Meenakshi Sinha Vs State of Jharkhand

¶1

2026: JHHC: 2652

¶2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

¶3

S.A. No. 115 of 2025

¶4

Meenakshi Sinha, aged about 52 years, wife of Late Manoj Kumar Sinha

¶5

Kunal Sinha, aged about 31 years, son of Late Manoj Kumar Sinha

¶6

Nidhi Sinha, aged about 27 years, daughter of Late Manoj Kumar Sinha All residents of Laxmi Niwas, Ranchi-Patna Road, New Loyala Centre, P.O. Hazaribag, P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribag (Jharkhand)

¶7

State of Jharkhand

¶8

Deputy Commissioner, Collectorate, Hazaribag, P.O. Hazaribag, P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribag.

¶9

Khas Mahal Officer, Collectorate, Hazaribag, P.O. Hazaribag, P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribag.

¶10

Arjun Lal, son of Hari Prakash Lal, resident of Rajendra Path, Matwari, P.O. Hazaribag, P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribag (Jharkhand)

¶11

Mahabir Tiwari, son of Shivdut Tiwari, resident of Village Sarley, Dipugarha, P.O. Hazaribag, P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribag.

¶12

Raghwendra Prasad Singh, son of Laxman Singh, resident of Village Koghati, P.O. Hazaribag, P.S. Sadar, District Hazaribag (Jharkhand)

¶13

… … Defendants/Respondents/Respondents

¶14

CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

¶15

--For the Appellants : Mr. Amar Kumar Sinha, Advocate For the Respondents : ---

¶16

12/2^nd February 2026

¶17

1. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants.

¶18

2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 30.04.2025 (decree signed on 09.05.2025) passed by the learned District Judge-II, Hazaribag dismissing the Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2023 and confirming the judgment dated 26.06.2023 (decree signed on 07.07.2023) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division)-III, Hazaribag in Title Suit No. 92 of 2016.

¶19

1

¶20

2026: JHHC: 2652

¶21

3. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the plaintiffs have lost in both the courts and accordingly, they are the appellants before this Court.

¶22

4. The learned counsel submits that the learned courts have recorded that there was no readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiffs, but this aspect of the matter has not been property considered and therefore a substantial question of law be framed. No other point has been argued for the purposes of framing substantial question of law.

¶23

5. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellants, this Court finds that the learned 1^st appellate court has recorded a clear finding that there was inordinate delay of more than 8 years after execution of the agreement of sale dated 25.02.2008 and after more than 3 years of renewal of lease deed in favor of original owner on 16.05.2013. The materials placed on record have been discussed to come to a finding that there was no readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiffs with respect to the plea seeking specific performance of contract. The relevant extract of the findings recorded by the learned 1^st appellate court is quoted as under:-

¶24

“ 26. Perusal of above-mentioned legal notice dated 23.11.2013 Ext.2, in the present case shows that the factum of renewal of lease deed, quoted as prerequisite for execution of Sale Deed in the agreement dated 25.02.2008 was well within the knowledge of the plaintiff in the year 2013 itself.

¶25

It is worthwhile to mention here that vide said legal notice the defendants were called upon to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within a fortnight from the date of receipt of said notice, failing which the plaintiff was to, inter-alia, file the Civil Suit for redressal of his grievance.

¶26

27. However, the plaintiff instead of filing the Civil Suit despite having the valid cause with him to do so as per the contents of the legal notice dated 23.11.2013 kept mum for almost 2 years and 3 months, i.e. when he got issued a second legal notice to the defendants on 08.2.2016. Still further the

¶27

2

¶28

2026: JHHC: 2652

¶29

Suit in the present case was filed after expiry of almost 4 months from the date of second legal notice.

¶30

28. As such in view of this inordinate delay of more than 8 years after execution of the Agreement to Sale dated 25.02.2008; and after more than three years of renewal of lease deed in favour of original owner on 16.05.2013, covenanted as prerequisite to execution of sale deed in the Agreement to Sell; and after expiry of almost 2½ years from the issuance of first legal notice to defendants, in filing of the suit speaks volumes about his Bonafide and willingness to perform his part of the agreement.

¶31

29. The above-mentioned period of delay cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed as reasonable period with the plaintiff to file the suit. As such the time consumed by the plaintiff to perform his part of the agreement, clearly shows his lackadaisical and indifferent attitude towards prosecution of his interest in the matter. It is settled law that granting decree for specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property is not automatic. It is one of discretion to be exercised on sound principles of equity based upon justice, good conscience and fairness to both the parties.

¶32

30. In view of my above findings I am of the considered opinion that the discretion vested in Court while adjudicating the aspect of specific performance in a contract for sale of immovable property, has well been exercised by the learned trial court in the present case. The impugned judgment and decree based upon sound legal principles are hereby affirmed. As such, the present appeal is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Since the main appeal is dismissed, all the pending successive applications filed by the appellants seeking temporary injunction are rendered infructuous accordingly. Parties to bear their own costs. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. Trial court's record along with a copy of this judgment be returned to the court concerned through its Presiding Officer for consignment forthwith. Appeal file be consigned to the record room after due compliance.”

¶33

6. There are concurrent findings on the point of readiness and willingness after appreciating the materials on record. No perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidences on record as such has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants.

¶34

3

¶35

2026: JHHC: 2652

¶36

7. This Court finds no reason to frame any substantial question of law on the point as argued by the learned counsel for the appellants.

¶37

8. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed .

¶38

9. Pending I.A., if any, is closed.

¶39

10. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the court concerned