Nitin Kumar Bhagat Vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The Principal Secretary Ministry Of Home And Ors.

[2026:JHHC:10806]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 221 of 2017

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Nitin Kumar Bhagat, s/o Sri Pramod Bhagat, R/o Karra Road, Khunti, P.O. Khunti, P.S. Khunti, District-Khunti, Jharkhand.

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… … Petitioner

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Versus

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The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Home, Office at Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, DistrictRanchi (Jharkhand).

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The I.G., Prison, Jharkhand, Office at Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand).

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The Superintendent of Sub-Jail, Khunti, P.O. and P.S.-Khunti, DistrictKhunti (Jharkhand).

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… … Respondents

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With W.P.(S) No. 339 of 2017

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Sumanjan Mundu, S/o Late Beeru Mundu, r/o Barudih, Khunti, P.O. Khunti, P.S.-Khunti, District-Khunti, Jharkhand.

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… … Petitioner

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Versus

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The State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Home, Office at Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, DistrictRanchi (Jharkhand).

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The I.G., Prison, Jharkhand, Office at Project Building, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand).

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The Superintendent of Sub-Jail, Khunti, P.O. and P.S.-Khunti, DistrictKhunti (Jharkhand).

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… … Respondents

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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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For the Petitioners : Ms. Shivani Jaluka, Advocate For the Resp.-State : Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh, AC to SC(L&C)-III [W.P.(S) No.221 of 2017] Mr. Devesh Krishna, SC Mines-III Mr. Kumar Pawan, AC to SC Mines-III Mr. Faisal Alam, AC to SC Mines-III

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[W.P.(S) No.339 of 2017]

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16 / Dated: 15^th April, 2026

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Since both the writ petitions are having common issues, as such, both the writ petitions are being heard together and being disposed of with this common order/judgment.

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Both the writ petitions have been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying therein the following relief(s):

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W.P.(S) No. 221 of 2017:

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“That, by this application, the petitioner prays for Writ(s), Order(s), Direction(s) particularly a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing of the order contained in letter No.3825 dated 01/12/16 issued by the Respondent Authority under the signature of I.G., Prison whereby and whereunder the petitioner is terminated from his employment as V.C. Operator even without issuing any show cause to him and without affording any opportunity of hearing despite the fact that the petitioner was engaged since 30/06/09 as daily wager against the sanctioned post of V.C. Operator.

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And/Or

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The petitioner further prays that he may be reinstated in his employment and may be allowed to continue to discharge his duty till the Respondent states goes for regular employment on the abovementioned post of V.C. Operator.

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And/Or

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Pass such Order/Orders as this Hon’ble Court may think just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, doing conscionable justice to the petitioner.”

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W.P.(S) No. 339 of 2017

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“That, by this application, the petitioner prays for Writ(s), Order(s), Direction(s) particularly a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing of the order contained in letter No.3825 dated 01/12/16 issued by the Respondent Authority under the signature of I.G., Prison whereby and whereunder the petitioner is terminated from his employment as Sweeper/Driver even without issuing any show cause to him and without affording any opportunity of hearing despite the fact that the petitioner was engaged since 23/10/06 as daily wager against the sanctioned post of Sweeper & subsequently in the year 2015 he was appointed to post of Driver.

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And/Or

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The petitioner further prays that he may be reinstated in his employment and may be allowed to continue to discharge his duty till the Respondent states goes for regular employment on the abovementioned post of Sweeper.

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And/Or

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Pass such Order/Orders as this Hon’ble Court may think just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, doing conscionable justice to the petitioner.”

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The brief facts of both the cases as per the pleading made in the writ petitions needs to be referred herein which is as under.

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The case of the petitioner is that they had been engaged on daily wages on the sanctioned post of V.C. Operator [petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 221 of 2017] and Sweeper [petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 339 of 2017] in the Sub-Jail at Khunti on 29.07.2009 and 23.10.2006 respectively.

