M/S Maa Vashwana Devi Stone Works through Its Partners Pankaj Kr Singh Son of Sri Rameshwar Singh Vs State of Jharkhand And Ors.

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No.2425 of 2010

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1. M/S. Maa Vashwana Devi Stone Works through its Partners “Pankaj Kumar Singh, S/o. Sri Rameshwar Singh, R/o. Jhumri Tilaiya, P.O. & P.S. Tilaiya, District-Koderma.

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2. Ramdeo Modi, S/o. Sri Babulal Modi, R/o. Village-Moriyawan, Ward No.9, Jhumri Tilaiya, P.O. & P.S. Tilaiya, District-Koderma.

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Petitioners

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Versus

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1. The State of Jharkhand.

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2. The Mines Commissioner, Department of Mines & Geology at Nepal House, Doranda, Ranchi.

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3. The Deputy Commissioner, Koderma.

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4. The District Mining Officer, Koderma.

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5. Ram Chandra Mehta, S/o. Sri Chhotelal Mehta, R/o. VillageBigha, P.S. Markachho, District-Koderma.

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6. Amitabh Kumar, S/o. Late Krishna Kumar, R/o. Koderma, P.S. Koderma, District-Koderma. .... .... Respondents

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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI ------ For the Petitioners : Mr. Kalyan Roy, Advocate Mr. Sidhartha Roy, Advocate For the State : Mr. Baibhaw Gahlaut, AC to AAG-V ------

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C.A.V. on 18.08.2025 Pronounced on 04/09/2025

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Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

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Prayer

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1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

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seeking therein for the following reliefs: -

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“For issuance of an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions for quashing the order dated 19.4.2010 passed by the Mines Commissioner, Jharkhand, Ranchi (Respondent no. 2) in Revision Case No. 48/2010 in terms

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of which the concerned respondent was pleased to setaside the order of Deputy Commissioner, Koderma dated 3.2.2010 whereby and whereunder the petitioner's application for grant of Mining lease of Stone was allowed and further Deputy Commissioner, Koderma (Respondent no. 3) has directed to cancel the lease executed in favour of the petitioner and to execute the same with respondent nos. 5 & 6.

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For quashing of the order dated 08.05.2010 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma, communicated to the petitioner by the Assistant Mining Officer Koderma vide letter No. 635/M, Dated 13.05.2010 by which lease of the petitioner has been cancelled.

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And/Or

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For issuance of any other appropriate writ(s)/order(s)/direction(s) as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper in view of the facts and circumstances of the case for doing conscionable justice to the petitioner.”

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Factual Matrix

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2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, requires to be enumerated, which read as under: -

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(i) It is the case of the writ petitioner that in respect to plot no.5688 measuring an area of 2.00 acres of land situated under Mouza-Domchanch within the District of Koderma, an application for grant of fresh Mining Lease for stone was filed by the petitioners along with all the requisites as provided under the statutory rules and the said application was filed on 31.07.2008 and an acknowledgement of the same was also granted to the petitioner in term “B” on 01.08.2008.

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(ii) The application of the petitioners got time barred on

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account of delay on the part of the concerned respondents against which, they preferred a revision case bearing No.159 of 2008 before the respondent no.2 on 23.12.2008.

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(iii) Before filing of the application by the petitioner, the respondent no.5 along with respondent no.6 both have applied for grant of Mining lease over same area i.e area of 2 acres of land in Mouza Domchanch, District Koderma, on 20.12.2007 from the Forest Department and thereafter, their lease application was deemed rejected on 17.04.2008 due to nonfulfillment of other condition and in this regard order has been passes on 06.05.2008 which was conveyed to them on 09.05.2008.

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(iv) After the said rejection, the respondent did not choose to prefer a revision within 75 days of the said order and thus, the order dated 06.05.2008 passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Koderma became conclusive.

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(v) After deemed rejection of the application of the writ petitioner, the respondent nos.5 and 6 again have jointly made a fresh application on 30.09.2008 for grant of stone Mining lease on the same area which is still pending before the competent authority and by concealing this fact they knowingly challenged earlier rejection order with a sole intention to show themselves in continuity as a first applicant. Thereafter, they preferred Revision case no. 131 of 2008.

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(vi) In revision case no.131 of 2008, the respondent nos.5 and 6 have not filed any petition for condonation of delay on or before the date of hearing of this application and when it was objected thereto by the petitioners, then on 01.11.2009, limitation petition was filed by them. But the matter was remanded to the Court below along with Rev. Case No.159 of 2008.

