Union of India through Secretary Ministry of Defence Vs the State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary Deptt of Revenue and Land Reforms

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Civil Review No.74 of 2023

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Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, South Block, New Delhi.

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Commanding Officer, Sonari Military Camp, Bistupur, Town Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum.

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.......... Petitioners.

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-Versus-

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The State of Jharkhand, through the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand, Nepal House, Doranda, Ranchi.

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The Deputy Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand, Nepal House, Doranda, Ranchi.

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The Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum.

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Circle Officer (Anchal Adhikari), Sakchi, Jamshedpur.

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The Assistant Settlement Officer, Sakchi, Jamshedpur.

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Alomoni Kamarin, wife of Late Bacha Kumar, resident of Sonari, Khagalnagar, P.O. & P.S. Sonari, District East Singhbhum.

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Baisali Kamarin, D/o Late Bacha Kumar, resident of Sonari, Khagalnagar, P.O. & P.S. Sonari, District East Singhbhum.

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Utility Transport Company, a partnership firm, having its registered office at New Kalimati Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur, through its one of the partners Daljeet Singh, S/o Late Sardar Harjeet Singh, House no.7, Road No.5, C.H. Area North, Bistupur, Jamshedpur.

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M/s. Tata Steel Ltd., 24 Homy Modi Street, Fort, Mumbai, having its Steel Plant at Jamshedpur, Town Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum, through R. Balasubrmaniam, Head Jamshedpur Litigation, Tata Steel Ltd., P.S. Bistupur, District East Singhbhum.

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.......... Respondents.

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----- CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----For the Petitioners : Mr. Anil Kumar, ASGI Mr. Shiv Kumar Sharma, Sr. Panel Counsel For the State : Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG-IA Mr. Yogesh Modi, AC to AAG-IA For Res. Nos.6 to 8 : Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate Mr. Prakhar Harit, Advocate ----- Reserved on 17.10.2025 Pronounced on 03.11.2025 Per: Rajesh Shankar, J.

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The present Civil Review application has been preferred against the judgment dated 14.03.2023 passed in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012

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with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012 whereby the appeals filed by M/s Tata Steel Limited (formerly known as M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited) (hereinafter referred as the respondent no. 9) against the common judgment dated 23.04.2012 passed in W.P.(C) No. 1981 of 2003 with W.P.(C) No. 6816 of 2005 have been dismissed.

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Factual Matrix of the case:

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The fact of the case as emerges from the record is that the respondent no. 9 was incorporated as a Public Limited Company on 26.08.1907. At different points of time, 15,725.05 acres land in total was conveyed to it by the Government of Bihar in order to establish industry for production of iron and steel. Since some portions of the acquired land were not immediately needed by the respondent no.9 for the purpose of establishing industry and other civil amenities, the same were allowed to be under cultivators’ possession.

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The land under Khata No. 40, Plot Nos. 1566, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1570 and 1572 situated at village Khuntadih, P.S Bistupur (hereinafter referred as the said land) was in possession of one Bengal Kumar. During the revisional survey and settlement operation undertaken between the year 1934-37, Bengal Kumar was shown as a tenant of the said land and the respondent no. 9 was shown as the owner of the same.

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The respondent no.9 filed T.A. Misc. Case No. 01 of 1943-44 under Section 50 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 for restoration of the occupied lands under cultivators’ possession

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including the said land and accordingly vide order dated 04.06.1944 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum (respondent no.3), the possession of the same was delivered to it on 24.06.1944 after deposit of a sum of Rs.11,117.14 in the treasury as revenue deposit.

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The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 having come into force, the interest of all intermediaries got vested in the State which became the sole landlord and thus the entire acquired land including the said land vested in the State. The respondent no.9 challenged few provisions of the Act, 1950, in particular Section 2B of the said Act before Hon'ble Supreme Court, however subsequently it withdrew the petition in the year 1982.