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It is the case of the petitioners that the service in this regard is like permanent employee. The status report with respect to services of the Daily wager working in jail within state of Jharkhand are regularly

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furnished by concerned prison to the Office of I.G. Prison. Vide Letter dated 02.06.2012, 14.08.2013, 17.10.2014 & 22.01.2015, the respondent authorities were informed about the employees who were engaged on daily wages. It is evident that the petitioners are continuously working since the date of employment.

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It is the also the case of the petitioners that the respondent authorities at no point of time were having any grievance against the petitioners and the authorities were fully satisfied with the services of the petitioners. The petitioners were engaged against the sanctioned post and even otherwise they were possessing requisite qualification as required for appointment for the said post. The engagement of the petitioners were on daily wages and they are serving the department for almost 8-10 years before the impugned order of termination was passed

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The respondent authority vide letter dated 01.10.2015 took a decision to enhance the salary of the petitioners and others similarly situated daily wages employee.

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But, paying no heed to all this, the impugned order of termination vide letter no. 3825 dated 01.12.2016 was issued terminating all the daily rated employees working at Khunti Sub-Jail and in the said impugned order of termination, there is a reference of letter No. 2109 dated 23.05.2009 and also letter No. 1168 dated 04.06.2009. The recommendation preceding letter dated 23.05.2009 is dated 20.05.2009 wherein at para-3 it is indicated that in future no appointment on daily wages shall be made on the sanctioned post.

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It is the grievance of the writ petitioners that they have been appointed to the post of V.C. Operator [writ petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 221 of 2017] and to the post of Sweeper [writ petitioner of W.P.(S) No. 339 of 2017] on 29.07.2009 and 23.10.2006 respectively and worked continuously up till the date they have been terminated from service, i.e., on 01.12.2016.

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The claim of the writ petitioners are that although they have been terminated from service but they have again been allowed to continue in service and by such continuation, both the writ petitioners have completed 10 years of continuous service, as such, their cases come under the fold of paragraph-53 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble

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Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1.

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The writ petitioners when have not been regularized, the present writ petitions have been filed.

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Argument on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners:

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Learned counsel for the petitioners has taken the ground that the action of the respondent authorities in not regularizing the services of the petitioners is highly arbitrary and illegal, i.e., contrary to the law laid down in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra) as also to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo vs. Union of India and Ors, 2024 SCC OnLine 3826 [S.L.P.(C) No. 5580 of 2024].

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It has also been submitted by taking the ground that the writ petitioners have been terminated only to break the chain of completion of 10 years of service.

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Learned counsel for the petitioners, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the both the writ petitions are, therefore, fit to be allowed by quashing the letter no.3825 dated 01.12.2016.

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Argument on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents:

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Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent-State has submitted that it is not a case where the order of regularization is fit to be passed reason being that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra) is not applicable if the factual aspect of the present case will be taken into consideration.

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Such submission has been made based on the admitted fact that both the writ petitioners have been terminated from service on the instructions given at the level of department and only that, instruction has also been issued to conduct inquiry regarding the conduct of the local authority in engaging these petitioners in service.

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The departmental proceeding has culminated into the order of punishment of censure.

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It has submitted that further continuation in service after the order of termination is, therefore, of no avail because that is at the local level for which the local authority has already been punished on conclusion of the inquiry by inflicting the punishment of censure.

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The argument has been advanced that so far as the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra) and Jaggo vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) are concerned, the same are also not applicable in the facts of the present case since in both the cases, continuity in service was taken into consideration but herein, the services has not been continued said to be counting the period of 10 years of continuous service as has been stipulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra).

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Learned counsel for the respondent, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that both the writ petitions, therefore, lacks merit and are liable to be dismissed.

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Analysis:

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This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleading made on behalf of the respective parties as available on record.

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The issue which has been raised on behalf of the petitioners regarding the continuation of 10 years of service said to be regular even after the order of termination as they were being allowed to continue in service thereafter.