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(vii) In the light of remand order dated 14.12.2009, notices were issued to the petitioners and respondent nos.5 and 6 to appear before him on 15.01.2010.

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(viii) Both the parties appeared and after hearing the parties at length and considering all the materials on record, the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma has passed an order on 03.02.2010 for execution of lease in favour of the petitioners by rejecting the application of the respondent nos.5 and 6.

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(ix) In terms of order dated 03.02.2010, the lease with regard to an area of 2.00 acres of land in plot no.5688(P) situated in village/mouza Domchanch under P.S. Koderma of DistrictKoderma was executed in favour of the petitioners on 18.02.2010.

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(x) Being aggrieved from the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma, the respondent nos.5 and 6 have also preferred revision application being Rev. Case Nos.25 of 2010 and 48 of 2010.

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(xi) The Mines Commissioner, considering the petitions together, vide order dated 19.04.2010 was pleased to set aside the order dated 03.02.2010 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma and consequently, allowed the revision application preferred by the respondent nos.5 and 6. (xii) Thereafter vide order dated 08.05.2010 the deputy commissioner Koderma had cancelled the lease which had been executed in favour of the writ petitioner on 18.02.2010.

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(xiii) It is the case of the writ petitioners that the orders impugned passed by the authority concerned are perverse and bad in law.

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(xiv) The said orders i.e. order dated 19.04.2010 and 08.05.2010 is the subject matter of the instant petition. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners

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3. Mr. Kalyan Roy, learned counsel for the writ petitioners has submitted that the authority concerned while passing the impugned order has not appreciated the fact in right perspective.

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4. It has been contended that the Mines Commissioner has also failed to appreciate the fact while reversing the order of Deputy Commissioner, Koderma and allowing the revision petitions of the respondent nos.5 and 6.

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5. It has been contended that the private respondent has not having requisite documents even then authority concerned has passed the order in the favour of private respondents.

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Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent-State

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6. Per Contra , Mr. Baibhaw Gahlaut, learned AC to AAG-V appearing for the respondent-State has submitted that impugned orders were passed in accordance with law by taking into consideration all aspects of the matter and particularly, taking into consideration that respondent nos.5 and 6 were first applicant with regard to the said land, as per the rule 13(2) of the JMMC Rules 2004, however, the order impugned by which lease has been executed in favour of the respondent nos.5 and 6 was for the period of 10 years and as such, the aforesaid impugned order had already lost its force in the year 2020 and as of now, as per the amendment of the year 2017 the statutory restrictions have been incorporated in the Rule, 2004, as such, the order impugned requires no interference.

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7. It has further been contended that in a case of statutory restriction having been put in the JMMC Rule 2004, there cannot be any direction by the Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the issue of lease license without taking recourse of the auction as per the mandate provided under amended Rule 9 of the JMMC Rules.

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8. Learned State Counsel has submitted that the implication of amended Rule 9 and other provision of JMMC Rule, 2004 have already been decided by this Court on 08.08.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No.3560 of 2025, wherein, it has been categorically observed that the license if renewed or extended the validity of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will remain

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there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction, as such, no positive direction can be issued.

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9. It has also been contended that so far as the force of the revision order is concerned, the same has also lost its validity sometime in the year, 2020 and even if, there will be interference with the said order passed by the revisional authority (impugned in this writ petition), no relief can be extended in favour of the writ petitioner.

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Analysis

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10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the orders impugned passed by the revisional authority.

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11. It is evident from the factual aspect that the respondent no.5 along with respondent no.6 both have applied for grant of Mining lease over an area of 2 acres of land in Mouza Domchanch, District Koderma, on 20.12.2007 from the Forest Department and thereafter, their lease application was deemed rejected on 17.04.2008 due to non-fulfillment of other condition and in this regard order has been passes on 06.05.2008 which was conveyed to them on 09.05.2008 and after the said rejection, the respondents did not choose to prefer a revision within 75 days of the said order and thus, the order dated 06.05.2008 passed by the learned Deputy Commissioner, Koderma became conclusive.

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12. Thereafter, an application for grant of fresh Mining Lease for stone was filed on 31.07.2008 by the petitioners for the same area along with all the requisites as provided under the statutory rules but the said application of the petitioners was time barred on account of delay on the part of the concerned respondents, against which, they preferred a revision case bearing No.159 of 2008 before the respondent no.2 on 23.12.2008.

