Krishnanand Rai Vs Meena Singh

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2025:JHHC:36974

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

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S. A. No. 122 of 2025

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Krishnanand Rai, aged about 57 years.

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Yogeshwar Pd. Rai, aged about 56 years.

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Deo Das Pd. Rai, aged about 54 years. All sons of late Nawal Kishore Rai, resident of Village Dakai, P.O. Manigarhi, P.S. Sarwan, Sub-Division and District-Deoghar. Late Nawal Kishore Rai (Defendant No.1 in Title Suit No.2 of 2013) died on 01.02.2023 therefore, he has not been made party in the instant appeal.

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… … Defendant 1^st party/Appellants/Appellants Versus

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Meena Singh, wife of Dharmendra Singh and daughter of Late Mahavir Singh, resident of Karnibad, Jhousagarhi Sahid Ashram Road, Deoghar, P.O. +P.S. + Sub-Division and District Deoghar.

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... ... Plaintiff/Respondent 1^st Party/Respondent

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Vivekanand Rai, S/o Lakhan Lal Rai, R/o Karnibad, P.O. Naulakha Ashram Deoghar, P.S. Kunda, Sub-Division and District-Deoghar

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Monaj Kr. Tiwary, S/o Nilkanth Tiwary, R/o Baghmara, P.O. Daburgram, P.S. Jasidih, Sub-Division and District-Deoghar … … Defendant 2^nd party/Respondent 2^nd Party/ Performa Respondents

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CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

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--For the Appellants : Mr. Ankur Anand Advocate For the Respondents : ---

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Lastly heard on, 19.11.2025 Pronounced on 09^th December, 2025

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1. This second appeal has been filed against the Judgment and Decree dated 22.03.2025 (Decree sealed and signed on 03.04.2025) passed by the learned District Judge-III, Deoghar in Civil Appeal No.20 of 2023 affirming the Judgment and Decree dated 24.01.2023 (Decree sealed and signed on 04.02.2023) passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division)-III, Deoghar whereby Title Suit No.28 of 2013 seeking specific performance of contract was partly decreed by directing the defendant no.1 to execute the sale deed for 1/3^rd share (829 sq. ft.) out of the area of 4978 sq.ft. as described in schedule ‘A’ of the plaint in favour of the plaintiff on receiving rest of the balance consideration amount as per the agreement dated 12.08.2009 within 2

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2025:JHHC:36974

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months failing which the plaintiff will be at liberty to get the sale deed executed through the agency of the court.

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2. The defendant 1^st party having lost in 1^st appellate stage has filed this second appeal.

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3. The suit was filed for the following reliefs:-

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(i) That the decree of specific performance directing the defendant 1^st party to execute the sale deed for the 1/3^rd share (829 Sq. ft.) property out of agreement area 2489 Sq. ft. out of total area of 678 plot number is 4978 Sq. ft. described in Schedule-A of this plaint to the plaintiff and 1/3 share to the defendant No. 2 and 1/3 share to the defendant No. 3, on receipt of the balance consideration amount and in case the defendant 1^st party will not find ready for executing the sale deed through the process of court.

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4. The learned counsel for the appellants while assailing the impugned judgments has submitted that the learned trial court did not frame any specific issue in connection with readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. The learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 8050-8051 of 2022 [V.S. Ramakrishnan vs. P.M. Muhammed Ali] decided on 09^th November, 2022 and has referred paragraph 4.1 of the said judgment to submit that no finding can be recorded with respect to readiness and willingness in absence of specific issue framed to that effect. He submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case had remanded the matter by framing that issue for consideration by the learned trial court.

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5. He has also submitted that the learned courts have failed to consider that the father of the plaintiff was contesting a case against the defendant in a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. which was initiated on 17.07.2009 and was ultimately dropped on 04.09.2009 and in the meantime the agreement of sale was entered on 12.08.2009. He submits that it is almost an impossibility that in the midst of a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. the agreement of sale will be entered into between the parties. He submits that this aspect of the

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matter has not been considered by the learned courts while upholding the validity of the agreement.

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6. Learned counsel has also submitted that the specific performance has been allowed with respect to undivided portion of the property inasmuch as there has been no partition with respect to the suit property which stood recorded in the name of the defendant and his brother. He submits that the brother of the defendant was not even a party in the suit for specific performance of contract and even in the agreement the brother of the defendant was not a party. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that there cannot be any suit for specific performance of contract with respect to undivided share in the property.

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7. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that one title suit being T.S. No. 147 of 2009 was pending challenging the sale deed which was executed in favour of the defendant with respect to the property which is involved in the present case and though the suit was dismissed but Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2023 is pending before the learned 1^st appellate court. He submits that the present suit was barred under Section 10 of the CPC.