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This Court, before considering the aforesaid issue, needs to refer herein the underlying principle which has been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in its Constitution Bench judgment rendered in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra).

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The background upon which the Hon’ble Apex Court has propounded the proposition to put restriction upon the back-door entry in public employment by putting restriction of induction of the person concerned on the daily rated capacity. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of one-time exercise, after taking into consideration the fact about the

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continuation of service of daily rated employee who have already completed more than 10 years of service has come out with the relaxation by carving out the guideline as under paragraph-53 thereof, which is being reproduced as under:

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“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071] , R.N. Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N. Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937] and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.”

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It is evident from the proposition as laid down under paragraph-53 for consideration at the end of the State that the daily rated employees who are to be regularized by way of one-time exercise are required to complete 10 years of continuous service without any aid of interim order passed by the Court such appointment if made against the sanctioned post.

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The said principle has been followed in the other judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. M.L. Kesari & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 247; Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (2018) 8 SCC 238 and; Nihal Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (2013) 14 SCC 65.

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The judgments rendered in the case of State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. M.L. Kesari & Ors. (supra) has come out with the proposition that what would be the meaning of the period of six months for completion of the exercise which has been propounded as under paragraph-53 of the judgment rendered in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors.

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Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra). It has been held therein that the period of six months will be said to be in completion if the candidature of all the daily rated employee has been considered by the State. If candidature of any of the candidate has not been considered, then the period of six months will be stretched. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment rendered in State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. M.L. Kesari & Ors. (supra) is being reproduced as under:

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“ 10. At the end of six months from the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , cases of several daily-wage/ad hoc/casual employees were still pending before courts. Consequently, several departments and instrumentalities did not commence the one-time regularisation process. On the other hand, some government departments or instrumentalities undertook the one-time exercise excluding several employees from consideration either on the ground that their cases were pending in courts or due to sheer oversight. In such circumstances, the employees who were entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 of the decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , will not lose their right to be considered for regularisation, merely because the one-time exercise was completed without considering their cases, or because the six-month period mentioned in para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] has expired. The one-time exercise should consider all daily-wage/ad hoc/casual employees who had put in 10 years of continuous service as on 10-4-2006 without availing the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals. If any employer had held the one-time exercise in terms of para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , but did not consider the cases of some employees who were entitled to the benefit of para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , the employer concerned should consider their cases also, as a continuation of the onetime exercise. The one-time exercise will be concluded only when all the employees who are entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , are so considered.

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11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] is twofold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more than ten years of continuous service without the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] was rendered, are considered for regularisation in view of their long service. Second is to ensure that the departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of employing persons on daily-wage/ad hoc/casual basis for long periods and then periodically regularise them on the ground that they have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. The true effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for more than ten years as on 10-4-2006 [the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] ] without the protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularisation. The fact that the employer has not undertaken such exercise of regularisation within six months of the decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for regularisation in terms of the above directions in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] as a one-time measure.”

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Another judgment has been rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (supra) wherein by following the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra) wherein the period of 10 years was to be counted till the date of pronouncement of the judgment. But the question arose that how the period of 10 years will be counted in a situation where the State of Jharkhand has been carved out w.e.f. 15.11.2000. The period of 10 years, therefore, has been modified by counting it from the date of creation of the State, i.e., from 15.11.2000. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment rendered in Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors., (supra) is being reproduced as under:

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“ 10. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the Regularisation Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation and the appellants, if they have completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the Regularisation Rules, ought to be given the benefit of the service rendered by them. If they have completed 10 years of service they should be regularised unless there is some valid objection to their regularisation like misconduct, etc.”

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The State of Jharkhand, based upon the aforesaid proposition, as has been laid down in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra) coupled with the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari & Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has passed observation by giving liberty to the State to formulate a rule for regularization and in turn thereof, a Rule has been formulated in the year 2015 which has been made effective from 01.12.2015. The Rule contains a provision of constituting a committee for consideration of the case of one or the other daily rated employees on the basis of the principle as laid down in the aforesaid judgment.