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In the meantime, Section 2B was deleted and Sections 7D and 7E were incorporated in the Act, 1950 vide Amendment Act, 5 of 1972 by virtue of which the respondent no.9 became 'Settllee' of the entire land earlier conveyed to it by the State of Bihar. Subsequently, on the basis of a compromise between the Government of Bihar and the respondent no.9, the provisions of Sections 7D and 7E of the Act, 1950 were further amended vide Amendment Act, 17 of 1983 and thereafter a lease deed was executed between the Governor of the State of Bihar and the respondent no.9 for a period of 40 years with effect from 01.01.1956 whereby the respondent no.9 became the deemed ‘Lessee’ of the entire acquired land including the said land.

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In the year 1965, the State of Bihar through Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Jamshedpur had initiated a proceeding under Sections

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5, 6 and 7 of the Act, 1950 against the respondent no.9 and Bengal Kumar for fixation of fair rent which was registered as Case No. 223/1965-66 and vide order dated 30.8.1966, the respondent no.9 was directed to pay fair and equitable rent of the said land. Against the said order, respondent no.9 preferred an appeal before the respondent no.3 vide Revenue Misc. Appeal 106 of 1966-67 which was allowed on 18.09.1969 holding that the respondent no. 9 was not liable to pay rent in view of section 2B of the Act, 1950.

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Thereafter, one Bachu Kumar, son of Bengal Kumar filed an application being Revenue Misc. Case 4 of 1970-71 under Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act, 1950 for fixation of rent of the said land which was allowed by the Land Reform Deputy Collector, East Singhbhum vide order dated 31.7.1971 holding, inter alia, that the rent for the subject property could be realized from him. The respondent no.9 preferred an appeal against the order dated 31.7.1971 vide Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 10 of 1971-72, however the said appeal was dismissed on 15.9.1980.

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Aggrieved thereby, the respondent no. 9 filed writ petition being C.W.J.C No. 202 of 1981 (R) before Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court which was allowed vide order dated 23.09.1986 holding that once the rights of the tenant had extinguished on 24.06.1944, no revenue authority had any jurisdiction to entertain such application and the said order was confirmed upto the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P No. 6566 of 1987.

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The State of Bihar conducted a land survey wherein the name of TISCO was not recorded as a lessee which led to filing of objection by it under Section 83 of the Act, 1950 and the said case was registered as Case No.467 of 1986-87. Though the Assistant Settlement Officer passed an order dated 26.06.1992 for recording the name of the respondent no.9 with respect to other leasehold land, however it omitted to record the name of the respondent no. 9 for the said land. Consequently, the respondent no.9 filed Revision Case No. 138 of 1992-93 which was allowed by the Court of Charge Officer, Jamshedpur vide order dated 15.6.1996.

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Aggrieved thereby, Alomoni Kamarin, successor of Bengal Kumar (the respondent no.6 herein) preferred an application being Case No. 264 of 2001-02 under Section 90 of the Act, 1908 which was allowed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur vide order dated 5.8.2002. Thereafter, the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue, Government of Jharkhand vide letter dated 5.9.2005 directed the respondent no. 3 to release the subject property in favour of Alomoni Kamarin and her daughter Baisali Kamarin (respondent no.7 herein).

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The Deputy Secretary, East Singhbhum vide letter dated 27.10.2005 again informed the respondent no.3 that the State of Jharkhand had decided to release the subject property in favour of respondent nos.6 and 7. Subsequently, upon issuance of a general notice dated 19.11.2005, objections were invited

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regarding release of the said land in favour of the respondent nos.6 and 7.

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The respondent no. 9 then filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1981 of 2003 seeking quashing of the order dated 5.8.2002 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, East Singhbhum, Jamshedpur in Case No.264 of 2001-2002. Another writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 6816 of 2005 was also filed by the respondent no.9 seeking quashing of various letters whereby the State authorities were taking consequential steps to release the said land in favour of the respondent nos.6 and 7. The said writ petitions were however dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 23.04.2012.

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Aggrieved thereby, the respondent no. 9 filed appeals being L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 and L.P.A No.236 of 2012 which have also been dismissed vide common judgment dated 14.03.2023.

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Argument made on behalf of the Review Petitioners

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Learned A.S.G.I. appearing for the review petitioners submits that pursuant to the judgment rendered in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012, the review petitioners examined the entire records and in course of the same, it was detected that few important facts could not be brought to the notice of the Court due to inadvertence and negligence on the part of the authorities.