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13. After deemed rejection of the application of the writ petitioners, the respondent nos.5 and 6 again have jointly made a fresh application on 30.09.2008 for grant of stone Mining lease on the same area. It has been alleged by the petitioners that by concealing this fact, respondent nos.5 and 6 knowingly challenged earlier rejection order with a sole intention to show themselves in continuity as a first applicant. Thereafter, respondent nos.5 and 6 preferred Revision Case No. 131 of 2008.

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14. It is further evident that vide order dated 14.12.2009, the matter was remanded to the Court below along with Rev. Case No.159 of 2008. In the light of remand order dated 14.12.2009, notices were issued to the petitioners and respondent nos.5 and 6 and accordingly, both the parties appeared and after hearing the parties at length and considering all the materials on record, the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma has passed an

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order on 03.02.2010 for execution of lease in favour of the petitioners by rejecting the application of the respondent nos.5 and 6. Accordingly, in terms of order dated 03.02.2010, the lease with regard to aforesaid land was executed in favour of the petitioners on 18.02.2010.

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15. Being aggrieved from the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma, the respondent nos.5 and 6 have also preferred revision application being Rev. Case Nos.25 of 2010 and 48 of 2010. The Mines Commissioner, considering the petitions together, vide order dated 19.04.2010 was pleased to set aside the order dated 03.02.2010 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma and consequently, allowed the revision application preferred by the respondent nos.5 and 6. 16. Thereafter, vide order dated 08.05.2010, the Deputy Commissioner Koderma, had cancelled the said lease and accordingly, the mining lease upon the said land was executed for 10 years in favour of the respondent nos.5 and 6.

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17. The said orders, i.e., order dated 19.04.2010 and 08.05.2010 are the subject matter of the instant petition.

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18. Thus, from the aforesaid factual aspect, it is evident that vide order dated 19.04.2010 passed by the Mines Commissioner the revision application filed by the respondent nos.5 and 6 was allowed and consequently, mining lease has been executed in their favour for subsistence period of 10 years

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which has already been completed in the year, 2020.

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19. It requires to refer herein that the Rules of 2004 has been amended and as per the amended rules, the grant of lease is being awarded by way of an auction only. For ready reference, the relevant Rules are required to be referred herein for proper consideration of the lis .

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“ 9(1) ( क ) रैयतीभूमि के 03.00 हे० क्षेत्रएवं उससेकि क्षेत्रपर पत्थर , िोरि एवं मिट्टी लघु खमिज के खिि पट्टा उपायुक्त द्वारा स्वीकृतमकयाजाएगा।

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परन्तु मक सभी सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं झारखण्ड लघु खमिज सििुदाि ( संशोधि ) मियिावली , 2019 केमियि -6( ख ) केपरन्तुिेंउल्लेखखत क्षेत्रएवंखमिज कोछोड़कर सभीरैयतीक्षेत्रपर बालू छोड़कर अन्य सभी लघु खमिज के खिि पट्टा की स्वीकृमत झारखण्डलघु खमिज िीलािी मियिावली , 2017 िें मिरूमपत प्रावधािों के अन्तगगत इलैक्टामिक िीलािी के िाध्यि से मिदेशक , खाि के द्वारा मकया जाएगा। परन्तुराज्यसरकार आवश्यकतािुसार िीलािीहेतु उपायुक्त कोभीप्रामधकृतकरसकतीहै।

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9(घ) इस अमधसूचिा के मिगगत होिे की मतमि से पूवग िें सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे क्षेत्र से अमधक के रैयती क्षेत्र पर खिि पट्टे हेतु प्राप्त आवेदि पत्र स्वतः अयोग्य हो जाएंगे ।

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9( ङ ) सरकारीक्षेत्रएवं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्रसेअमधक केरैयतीक्षेत्रपर प्राप्तवैसेआवेदि पत्र मजसिेंइस अमधसूचिा मिगगतहोिेकीमतमि से पूवगझारखण्डलघुखमिजसििुदािमियिावली , 2004 केमियि 11 अंतगगत Letter of Intent ( आशय का पत्र ) मिगगत होचुका है , उसे इस अमधसूचिा के मिगगत होिे की मतमि से 180 मदिों के अंदर पयागवरण स्वीकृमत एवंखिि योजि अमिवायगरूप सेसिमपगत करिा होगा , अन्यिाउिकाआवेदिस्वतः अस्वीकृतहोजाएगा।

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9( च ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे क्षेत्र से अमधक के रैयती क्षेत्र पर प्राप्त वैसे खिि पट्टे , जो िवीकरण अन्तगगत िे एवं