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Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is admitted that the writ petitioners of both the cases have been appointed by the local authorities without any advertisement.

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The departmental authority has made a query and has instructed to immediately dispense with the services of the writ petitioners being inducted through back-door entry. The local authority, in pursuance of the said direction, has dismissed the services of the writ petitioners by

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passing order as contained in letter no.3825 dated 01.12.2016, as impugned in both the writ petitions.

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The authority at the departmental level has also taken a decision to initiate a departmental proceeding against the erring officials who have inducted the writ petitioners to discharge their duty in daily rated capacity. The departmental proceeding initiated has concluded on the punishment of censure upon the local authority but most surprising thing is that even after their termination, they have been allowed to continue in service by the local authority.

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The writ petitioners now want to take advantage of the services which has been rendered by the writ petitioners after the termination from services so that the period be counted of 10 years.

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The purpose of such argument is to claim regularization by taking instance of the completion of 10 years of service by considering the case of the writ petitioners in view of paragraph-53 of the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra).

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This Court has also considered the judgment rendered in the case of Jaggo vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra). The factual aspect of the said case needs to be referred herein which is as under:

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“ 3. The appellants before this Court, who were applicants before the Tribunal originally numbered five. However, the fourth applicant before the Tribunal has not approached this Court. Therefore, these appeals are instituted by Applicant Nos.1, 2, 3, and 5 only. The sole Appellant in SLP(C) No. 5580/2024 was applicant no. 2 before the Tribunal whereas the Appellant no. 1, 2 and 3 in SLP(C) No. 11086/ 2024 were Applicant Nos. 1, 3 and 5 respectively before the Tribunal. For ease of reference and to maintain consistency, they shall continue to be referred to by their original applicant numbers as before the Tribunal.

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4. The appellants before this Court, being Applicant Nos.1, 2, 3, and 5 before the Tribunal, were originally engaged by the Central Water Commission2 on part-time, ad-hoc terms. Applicant No.1 was appointed as a Safaiwali in 1993, Applicant No.2 as a Safaiwali in 1998, and Applicant No.3 as a Safaiwali in 1999. All three were primarily responsible for cleaning and maintaining the office premises under the CWC. Applicant No.5, appointed in 2004 as a Khallasi (also discharging duties akin to a Mali/Khallasi), was entrusted with tasks such as gardening, dusting, and other ancillary maintenance work. Throughout their engagement, these individuals performed essential housekeeping and support functions at CWC establishments, including its offices at Faridabad, ensuring daily upkeep and contributing to the smooth functioning of the Commission’s administrative operations.

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5. Initially, the appellants sought regularization of their services by filing Original Application No.2211/2015 before the Tribunal. They contended that over the years, their roles and responsibilities had evolved beyond

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the nominal labels of “part-time” or “contractual” and that they were performing ongoing and core functions integral to the CWC’s operations. They relied on applicable government instructions and the principle that long-serving employees, engaged against work of a perennial nature, deserve fair consideration for regularization, provided their appointments were not illegal or clandestine. The Tribunal, by its order dated 17.04.2018, dismissed the appellants’ plea. It concluded that the appellants were not engaged on what it considered “regular vacancies,” that they had not completed what it termed as sufficient “full-time” service (such as meeting a 240-days per year criterion), and that their case did not attract the principles enabling regularization. Within ten days after the dismissal of the original application, on 17.04.2018, the services of all these individuals were abruptly terminated on 27.10.2018 by the respondent authorities without issuance of any show-cause notice.