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It is further submitted that the respondent no. 3 had requisitioned the said land as well as other lands in exercise of the power conferred under rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 read with the Bihar Government Notification No. 1705 dated

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08.05.1942 for military purpose and since then the said land was in occupation of the review petitioners.

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It is also submitted that in a proceeding initiated vide T.A Misc. Case No. 1 of 1943-44 under Section 50 of the Act, 1908, the delivery of possession of the said land was given to the respondent no. 9 after deposit of compensation amount of Rs.11,117.14 in the treasury.

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It is further submitted that in the year 1954, the military authorities had requested the respondent no.9 for settlement of the entire area occupied by them and after negotiation, 94.535 acres of land in total including the said land was given to them on lease for a period of 30 years on a nominal rent of Rs. 1 per acre per annum and the said lease was subsequently renewed from time to time.

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It is argued that review petitioners will suffer irreparable damage as well as security concern, if the said land is not delivered to Ministry of Defence, Government of India since the said land is the part of Jamshedpur Military Station.

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It is also contended that the claim of the review petitioners can be substantiated by the documents and letters which have been exchanged in the said matter as well as attached plan showing that the said land is located within the Military Station at Jamshedpur.

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It is further submitted that the proceeding under Section 90 of the Act, 1908 initiated on the application of the respondent no. 6 was barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the judgment

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dated 23.09.1986 passed in C.W.J.C 202 of 1981 (R) whereby the Patna High Court had clearly held that the right claimed by the tenant had extinguished on 24.06.1944. The said order attained finality up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 07.08.1995 passed in SLP No. 6566 of 1987.

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Argument on behalf of the respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8:

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8 submits that in the instant review petitioner, the Ministry of Defence has now taken a complete new as well as contradictory stands. At the first instance, the review petitioners had claimed that the said land was sub-leased to it by the respondent no.9 for which it had been paying rent, however now they are claiming that the said land was requisitioned to them under rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 by the respondent no.3.

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It is also submitted that the review petitioners have neither any lawful right over the said land nor are in possession of the same. It is an admitted stand of the review petitioners that they are the sub-lessee of the respondent no. 9.

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It is contended that the review petitioners have miserably failed to make out any ground for review of the judgment dated 14.03.2023 passed in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012 and as such the present review petition is liable to be dismissed.

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Finding of the Court :

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Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

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The review petition filed by the petitioners was earlier dismissed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.11.2023 on the ground that the same was filed after expiry of the period of limitation and no application for condonation of delay was filed.

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Aggrieved by the said order, the review petitioners filed appeals before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and vide order dated 15.07.2024 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 7864-7866 of 2024, the present Civil Review has been remanded for deciding it on merit by observing as under: -

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“Leave granted.

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We are inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment passed in the review application as it has been dismissed on two grounds, namely, that the appellant has filed it belatedly and the defects pointed out by the Registry have not been cured.

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Taking into consideration the facts of the case, we are of the view that the review will have to be heard on merits. In such view of the matter, we are inclined to condone the delay that has occasioned in filing the review application. Consequently, we grant six weeks’ time to the appellant to rectify the defects pointed out by the Registry.

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Thereafter, we request the High Court to decide the review application on merits and in accordance with law.

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Liberty is also granted to the appellant to challenge the main order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal in the event of review being dismissed.

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We make it clear that we have not expressed anything on the merits of the case and both parties are at liberty to raise all contentions before the High Court.

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Taking note of the submission of learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondent that the matter is pending from year 2006 onwards, we request the High Court to expedite the hearing of the review application.

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The impugned Judgment passed in review stands set aside with the above directions.

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The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.

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Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.”

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Before delving into the merit of the review petition, it would be appropriate to refer few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein the law relating to the scope of entertaining a review petition has been discussed.

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In the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aibam Pishak

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Sharma & Ors. reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

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“3. ……… It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.”

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29. In the case of Parsion Devi and others Vs. Sumitri Devi and

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others reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

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“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in the case

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of Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. Vs.

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Mawasi and others , reported in (2012) 7 SCC 200 has held thus:

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“27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing and observed:

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“19. Review literally and even judicially means reexamination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the

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courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: (Rajunder Narain Rae case, MIA p. 216)

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‘… nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. … The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.’ Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:

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‘It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.’

