Bilasini Tudu Vs State of Jharkhand

(2026:JHHC:4591)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr.M.P. No. 2303 of 2025

Bilasini Tudu, aged about 37 years, daughter of Karan Chandra Tudu, resident of Village-Raghunathpur, P.O.-Bardikanpur, P.S.-Chakulia, Dist.-East Singhbhum

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.... Petitioner

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Versus

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The State of Jharkhand

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…. Opp. Party

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P R E S E N T

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HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

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….. For the Petitioner : Mr. Gautam Kumar, Advocate : Mr. Sanjay Kr. Sinha, Advocate : Ms. Savita Kumari, Advocate For the State : Mr. Vishwanath Roy, Spl. P.P.

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By the Court:-

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Heard the parties.

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This criminal miscellaneous petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of B.N.S.S., 2023 with the prayer to quash the FIR as well as the entire criminal proceeding arising out of Hiranpur P.S. Case No. 64 of 2025 registered for the offences punishable under Section 292, 299 and 302 of B.N.S., 2023 and under Section 67 of Information Technology Act, 2000.

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The allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner in her channel through the social media is abusing Lord Jesus in filthy language by which the religious sentiments of the informant has been hurt and the harmony between two religions i.e. the

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Christians and the followers of Sarna religion (Hindu Religion) is being disturbed.

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On the basis of the written report submitted by the informant, police registered Hiranpur P.S. Case No. 64 of 2025 for the offences as already indicated above and took up investigation of the case. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the investigation of the case is still going on and the charge sheet has not yet been submitted.

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It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner by relying upon the Judgement of this Court in the case of Mukesh Kumar Shukla @ Mukesh @ Pinku Shukla vs. The State of Jharkhand & Anr. reported in [2024 (3) East Cr C 108 (Jhr)] wherein, this Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mahendra Singh Dhoni vs.

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Yerraguntla Shyamsundar & Another reported in (2017) 7 SCC 760 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had the occasion to consider the scope and impact of Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code which corresponds to Section 299 of B.N.S. and it was observed that Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code does

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not stipulate everything to be penalised and any and every act which tantamount to insult or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens is not be penalised. It penalises only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or religious belief of a class of citizens which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of

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outraging the religious feelings of that class of citizens. Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come within the purview of Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code.

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It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in that case, this Court considered the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ramji Lal Modi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1957 SC 620 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has clarified that the provisions of Section 295-A of the Indian Penal Code only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion, when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of a particular class of citizen. Emphasis has been laid on the calculated tendency of the said aggravated form of insult and also to disrupt the public order to invite the penal consequences.

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It is then submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there being no allegation against the petitioner that the petitioner with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of a class of citizens of India, has done anything not there is any allegation that the posting in this social media made by the informant has been seen by anyone else than the informant or anyone else’s religious feeling has been hurt, hence, even if the entire allegation made against the petitioner are considered to be

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true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 299 of B.N.S. is not made out. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the absence of any allegation of public nuisance which causes any injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right, the offence punishable under Section 292 of B.N.S. is not made out. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the absence of any allegation that the petitioner published or transmitted or cause to be published or transmitted in the electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, the offence punishable under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is not made out. It is then submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that so far as the offence punishable under Section 302 of B.N.S., 2023 is concerned, the same is a non-cognizable offence so, if no cognizable offence is made out against the petitioner, the FIR in respect of only non-cognizable offence is not sustainable in law. Hence, it is submitted that the prayer as made in this criminal miscellaneous petition be allowed.

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The learned Spl. P.P. on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer and submits that the allegation made in the FIR is sufficient to constitute each of the offence in respect of which the

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FIR has been registered. Hence, it is submitted that this criminal miscellaneous petition being without any merit be dismissed.

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Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to refer to Section 270 of B.N.S., 2023 which reads as under:-

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“270. Public nuisance .—A person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right but a common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or advantage.”

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Defines public nuisance. The plain reading of the same makes it abundantly clear that in order to constitute public nuisance, the accused must do any act or is guilty of an illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right.

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Now coming to the facts of the case, there is no allegation in the FIR of the informant of causing any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right and in the absence of this

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essential ingredient, the offence punishable under Section 292 of B.N.S., 2023 is not made out.

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So far as the offence punishable under Section 299 of B.N.S. is concerned, the essential ingredient to constitute the said offence is that the petitioner insulted or attempted to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of any class of persons of India deliberately, maliciously and intentionally in order to outrage the religious feelings of that class of citizens. Now, coming to the facts of the case there is no allegation against the petitioner that she did anything deliberately, maliciously and intentionally in order to outrage the religious feelings of a class of citizens. There is no allegation that anyone else than the informant has seen the posting made in social media. There is no allegation that the religious feelings of anyone else other than the informant has been outraged. Thus, in the absence of the essential ingredient that is the petitioner committed the alleged act deliberately, maliciously and intentionally to outrage the religious feelings of any class of citizens; to constitute the offence punishable under Section 299 of B.N.S., 2023, this Court is of the considered that even if the entire allegation made against the petitioner are considered to be true in its entirety, still, the offence punishable under Section 299 of the B.N.S., 2023 is not made out.

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So far as the offence punishable under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is concerned, the same envisages punishment for publication or transmission etc. of any

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material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.

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Now coming to the facts of the case, there is no allegation that the material published by the petitioner was lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the offence punishable under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is not made out to even if the entire allegation made in the First Information Report is considered to be true in their entirety.

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Now coming to the offence punishable under Section 302 of B.N.S. is concerned, the same is a non-cognizable offence. Since, no cognizable offence is made out against the petitioner as already discussed above, the FIR in respect of only non-cognizable offence is not sustainable is law, therefore, this Court is of the considered view that continuation of this FIR against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of the law and this is a fit case where the FIR as well as the entire criminal proceeding arising out of Hiranpur P.S. Case No. 64 of 2025 be quashed and set aside qua the petitioner.

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Accordingly, the FIR as well as the entire criminal proceeding arising out of Hiranpur P.S. Case No. 64 of 2025 is quashed and set aside qua the petitioner.

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In the result, this criminal miscellaneous petition is allowed.

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(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.)

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High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated the 17^th February, 2026 AFR/Sonu-Gunjan/-

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Uploaded on 20/02/2026

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Cr.M.P. No.2303 of 2025

Bilasini Tudu v. State of Jharkhand

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Bilasini Tudu v. State of Jharkhand

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