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6. Aggrieved by the Tribunal’s decision and subsequent termination, the appellants approached the High Court in W.P.(C) No. 6822 of 2018 praying for the following reliefs:

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“a) Setting aside and quashing the impugned order dated 17.04.2018 passed by the Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. No. 2211/2015 titled as Smt. Anita & Ors. Versus Union of India & Ors., and

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b) Directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioners to their posts held by them prior to their illegal termination on 27.04.2018 and further to regularize the services of all the petitioners in their respective posts, from the date of their initial appointments with all the consequential benefits, in the interest of justice.

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c) Issue the writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, direction, or order, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents.”

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7. They urged the High Court to recognize their long and continuous service, the nature of their work, and the lack of any backdoor or illegal entry. They highlighted that they had functioned without any break, performed tasks equivalent to regular employees, and had been assigned duties essential to the regular upkeep, cleanliness, and maintenance of the respondent’s offices. The High Court, after examining the Tribunal’s decision and the submissions advanced, concluded that the petitioners before it were part-time workers who had not been appointed against sanctioned posts, nor had they performed a sufficient duration of fulltime service to satisfy the criteria for regularization. It relied on the principle laid down in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi3 holding that the petitioners could not claim a vested right to be absorbed or regularized without fulfilling the requisite conditions. The High Court further observed that the petitioners did not possess the minimum educational qualifications ordinarily required for regular appointments, and additionally noted that the employer had subsequently outsourced the relevant housekeeping and maintenance activities. Concluding that there was no legal basis to grant the reliefs sought, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by this rejection, the appellants have approached this Court by way of these appeals.

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It is evident from the factual aspect that the concerned appellant was allowed to continue in service for more than two decades and thereafter, they have been terminated. The Hon’ble Apex Court, after taking into consideration the fact of their continuous service of 20 years, has passed an order that even though the post is not sanctioned but even then, the

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daily rated employee has been allowed to continue in service continuously for two decades. The State Government cannot be allowed to take advantage of the post being not sanctioned.

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Similarly, in the case of Nihal Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. (supra) the issue of regularization and issue of sanctioned post has been discussed. For ready reference, relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is being reproduced as under:

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“ 20. But we do not see any justification for the State to take a defence that after permitting the utilisation of the services of a large number of people like the appellants for decades to say that there are no sanctioned posts to absorb the appellants. Sanctioned posts do not fall from heaven. The State has to create them by a conscious choice on the basis of some rational assessment of the need.

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21. The question is whether this Court can compel the State of Punjab to create posts and absorb the appellants into the services of the State on a permanent basis consistent with the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] . To answer this question, the ratio decidendi of Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is required to be examined. In that case, this Court was considering the legality of the action of the State in resorting to irregular appointments without reference to the duty to comply with the proper appointment procedure contemplated by the Constitution: (SCC pp. 17-18, para 4)

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“4. … The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commissions or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching the courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the posts concerned. The courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called ‘litigious employment’, has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution are intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognised by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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It can be seen from the above that the entire issue pivoted around the fact that the State initially made appointments without following any rational procedure envisaged under the scheme of the Constitution in the matters of public appointments. This Court while recognising the authority of the

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State to make temporary appointments engaging workers on daily wages declared that the regularisation of the employment of such persons which was made without following the procedure conforming to the requirement of the scheme of the Constitution in the matter of public appointments cannot become an alternate mode of recruitment to public appointment.

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22. It was further declared in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] that the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 cannot be exercised to compel the State or to enable the State to perpetuate an illegality. This Court held that compelling the State to absorb persons who were employed by the State as casual workers or daily-wage workers for a long period on the ground that such a practice would be an arbitrary practice and violative of Article 14 and would itself offend another aspect of Article 14 i.e. the State chose initially to appoint such persons without any rational procedure recognised by law thereby depriving vast number of other eligible candidates who were similarly situated to compete for such employment.

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23. Even going by the principles laid down in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , we are of the opinion that the State of Punjab cannot be heard to say that the appellants are not entitled to be absorbed into the services of the State on permanent basis as their appointments were purely temporary and not against any sanctioned posts created by the State.