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8. During the course of hearing, a specific query was put to the learned counsel for the appellants as to whether any petition seeking to keep the adjudication of the suit in abeyance under Section 10 was filed by the appellants. He has submitted that no such petition was filed, but still the court should have Suo Motto kept the matter pending awaiting the decision of Title Suit No. 147 of 2009/ Civil Appeal No. 10 of 2023.

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9. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred to the proposed substantial question of law Nos. (i), (ii), (iv) & (v) which are as follows: -

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I. Whether the decree for specific performance is legally tenable when the execution and validity of the sale agreement are doubtful and not conclusively proved, especially in light of inconsistencies in evidence or suspicious circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement?

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2025:JHHC:36974

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II. Whether the courts below erred in law by granting specific performance of an agreement executed by one co-owner in respect of the entire undivided property, without partition or identification of his share?

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III. Whether the decree for specific performance is legally sustainable when the suit property is already sub judice in a prior pending litigating involving ownership, thereby attracting the bar under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?

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IV. Whether the court below erred in law in granting specific performance despite the plaintiff failure to prove readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract as mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?

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10. The impugned judgements reveal that the suit was filed by one plaintiff seeking specific performance of contract and stating that the registered agreement of sale dated 12.08.2009 was valid and enforceable and the agreement was entered into between the plaintiff along with defendant No.2 and 3 with the defendant No.1 and maximum payment of Rs.1,22,000/- out of total consideration amount of Rs.1,42,000/- was paid to the defendant No.1. Admittedly, the learned trial court did not frame any issue with regard to readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform her part of the contract. Since, the agreement was entered into between the plaintiff along with defendant No.2 and 3 on one hand and the defendant No.1 on the other hand an issue was framed by the learned trial court being issue No.(iv) i.e “Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of specific performance of contract alongwith defendant numbers 2 and 3 against defendant 1^st party on the basis of registered agreement dated 12.08.2009?”

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11. Since the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 did not continue with the suit after filing of the written statement, the learned trial court was of the view that the plaintiff could not suffer on account of their absence and held that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of contract to the extent of her share as per agreement dated 12.08.2009 and the defendant No.1 was directed to execute a sale deed for 1/3^rd share (829 Sq.ft.) property out of the agreement area 2489 Sq.ft. out of total area

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of 4978 Sq.ft., plot No. 678 as described in schedule ‘A’ of the plaint in favour of the plaintiff on receiving the balance consideration amount as per the registered agreement dated 12.08.2009 within two months.

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12. Thus, specific performance of contract was allowed with respect to only 1/3^rd share as defendant Nos. 2 and 3 who were also party in the agreement along with the plaintiff did not participate in the suit and the plaintiff was asked to give the balance consideration amount in terms of the agreement dated 12.08.2009.

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13. The learned trial court observed that after passing of the judgment in Title Suit No. 147 of 2009 there was no dispute that the defendant No.1 had title over the property and it had come in the evidence of DW-3 that the contesting defendant i.e. defendant No.1 had not filed any suit to cancel the alleged agreement dated 12.08.2009. Admittedly, the plaintiff was not a party to the Title Suit No. 147 of 2009.

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14. The learned 1^st appellate court referred to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharaja Singh & Others vs. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Others in Civil Appeal No.6782 of 2013 decided on 09^th July, 2024 wherein the suit for specific performance of contract was confined to only 1^st plaintiff out of two by directing execution of specific performance of contract only with respect to the extent of half share of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff as the 2^nd plaintiff was not interested. The suit for specific performance of contract was granted with respect to the extent of onehalf undivided share of the suit property.

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15. In the present case also the learned trial court has granted specific performance of contract with regard to 1/3^rd undivided share of the suit property in which the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were not interested although, they were party to the agreement of sale which was sought to be enforced in the suit. This Court is of the view that the learned 1^st appellate court has not committed any illegality while sustaining the judgment of the learned trial court who had restricted

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the transfer of suit property only to the extent of 1/3^rd of the suit property.