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पयागवरणीय स्वीकृमत खिि योजिा प्राप्त िहीं रहिे के कारण कालमतरोमहत हो गये हो , उिके पट्टे की अवमध पट्टा स्वीकृमत / िवीकरण की मतमि से 31 िाचग , 2022 तक के मलए अवमध मवस्ताररत िािी जाएगी , बशते मक अमधसूचिा की मतमि के पूवग खिि पट्टा के अस्वीकृमत / रद्द / व् य गत होिे का आदेश िहीं पाररत मकया गया है , परन्तु वैसे खिि पट्टे पर कोई खिि तब तक िहीं मकया जा सकेगा , जबतक मक खिि हेतु आवश्यक पयागवरणीय स्वीकृमत / वि एवं पयागवरण मवभाग की स्वीकृमत खिि योजिा स्वीकृमत प्राप्त िहीं हो जाता है। आवेदक को सभी वांमछत अिापत्ती 180 मदिों के अन्दर सिमपगत करिा होगा ।

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9(छ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अमधक के रैयती क्षेत्र पर स्वीकृत/िवीकृत खिि पट्टे की अवमध यमद उिकी स्वीकृमत/िवीकरण की अवमध 3[31 िाचग, 2022 के बाद की मतमि हो, तो उिकी अवमध उिकी स्वीकृमत/िवीकरण की अवमध तक मवमधिान्य रहेगी।

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9(12) मियि-9 (1) (घ), 9(1)(ङ), 9(1)(च), 9 (1) (छ) तिा 9 (10) पूवग से स्वीकृत/आवमदत लघु खमिज के 5.00 हेक्टेयर क्षेत्र से कि क्षेत्र पर भी लागू होंगें। “

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20. It is evident that there has been an amendment in the Rules and by virtue of said amendment, under the provisions of Rule 9( क ) under the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules,

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2004, lease for mining purpose can only be granted on holding a proper auction.

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21. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9( च ) that in any

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case, ever after renewal of the lease, initially, the same is not to be extended beyond the period of 31.03.2020 by virtue of amendment, the period has been extended upto the period of

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31.03.2022. The specific stipulation has been made that even if the license has been renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force of the lease will be upto 31.03.2022.

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22. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9(छ) as referred above that the license if renewed or extended the validity of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction.

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23. It is evident from perusal of Rule 9( ङ ), of Jharkhand Minor

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Mineral Concession Rules wherein it has been stipulated that within 180 days from the issuance of notification, the Environmental Clearance has to be mandatorily produced and if the same is not produced, the letter of intent/application would be deemed to have been rejected.

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24. Further, there is a provision under Rule 9( ङ ) which was added by way of amendment dated 28.09.2020 and as per the said provision, in case, where due to delay in granting Environmental Clearance beyond 180 days, which is not attributable to a lessee, and the lease agreement was not approved, in those cases the Revisional Authority was given power to decide the matter on merits.

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25. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (12) as quoted

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and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9 (1) ( घ ),

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9(1)( ङ ), 9(1)( च ), 9 (1) ( छ ) and 9 (10) will be applicable even if

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the area of land is less than 5 hectares.

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26. This Court since has already discussed and referred hereinabove the applicability of amendment incorporated under rule of Rule 2004, is of the view that merely on the basis of pending application or otherwise also on any reason whatsoever, there cannot be any positive direction for issuance of lease license on or after 31.02.2022, particularly, in view of rule 9 ( क ) of Rules, 2004, whereby, the lease for mining purpose can only be granted on holding a proper auction.

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27. The matter would have been different if the lease license granted in favour of the private respondent nos.5 and 6, would have been valid after 31.03.2022, then, the legality of the impugned order passed by the quasi-judicial functionary, would have been taken into consideration on the pretext that if the same has been found to be illegal, then for the subsisting period, the petitioners would have a right to be a licensee and in consequence thereof, a direction would have been issued by the competent authority of the State Government for issuance of lease license in favour of the writ petitioner but as has been admitted by the writ petitioners that even the lease license of the private respondents has lost its forces sometime in the year, 2020, therefore, no relief can be granted in favour of the writ petitioner in view of the amended rule 2004.

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28. It needs to refer herein that the implications of the said rule has already been dealt by this Court in the writ petition being W.P. (C) No.3560 of 2025 wherein it has been categorically observed that the license if renewed or extended the validity of which is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will remain there upto the period of lease but there cannot be any extension, thereafter, since as per the mandate of the provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way of auction, for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs, are being quoted as

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under:

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“43. The factual aspect therefore is not in dispute that the application for renewal has been made for extension of license on or after 31.03.2022. Such application has been filed on the pretext of statutory restriction of expiry of the lease after 31.03.2022 even if, the renewal has been granted, the aforesaid statutory restriction has been taken into consideration by the quasi-judicial authority in rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner.

