Rajkumar Gupta Vs the State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary

(2026: JHHC: 3914-DB)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

W.P. (S) No. 2301 of 2024

Rajkumar Gupta, aged about 40 years, son of Krishna Mohan Sahu, resident of Village- Jogiyara, P.O.- Pratappur, P.S.- Pratappur, District- Chatra, Jharkhand.

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…. Petitioner

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Versus

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The State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary, at Project Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, Ranchi, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.

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The Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms & Rajbhasa, Jharkhand, Ranchi, P.O. & P.S.- Ranchi, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.

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The Deputy Commissioner, Chatra, having its office at Collectoriate Building, Chatra, P.O. & P.S.- Chatra, District- Chatra, Jharkhand. …. Respondents

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CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR

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-----For the Petitioner : Mr. Umesh Kumar Choubey, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Shubham Gautam, AC to A.A.G.-V ----- Order No. 07 Dated : 12.02.2026

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Heard Mr Umesh Kumar Choubey, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Shubham Gautam, learned A.C to A.A.G-V for the Respondent State.

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The petitioner, by instituting this petition, questions the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, inter alia , on the ground that by giving a right of appeal only to the contemnor, who is punished in the exercise of Court’s contempt jurisdiction and denying such a right to the contempt petitioner, amounts to discrimination, which is otherwise prohibited by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

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In the Petition, the petitioner contends that Section 19 is ultra vires because it is “ incomplete as it is limited to the contemnor as intra appeal for non-compliance of Hon’ble Courts order and it is not available to the petitioner who is party to the partition whose petition (Contempt petition) is dropped without compliance which amounts more than to dismissal of the writ petition and left no option to move forward to get justice .”

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Mr Choubey, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner had secured a favourable order dated 06.03.2019 in W.P.(S) No. 4418 of 2013, which the respondents failed to comply with. He further submitted that the petitioner subsequently filed Contempt Case (Civil) No. 1095 of 2019 to address this noncompliance by alleging contempt of court. By an order dated 24.02.2023, the learned Single Judge of this Court declined to entertain the contempt petition but granted the petitioner liberty to pursue his remedies in accordance with law.

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Mr Choubey submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge dated 24.02.2023 cannot be appealed because of the discrimination introduced under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. He further submitted that had the contemnors been punished, they would have been entitled to a right of appeal under Section 19 of the said Act. Conversely, for a person such as the petitioner, who is aggrieved by what he perceives to be a contempt of court, the statute provides no such remedy. On this basis, Mr Choubey submitted that the

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statutory scheme results in patent discrimination, which is prohibited by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

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Mr. Choubey therefore submits that on the aforementioned grounds, Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act is liable to be declared ultra vires, illegal, and unconstitutional. In the alternative, he submits that the provisions of Section 19 should be read down to afford a right of appeal to a petitioner who initiates a contempt proceeding in the event the petition is dismissed or not entertained. He further submits that through such a reading down, the constitutionality of Section 19 may be salvaged.

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Mr Shubham Gautam, learned counsel for the respondent-State, submits that Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is legally sound and free from constitutional infirmity. He first points out that contempt is primarily a matter between the contemnor and the Court, in which the role of the petitioner is limited to apprising the Court of the alleged contumacious conduct. Secondly, he submits that the right of appeal is not an inherent right but is a creature of statute. Consequently, the mere fact that the right of appeal is conferred exclusively upon a contemnor who has been punished does not render the provisions of Section 19 either ultra vires or unconstitutional

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Besides, Mr Gautam submitted that the contemnor, who has been punished for contempt, cannot be held as an equal to the contempt petitioner who only seeks to apprise the Court of the facts and circumstances which could persuade the Court to initiate its contempt

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jurisdiction. He submitted that the concept of equality enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution of India is among equals, and that it cannot be invoked in the present matter.

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Mr Gautam submitted that in any event, the petitioner is not barred from invoking the remedy under Article 136 of the Constitution, and therefore, it cannot be assumed that the petitioner is remediless. He pointed out that, even otherwise, the learned Single Judge has expressly granted the petitioner liberty to pursue his remedy in accordance with law.

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The rival contentions now fall for our determination.

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In this case, the petitioner has questioned the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which reads as

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follows: -

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“19. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt—

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(a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of not less than two judges of the Court;

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(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.

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(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that— (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended;

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(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and

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(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt.

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(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2).

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(4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed—

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(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days;

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(b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days, from the date of the order appealed against.”

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The three main grounds on which the constitutional validity of Section 19 is challenged have been set out in paragraph-4 of this petition, and they read as follows: -

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“A. Whether section 19 of the court of contempt act is limited to one party i.e. for contemnor and gives no option for petitioner who approach the Hon’ble court as first party under another provision of the contempt of court act and it being ultra virus for limited opportunity to one party is discriminative in nature in providing equal opportunity for both parties of contempt petition?

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B. Whether the issue of non-complaisance is an issue in between the Hon’ble courts with its direction and the contemnor or also the aggrieved petitioner (writ petitioner) who comes as first party before the Hon’ble court with a prayer for compliance of the order passed by the Hon’ble court?