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24. In our opinion, the initial appointment of the appellants can never be categorised as an irregular appointment. The initial appointment of the appellants is made in accordance with the statutory procedure contemplated under the Act. The decision to resort to such a procedure was taken at the highest level of the State by conscious choice as already noticed by us.

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25. The High Court in its decision in LPA No. 209 of 1992 recorded that the decision to resort to the procedure under Section 17 of the Act was taken in a meeting dated 24-3-1984 between the Advisor to the Government of Punjab and senior officers of the various banks in the public sector. Such a decision was taken as there was a need to provide necessary security to the public sector banks. As the State was not in a position to provide requisite police guards to the banks, it was decided by the State to resort to Section 17 of the Act. As the employment of such additional force would create a further financial burden on the State, various public sector banks undertook to take over the financial burden arising out of such employment. In this regard, the written statement filed before the High Court in the instant case by Respondents 1 to 3 through the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Welfare & Litigation) is necessary to be noticed. It is stated in the said affidavit:

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“2. That in meeting of higher officers held on 27-3-1984 in Governor House, Chandigarh with Shri Surinder Nath, IPS, Advisor to the Governor of Punjab, in which the following decisions were taken:

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(i) That it will not be possible to provide police guard to banks unless the banks were willing to pay for the same and additional force could be arranged on that basis, it was decided that police guards should be requisitioned by the banks for their biggest branches located at the district and sub-divisional towns. They should place the requisition with the District SSPs endorsing a copy of IG CID. In the requisition, they should clearly state that the costs of guard would be met by them. It will then be for the Police Department to get additional force sanctioned. This task should be done on a top priority. In the meantime depending upon the urgency of the need of any particular branch, the Police Department may provide from police strength for its protection.

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(ii) For all other branches guards will be provided by District SSP after selecting suitable ex-servicemen or other able-bodied persons who will

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be appointed as Special Police Officer in terms of Section 17 of the Police Act. Preference may be given to persons who may already be in possession of licensed weapons. All persons appointed as SPO for this purpose will be given a brief training for about 7 days in Police Lines in the handling of weapons taking suitable position for protection of branches. These SPOs will work under the discipline and control and as per the Police Act, they will have the same powers, privileges and protection and shall be amenable to same penalty as ordinary police personnel.”

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It can be seen from the above that a selection process was designed under which the District Senior Superintendent of Police is required to choose suitable ex-servicemen or other able-bodied persons for being appointed as Special Police Officers in terms of Section 17 of the Act. It is indicated that the persons who are already in possession of a licensed weapon are to be given priority.

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26. It is also asserted by the appellants that pursuant to the requisition by the Police Department options were called upon from ex-servicemen who were willing to be enrolled as Special Police Officer (SPOs) under Section 17 of the Police Act, 1861. [ Para 4 of the writ petition and at p. 34 of the SLP paperbook:“That the Government made a policy to enrol the exservicemen to guard the life and property of the government employees as well as government employees. All the petitioners being ex-servicemen enrolled themselves in the employment exchange. The Police Department sent the intimation to the employment exchange and thereafter all the exservicemen who were enrolled with the employment exchange were called upon and got their option to be enrolled in as Special Police Officer (SPOs) under Section 17 of the Police Act, 1861 (hereinafter called as the SPOs). Those persons who were having armed licence were enrolled as SPOs and this enrolment was made by the Superintendent of Police, Amritsar.”]

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27. Such a procedure making recruitments through the employment exchanges was held to be consistent with the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by this Court in Union of India v. N. Hargopal [(1987) 3 SCC 308 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 227 : (1987) 4 ATC 51:“9. … We, therefore, consider that insistence on recruitment through employment exchanges advances rather than restricts the rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The submission that employment exchanges do not reach everywhere applies equally to whatever method of advertising vacancies is adopted. Advertisement in the daily press, for example, is also equally ineffective as it does not reach everyone desiring employment.”] .

