M/S Jai Maa Tara Projects, Rep. through Its Partner Mr. Ajay Kumar Jain Vs Central Coalfields Limited (Ccl) through Its Chairman-Cum-Managing Director

2026:JHHC:2396-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No.363 of 2026

M/s Jai Maa Tara Projects, Station Road, Bijulia, Ramgarh, P.O. & P.S. Ramgarh Cantt, District Ramgarh, represented through its partner Mr. Ajay Kumar Jain, son of Late Madan Lal Jain, resident of Bangali Tola, Nehru Road, Near Shiv Mandir, P.O. & P.S. Ramgarh Cantt, District Ramgarh (Jharkhand).

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.......... Petitioner .

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-Versus-

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Central Coalfields Limited (CCL), through its Chairman-cumManaging Director, Darbhanga House, Ranchi.

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Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Coalfields Limited (CCL), Darbhanga House, Ranchi.

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Director (Technical), Central Coalfields Limited (CCL), Darbhanga House, Ranchi.

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Director (Operation), Central Coalfields Limited (CCL), Darbhanga House, Ranchi.

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General Manager (Contract Management Cell), Central Coalfields Limited (CCL), Darbhanga House, Ranchi.

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General Manager, Dhori Area, Central Coalfields Limited, Dhori Area, P.O. & P.S. Bokaro, District Bokaro.

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Project Officer/Engineer-in-charge, Dhori Area, P.O. & P.S. Bokaro, District Bokaro.

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.......... Respondents.

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----- CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR

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----For the Petitioner : Mr. Pradyumna Poddar, Advocate Mr. Priyanshu Shekhar, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate Mr. Shivam Utkarsh Sahay, Advocate -----

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Order No.02 Date: 28.01.2026

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Per: Rajesh Shankar, J.

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The present writ petition has been preferred seeking issuance of direction upon the respondent authorities to grant appropriate extension of time to the petitioner for transportation of the balance contractual quantity of coal, in accordance with Clauses 6.4 and 6.6 of the terms and conditions as mentioned in the Service Level Agreement in connection with NIT No.CCL/GM (CMC)/Dhori/GeM/2024/29 dated 22.07.2024 (hereinafter referred as the said Tender) without imposing any penal consequences.

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Further prayer has been made for quashing the e-Tender Notice dated 03.12.2025 bearing NIT No.CCL/GM(CMC)/Dhori/GeM/ 2025/35 floated by the Central Coalfields Limited (CCL) insofar as it relates to loading, transportation and spreading of coal forming part of the scope of work already awarded to the petitioner by the said Tender.

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The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the CCL issued the said Tender through the Government e-Marketplace (GeM), for "Loading, Transportation and Spreading of total quantity of 43,76,080 metric tonnes of coal by contractor's tipping trucks from the crushed coal point of Feeder Breaker to PF-I and PF-II of Dhori Railway Siding of AADOCM, Dhori Area, for a period of 420 days with an estimated cost of work of Rs.12,42,92,049.81 (inclusive of GST @ 18%).

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It is further submitted that the petitioner firm participated in the said Tender and emerged as the L-1 bidder. The said Tender was awarded to it being L1 bidder. A formal agreement was executed between the petitioner and the CCL vide Agreement No. GM(D)/SO(M)/Agreement/AADOCM/24-25/256 dated 11.12.2024 having contract value of Rs.8,32,75,673.37 (inclusive of GST @ 18%).

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It is also submitted that a work order dated 03.01.2025 was issued to the petitioner wherein it was specifically mentioned that the said work was awarded for a period of 420 days commencing from 22.11.2024 to 15.01.2026 and the minimum quantity of coal to be handled by the petitioner would be 10,422 metric tonnes per day.

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The petitioner firm commenced the work and in order to meet the minimum daily handling requirement stipulated in the Work Order, arranged and deployed the requisite fleet by purchasing vehicles through financial institutions, thereby incurring huge financial liabilities.

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It is contended that the petitioner was ready and willing to perform its contractual obligations at all times without any default on its part. In fact, the shortfall in the handled quantity of coal occurred due to hindrances wholly beyond the control of the petitioner and in no manner attributable to it.

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It is also contended that during the period from 22.11.2024 to 30.11.2025, the respondent authorities provided only 14,64,402 metric tonnes of coal for transportation and the balance quantity of 29,11,678 metric tonnes is still to be transported under the subsisting contract.

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It is argued that instead of granting an appropriate extension of time to the petitioner-firm for completion of the balance contractual work, the respondent-CCL issued a fresh e-Tender Notice dated 03.12.2025 bearing NIT No. CCL/GM(CMC)/DHORI/GeM/2025/35 which also included the work awarded to the petitioner.

