Home Jail and Disaster Management

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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