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28. The abovementioned process clearly indicates it is not a case where persons like the appellants were arbitrarily chosen to the exclusion of other eligible candidates. It required all able-bodied persons to be considered by the SSP who was charged with the responsibility of selecting suitable candidates.

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29. Such a process of selection is sanctioned by law under Section 17 of the Act. Viewed in the context of the situation prevailing at that point of time in the State of Punjab, such a process cannot be said to be irrational. The need was to obtain the services of persons who had some experience and training in handling an extraordinary situation of dealing with armed miscreants.

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30. It can also be noticed from the written statement of the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Welfare & Litigation) that preference was given to persons who were in possession of licensed weapons. The recruitment of the appellants and other similarly situated persons was made in the background of terrorism prevailing in the State of Punjab at that time as acknowledged in the order dated 23-4-2002 of the SSP. The procedure which is followed during the normal times of making recruitment by inviting applications and scrutinising the same to identify

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the suitable candidates would itself take considerable time. Even after such a selection the selected candidates are required to be provided with necessary arms and also be trained in the use of such arms. All this process is certainly time-consuming. The requirement of the State was to take swift action in an extraordinary situation.

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31. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the process of selection adopted in identifying the appellants herein cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary in the sense that it was devised to eliminate other eligible candidates. It may be worthwhile to note that in Umadevi (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , this Court was dealing with appointments made without following any rational procedure in the lower rungs of various services of the Union and the States.

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37. We are of the opinion that neither the Government of Punjab nor these public sector banks can continue such a practice consistent with their obligation to function in accordance with the Constitution. Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] judgment cannot become a licence for exploitation by the State and its instrumentalities.

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38. For all the abovementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to be absorbed in the services of the State. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The judgments under appeal are set aside.

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39. We direct the State of Punjab to regularise the services of the appellants by creating necessary posts within a period of three months from today. Upon such regularisation, the appellants would be entitled to all the benefits of services attached to the post which are similar in nature already in the cadre of the police services of the State. We are of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to the costs throughout. In the circumstances, we quantify the costs to Rs 10,000 to be paid to each of the appellants.”

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The admitted fact herein is that the writ petitioners have been appointed to the post of V.C. Operator and Sweeper respectively and thereafter terminated from service vide letter no. 3825 dated 01.12.2016, meaning thereby, they were in service of the period which is less than the period of 10 years.

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So far as the claim of the writ petitioners to count the period of 10 years of service after the termination since they have been allowed to work is concerned, this Court is of the view that such continuation cannot be said to be proper reason being that once the petitioners have been terminated from service that too by the order passed by the departmental authority at the departmental level and even though the local authority has been punished with the punishment of censure allowing the petitioners to continue in service cannot be considered for the purpose of consideration for the purpose of consideration of the issue of regularization by adding the aforesaid period to count the continuation period of 10 years.

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So far as the ground taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the writ petitioners have been terminated only to break the chain is concerned, this Court is of the view that once the order of termination has been passed by the authority above than the local authority who have allowed the petitioners to continue in service, it is not available to the petitioners to take the ground that to break the chain, the order of termination has been passed.

¶154

Further, while considering the entry of these petitioners by the local authority without any policy decision to that regard or any cognizance by the State Government, the departmental proceeding had already been initiated against them, hence, it cannot be said that only to break the chain, the order of termination has been passed.

¶155

That could have been considered, if further continuation of service would have been made by the authority at the departmental level but that is not the case herein.

¶156

Even if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners will be accepted, then, there will be anomalous situation and everything will come at the hand of the local authority.

¶157

This Court, in view of the aforesaid fact, is of the view that the case of the writ petitioners is not coming under the fold of the judgment rendered in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Uma Devi (3) (supra) or under the fold of Jaggo vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) upon which the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon.

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This Court in view of the entirety of facts and circumstances and based upon the reasons as referred hereinabove, is of the view that the both the writ petitions lack merit and as such, the same stand dismissed.

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