The State of Jharkhand Vs Santosh Kumar Singh

Santosh Kumar Singh, son of Late Dr. Basant Kumar Singh, resident of Village & P.O.- Jai Prakash Nagar (Sitabdiara), P.S.Bariya, District- Balia (U.P.), presently residing at Flat No. B/4, Roopmati Apartment, North Office Para, Doranda, P.O. & P.S.Doranda, District- Ranchi …. … Respondent

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CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR

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--- For the Appellants : Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, A.C. to A.A.G.-III For the Respondent : Mr. Raj Vardhan, Advocate --- Reserved on 28.01.2026 Pronounced on 03.02.2026 Per : Rajesh Shankar, J. :

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1. The present appeal has been preferred against the order/judgment

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dated 18.01.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 2686 of 2016 whereby the notification dated 23.08.2013 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Department of Road Construction, Government of Jharkhand has been quashed/set aside with an observation that the writ petitioner (the respondent herein) will be entitled to all consequential benefits.

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2. Since the present appeal is barred by limitation, it is appropriate to first consider the application filed on behalf of the appellants seeking condonation of delay.

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I.A. No. 1063 of 2025

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3. The present interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of the appellants/applicants seeking condonation of delay of 289 days in filing the present appeal.

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4. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the information with regard to passing of the impugned judgment dated 18.01.2024 came to the knowledge of the concerned department on 12.06.2024. The file pertaining to the present case was thereafter put up by the Administration Officer before the Under Secretary on 23.09.2024 for further necessary action. The Under Secretary, then made his endorsement on 01.10.2024 to take legal opinion in the matter.

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5. It is also submitted that the Principal Secretary of the department accorded his approval on the said endorsement on 04.10.2024 and the file was sent to the Department of Law, Government of Jharkhand which was then marked to the office of the Advocate General on 07.10.2024.

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6. Learned counsel for the applicants further submits that the file pertaining to the present appeal was received by the office of the Advocate General on 18.10.2024 and on the same date, the opinion was given to file the appeal. Accordingly, the file was sent back to the Department of Road Construction, Government of Jharkhand. On 21.10.2024, the file was put up for sending the matter to the retainer for preparation of grounds of appeal. The retainer thereafter prepared the grounds of appeal and submitted

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it to the department which was put up for approval vide notesheet dated 23.10.2024. After according approval vide notesheet dated 28.10.2204, the file was sent to the Law Officer for filing the appeal.

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7. It is also submitted that the file was thereafter forwarded to the concerned Law Officer to prepare the memo of appeal against the impugned judgment dated 18.01.2024. Though the appeal was drafted by the Law Officer, however the pleadings of the writ proceeding were required. After making the entire writ court proceedings available to the concerned Law Officer, the appeal was filed on 12.11.2024.

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8. It is thus contended by the learned counsel for the applicants that though considerable delay occurred in filing the present appeal, however the same cannot be said to be inordinate as some time was consumed at different levels in the concerned department. Since the said delay in filing the present appeal is primarily attributed to the procedural formalities, the same may be viewed leniently and the present application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal may be allowed.

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9. On the contrary, learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the applicants by submitting that no cogent ground has been made out in the present application seeking condonation of delay. The writ petitioner, who has superannuated from service way back on 31.08.2016, is made to suffer due to lethargic attitude of the authorities of the State of Jharkhand as he has not yet been able

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to obtain the fruits of the impugned judgment 18.01.2024.

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10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the content of the present interlocutory application.

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11. Though the impugned judgment was passed by the learned writ court on 18.01.2024, it has been averred by the applicants in the present interlocutory application that the concerned department came to know about the said judgment on 12.06.2024. Thus, the period of about 05 months consumed between the said dates remains unexplained in the interlocutory application.

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12. It has further been averred in the present application that the file was put up by the Administrative Officer before the Under Secretary of the concerned department on 23.09.2024 for further action. It is thus evident that the delay of about more than three months caused after 12.06.2024 has also not been explained.

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13. The further averments made in the present interlocutory application would clearly suggest that the file concerning the present case kept on hopping in the department from one desk to another which cannot be said to be sufficient cause so as to condone the delay. The applicants, rather on superficial and frivolous grounds, have sought the condonation of delay in filing the instant appeal.

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14. The applicants being the State and its officers were well aware of the time period for filing the appeal challenging the order of the writ court which is only 30 days, however the laxity on their part is apparent particularly as the reason for delay of about 05 months occurring between 18.01.2024 and 12.06.2024 as well as for about

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more than three months consumed between 12.06.2024 and

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29.03.2024 remains completely absent.

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15. So far as the issue of consideration of an application filed on behalf of the State seeking condonation of delay is concerned, it seems appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 , wherein it has been held as under:

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“25. We have already extracted the reasons as

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mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or

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the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

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27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

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28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.”

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16. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji

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Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: -

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“25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the

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fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

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27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

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35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.”

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17. In a recent judgment rendered in the case of Shivamma (dead)

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by LRs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Others , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

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“261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the Statemachinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

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262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law. 263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is

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to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.”

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18. It is thus well settled that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being available and used. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the government and its instrumentalities.

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19. The appellants/applicants have not been able to carve out sufficient cause so as to condone the delay of 289 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal, which otherwise in our view is inordinate.

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20. We are also mindful of the fact that the writ petitioner/respondent herein has superannuated from service on 31.08.2016 itself and has certainly been made to suffer due to lethargic and casual attitude of the appellants/applicants in filing the present appeal after inordinate delay of 289 days.

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21. The writ petitioner/respondent is not supposed to wait for indefinite period to obtain the fruit of the order passed by the writ court at the whims and fancies of the state authorities i.e., the

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appellants/applicants herein, to file an appeal as per their own convenience. If such an attitude of the state authorities is taken lightly, the same will certainly cause serious prejudice to the writ petitioner who is a senior citizen and will amount to granting undeserving latitude to them in deliberately delaying filing of the appeal without setting out any cogent explanation.

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22. Under the aforesaid circumstance, we are of the view that the explanation offered by the appellants/applicants in the present application is not sufficient to condone an inordinate delay of 289 days in preferring the present appeal.

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23. Accordingly, the present interlocutory application is dismissed.

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24. Consequently, the L.P.A. is also dismissed.

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25. pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.

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(Rajesh Shankar, J.)

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February 03, 2026 Ritesh/A.F.R. Uploaded on 03.02.2026

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