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16. A plea of non joinder of necessary party was raised by the defendant no.1 on the ground that widow of Sachhidanand Roy was not made party to the suit and admittedly the suit property was purchased by the defendant no. 1 and his brother Sachhidanand Roy. The suit was filed seeking specific performance of a registered agreement of sale entered into between the original plaintiff and defendant 2^nd party on one side and defendant 1^st party on the other. The learned trial court while considering the point of non-joinder of necessary parties under issue no. (vi) has recorded a finding that in the suit for specific performance of contract involved in the suit all the necessary parties were on record. The court observed that the defendant no.1 has raised his objection that the suit land was purchased jointly by the defendant no.1 along with his deceased brother Sacchidanand Roy who died issue-less leaving behind his widow and in absence of any partition between this defendant no.1 and widow of Sachhidanand Roy, namely, Premlata Devi, the question of selling out the suit land does not arise at all. The plea of non-joinder of necessary party raised by the defendant no.1 was rejected by observing that on perusal of the registered agreement dated 12/08/2009 as executed by the defendant no.1 alone without mentioning that defendant no.1 was also representing the widow of Sachhidanand Roy and it was an admitted fact that Sacchidanand Roy died issue less and no legal heir, if any, had come forward to challenge the same. The learned 1^st appellate court has recorded that in the registered agreement, the defendant no.1 had mentioned that after death of Sachhidanand Roy, he was the sole owner of the property having area of 4978 sq.ft. This Court also finds that the suit property was its half, that is, 2489 sq.ft. This Court also finds that the defendant no.1 claimed in the written statement that there was a co-sharer of the suit property as widow of Sachhidanand Roy was alive, but she did not come forward to substantiate the stand taken in the written

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statement. Further, the registered agreement dated 12.08.2009 as executed by the defendant no.1 revealed that defendant no.1 was the sole owner of the suit property. The defendant no.1 himself declared in the registered agreement to be the sole owner and himself stated in the written statement that there was co-owner, namely the widow of Sachhidanand Roy but the defendant 1^st party could not substantiate this fact as is apparent from the judgement passed by the learned trial court and upheld by the learned 1^st appellate court. No material as such has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants to show that there was any material on record to substantiate that Sachhidanand Roy, who admittedly died issueless had a living widow on his death, much less on the date of execution of the registered agreement by the defendant no.1 declaring himself as the sole owner of the property whose half portion only was the subject matter of the suit. Thus, the plea of non-joinder of necessary party was rejected by the learned trial court by citing good reasons and no substantial question of law arises in this regard. 17. This Court finds that the learned trial court though has not framed any specific issue in connection with readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform her part of the contract which was essentially relating to payment of balance consideration amount, but has recorded finding in connection with readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to pay the balance consideration amount and ultimately partly decreed the suit in her favour confined only to the extent of 1/3^rd share of the suit property and rejected the prayer with respect to specific performance of contract in favour of defendant 2^nd party with respect to balance 2/3^rd of the suit property. There can be no dispute that the consideration amount to the extent of 1/3^rd of the suit property was already paid, but the specific performance was subject to payment of the entire balance consideration amount which was balance with respect to the entire suit property. Thus, the plaintiff could get relief of specific performance regarding only 1/3^rd of the suit property upon payment of entire balance consideration amount of the

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whole property and there is no dispute that consideration amount to the extent of 1/3^rd portion of the suit property was already paid. Further, the learned 1^st appellate court has recorded a finding that on perusal of Exhibit 1 it appeared that the plaintiff has send a pleader notice through registered post Exhibit 3, and she requested the original defendant no 1 to execute registered deed in her favour as per agreement dated 12.08.2009 after receiving the outstanding dues amount Rs 20,000/- from her and again, she had sent legal notice on 29.01.2013 regarding the same which showed that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to purchase the suit land as per agreement dated 12/08/2009. This Court finds that the learned courts have recorded findings with regards to readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff and recorded specific finding that no relief could be granted to the defendant 2^nd party as they were not interested although they were also party to the agreement along with the plaintiff while entering into registered agreement with the defendant 1^st party (defendant no.1).

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18. The bone of contention between the parties was validity of the agreement which by the defendant 1^st party was alleged to forged and fabricated. However, the courts after scrutinizing the materials have found that the agreement of sale was valid. No perversity with regards to the said finding has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants.

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19. So far as the point of readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract on the part of the plaintiff is concerned, Rs.1,22,000/- was already paid against the total consideration amount of Rs.1,42,000/- for the entire suit property and remaining to be paid by the plaintiff and the defendant 2^nd party was Rs.20,000/- only. The learned trial court though decreed the suit only in connection with 1/3^rd of the suit property, but still directed the plaintiff to pay the balance consideration amount which was for the entire suit property. Thus, the plaintiff could get only 1/3^rd of the suit property upon payment of entire consideration amount for the entire suit property

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although the total consideration of 1/3^rd portion would be only Rs. 47,334/-and total of Rs.1,22,000/- was already paid. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 80508051 of 2022 (Supra) does not help the appellants in any manner whatsoever.

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20. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that no substantial question of law, much less the substantial questions of law as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants, is involved in this case.

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21. This 2^nd appeal is accordingly dismissed.

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22. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed.

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23. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the concerned courts through “Fax/e-mail”.

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(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)

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09.12.2025 Rakesh/Uploaded on 09.12.2025

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Krishnanand Rai v. Meena Singh

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Krishnanand Rai v. Meena Singh

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