State of Jharkhand through Its Chief Secretary Vs Baldeo Singh

For the Appellants: Mr. Aditya Kumar, A.C to Sr. S.C-I For Respondent Nos.1-2: Ms. Khalida Haya Rashmi, Advocate For Respondent No.3: Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate

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Order No. 09

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Dated: 03.02.2026

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1. The present appeal has been preferred against the order/judgment dated 29.08.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge of this court in W.P.(S) No. 5067 of 2018 whereby the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners (respondent Nos. 1 & 2 herein) has been disposed of by setting aside the order dated 05.09.2018 passed by the Director, Employment and Training, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand and they have been held entitled for all the benefits in view of grant of second MACP in the year 2013.

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2. Since the present appeal is barred by limitation, it is appropriate to first consider the application filed on behalf of the appellants seeking condonation of delay.

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I.A. No. 6529 of 2025

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3. The present interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of the

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appellants/applicants seeking condonation of delay of 328 days in filing the present appeal. However, as per the Registry, the delay is of 339 days.

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4. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellant department came to know about the impugned judgment in its review meeting held on 13.03.2024 for verification of pay fixation of the writ petitioners and subsequent thereto, the file was put before the establishment section of the department on 14.03.2024 for taking decision to file Letters Patent Appeal in the present matter. Thereafter, the file was endorsed to the Assistant Director, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand on 19.03.2024 for taking high level decision regarding filing of Letters Patent Appeal.

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5. It is further submitted that on 18.04.2024, the file was endorsed to the Director, Employment and Training, Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand with a proposal to forward the file to the learned Advocate General, through the Secretary of the department for his opinion regarding possibility of filing of Letters Patent Appeal. The file was then put up before the Secretary of the department for the said purpose and thereafter on the same day, the Secretary, endorsed the file to the learned Advocate General for obtaining his opinion with respect to filing of appeal in the present case.

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6. It is contended that on 24.04.2024, the learned Advocate General advised the department to file appeal, whereafter the file was endorsed to the Deputy Director for obtaining approval to

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endorse the file to the concerned lawyer for preparing statement of facts. The file was then endorsed to the Director on 06.05.2024.

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7. It is also submitted that the grounds of appeal were prepared on 15.05.2024 and thereafter the file was placed before the Deputy Director on 15.05.2024 for obtaining approval of Departmental Secretary, pursuant to which the file was placed before the Director/Secretary on 16.05.2024 for the said purpose and also to accord approval for authorizing a competent officer to file Letters Patent Appeal.

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8. It is argued that on 17.05.2024, the department authorised a competent authority for filing of memo of appeal challenging the order dated 29.08.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No. 5067 of 2018. Thereafter, series of discussions were held in the appellant department with respect to the implication of the impugned judgment. Finally, on getting approval from the department, the appeal was filed on 21.08.2024.

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9. It is further argued that the delay in filing the appeal has occasioned due to the reasons beyond the control of the appellants which is neither intentional nor deliberate and as such the same may be condoned.

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10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the writ petitioners/respondent Nos. 1 & 2 vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the applicants by submitting that no cogent ground has been made out in the present application seeking condonation of delay. It is submitted that the plea regarding the movement of files from one table to another within the department cannot constitute

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sufficient cause seeking condonation of an inordinate delay of 339 days. The appellants, according to their own statement, have taken one month merely for moving the file from Assistant Director to the Director which remains completely unexplained.

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11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the contents of the present interlocutory application.

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12. Though the appellants have claimed that they came to know about the impugned judgment only on 13.03.2024, however, on bare perusal of the impugned judgment, it would appear that the learned counsel for the State did not only appear, but was also duly heard in the matter. Thus, the said reason assigned by the appellants is bound to be discarded. Surprisingly, the requisition for obtaining the certified copy of the impugned judgment was filed as late as on 01.8.2024 i.e. after more than 11 months from the date of passing of the impugned judgment which evidently suggests that the appellants were too lethargic and casual in filing the appeal in time.

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13. The averments made in the present interlocutory application clearly indicates that the file concerning the present case kept on moving in the department from one table to another for several months which cannot be said to be a sufficient cause so as to condone the delay. The applicants, rather on superficial and frivolous grounds, have sought the condonation of considerable delay in filing the instant appeal.

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14. The applicants being the State and its officers are expected to be aware of the limitation period for filing appeal seeking challenge to the order of the writ court which is only 30 days, however, the

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lethargy on their part is apparent, as they had initiated the process for filing the appeal after more than six months from the date of passing of the impugned judgment.

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15. So far as the issue of consideration of an application filed on behalf of the State seeking condonation of delay is concerned, it seems appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 , wherein it has been held as under:

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“25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day

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one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

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28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.”

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16. The aforesaid judgment has been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme

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Court in several subsequent cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) (P) Ltd. reported in (2022) 3 SCC 159 , Union of India vs. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others reported in (2021) 11 SCC 557 , State of Uttar Pradesh & Others Vs. Sabha Narain & Others reported in (2022) 9 SCC 266 and Union of India & Others Vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited & Another reported in (2022) 9 SCC 263 .

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17. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji

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Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR reported in 2024 SCC OnLine

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SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

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“25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

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26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

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27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public

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policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.”

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18. In a recent judgment rendered in the case of Shivamma (dead)

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by LRs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:

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“261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the Statemachinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

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262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a

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private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.

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263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice. 264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.”

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19. In the case of The State of Jharkhand & Others Vs. Md. Noor

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Hassan ( SLP (C) No. 27014 of 2024), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if a case of wilful negligence, lethargy or incompetence and ignorance or inaction of the public authorities causing delay in approaching the appellate judicial forum is found, the same cannot be said to be fulfilling the threshold of “sufficient cause” so as to condone the delay.

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20. It is well settled law that administrative lethargy and laxity can never be a sufficient ground to condone an inordinate delay. Moreover, delay does not deserve to be condoned on frivolous and superficial

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grounds, rather there has to be proper and sufficient cause on the part of the State authorities explaining that they have acted in a bonafide manner and have remained vigilant throughout. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone including the government and its instrumentalities. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being available and used.

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21. The appellants/applicants have not been able to set out sufficient cause so as to condone the considerable delay of 339 days in filing the present Letters Patent Appeal, which in our view, is otherwise inordinate. Further, the cause shown by the appellants seeking condonation of the said delay does not fulfill the threshold of “sufficient cause”.

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22. We are also conscious of the fact that vide impugned judgment dated 29.08.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No. 5067 of 2018, the writ petitioners have been held entitled to all the benefits in view of grant of second MACP in the year 2013 and as such they have certainly been made to suffer on account of lethargic and casual attitude of the appellants/applicants in filing the present appeal after inordinate delay of 339 days.

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23. The writ petitioners/respondent Nos. 1 & 2 are not supposed to wait for indefinite period to obtain the fruit of the order passed by the Writ Court at the whims and fancies of the State authorities i.e. the appellants/applicants herein to file an appeal as per their own convenience. If such an attitude of the State authorities is taken

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lightly, it will certainly cause serious prejudice to the writ petitioners and will amount to granting undeserving latitude to the State authorities in deliberately delaying filing of the appeal without setting out any cogent explanation.

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24. Under the aforesaid circumstance, we are of the view that the explanation offered by the appellants/applicants in the present application is not sufficient to condone an inordinate delay of 339 days in preferring the present appeal.

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25. Accordingly, the present interlocutory application is dismissed.

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26. Consequently, the present L.P.A. is also dismissed.

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27. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.

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(RAJESH SHANKAR, J.)

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03.02.2026 Satish

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