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C. Whether dropping of contempt petition left no option or remedy to petitioner other than to raise his grievances a fresh?

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After considering the rival submissions, we are satisfied that no case has been made out for declaring Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as ultra vires or unconstitutional on the grounds alleged and argued. Nor is any case made out to read down the provisions of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, by conferring a right of appeal to the contempt petitioner. The reasons in support of this conclusion are set out hereafter.

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The foundational principle in contempt jurisprudence is that such proceedings are exclusively between the Court and the contemnor. A third party may only bring relevant information to the notice of the Court and assist in the proceedings. Consequently, it is well-settled

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that a matter of contempt concerns only the contemnor, who is alleged to have committed the contempt, and the Court, whose authority is alleged to have been flouted.

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In the case of D.N. Taneja Verus Bhajan Lal¹ , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that any person who moves the machinery of the court for contempt only brings to the notice of the court certain facts constituting contempt of court. After furnishing such information, he may still assist the court, but it must always be borne in mind that in a contempt proceeding there are only two parties, namely, the court and the contemnor. This may be one of the reasons that weighed with the legislature in not conferring any right of appeal on the petitioner in respect of the contempt. The aggrieved party under Section 19(1) of the Act can only be the contemnor who has been punished for contempt of court.

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The above principle was further reinforced in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda² , which clarified that since the petitioner is not a party to the lis in the traditional sense, it cannot claim a vested right of appeal when the Court declines to punish. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Another³ , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a contempt proceeding is not a dispute between two parties; it is primarily between the court and the person alleged to have committed the contempt of court. The person who informs the court, or brings to the

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1 (1988) 3 SCC 26

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2 (2006) 5 SCC 399

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3 (1996) 4 SCC 411

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court's notice, that anyone has committed contempt of the court is not in the position of a prosecutor; he is simply assisting the court so that the dignity and majesty of the court are maintained and upheld. This decision explains the difference between the positions of a contempt petitioner and a contemnor punished for established contempt.

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The second principle is that a right of appeal is never inherent, but it is the creation of the Statute. The mere fact that the legislature has not chosen to provide a right of appeal to a contempt petitioner or a person bringing to the notice of the Court certain facts which, according to him, constitute contempt of court, would not render such provisions to be ultra vires or unconstitutional.

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Again, in D.N. Taneja (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that the right of appeal is a creature of the statute, and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration.

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In this connection, the Hon’ble Supreme Court pointed out that there was no right of appeal under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. This means that even the contemnor, who was punished for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, could not appeal the same. It was for the first time that, under section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1917, a right of appeal was provided. These observations buttress the position that a right of appeal is never inherent and that the mere failure to provide one, by itself, does not render any legislation ultra vires or unconstitutional.

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In Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.⁴ , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the mere absence of an appellate provision in a statute does not, by itself, render the enactment constitutionally invalid . The Hon’ble Court further observed that the right of appeal is a statutory creation rather than a constitutional mandate; consequently, if a statute does not provide for an appeal in respect of certain matters, the statute does not become unconstitutional or ultra vires. Moreover, the aggrieved party is not left without recourse, as it may still invoke judicial review by approaching the High Court under its writ jurisdiction or the Apex Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

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21. As the petitioner’s challenge entirely ignores the above two principles, i.e. the limited role of a contempt petitioner and the principle that generally, the right of appeal is neither inherent nor a Constitutional right but only statutory, the challenge now raised cannot be sustained. The challenge proceeds on the premise that the absence of a right to appeal in a statute renders such statute ultra vires or unconstitutional. This would not be a correct premise. Such a contention was expressly rejected in Jamshed N. Guzdar (Supra) .

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In any event, to sustain a claim of discrimination or hostile discrimination prohibited under Article 14, the petitioner must establish that the position or status of a contempt petitioner like himself is equal to, or at least not materially different from, that of a contemnor punished under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This

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4 (2005) 2 SCC 591

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means that the Petitioner must plead and establish that the contemnor who is or may be punished for contempt and the Petitioner are equally placed.

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In the present case, the pleadings do not even attempt to lay any foundation for such equivalence. Such equivalence is difficult to establish because the two classes are inherently distinct and cannot be treated as equal or in the same position. The classification between these two classes is based upon an intelligible differentia, which bears a rational nexus to the object the statutory provision seeks to achieve.

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Tracing the objective of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, through the landmark decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of D.N. Taneja (supra) and Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda , it is evident that the Act aims to uphold the majesty of the law rather than to adjudicate private grievances.

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Since the potential for deprivation of personal liberty arises only in respect of the contemnor, the legislature has strategically provided a right of appeal only to that class. Equality, ultimately, could be insisted on among equals. Therefore, unless equality between two persons or two classes of persons is first established, a complaint of hostile discrimination cannot be sustained.

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In the present context, the legal positions of the petitioner and the contemnor are fundamentally different, and the legislative policy of limiting the right of appeal to the latter is logically connected to the

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protective and corrective nature of contempt jurisdiction and the relative position of the parties.