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Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitutionmakers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, ‘for any other sufficient reason’ in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice.” 28. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed:

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“32. … It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the

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Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.

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It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words ‘any other sufficient reason’ must mean ‘a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule’. (See Chhajju Ram v. Neki.) This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath and was adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of ‘mistake or error apparent on the face of the record’ or some ground analogous thereto.”

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In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed:

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“11. … A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that

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where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out.”

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In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe:

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“3. … But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.”

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In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, the Court observed:

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“9. … An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC … A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.”

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In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the power of review in the following words:

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“56. … Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.”

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In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed: “13. … The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing ‘on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason’. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict.”

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In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed:

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“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new

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matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.

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The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over

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its judgment/decision.”

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In the case of Yashwant Sinha & Others Vs. Central Bureau

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of Investigation through its Director and Another reported

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in (2020) 2 SCC 338 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as

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under:-

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In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612], this Court, inter alia, held as follows: (SCC p. 633, para 21)

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“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Governor of Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167] was a case which fell to be considered under Article 137 of the Constitution of India. The relevant discussion is found in paras 8 and 9. They read as follows: (SCC pp. 171-72)

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“8. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so [Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845]. For instance, if the attention of the court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the court will review its judgment (Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta, (1971) 3 SCC 189] SCR at p. 750). The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice: [O.N. Mohindroo v. District Judge, Delhi,

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(1971) 3 SCC 5] SCR at p. 27. Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the court will not be reconsidered except “where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility” (Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib, (1975) 1 SCC 674).

¶146

Now, besides the fact that most of the legal material so assiduously collected and placed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who has now been entrusted to appear for the respondent, was never brought to our attention when the appeals were heard, we may also examine whether the judgment suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record. Such an error exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by the court in the original judgment is a possible view having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record.”

¶147

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¶149

In [Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320] , this Court in para 20, laid down its conclusions, which reads as follows: (SCC pp. 333-34)

¶150

“Summary of the principles

¶151

Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

¶152

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

¶153

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;

¶154

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

¶155

(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

¶156

The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in [Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11] and approved by this Court in [Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in [Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd., (2013) 8 SCC 337]

¶157

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:

¶158

(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.

¶159

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

¶160

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.

¶161

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.

¶162

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.

¶163

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¶164

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¶165

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.

¶166

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.

¶167

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

¶168

In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) through its Secretary,

¶169

Land and Building Department & Another vs. K.L. Rathi

¶170

Steels Ltd. & Others reported in (2024) 7 SCC 315, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

¶171

After considering a host of decisions with a fine-tooth comb, the Court went on to cull out the principles of review in para 35 of the decision which is extracted hereunder: (State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612)

¶172

“35. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are:

¶173

(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1CPC.

¶174

(ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise.

¶175

(iii) The expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds.

¶176

(iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face

¶177

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¶178

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¶179

of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f).

¶180

(v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review.

¶181

(vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench of the tribunal or of a superior court.

¶182

(vii) While considering an application for review, the tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent.

¶183

(viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court/tribunal earlier.”

¶184

(emphasis supplied)

¶185

This Court in Subramanian Swamy v. State of T.N., (2014) 5 SCC 75, has read the Explanation as follows: (SCC pp. 96-97, para 52)

¶186

“52. … The Explanation to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides … that if the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based, is reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for the court to undertake review, as the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, review of which is

¶187

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¶188

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¶189

sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face of the order and in absence of any such error, finality attached to the judgment/order cannot be disturbed.”

¶190

(emphasis in original)

¶191

The law enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments may thus be summarized as under: -

¶192

(i) A review petition cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.

¶193

(ii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court which it cannot be permitted to be advanced in review petition.

¶194

(iii) The power of review may be exercised on discovery of new and important matter or evidence or where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found or on any analogous ground.

¶195

(iv) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court/tribunal earlier.

¶196

(v) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record.

¶197

(vi) The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated.

¶198

23

¶199

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¶200

(vii) A review petition cannot be filed on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merit.