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44. The argument has been advanced by taking aid of Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules but as has been referred that the Rule 23 of the JMMC Rules lays down the procedure for making application for the purpose of renewal in a case where the application is to be filed under Rule 9( ङ ) of the JMMC Rules and once the application is being filed, then, the lease is to be renewed either by way of renewal or extension but in no case, it is beyond the period of 31.03.2022 in view of the provision of Rule 9( च ) .”

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29. Further, it requires to refer herein that the petitioners can have a

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case if the right has been accrued in their favour and then in the aforesaid circumstances, the amended provision will not be a

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rider.

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30. It needs to refer herein that the protection is to be given to a person concerned only where the right will be said to be vested on the principle of accrued right. It requires to refer the definition/meaning of “vested/accrued right”.

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31. Rights are ‘vested’ when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute vested rights.

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32. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at page1397, the word ‘vested’ is defined as a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right, vested interest.

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33. The word ‘vested’ is normally used where an immediate fixed right in present or future enjoyment in respect of a property is created. With the long usage the said word ‘vest’ has also acquired a meaning as “an absolute or indefeasible right”. It had a ‘legitimate’ or “settled expectation” to obtain right to enjoy the property etc. Such “settled expectation” can be rendered impossible of fulfilment due to change in law by the legislature. Besides this, such a “settled expectation” or the so-called “vested right” cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the law.

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34. Thus, “vested right” is a right independent of any contingency. Such a right can arise from a contract, statute or by operation of law. A vested right can be taken away only if the law specifically or by necessary implication provide for such a course.

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35. In the light of the definition of the “vested right”, it is evident that right accrues to person or persons attached to an institution or building or anything whatsoever, meaning thereby, if an incumbent is claiming a vested right, he is to substantiate before the court of law that the right has been created in his favour by an order passed by the competent authority in accordance with law.

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36. It is evident from the definition of the vested right that right would be said to be vested right, permanent and continuous in nature and if that be so, the question of prejudice or following of principles of natural justice will arise.

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37. The settled position of law is that once the right has been accrued, the subsequent rule framed carving out the eligibility criteria will not be considered to be a reason to recall the benefit already granted due to the reason that a vested right has been created. Here, it is relevant to refer the definition of vested right as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh, [(2014) 13 SCC 583] at paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, which read hereunder as: —

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“ 11. The word “vested” is defined in Black's Law

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Dictionary (6^th Edn.) at p. 1563, as: “Vested.—fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having the character or given in the rights of absolute

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ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are ‘vested' when right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest inproperty founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute ‘vested rights’.”

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12. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) at p. 1397, “vested” is defined as law held by a tenure subject to no contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right; vested interest.

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13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency and it cannot be taken away without consent of the person concerned. Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by operation of law. Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the policy decision/scheme could be changed.”

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38. On the basis of the factual aspect as well as settled position of

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law, it is evident that no accrued right will be said to be available for the writ petitioners because it is the admitted case of the writ petitioner that the issue of grant of mining lease is being contested by the writ petitioners to the respondent nos.5 and 6 which itself suggests that no right has been accrued in favour of the writ petitioner. Thus, it is evident that for the accrual of right, the petitioners are contesting the case with the private respondents.

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39. This Court, considering the aforesaid fact, is of the view that the instant writ petition lacks merit as per the discussion made hereinabove.

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40. Further, it needs to refer herein the power which is to be

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exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of

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the Constitution of India by way of issuance of prerogative writs and one of the same is Writ of Certiorari which is the subject matter in the present writ petition.

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41. We are aware with the settled position of law of issuance of Writ of Certiorari , which can only be issued if there is any error apparent on record or there is gross miscarriage of justice, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477 , wherein, at paragraph-7 it has been held as under:

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“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is

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apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.”

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42. Similarly, in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad

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Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph-21 as

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hereunder: -

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“21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or

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fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.”

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43. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 , their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder:

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“12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will

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be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed

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out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra).

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13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.”

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44. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court to issue Writ of Certiorari and basing upon the reason assigned hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the authority concerned, cannot be said to suffer from an error, hence, the same is not fit to be interfered with.

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45. Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed.

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46. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

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(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

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I Agree

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(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)

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Rohit/- A.F.R.