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It is further contended that though the petitioner participated in the fresh Tender, it simultaneously represented the respondent authorities for granting appropriate extension of time so as to enable it to complete the balance work of loading, transporting and spreading of coal and to mitigate the losses so caused. However, till

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2026:JHHC:2396-DB

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date, no decision or response has been communicated to the petitioner by any of the respondent authorities.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that Clause 6.4(E) of the terms and conditions mentioned in the Service Level Agreement, which forms part of the main agreement, provides for extension of date of completion of contract in which delay has occurred on account of any other cause which, at the sole discretion of the company, is beyond the control of the contractor. The said clause further contemplates that such extension shall be granted by the Area General Manager on the recommendation of the Engineer-in-Charge of the concerned work in course of execution of the same. Additionally, Clause 6.6 stipulates that when the period fixed for completion of the contract is about to expire, the question of extension may be considered at the instance of the contractor or the company or both, and such extension will have to be by party’s agreement, expressed or implied.

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It is also urged that despite the petitioner having fulfilled the preconditions for consideration of extension of time, the respondent authorities failed to exercise the contractual discretion vested in them under clause 6.4(E) of the terms and conditions as illustrated in the Service Level Agreement.

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The learned counsel for the petitioner puts much reliance on the judgment of learned Division Bench of Orissa High Court rendered in the case of M/s Utkal High Ways Engineers and Contractors

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vs. General Manager, Lingaraj Area, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited & Ors., reported in MANU/OR/0029/2012 , and

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submits that in the said case, while dealing with an identical situation, it has been held that where delay or shortfall in execution of contractual work is not attributable to the contractor, the authorities are duty-bound to consider extension of time under the contractual clauses of agreement and inviting fresh tender pending such consideration amounts to termination of subsisting contract which violates the fundamental rights of the contractor guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

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According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the present writ petition challenges the arbitrary and pre-emptive issuance of a fresh tender during subsistence of an existing contract, thereby attracting a public law element.

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It is also argued that issuance of a fresh tender during subsistence of the petitioner's contract amounts to a colourable exercise of power and indirect termination of the existing contract, which is impermissible in law.

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The learned counsel for the respondent-CCL has primarily raised the issue of maintainability of the present writ petition on the ground that the present dispute is purely contractual in nature and no public law element is involved in it and as such the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this score alone.

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Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed on record.

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Before delving into the merit of the rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to refer few judgments of the Hon’ble

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2026:JHHC:2396-DB

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Supreme Court dealing with the scope of interference by a writ court in contractual matters.

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In the case of Rishi Kiran Logistics (P) Ltd. v. Kandla Port Trust, reported in (2015) 13 SCC 233, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, only public law remedy can be invoked. Contractual dispute is outside the realm of judicial review under Article 226 except such cases where a contractual dispute has public law element.

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20.

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In the case of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd., Jabalpur v. Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd. & Others, reported

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in (2023) 2 SCC 703, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that undoubtedly the writ jurisdiction is a public law remedy and a matter, which lies entirely within a private realm of affairs of public body, may not be entertained under the writ jurisdiction. It has further been held that the existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a writ petition filed in a contractual matter. When there are disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of filing a civil suit.

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The existence of a provision for arbitration, which is a forum intended to quicken the pace of dispute resolution, is viewed as a near bar in entertaining a writ petition. In a case where the State is a party to a contract and a breach of contract is alleged against the State, a civil action in the appropriate forum is, undoubtedly,

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maintainable, but the State has a duty to act fairly and to eschew arbitrariness in all its actions. However, every case involving breach of contract by the State, cannot be dressed up and disguised as a case of arbitrary State action. While the concept of an arbitrary action or inaction cannot be cribbed or confined to any immutable mantra, and must be laid bare, with reference to the facts of each case, it cannot be a mere allegation of breach of contract that would suffice. What must be involved in the case is that the action/inaction is palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle. An action, which is completely mala fide, can hardly be described as a fair action and may, depending on the facts, amount to arbitrary action.

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In the case of Tata Motors Ltd. Vs. Brihan Mumbai Electric

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Supply & Transport Undertaking & Others, reported in

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(2023) 19 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

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“ 50. This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is duty-bound to interfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias. However, this Court has cautioned time and again that courts should exercise a lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review in contractual or commercial matters. This Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides or bias or irrationality is made out. One must remember that today many public sector undertakings compete with the private industry. The contracts entered into between private parties are not subject to scrutiny under writ jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of superior courts but this discretionary power must be exercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The courts must realise their limitations and the

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havoc which needless interference in commercial matters can cause. In contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain. The courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give “fair play in the joints” to the government and public sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer. [See Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489].”

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It is trite law that only public law remedy can be invoked by way of filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and purely contractual dispute is outside the scope of judicial review under the said extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. When there are disputed questions of fact determination of which needs evidences, the Court should relegate the party to the remedy by way of filing a civil suit. If there is a provision of arbitration in the contract, the court should be slow in entertaining the dispute, rather the parties should be relegated to the said forum. Only when the action of the State is found to be palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and denuded of any principle or malafide, the writ petition is entertainable even in contractual matters. The Court is normally loathe to interfere in contractual matters unless a clear case of arbitrariness or mala fide or bias or irrationality is made out.

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Reverting back to the present case to examine as to whether it is fit one to exercise the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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2026:JHHC:2396-DB

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The petitioner is claiming that out of the total contractual quantity of 43,76,080 Metric Tonnes, only 14,64,402 Metric Tonnes of coal has been transported by it and balance quantity of 29,11,678 Metric Tonnes is yet to be transported due to hindrances wholly beyond its control and as such the respondents are duty bound to extend the date of completion of work.