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In the case of Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda and others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to several decisions concerning Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1917, summarised the position emerging from these decisions with regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings. Such a summary is contained in paragraph-11 and therefore, the same is transcribed below for convenience of reference:-

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“ 11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarised thus:

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I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt.

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II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution.

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III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties.

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IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of “jurisdiction to punish for contempt” and, therefore, not appealable under Section

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19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions.

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V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intracourt appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).

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The first point is answered accordingly.”

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In the above decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while holding that

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neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt, nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt, nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under section 19 of the said Act. In special circumstances, such orders may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution.

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Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained that any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties will not be in the exercise of ‘ jurisdiction to punish for contempt’ and, therefore, not appealable under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under section 19 of the Act can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions.

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In Ajay Kumar Bhalla and others versus Prakash Kumar Dixit⁵ , the decision in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop Bank Ltd. (supra) was reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Considering the legislative policy underlying the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and specifically Section 19 thereof, we are satisfied that the said provision is not ultra vires the Constitution of India. The statutory scheme cannot be termed discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution merely because it limits the right of appeal.

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In Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Anr.⁶ , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right but is a substantive statutory right governed strictly by the enactment creating it . The Hon'ble Court further elucidated that an appeal must find its genesis in the authority of law. In the absence of an express provision, such a right can neither be assumed by logical analysis nor inferred through the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

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Relying upon the earlier verdicts in M. Ramnarain (P) Ltd. v. State Trading Corpn. of India Ltd.⁷ and Gujarat Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn.⁸ , the Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed “that the Legislature may in its wisdom determine whether a right to appeal shall be unconditional

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5 (2024) 12 SCC 159

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6 (2010) 10 SCC 744

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7 (1983) 3 SCC 75

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8 (1999) 4 SCC 468

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or circumscribed by conditions. Such a statutory scheme does not offend Article 14 of the Constitution” .

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This principle is further supported by the decisions in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar⁹ and Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh¹⁰ . These authorities underscore the settled position that the right of appeal is contingent upon the relevant provisions of law and may be unavailable to a party where the statute so dictates.

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Moreover, it is a fundamental canon of constitutional jurisprudence that there exists a persistent presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a statute, and the burden remains heavily upon the petitioner to displace this presumption by demonstrating a clear and irreconcilable conflict with constitutional mandates. Having failed to do so, the challenge to the validity of Section 19 must fail, as the provision is a valid exercise of legislative competence that conforms to the specialised nature of contempt jurisdiction.

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Merely alleging that a provision is ultra vires or unconstitutional is insufficient. Neither the assertion of personal inconvenience nor the erroneous premise that the right to appeal is an inherent right constitutes a valid ground for striking down legislation. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate how an informant and a contemnor, who is subject to punishment, can claim equality in the first place. In the absence of such a foundation, any complaint of discrimination or unequal treatment cannot be readily sustained. It is

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9 (1999) 3 SCC 722

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10 (2008) 12 SCC 796

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well settled that equality operates only among equals; indeed, the equal treatment of unequals may, in itself, constitute a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

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The argument that we must read into section 19 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, a right for a contempt petitioner to appeal a decision not to initiate contempt proceedings or to exercise powers under the Act cannot be accepted. Such a construction would run counter to the express words of the statute and the legislature's avowed intention. The doctrine of reading down is premised on certain well-established circumstances, none of which are even remotely applicable in the present situation. Besides, the argument proceeds on the premise that the present position renders the impugned provision arbitrary or ultra vires. Even this premise, as noted above, is not well-founded.

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In The Authorised Officer v. Shanmugevelu¹¹ , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the rule of ‘reading down’ should not be applied at the first instance but should always be the last resort, i.e., only where the Court finds that a particular provision, if given its plain meaning, cannot be saved from invalidation. Thus, by restricting or reading it down, the Court renders the provision workable and saves it from invalidity. “Reading down” is only for the limited purpose of making a provision workable and its object achievable.

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Applying the above ratio to the present case, we find that a plain reading of section 19 neither renders it vulnerable to the charge of

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11 2024 INSC 80

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unconstitutionality nor renders its legislative object unachievable. Therefore, the addition of words to the clear and unambiguous statutory provision or introducing therein a right of appeal to a contempt petitioner, like the petitioner, contrary to the plain text and legislative intent, would not be a permissible judicial exercise.

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For all the above reasons, we find no merit in this petition and dismiss it without any order for costs.

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However, it is needless to add that the petitioner can always explore other constitutional remedies with regard to the learned Single Judge’s order dated 24.02.2023 if he is unwilling to avail of the liberty already granted by the learned Single Judge to work out his remedies in accordance with law.

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This petition is dismissed with liberty in the above terms. No costs.

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(M.S. Sonak, C.J.)

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(Rajesh Shankar, J.)

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February 12, 2026 Ranjeet / R.Kr. A.F.R. Uploaded on 18.02.2026

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Rajkumar Gupta v. the State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary

Case brief

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Rajkumar Gupta v. the State of Jharkhand through Chief Secretary

Case brief

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