¶201

Now, the primary issue before this court is as to whether any of the above grounds is available in the present case so as to review the judgment dated 14.03.2023 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012.

¶202

It is evident from the record that the review petitioners were arrayed as respondents in W.P.(C) No. 6816 of 2005 and in course of adjudication of the said case, they were also provided opportunity of hearing, however they did not bring any document on record in support of its claims, rather they supported the case of the respondent no. 6 and 7.

¶203

The relevant part of the judgment dated 23.04.2012 passed in W.P.(C) No.1981 of 2003 with W.P.(C) No.6816 of 2005 is quoted hereinbelow:

¶204

“Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.8 has supported the arguments on behalf of the respondent nos.6 and 7.”

¶205

That apart, the said judgment was not even challenged by the review petitioners by filing an appeal and thus they literally accepted the said judgment.

¶206

It is also important to note that the respondent no.9 filed appeals being L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 and L.P.A No. 236 of 2012. The review petitioners were arrayed as respondents in L.P.A. No.236 of 2012. The respondent no. 9 as well as the review petitioners took specific stand that 94.535 acres of lands including the said land were given to the review petitioners on sublease by the

¶207

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¶208

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¶209

respondent no.9, however the said claim was not accepted by the learned Division Bench observing as under: -

¶210

The first and foremost of all the inconsistencies in the stand of the Tata Steel is that a copy of the lease/sub-lease executed in favor of the Ministry of Defence has not been brought on record. On the contrary, it can be easily inferred from the aforementioned communications that the proposal to acquire 94.535 acres land by the Ministry of Defence did not fructify in execution of any lease deed/sublease and all that can be projected by the Tata Steel is that there were discussions with the Ministry of Defence over a proposal for hiring of 94.535 acres land for which sanction of the President was taken but, not even the sanction order of the President has been produced on record. The Tata Steel did not produce the records of handing over to and taking over possession by the Ministry of Defence and there is no evidence of the Ministry of Defence or its agent/representative coming into possession over the said lands. From the letter dated 13th February 1990 of the Ministry of Defence, it transpires that the proposal for hiring of 94.535 acres land was mooted sometime in 1960 or even before that. In its letter dated 6th August 1988, the Tata Steel has made a reference of a lease for a period of 30 years from 1st January 1956 which was neither executed nor registered. There is also a reference of the lease deed dated 1st August 1985 executed by the Government of Bihar in favor of the Tata Steel and, in view thereof, the Tata Steel seems to have suggested the Estate Officer for execution of a lease for a period of 10 years ending on 31" December 1995. The letter by the Tata Steel also does not provide any clue as to when the sub-lease was executed, if at all that was done. Therefore, what emerges is that there is absolutely no description of the land admeasuring about 94.535 acres for which the President has accorded sanction for hiring of the said land from the Tata Steel. Secondly, no other document leave alone any lease deed has been

¶211

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¶212

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¶213

produced by the Tata Steel or the Union of India. Thirdly, the sanction of the President was for 30 years which period has lapsed long back. In summation, the plea set-up by the Tata Steel is not substantiated and it was a misconceived defence.

¶214

The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is plenary and without any fetters. The High Court while sitting in the writ jurisdiction is required to consider all relevant facts to satisfy itself whether any relief can be granted and shall not be swayed away by any issue howsoever contested that may be. A host of claims have been made by the Union of India and the private respondent but none of them has been able to establish any right, title or interest and more particularly possession over the subject-property. The claim made by the Ministry of Defence is not based on any clinching evidence. Its claim is without any substance and in part self- contradictory inasmuch as not even description of any construction over the subject-property made by the Ministry of Defence has been pleaded. What followed after the sanction of the President was intimated through letter dated 22nd July 1960 to the Tata Steel has remained a mystery and the plea of possession by raising construction over the subjectproperty is not supported by any material whatsoever. There is also absolutely no material on record to show that the subject-property falls within 94.535 acres land which allegedly has been taken over by the Ministry of Defence under the sanction granted by the President. The story of the Ministry of Defence having possession over 94.535 acres land including the subject-property has not been accepted by the writ Court and, on the contrary, the writ Court has approved the findings by the Assistant Settlement Officer that the Garrison Engineers, MES Tatanagar Division was tenant under Bengal Kumhar for more than a decade between 10th April 1942 to 7th August 1953. This finding by the Assistant Settlement Officer is