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The learned counsel for the petitioner while putting much emphasis on Clauses 6.4 and 6.6 of the terms and conditions illustrated in the Service Legal Agreement submits that the said provisions contain express mechanism for extension of time. The said provisions are

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quoted hereunder for ready reference:-

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“6.4 Extension of date of completion - on happening of any events causing delay as stated under the Contractor shall intimate Engineer-In-Charge in writing immediately:

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A. abnormally bad weather,

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B. serious loss or damage by fire,

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C. Civil commotion, strikes or lockouts affecting any of the trades employed on the work.

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D. delay on the part of the Contractors or tradesmen engaged by the Company not forming part of the contract, holding up further progress of the work,

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E. any other causes which, at the sole discretion of the Company is beyond the control of the Contractor.

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"Hindrance Register" should be maintained for recording the hindrances.”

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The contractor shall however use his best efforts to prevent or make good the delay by putting his endeavors constantly as may be reasonably required of him to the satisfaction of the Engineer-In-Charge.

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Time extension on account of hindrance shall be granted by Area General Manager based on the recommendation of the Engineer-in-Charge of the work during the course of execution of work reserving the right to impose/waive the

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clause relating to compensation for delay. The extension will have to be by party's agreement, expressed or implied.

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Bank Guarantees, against security, shall be suitably extended, to take care of any extension granted.

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6.6. When the period fixed for completion of the contract is about to expire, the question of extension of the contract may be considered at the instance of the Contract or the Company or both. The extension will have to be by party’s agreement, expressed or implied.

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The extension of time other than on account of hindrance shall be granted with the approval of the Accepting Authority of the tender limited to DoP.”

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Clause 6.4 of the Service Legal Agreement explicitly provides that

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the contractor is liable to report in writing the delay occasioned in completion of the work to the Engineer-in-charge of the work on occurrence of any event mentioned under the said clause which should be recorded in the hindrance register. It is further provided that the contractor shall, however, use his best efforts to prevent or make good the delay by putting his endeavours constantly as may be reasonably required of him to the satisfaction of the EngineerIn-Charge. Thus, it is evident that the extension of time for completion of work cannot be claimed by the contractor as a matter of right, rather it is upon the discretion of the respondent-company to grant extension looking to the hindrance caused in completion of the work.

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The petitioner has not been able to bring on record sufficient materials to show that it had reported the hindrances caused in delay of completion of contractual work. Even, the “Hindrance Register” has not been placed before this court. The issue as to whether the petitioner made best efforts to prevent or make good

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the delay is a question of fact which can only be ascertained by the fact-finding authority/court of law taking into consideration the evidences laid by the parties. Moreover, during the pendency of the writ petition, the respondents keeping in view the possible hindrances have already decided to extend the time for execution of the awarded work from 16.01.2026 to 06.02.2026 (22 days) vide letter dated 09.01.2026.

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Though the petitioner has claimed that the action of the respondents in issuing fresh tender for the work assigned to it instead of extending the time of completion of the same, is an arbitrary exercise of power by the respondent authorities, the said claim itself is not sufficient unless supported by cogent evidences. Mere allegation of breach of contract is not enough to prove arbitrary action of the respondents. The petitioner has failed to show before this court by bringing on record sufficient materials that the action of the respondents is palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle or suffers from the vice of mala fide.

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Moreover, looking to the nature of the dispute raised by the petitioner, we are of the considered view that no public law element is involved in the present case, rather it is purely a private contractual dispute between the petitioner and the respondents.

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Otherwise also, Clauses 13 and 14 of the terms and conditions of the Service Level Agreement provide the manner of settlement of dispute between the parties through conciliation and arbitration. However, the petitioner instead of availing the said remedy has

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resorted to the extraordinary writ jurisdiction, that too without sufficient materials.

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32. The judgment of Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors

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(Supra.) as has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned Bench in the said case had found from the documents produced before it that the delay was not attributable to the petitioners of that case. However, in the present case, in absence of sufficient materials on record, factual determination as to which party is responsible for the delay caused in execution of the awarded work is not possible. It is trite law that each case is to be decided in its own facts. In the case of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. (Supra.), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the concept of an arbitrary action or inaction cannot be cribbed or confined to any immutable mantra, and must be laid bare, with reference to the facts of each case.

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For the reasons as discussed above, the present writ petition is dismissed being not maintainable. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to seek appropriate alternative remedy as available under law.

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(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)

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(Rajesh Shankar, J.)

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28^th January, 2026 Sanjay/ NAFR Uploaded on 03.02.2026

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M/S Jai Maa Tara Projects, Rep. through Its Partner Mr. Ajay Kumar Jain v. Central Coalfields Limited (Ccl) through Its Chairman-Cum-Managing Director

Case brief

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M/S Jai Maa Tara Projects, Rep. through Its Partner Mr. Ajay Kumar Jain v. Central Coalfields Limited (Ccl) through Its Chairman-Cum-Managing Director

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