¶215

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¶216

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¶217

based on the rent receipts produced by Alomoni Kamarin to show that the Bihar Regiment of Garrison Engineers paid Rs. 317 and 4 Annas on 9th September 1944 and further rents for different periods till 7th August 1953 on different dates to the recorded tenant. The Tenancy Act provides a statutory regime and is a complete code in itself. While so, the findings of fact recorded by the statutory authority under the Tenancy Act are binding on the parties except where such findings of fact are not based on legal evidence or are contrary to the records. The writ Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not embark upon an exercise to test legality of the order passed by a statutory Authority under the Tenancy Act, except where the order is challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Even so, a plea based on jurisdictional error committed by a statutory Authority under the Tenancy Act may not invite exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. -----------"

¶218

Thus, the claim of the review petitioners’ right, title, interest and possession over the said land was rejected by the learned Division Bench for want of any document in support of the said claim. The learned Division Bench further observed that the Writ Court approved the findings given by the Assistant Settlement Officer that the Garrision Engineers, MES, Tata Nagar Division was tenant under Bengal Kumar for more than a decade and had also paid rent for the said land to the recorded tenant

¶219

The review petitioners have failed to show before this Court any error apparent on the face of the record of the judgment passed in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012, rather they have sought to review the said judgment by placing certain documents contending that the said land was initially

¶220

27

¶221

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¶222

requisitioned to them under Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. The review petitioners have also claimed that the said land was sub-leased to them by the respondent no.9, however they have again failed to bring on record any such lease deed in support of their claims.

¶223

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases cited hereinabove has specifically held that the party seeking to review an order on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence has to show that the same was not within its knowledge and could not be earlier produced before the court/tribunal even after exercise of due diligence.

¶224

It is the own case of the review petitioners before this Court that the said evidences/facts were not brought on record by them due to inadvertence or negligence. They have failed to show before this court that they had shown due diligence to discover and produce the said documents before the writ court or at the time of hearing the appeals by the learned Division Bench. Curiously enough, the writ petitions were filed in the year 2003/2005 and the order under review was passed in the year 2023. Thus, the matter remained pending before this Court for about two decades, but the documents relating to requisition of the said land under the Defence of India Rules, 1939 was never brought on record. It is also not the contention of the review petitioners that the said documents were not in their possession.

¶225

Had the said documents been filed before the writ court, there would have been determination on the said point. We are,

¶226

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¶227

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¶228

therefore, of the view that such an issue cannot be raised in this proceeding being barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata.

¶229

Res judicata is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but it also covers the issues or facts which are part of the subject-matter of the litigation and the same could have been raised. It is well settled that an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him.

¶230

It is a settled law that if a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such character that if same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In the present case, the claim of the review petitioners is that the said land was initially requisitioned and thereafter sub-leased to them by the respondent no. 9. Thus, otherwise also these documents are not of such a nature which might have altered the judgment, if the same had been brought on record before the learned Division Bench at the time of adjudication of the appeals.

¶231

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¶232

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¶233

Thus, the review petitioners have failed to show any ground much less a sufficient one for review of the judgment dated 14.03.2023 passed in L.P.A No.227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012.

¶234

Before parting with the case, we would also like to deprecate the conduct of the review petitioners who had, in fact, supported the case of the respondent nos.6 and 7 before the Writ Court and despite being non-appealing parties in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012, have sought review of the judgment dated 14.03.2023 on the basis of certain documents claiming that the same could not be filed before the writ court or during hearing of the appeals due to their own negligence and inadvertence.

¶235

The review petition being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.

¶236

(Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.)

¶237

(Rajesh Shankar, J.)

¶238

3^rd November, 2025 AFR Sanjay/

¶239

30

Union of India through Secretary Ministry of Defence v. the State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary Deptt of Revenue and Land Reforms

Case brief

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Union of India through Secretary Ministry of Defence v. the State of Jharkhand through the Principal Secretary Deptt of Revenue and Land Reforms

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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